Impact on regional environment in foreign policy of Iran

It can be demonstrated that Iran's foreign policy has always sought to influence its neighbors. In various historical periods since the sixteenth century, Iran has tried to gain supremacy over the surrounding area through its relationships with the major powers, and by imposing a distinctive religious identity.

Geographic conditions, political history, memories of the Empire, and events that are representive of the political conflict with other areas of the region have contributed to the persistence of signs of distinction and regional supremacy in the foreign policy of Iran. The preeminent behavior pattern of Iran in its neighboring areas, and some historical points, are based on two groups of actors. One group consists of neighbors by land and maritime borders and the other group includes great powers.

Supremacy in the region has been pursued in different historical periods whether through partnerships with major powers or resolving major challenges with them. The same issue is true about Iran's relations with its neighbors. For example, certain foreign policy issues with some neighbors have been permanently resolved. However, some unresolved problems with neighbors have provoked a change of direction in the relationships with neighboring countries, giving rise to issues that were long dormant. The relationships of Iran – as a state with the largest Shiite population in the world – and Saudi Arabia – as the spiritual leader of the Sunnis during the 2008 to 2014 – are characterized by such features. Accordingly, it can be concluded that historical and political conflicts are reproduced based on new indices (Motaghi and Postinchi, Reference Motaghi and Postinchi2011: 154).

Iranian identity is linked with the general molds of Shiite. This reflects the features that distinguishe Iran from the Arabs. Many researchers, including Petrushevsky and Vali Nasr, see the rise of Shiite, the official religion in Iran, as a distinguishing feature of the Iranian people and their national identity. In his book Islam in Iran, Petrushevsky posits that the government of Iran emerged under conditions that emphasized the cultural, political, and ideological differences between Iran and the Arabs. Thus, in an effort to identify the major aspects of political culture, it should be noted that cultural, political, and security-related observations produce relatively homogenous results (Petrushevsky, Reference Petrushevsky1984: 371).

Vali Nasr (Reference Nasr2007) argues that the destiny of the Middle East is tied to the Sunni and Shia conflict rather than discussions of globalization and democracy. Therefore, he regards this identity factor as a critical variable in the future struggles in the Middle East. Tehran, as stated by Nasr, has taken advantage of this factor in its political affairs. Elaborating on the strengthening of the Shia after 9/11, Nasr states that in the period between the Islamic Revolution and 9/11, Shiites were not in the spotlight. The Islamic revolution in Iran was the first opportunity for Shiites to recognize their rights and consolidate their organization. In the meantime, Tehran pursued its evolutionary and political views through this new path. Then, the US invasion of Iraq gave the Shiites the opportunity to not only seize political power but also to create the first Shia Arab country. In Nasr's opinion, the Shiite rise to power in Iraq was a threat to other Arabic countries, even more than the Iranian revolution. Iranians, given their non-Arabic language, were restricted in their influence. Shiite Arabs, on the contrary, were equipped with all ethnic, religious, and political instruments required for transcending borders and becoming a powerful force (Nasr, Reference Nasr2007: 172). Thus, one of the main challenges for Iran in connection with the identity factor is the lack of a common language to bring together jurisprudential principles and the continuity of strategic preferences.

Iran's political history has witnessed conflicts between the Persian and Arabic cultures, which constitute the main basis of the continuing hostility between Iran and the Arabs. The lack of cooperation from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and Qatar on issues such as the Syrian crisis or in combating the ISIS terrorist groups fall within this category. The reluctance of these countries to cooperate on security-related matters reflect the cultural values of both sides. Each of these two cultures and civilizations focus on a specific form of Islamism. Arabic countries, drawing on concepts such as ‘heretic’ are trying to question the identity of Islam in Iran. In contrast, terms such as ‘Wahhabism’ and ‘Salfit’ in the political discourse of Iran have been the subject of growing attention in the research circles. These terms have produced a negative image of the countries that finance Salafi groups in the foreign policy of Iran. The spread of internal violence in Syria since 2011 was the peak of the identity confrontation between Iran and the Salafi movement. Iran asserts that a large portion of the opposition forces against Bashar Assad's government are composed of terrorists groups, such as Salafists (Niakooee, Reference Niakooee2013: 441). Religious and ideological factors have not only have failed to alleviate Arabic–Iranian political and regional conflicts, but have also encouraged a new feature of the conflict between the countries, something that represents the supremacy of marginal concepts overcoming dominating concepts. This factor has complicated the pursuit for dominance in the region.

International policies and the role of Great Powers have also been involved in the mapping of the regional influence of Iran. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, in keeping with US Middle East policy, was able to play the role of regional inhibitor and adopted an independent national policy (Alvandi, Reference Alvandi2014: 29–30). The implementation of military missions in the Dhofar province of Oman reflected the fact that the pattern of regional influence of Iran was founded on cooperation with the great powers and the acceptance of this role by the powers (Behestani and Hedayati, Reference Behestani and Hedayati2015: 27–8).

After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the element of influence in the region and neighboring countries has been based on conflict with the policies of the great powers. To the extent that the influence of major powers on the neighbors of Iran has increased, the supremacy strategies of Iran towards its neighbors has changed. For instance, despite the fact that Turkey has good relations with US and Israel, the relationship of Iran with this country follows a model of cooperation on competition, with Tehran unwilling to expand its supremacy over Ankara's policy. Following the US presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, however, signs of increased regional competition by Iran became evident. Given the significant proportion of the Shiite population in these two countries, the behavior patterns of Iran towards them have been focused on the Shia identity. Shia goals have come into the spotlight in Iran after the Iranian Revolution. Rather than aiming at promoting the views of the Shiite, the Iranian Revolution was an uprising against the Shah's regime and dictatorship, with the aim of promoting anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments. At that time, Iranian leaders knew their limits (Salman, Reference Salman2003: 146).

