Robert H. Jackson was arguably the most competent among President Franklin Roosevelt's many competent advisors. Unlike those who joined the New Deal hoping to deconstruct America's economic and constitutional order, Jackson's feet never left the ground. An accomplished consigliere of growing national reputation, he prided himself as a problem solver, not as a founder of an imaginary republic. His practicality and prudence also explain his astonishingly rapid ascent after he came to Washington in 1934: in less than six years, Jackson rose from tax counsel in the Treasury Department to attorney general. Clearly, he was a rising star and man of parts. No one was surprised when FDR nominated him to the Supreme Court in 1941; the Senate took all of three weeks to confirm him.
In his thirteen years on the Court, Justice Jackson seldom departed from the earth-bound common sense that marked his prior career. His elevation to the bench also created a national stage to display his exceptional analytical and rhetorical gifts. His best opinions, whether for the majority or while concurring or dissenting, are noteworthy not only for cutting to the heart of things but also for their eloquence; at their best, they are positively lyrical. These same qualities may also be observed in his unpublished opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, the subject of Professor David O'Brien's informative book.
Brown is certainly an iconic decision, as we are invariably reminded, but even after six decades, scholars still debate whether, and how precisely, Brown as such helped to dismantle Jim Crow. Its ambiguous legacy may be attributed in part to Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court, which was, to say no more, hardly a model of meticulous legal craft. Admittedly, the Court faced a difficult legal and political task if it wished to end segregated schools; but rather than confront head-on the language of the Fourteenth Amendment and its own role in protecting racial segregation over many decades, the justices ducked, saying merely that they could not “turn the clock back.” In place of rigorous legal argument, they relied instead on highly dubious psychological test data. This had the unfortunate effect of detaching the ruling from the actual text of the Constitution. By gradual degrees, the Court would in the future apply similar logic across a broad swath of constitutional law, justifying departures from text and tradition in the name of achieving social progress. “Living constitutionalism” may have been conceived by Woodrow Wilson, but its true birthday occurred with Brown in 1954.
It may be that “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal,” as Chief Justice Warren said, but it was not self-evidently so in 1954. As a legal proposition, the statement was essentially a conclusion to an argument the Court never elaborated. Such an argument might have taken the justices on an interesting journey, leading them by turns, via Abraham Lincoln, to the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment rightly understood, and ultimately to reflections on the continuing relevance of the Declaration of Independence. Such an opinion might have become a magnificent teaching moment, not only for the future of race relations but for American political culture generally.
Justice Jackson, for his part, also failed to take the Lincolnian route. But his draft opinion was far more disciplined than the feel-good sentiments and faux social science that animated the Court's opinion. To name only three important topics that are featured in his draft, but are barely acknowledged, if at all, in Warren's opinion for the Court: Jackson tries to explain why changed circumstance may sometimes alter constitutional meaning, he tries to maintain the link between the decision and constitutional text, and he is candid about the serious logistical difficulties with enforcing the Court's eventual decree. Professor O'Brien does a good job delineating Jackson's changing drafts (there were six in toto), but he underestimates how deeply troubled Jackson the judicial craftsman was about the enormity of the task the Court was about to undertake.
In the end, Jackson signed on to Warren's opinion to present a united front, and to affirm his bona fides on the question of racial equality. That being said, why did he labor for nearly two years on six versions of his own opinion? It is not clear that Professor O'Brien has provided a compelling answer. But we should be grateful that that he has now made Jackson's opinion so easily accessible, along with background material on the Court's struggle to do the right thing in Brown. If nothing else, close study of Jackson's labors may enable thoughtful students to see why the Court's opinion in Brown is flawed without giving aid and comfort to opponents of racial equality.
