In Religion and Law in China, Zhao Jianmin comprehensively lists current legislation and regulation concerning religion in China. This collection of primary texts not only can provide a reader with a general understanding of the legal framework for the administration of religious activities in China but may also be of particular value to foreign readers interested in the topic but who may otherwise have difficulty locating Chinese laws, for it provides much basic material conveniently in a single volume. Moreover, if read with an informed eye by someone generally familiar with the various issues, tensions, and sensitivities that surround the matter of regulation of religious thought and practice in China, the various codified rules can be seen to reflect the official Chinese attitudes toward religious freedom in China. However, Zhao does not provide an explanation or discussion of this important contextual issue: it is a compendium of laws and regulations, not a discursive examination of the topic.

Zhao opens the book with a general introduction of background information on religion in China before providing detail to outline the specific legal framework and the effect that the framework has on the religious communities and individuals. While Zhao helpfully provides a listing of the relevant rules in relation to religion in China, for reasons that are not explained by either the author or publisher, the specific content of some chapters is omitted, with only the chapter titles appearing. This of course raises far more questions than it answers. The book would be far more interesting and valuable if Zhao could engage in further critical analysis of the laws that are here listed and extracted but not otherwise explained or subject to discussion. Drawing upon the basic framework introduced in the book, this review seeks to discuss some trends of administration of religion and religion-related activities in China, specifically party leadership in Chinese religion law, use of law to strengthen regulation of religion, and continuous fear of foreign domination and localization of religion.

The first point to understand about religion and law in China is that the Communist Party of China (CPC) currently plays a dominant role in formulating laws touching upon any aspect of religious practice, and it will continue to do so in the future. The People's Republic of China did not have actual laws concerning religion until the 1980s, and, strictly speaking, there is still no national legislation concerning religion promulgated by the Peoples’ Congress. Before the adoption of the Open and Reform policy in 1978, the only basis for dealing with religions in China was not law, but rather the CPC's religious policies. When laws were eventually enacted, they were also shaped by the religious policies of the CPC. Therefore, as Zhao points out, in order to understand the religion laws and the basic structure of China, it is very important to understand the CPC and its religious policies (13, 16). The guiding ideology of the CPC in this matter has been Marxism–Leninism–Maoism, and China maintains the “Leninist–Stalinist–Maoist tradition of totalitarian control” in relation to religion. Such control can only be eased by a small degree under the “united front” policy of the CPC in order to maintain the overriding policy of the stability and unity of China.Footnote ¹

Marxism and Maoism have notoriously referred to religion as “the opium of the people,”Footnote ² but the CPC adopted freedom of religion as a pragmatic policy even before the establishment of the People's Republic of China. During the Soviet Republic of ChinaFootnote ³ and the time of the revolutionary-based border governments,Footnote ⁴ freedom of religion was adopted in the regions by numerous rules issued by those governments.Footnote ⁵ Because the principles of Marxist atheistic materialism underpin the CPC's basic worldview, the adoption of freedom of religion was a practical response to the fragmentation of China as well as a means of seeking to unite as many people as possible to support the CPC and the fight against the Japanese invasion or the ascendancy of the National Party. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, freedom of religion was incorporated into the Common ProgramFootnote ⁶ and the first constitution.Footnote ⁷ However, these constitutional rights could not be legally enforced and were more like mere political statementsFootnote ⁸ and all regulation and control of religion and religious activity relied for any authority or validity upon policy positions of the CPC.

Yuan-lin Tsai, a scholar of religion at National Chengchi University in Taiwan, divides the religious polices implemented in China into three periods. The first period, from 1949 to 1966, which featured a transition from the new democracies to socialism to fight against feudalism and imperialism. The second period, from 1966 to 1982, was the period of the Great Cultural Revolution, which was characterized by the oppression and devastation of religions and religious activity. In the third period, from 1982 to the present day, the official perspective has been to move away from the negative attitudes towards religion expressed during the Great Cultural Revolution and recognize that because religions and religious practice will persist among the Chinese population, a limited space for religion should be recognized and controlled.Footnote ⁹

The Great Cultural Revolution turned China into a lawless state,Footnote ¹⁰ during which time, among many other abuses, there was much persecution of religion and religious practice. It was not until 1982 that the CPC Central Committee issued the very important Document No. 19, which granted some limited autonomy to religious believers.Footnote ¹¹ This document reiterated the policy of freedom of religion and the purpose of uniting religious believers. It also required the “reasonable arrangement” of religious sites, called for cultivation of patriotic clergy, and demanded that religious associations be free from any foreign infiltration.Footnote ¹² This document, however, still proclaimed the Marxist atheistic worldview as the view of the CPC towards religion, and vested the CPC with the right of ultimate control over religion.Footnote ¹³ This document can be seen as laying down a foundation for China's religious policies, and various laws and rules that were issued in the years that followed were based upon this foundation as a just reflection of the various CPC's policies.

