Amos Bertolacci's The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics in Avicenna's Kitāb al-Šifāʾ: A Milestone of Western Metaphysics could easily have been titled A Tale of Two Metaphysics. It tracks the impact of Aristotle's Metaphysics in both the Greek- and Arabic-speaking worlds up to Avicenna's Metaphysics and then maps his recasting of Aristotle's Metaphysics into a science of metaphysics. Like Dickens before me, let me say that Bertolacci's book is the best of books, and it is the worst of books. It is the worst of books because its 678 pages are crammed with the most minute and technical details; one risks missing the proverbial forest for the trees. It is the best of books because its 678 pages are crammed with the most minute and technical details; one knows exactly how and what Avicenna drew from Aristotle's Metaphysics as well as what metaphysics as a science is for Avicenna and so how we ought to think about his own Metaphysics. The book is not for everyone: general or casual readers of the history of ideas and philosophy will probably grow weary before completing this tome; however, those interested in a close philological and historical analysis of the Metaphysics of the Shifaʾ should find it invaluable and at times even entertaining (or at least eye-opening).
The work divides into four basic parts covering the reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics before Avicenna, the structure and the content of Avicenna's Metaphysics, and finally six appendices and other end material. The first part consists of three chapters, the first of which canvases the Arabic translations of Aristotle's Metaphysics. The second considers the shift in Avicenna's own understanding of metaphysics as a science, first as strictly theology then as the science of existence qua existence. The third chapter considers the possible influence of Ammonius (as filtered through al-Farabi) on Avicenna's transition.
The second part, concerning the structure of Avicenna's own Metaphysics, has four sections: Avicenna's conception of existence qua existence, how Avicenna restructured Aristotle's Metaphysics to meet his view of metaphysics as a science, the demonstrative method that Avicenna used in metaphysics and the relation of metaphysics to the other sciences, and finally metaphysics' role in establishing the first principles of those sciences.
Bertolacci's treatment of the content of Avicenna's Metaphysics, which makes up the third part, similarly has four chapters. The first involves Avicenna's judicious use of quotations, paraphrases (close and not so close), and summaries of passages from Aristotle's Metaphysics, in which it is shown that, with the possible exception of Book K, Avicenna drew on every book in Aristotle's Metaphysics. The second and third chapters of this part are a very close consideration of the use and roles of Book Γ and then Book B by Avicenna. The main text concludes with other sources found in Avicenna's Metaphysics.
The six appendices include an exhaustive list of corrections to the Cairo edition of Avicenna's Metaphysics, based upon four not previously considered manuscripts, the Avicenna Latinus, and other sources. They also present an index of authors and works cited in Avicenna's Metaphysics, a chronological list of Avicenna's works on metaphysics, a list of names that Avicenna used for Aristotle's Metaphysics, the general style of Kitab al-Shifaʾ, and finally the various terms for “property” found in Avicenna's Metaphysics. The work ends with an extensive bibliography (around thirty-five pages) and five indices but unfortunately no subject index. One might also add that Bertolacci has a decided penchant for tabulating information, as the 200-plus texts, outlines, and tables amply testify.
The significance of Bertolacci's philological and historical analysis is obvious. The philosophical value, however, might be lost in the details. At least to this reader, Bertolacci's general framework for understanding the structure of Avicenna's Metaphysics is priceless. This is all the more important because with the appearance of a number of modern-language translations of Avicenna's Metaphysics, more philosophers and scholars have access to Avicenna's metaphysical thought and yet it is not always clear why Avicenna treated the various subjects that he did or how they fit together. So let me conclude by extracting Bertolacci's outline of that superstructure.
The general thesis is that Avicenna recast the text of Aristotle's Metaphysics in such a way as to fulfill the canons of a demonstrative science as set forth in the Posterior Analytics. Thus, Book I of Avicenna's Metaphysics lays out his conception of metaphysics as a science for which the proper subject matter is existence qua existence. Existence is investigated first with respect to the kinds or divisions of existence, which are identified with Aristotle's ten categories (roughly Books II–III); second, metaphysics inquires into the proper accidents of existence, which include such states as priority, posteriority, potentiality, actuality, universal, particular, cause, and effect (Books IV–VII); and finally the first causes, and most specifically God, represent the goal of metaphysical inquiry (Books VIII–X). In addition, because “one” is said in as many ways as “being,” Avicenna considered a subclass of ontology that Bertolacci terms “henology.” Henology parallels the previously mentioned three areas of metaphysical investigation but now from the perspective of the “one” and the “many.” The divisions and kinds of one and many are considered intermingled throughout Avicenna's discussion in Books II–III, whereas the proper accidents of the one and many receive an independent treatment in Book VII. Finally, the studies of existent qua existent and unity come back together in Books VIII–X, in which Avicenna treats the pure unity, God.
To conclude, Amos Bertolacci's The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics in Avicenna's Kitāb al-Šifāʾ is a brilliant work, albeit not for everyone. It deluges the reader with the most minute details of Avicenna's Metaphysics and Avicenna's reliance on Aristotle's Metaphysics. In those details this work finds its greatest weakness because the reader can almost drown in them. However, they are also the work's greatest strength because from their depths the core of Avicenna's metaphysical system begins to emerge.
