Social movements are one of the most studied phenomena in the social sciences, and the U.S. Civil Rights movement is perhaps the most widely studied of all social movements—at least in the twentieth century. Even so, this book has something new to say about social movements. It aims to develop and test a “theory of movement outcomes based on an analysis of the costs that shape the behavior” of the organized interests from whom the movement demanded change (targets), and of the “individuals or organizations not directly targeted for disruption by social movement activists,” that is, third parties (p. 3). Ultimately, Joseph E. Luders contends that a focus upon movement targets, third parties, and the ways that each assesses costs associated with movement demands will permit scholars to arrive at a more complete understanding of movement outcomes. Since the bulk of the literature theorizes ways in which movements emerge and develop, shifting the intellectual focus from movement forces to movement opposition represents a fresh perspective.

The first chapter outlines the book's theoretical approach, but not before identifying what the author perceives as blind spots in the literature. While Luders acknowledges that he is not the first to recognize the importance of costs borne by targets, the extant literature, he feels, falls short in at least three areas: 1) the insufficient account of how costs may vary; 2) the extent to which targets vary, “in particular their vulnerability to movement-imposed disruptions” (p. 2); and 3) the relative inattention to third parties and how they affect movement-target dynamics.

To correct for these blind spots, Luders describes what he calls “disruption” and “concession” costs. The former are the costs borne by targets for refusing to bow to movement demands; the latter are the costs associated with conceding to movement demands. Ultimately, movement outcomes are a function of the relative weight assigned to both types of costs by targets and third parties. For Luders, this yields a two-by-two matrix, with four possible outcomes in which 1) high disruption costs and low concession costs should force the target and third parties to accommodate movement demands; 2) high concession costs and low disruption costs produce resistance; 3) both high concession and disruption costs produce vacillation in which targets try to appease both third parties and movement demands; and 4) both low concession and low disruption costs produce conformity with local customs. Luders also outlines the ways in which targets vary, distinguishing political targets from economic targets and highlighting their relative vulnerability to movement pressure. In the author's formulation, political targets are elected officials who are accountable to their respective (mainly white) constituencies, making them less vulnerable. Economic targets are businesses that must ultimately answer to consumers of various stripes, something that makes them more vulnerable. Finally, he outlines the role of third parties.

Drawing on secondary sources, Chapters 2 and 3 outline the ways in which concession and disruption costs, respectively, are calculated. Chapter 2 explains sources of countermobilization, fleshing out why the planter elite, elected officials representing areas in which blacks are a significant part of the population, and white workers who felt threatened by blacks refused to accede to movement demands. Chapter 3 describes the conditions for accommodation. In the main, the chapter attempts to make the case that disruptions associated with pickets and sit-ins were simply too costly for, say, hoteliers and restaurateurs to endure. In the interest of turning a profit, these businesses would be forced to capitulate to movement demands.

Chapters 4–6 test the new theory. In the fourth chapter, for instance, Luders draws upon the vast historiography of the Civil Rights movement as the evidentiary basis for testing his claims. To do so, he selects six case studies. Using the method of process tracing, the case studies illustrate circumstances under which target–third party dynamics produced accommodation, resistance, vacillation, or conforming to local norms, respectively. Chapter 5 shifts from process tracing to an illustration of the ways in which movement goals affected movement outcomes. It shows how the target–third party dynamic played out across efforts to register voters, school desegregation, and desegregating public accommodations. In the end, the chapter makes a convincing case about why the desegregation of public accommodations enjoyed more success than did voter registration and, especially, school desegregation. Simply put, the evidence suggests that entrepreneurs were, in fact, vulnerable to economic disruptions, something that paved the way for accommodation. But public officials, given the visibility of school desegregation, and sensitive to the relative size of the black population, were more concerned with concession costs, ruling out accommodation.

In Chapter 6, Luders shifts gears to discuss how the model explains the federal government's response, as a third party, to movement demands. He seeks to explain the ways in which “variation in presidential support for equal rights follows from broad changes in the overall disruption and concession costs over time” (p. 144). This chapter also takes great care to examine concession costs among legislators, something that the author argues is “often overlooked.” Examining the black freedom struggle from Reconstruction through the late 1960s, the chapter very nicely illustrates the process through which the movement faced resistance from Reconstruction through World War II and vacillation from World War II through the early 1960s, culminating in accommodation in the latter period during which time the Civil Rights, Voting Rights, and Fair Housing Acts were passed. Ultimately, he argues that public attention, supportive public opinion, and the political importance of Civil Rights supporters eventually resulted in accommodation. In short, national politicians perceived the disruptive costs associated with meeting movement demands and interested third parties (e.g., Civil Rights supporters and the concomitant interest groups) to be high and the concession costs to be relatively low, especially for Republicans who managed to protect their constituents from bearing much of the cost.

The Civil Rights Movement and the Logic of Social Change is an important intervention in scholarship on the Civil Rights movement and social movements more generally. By offering a bold new approach, one predicts movement outcomes by concentrating upon costs weighed by targets and third parties, it makes an important contribution to social movement theory. For some time now, political scientists and sociologists have identified the ways in which movement activism influences policy: Some argue that it is about issue salience; for others it is about supportive public opinion; still another approach stresses the way in which movement supporters participate in conventional politics. Instead of choosing one of these, Luders highlights the ways in which they interact, something about which he makes a persuasive case. This, too, is an important contribution.

At the same time, I would like to highlight two issues that limit the explanatory power of the theory. First, the book posits no alternative approach against which to compare its theoretical claims. It seems, at least to me, that the political process model is a plausible competing approach. Indeed, Doug McAdam's (Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970, 1982) use of it to explain protest dynamics during the Civil Rights movement accounts for movement resistance, too—albeit in the context of larger historical forces. Yet the political process model is mentioned only in passing (see also, Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow, “Ballots and Barricades: On the Reciprocal Relationship between Elections and Social Movements,” Perspectives on Politics 8 [no. 2, 2010]: 529–542).

Second, reducing the behavior of targets and third parties to rational calculations, as this book appears to do, risks underestimating—if not omitting—the role of beliefs and values. Consider white supremacy, a dominant belief system during this period in the South. I am quite sure that it was a factor in at least some of the decisions made by public officials and that it motivated resistance on the part of working-class whites, beyond brute-force rationality. However, in this account, it lurks in the background, perhaps as part of the disruption–concession calculus, but it is not clear what—if any—factor white supremacy plays in the model. Likewise, at the federal level, scholars have noted that President Lyndon Johnson and Senate minority leader Everett Dirksen (R-IL) were motivated by much more than possible electoral costs to push through landmark legislation. Johnson thought it morally wrong that black southerners were treated as second-class citizens. For his part, Dirksen was horrified that black southerners were beaten up in their attempts to vote, and promised to deliver at least some Republican support for the Voting Rights legislation.

In short, while a cost-based approach might be parsimonious, a more complete and credible explanation for movement outcomes requires going beyond what boils down to rational choice. Even so, this is an important book for anyone interested in the ways in which social movements affect politics. Luders does a masterful job of synthesizing various literatures on interest groups, social movements, public opinion, and political institutions. In doing so, he has written a fascinating, accessible book and presented a fresh interpretation of one of the most important episodes in American history.