Accordingly, the enforcement of the relevant laws and rules by government is in fact the implementation of the religious policies of the CPC. The role of CPC and the government, as pointed out by Tsai, is that “the United Front Work Department of CPC Central Committee (UFWD) is more like a guiding and planning unit but the State Administration for Religious Affairs … and its branches are more like research institutions and the organs to enforce the policies laid out by the UFWD, and the CPC can implement its religious policies through the organizations such as the People's Congresses at various levels, the China People's Political Consultative Conference … and the five religious associations.”Footnote ¹⁴

This trend has not changed in modern China. At the most recent National Conference on Religion, on April 23, 2016, President Xi Jinping addressed the conference to call for adherence to socialist core values and the strengthening of supervision of religion.Footnote ¹⁵ According to Xi, “We should guide and educate the religious circle and their followers with the socialist core values, and guide the religious people with ideas of unity, progress, peace and tolerance.” He continued: “In particular, CPC members must act as ‘unyielding Marxist atheists, consolidate their faith, and bear in mind the Party's tenets.’”Footnote ¹⁶ It seems that the dominance of Party leadership on religion will only be strengthened, and the limited autonomy allowed to religion and religious practice by existing policies is considered to be adequate to serve the CPC's purpose to maintain the unity and stability of the CPC's regime.

The second point to understand about religion and law in China has to do with the use of law as a tool to strengthen the regulation of religion and religious activities. The use of law to regulate religious activities is the result of the development of the rule-of-law rhetoric accompanied with the rapid development and further liberalization of the Chinese economy in the past almost 40 years.Footnote ¹⁷ After the Great Cultural Revolution, the CPC recognized the devastating effects of its religious policies unleashed during the Revolution and made a conscious decision to adopt a more liberal policy towards religion. As discussed above, Document No. 19, issued by the CPC in 1982, opened a new page for the regulation of religion, and from then into the early 1990s, a series of laws were promulgated. The early rules are to be found mainly in various circulars or opinions issued by different ministries and the Supreme People's Courts, which are at the lower level of regulation in China.Footnote ¹⁸ It was not until 1994 that the State Council promulgated the Regulations on the Administration of Sites for Religious Activities, which was later repealed by the Regulation on Religious Affairs promulgated in 2004 by the State Council.Footnote ¹⁹

The 2004 Regulation issued by the State Council is by far the most authoritative rule in relation to regulation of religion and covers such issues as administering religious bodies, religious personnel and the religious sites. Through the promulgation of this regulation, the Chinese government in fact strengthened its control over religion.Footnote ²⁰ Following the promulgation of the 2004 Regulation, the State Administration for Religious Affairs also issued a number of provisions regarding the regulation of religion and related activities, including the registration of religious sites, the recording of religious teaching staff, the administration of the establishment of religious seminaries, and the administration of the awarding of degrees by religious seminaries.Footnote ²¹

However, there is still no legislation by the People's Congress on religion at the national level. Many religious groups realized that the various regulations issued by different Ministries and at different provincial levels have become a hindrance to the conduct of religious activities. These groups hope that national legislation could standardize the activities conducted by different government agencies, and accordingly there are calls for national legislation to regulate religion among academics and religious leaders.Footnote ²² Preparing national legislation would in all probability require the formulation of clearly articulated policies, resolve inconsistencies, attempt to promote some efficiency, and involve exposure for public comment. Religious organizations and communities would have an opportunity to argue within that process of review and legislative development for a more transparent, consistent, and liberal framework of regulation.

