Philip Hamburger is a highly accomplished legal scholar who is rarely content to sort through precedents. In his full-length books, he typically refuses to limit himself to modest claims in any sphere. His Separation of Church and State (2002) attacked more than half a century of First Amendment jurisprudence. His more recent polemic, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (2014), seeks to discredit more than a century of jurisprudence in that field.
The current book, despite its more specialized focus, likewise displays Hamburger's characteristic mix of scholarly virtuosity and political audacity. The title captures the spirit of the performance—the seemingly narrow, technical legal inquiry announced in the subtitle, but only after the blaring, sensational warning in the headline phrase above it.
The most fully developed part of the book is the legal argument. Section 501(c)(3) is the provision in the Internal Revenue Code (a.k.a., the federal tax code) that sets out terms of eligibility for tax exemptions of religious, charitable, and educational institutions. Among other things, applicants for this status must agree to refrain from many kinds of political advocacy (e.g., on behalf of candidates for office).
The policy set out in this provision has rarely been contested. Advocates for free speech, even advocates for religious freedom, rarely give it a thought. The conventional thinking is that, after all, the government is giving out a benefit that few other entities get, so it is not unreasonable to impose some conditions in return. The rest of us have to pay our taxes before sounding off with our opinions. Those who have the special exemption from taxation should not have special subsidy to express their views on political contests.
Hamburger's rejoinder starts with the point that exemption from income tax is not a “subsidy” to tax-exempt organizations because nonprofits do not have “income” in the usual sense of the term. Elsewhere, salaries and dividends can be spent on whatever the recipients choose, while nonprofits must rechannel their revenues to the registered purposes of the institution.
Hamburger acknowledges that there is something of a subsidy in allowing private donors to claim tax credits for donations to religious and charitable institutions. It does reduce the tax obligation that donors would otherwise owe to the government. But even here, it is a highly questionable leap to threaten the entire value of the donor's tax credit because the recipient has exercised the right to express political opinions in ways normally protected by the First Amendment. If it were true that some government financial benefit is enough to justify limitations on speech, then all government employees—including professors at public universities—could be barred from sharing their opinions on a wide range of matters.
These and other arguments in Liberal Suppression do not seem to me at all frivolous. They may someday find their way into legal briefs given respectful hearing by courts. As Hamburger explains, the most serious constitutional issues have not yet been fully considered. But Hamburger seems to think the legal arguments will not carry enough force, even with legal scholars or judges, unless buttressed with historical material to make them doubt whether these features of the tax code actually emerged from respectable policy concerns.
So Hamburger offers several chapters, not only describing the history of the relevant federal tax provisions but the larger cultural context. The first (peacetime) income tax statute, enacted in 1894, exempted nonprofit entities, but with no limitation on their political speech. The statute enacted in the wake of the 1913 Income Tax Amendment also made no effort to limit political speech. As Hamburger shows, the limits in today's statutes began in the 1930s and were tightened in the 1950s.
Rather than offer a focused legislative history, the book browses through influential currents in American thought relevant to these issues. The background concern, Hamburger contends, was not schools or hospitals or other “idealistic institutions” but religious institutions in general—and the Catholic Church, in particular. The restrictions on political advocacy reflected widespread suspicion of Catholic influence, imagined as a monolithic, disciplined formation of unthinking followers, directed by scheming priests.
Hamburger adds piquancy—and contemporary relevance—by showing that polemics against Catholic power in the early twentieth century were a mainstay not just of populist rabble-rousers but of genteel liberal (Protestant) clergymen as well. They both emphasized the difference between slavish embrace of mystical dogmas and a free-thinking, independent acceptance of fundamental truths, after due personal reflection.
The contrast still figures in the rhetoric of liberal scholars who urge that “religious” appeals be excluded or discounted in acceptable “democratic” debate, with the animus shifted in recent decades from Catholics to Evangelical Christians. Hamburger can thus show close parallels between the exhortations of an early twentieth-century Klan leader (targeting Catholic masses) and the admonitions of Harvard philosopher John Rawls.
Hamburger himself seems to recognize that it does not clinch the constitutional argument to demonstrate social prejudice as one of the background drivers of political restrictions in the tax law. Accordingly, he buttresses arguments from law and social history with arguments from political theory. The supposedly free-thinking citizen, he warns, is the one most subject to doubt and therefore most subject to bullying or intimidation from the majority or the state. Religious communities often nurture the sort of conviction that a democracy most needs to reckon with. To remove churches from political engagement risks making them politically docile and leaving their adherents voiceless. So, rather than threatening democracy, politically active churches could enhance its vibrancy.
This argument seems to me the most important for the debate that Hamburger hopes to launch. But it is the least fully developed in this book. Hamburger repeatedly invokes Tocqueville's warnings about the moral and spiritual tyranny of majority opinion but does not pause to consider Tocqueville's own praise for the beneficent effects of the near-universal abstention of American clergy (as he depicts it) from political advocacy. Hamburger mentions Locke's exclusion of papal supremacists from religious toleration but does not pause to consider whether there are contemporary analogues that might justify similar restrictions. He says nothing, for example, about attempts in European countries to restrict jihadi preaching in mosques. But if he has not clinched his arguments, Hamburger has certainly done enough here to open a serious debate.
