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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 May 2004
In 1951, Libya became an independent state, a federal monarchy. In 1969, a military coup overthrew the Sanusi monarchy and brought Muammar el-Qaddafi to power. Since that time, Libya has become politically and socially invisible, the least known of the North African states compared with Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. Continuing conflict with the United States over terrorism and the question of Palestine have made Libya irascible to foreign scholars. In the absence of serious scholarship, competence in Arabic, and reliable knowledge of Libyan society and politics, Western mass media and many academics have reduced Libyan politics to the persona of Qaddafi, who is frequently characterized as a “mad dog” ruling a “rogue regime.” This study by a female Libyan political scientist, Amal Obeidi, is therefore an especially welcome contribution to Libyan studies.
Obeidi is one of few scholars, such as Lisa Anderson, Dirk Vandewalle, Monte Palmer, Omar El-Fathaly, and John Davis, who have actually done research inside Libya since 1969. Obeidi's book is based on the Ph.D. dissertation she presented to the University of Durham in England, and she is currently a professor of political science at Garyounis University in Benghazi, Libya.
Obeidi's text is based on the study of political socialization and culture as analyzed by structural-functionalist American political scientists, especially Gabriel Almond, Bingham Powell, and Sidney Verba. Her main concern is to “understand the influence of state ideology on the young generation in Libya, since the revolutionary regime has made substantial effort to create a ‘jamahirian citizen’, by employing the main agents of political socialization, namely media and education. It has targeted the younger generation, in particular students” (p. 2). The author sets her task as assessing the influence of state ideology on a group of Libyan students by asking how effective Qaddafi's regime has been in creating politically active and motivated students who believe in the regime's ideology of Arab nationalism and unity.
Obeidi used the quantitative survey method to gather her data on 500 male and female students at Garyounis University in Benghazi, the capital of the eastern region and the second-largest city in Libya. The data were collected during the spring and the summer of 1994, and Obeidi combined multiple-choice questions with follow-up interviews with some of the students.
Obeidi's basic premise is that the revolutionary regime in Libya has had mixed success in reproducing its values among Libyan students. The regime has been most successful in advancing women's rights, education, Arab nationalism, Arab unity, and support for Palestinian people. However, it has failed to create participant citizens and to develop alternatives to kinship ties (p. 224). The study's body of argument projects an analysis of the survey on questions such as Arabism and Islam, tribes and tribalism, political participation, women's role in society, and Arab unity and the Palestinian question.
Obeidi points out that the Qaddafi regime advocates Arab nationalism and Islam and promotes them as an alternative to local Libyan identity and regional and tribal identities. Her findings show that the students, like the regime, did not distinguish between Arabism and Islam and viewed both as significant to them. Yet this result should not surprise the reader: for most North Africans, including Libyans, Islam and Arabism are two sides of one coin because the majority of North African people are Muslims who confronted European colonialism rather than the Ottoman Empire, as in the case of the Arab East.
The survey indicates that tribal and kinship identity is strong among a majority of the students (p. 131). At the same time, many students preferred that there was no tribal system. These views reflect the regime's position, which accepts a social role for tribalism but—at least, in the first decade after 1969—opposed a political role for it, and after 1975 accepted its role as a social base for the security of the regime.
The third topic surveyed by the author is political participation. Her survey demonstrates that the students held a negative view toward this topic. Most of the students did not participate in the popular committees and congresses organized by the regime (p. 163), suggesting that the regime has failed to engage students in its political organizations.
On the question of women, the survey demonstrates that the regime championed women's rights in Libya. Consequently, female students expressed strong views toward women's rights and equality. These students also voiced traditional views on the issue of joining the military, as demanded by the regime. The regime clearly managed to include women in education and jobs, and this is a positive achievement in a conservative society such as Libya's.
The issue of Arab unity and the Palestinian question was also surveyed. The survey indicates that the regime made some gains in persuading students to support the Palestinians’ struggle for self-determination and that they held a positive view toward Arab unity. Both issues are high in the ideology of the Qaddafi regime and both issues are significant in Libya's modern history because of the brutal experience Libya had with Italian settlers’ colonialism between 1911 and 1943. The students favored complete liberation of Palestine. The author concludes her study with a summary of the positive and negative attitudes of the students regarding the outcome of their socialization by Qaddafi's regime. She gives the regime high marks on Arabism, Islam, and women's rights and low marks on participation and kinship and local identity.
The study has some minor errors in dates and translation of names. For instance, Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif al-Sanusi succeeded his uncle Muhammad al-Mahdi not in 1917, as the author states, but in 1902 (p. 39). Sukana is misspelled “Socra” (p. 45), and Halim Barakat is misspelled “Baakat” (p. 59, fn. 41). These mistakes can easily be attended to in subsequent editions.
There are two methodological problems in the book. First, the author admits that 64 percent of the 500 students surveyed came from the city of Banghazi (p. 77). In addition, 10 percent came from the suburbs of Benghazi, and only 4 percent each came from Tubruk and Tripoli. Thus, 78 percent of the surveyed students came from Benghazi in eastern Libya. Thus regional bias may raise questions about the validity of the study's conclusions beyond the eastern region, especially if we keep in mind that Libya is a huge country known for its social diversity and regional economies.
Second, the text leaves out two important questions. How are the main issues surveyed by the author contested and configured by the state and the revolutionary elite itself? And how are ideological goals set by the state such as popular committees and congresses appropriated by students for causes different from the original state ideology? These two questions may be the next agenda for research on Libyan political culture.
Aside from these two problems, Obeidi's book is a new contribution to the field of Libyan studies, especially political socialization and culture under the military regime since 1969. The study applies an empirical survey analysis, still a relatively new field in the study of the Middle East and North Africa. The author updates the data on political socialization on Libya pioneered by her mentor Zahi El Mogherbi (1978) and on political culture in Libya by Omar El Fathaly and Monte Palmer (1980). It is useful for undergraduate and graduate students interested in the study of political socialization in the Middle East and North Africa.