There is no sign that government is responding to these calls by preparing a more liberal framework or perspective. Indeed, it would seem that a more restrictive application of the existing regulatory framework is in fact occurring. With the emergence of global terrorism and increasing attacks by separatists in the restive northwestern region of China, the issue of the balance between freedom of religion and the prevention of religious extremism has become an urgent issue in China, and a predictable response of government is to use the law to strengthen its control over religion. In 2014, the Supreme People's Court, together with the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security, issued an opinion in order to apply criminal law to deter the offenders involved in violent terrorism and religious extremism.Footnote ²³ China then promulgated its Counterterrorism Law of the People's Republic of China in 2015.Footnote ²⁴ This law includes several accounts of religious extremism, although no definition of the concept is provided. The law is nonetheless considered to be a necessary tool in the effort to combat against terrorism.Footnote ²⁵ The Chinese government sees the adoption of the Counterterrorism Law as a proper use of law making to pursue and maintain social order and national unity. Others, however, have expressed concern that this use of law erodes protection of human rights.Footnote ²⁶ It is also reported that Xinjiang Autonomous Region, which is a Chinese Muslim congregated region, will start to draft its own regulation against religious extremism.Footnote ²⁷

A third and final point about law and religion involves taking account of the continuous fear of foreign domination and localization of religion. The CPC requires that all Chinese religion and religious organizations to be independent of any foreign organizations; thus, concern about the localization of any foreign religions can be seen as a trend in China. The fear of foreign domination over religion is grounded in the history of China,Footnote ²⁸ and the idea that religious bodies and affairs should be free from foreign domination has been incorporated into the Constitution of the People's Republic of China.Footnote ²⁹ The ensuing regulations promulgated by the State CouncilFootnote ³⁰ and Implementation Rules issued by the State Administration for Religious AffairsFootnote ³¹ have detailed provisions to regulate the religious activities of foreigners and foreign religious bodies, which has strengthened this position of the Chinese government. The tension between the Chinese government and the Vatican, and the limited tolerance shown by the Chinese authorities towards Protestant “house churches” reflect this fear.Footnote ³²

The recent address by President Xi at the National Religion Conference is further evidence of the authorities’ suspicion and resistance to foreign influences in any aspect of religion in China. Xi called for a resolute guarding “against overseas infiltrations via religious means” and prevention from “ideological infringement by extremists.”Footnote ³³ Xi also urged religious leaders to “dig deep into doctrines and canons that are in line with social harmony and progress, and favorable for the building of a healthy and civilized society, and interpret religious doctrines in a way that is conducive to modern China's progress and in line with our excellent traditional culture.”Footnote ³⁴ The address sent out a clear message that foreign infiltration should be avoided and localized religions that cater to the CPC's policy should be the orthodoxy.

The regulation of religion in China, which had been based upon reliance on the CPC's religious policies, is now becoming more and more formalized and institutionalized. During this process, the dominant role of the CPC will not bend. There remains an insistence by the government that, under this patchwork of laws and regulations founded upon the policies of and put into practice by the CPC, religion and religious practice in China should be permitted but controlled in the light of the fundamental goal of social unity and harmony. An important aspect of those policies is that religion in China should be independent of any foreign influence or foreign religious organization. The legal framework for the regulation of religion in China is administrative in nature and is intended to avoid the inevitable resistance and conflict that a banning of religion would undoubtedly engender by permitting religious practice and institutions to exist but only within a close framework of regulated controls. For the foreseeable future it is highly unlikely that this existing framework of controls will be replaced by national level legislation.

It would seem that Zhao intended Religion and Law in China to be an English-language source book for the various laws relating to the regulation and control of religion and religious practice in China. Such a book is certainly useful and particularly useful for foreigners who do not read Chinese or who are unfamiliar with the methods needed to find the texts of laws in China. It is likely to be useful for people from foreign religious organizations and foreign scholars who have interests in the legal framework used by Chinese authorities to regulate religion in China. If there are to be future editions of this work, it would be interesting for the sake of completeness to include the texts of those laws that are mentioned but not reproduced. Further, it would be interesting to go beyond the laws themselves to include contextual material that directly informs the laws, such as some selected documents setting out the policies of the CPC concerning religion. Such material certainly should include Document No. 19 and could even include contemporary speeches by leaders that point to the thinking of the leadership about this field such as the address by President Xi at the National Religion Conference in 2016. Eventually, perhaps, Zhao could use his considerable learning and expertise to write an analytic commentary that considers the development of the government's thinking and practice in regulating religion in China and includes some case studies, which would help readers to envisage the actual implementation of the rules and the impact of these policy choices upon society.