Iran's relations with Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf Arab states indicate that politics is more important to Tehran than religious tendencies are. The relationship between Iran and Egypt has deteriorated not because of its Sunni majority, but because of the signing of the Camp David by Anwar Sadat. This is true about the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia too. That is, the break-down in the Iran–Saudi Arabia relationship is more due to US–Saudi relations rather than to Wahhabism in this country. Similarly, the close relationship between Iran and Syria is due to the competition between Syria with Israel in the geopolitical areas of the Mediterranean. Even Iran's influence on the Shias is not because of their religious exercises, but rather because of their anti-American policies.

The position of ‘Others’ in foreign policy of Iran

Many foreign policy attitudes towards Iran are complementary in nature, meaning that these attitudes are related to each other. For example, when the national interests of Iran are threatened by the actions of trans-regional great powers, the signs of xenophobia appear in its foreign policy. There are numerous historical instances in which the supremacy sentiments of Iranians have been shattered, eventually producing a disturbing feeling of insecurity in the collective personality. Iran, despite its long history as a nation-state, has been subjected to a series of foreign conquests. This has debilitated the sense of unity and sovereignty of the country over its destiny. In such circumstances, increased security is the top priority in the foreign policy planning of Iran. As a result, perceived xenophobia is clearly seen in the external behavior of Iran (Dehghani, Reference Dehghani2009: 88).

Iran's occupations began two thousand years ago with the conquest of Alexander the Macedonian followed by the conquest of Arabs in the early Islamic era. It then continued with the inflow of the armies of the Mongol Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, the armies of the Seljuk Turks, the occupation of Iran by Afghans, and finally domination by Great Britain, Russia, and the United States over the socio-political affairs of the last 150 years. Each of these historical, political and security events have exercised significant influence on the political attitudes and perceptions of the Iranians. Muhammad Ali Jamalzadeh (1892–7), one of the contemporary Iranian authors, describes the psychological and social conditions of Iran through the eye of a tourist:

Jamalzadeh's social literature reflects political spirit and public culture in dealing with foreign troops. It is difficult to find a country with such a tragic history as Iran. Evidence suggests that Iranian political history is tied to some manifestations of international confrontations and struggles. The geopolitical position of Iran has also aggravated this process. The accumulated skepticism about others at different historical periods has left an undeniable mark on the public psychology of Iranian society.

Inherent distrust is the direct repercussion of cynicism in the political and strategic culture of Iran. This line of thought can be traced in the works of many political analysts. The widespread distrust in the political society of Iran, not restricted to the modern times, has its roots in an earlier era. For example Iraj Pezeshkzad in his famous book My Dear Uncle Napoleon portrays an aspect of Iranian skepticism about the role of the great powers through sarcastic and humorous language (Pezeshkzad, Reference Pezeshkzad2006: 8–11). Even Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in his book Answer to History followed this line of thought. In his dialogue with Sullivan – the last US ambassador in Iran – he speaks of his surprise about the withdrawal of US support during the Islamic Revolution, referring to the possible role of the CIA in his dethronement (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Reference Pahlavi1980; Shawcross, Reference Shawcross1988: 29). It should be noted that despite widespread economic, security, and technological relations and cooperation between Iran and US during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, ‘the independent national policy’ of Mohammad Reza meant breaking security ties with the West (Milani, Reference Milani2012: 240). This intensified the Shah's distrust of the Americans in the last days of his reign.

Historical mistrust of the surrounding environment and the long memories in connection with foreign aggressors of the Iranian territories can be considered as a factor strengthening the concept of xenophobia in the minds of the Iranians. Based on this perspective and the relationship with other concepts such as ‘Iranism’ and ‘Supremacy in the regional geography’, Iranians have reached the conclusion that ‘Others’’ are the main obstacle to the realization of the global role of their country (Abrahamian, Reference Abrahamian2008: 6–7).

In the modern era, the nature of the foreign policy thinking of Iran has been ‘normative’ based on the principle of utility and risk. In this view, the great powers are at the center of national risk. All Iranians are suspicious of foreigners (Others) and if any coalition is to be formed, there would be layers of suspicion that could potentially destroy the coalition (Ehteshami, Reference Ehteshami2008: 32). Accordingly, since 1979, no bilateral relations have developed between Iran and some countries, especially the United States.

The behavior pattern of Iran in international politics should not be considered as an exception, but rather as a norm. According to Graham Fuller, the rise of political Islam and its bondage with identity supremacy of Iran since 1979 is one of the factors that have complicated the establishment of a relationship with the United States. The difficulty was compounded after Iran–Iraq War with Iranian doubts about the US role in this conflict. Fuller also posits that the role of Iran in spreading regional insecurity and the supremacy sentiments of this country in the region have aggravated the relations of this country with the United States (Fuller and Lesser, Reference Fuller and Lesser1995: 40).

Such distrust of foreigners increased significantly after the Islamic Revolution. Many experts on the foreign policy of Iran assert that the political norms and the foreign policy of Iran are consistent and correlated with the realities of the cultural–political norms of Iran. Thus, the political and strategic conflicts with countries such as United States, England, Germany, and France can be considered as a reflection of historical experience and the strategic mindset in the field of foreign policy. This process has developed in such a way that in the perceptions of the social groups and foreign policy officials of Iran, the Others, especially the great powers, are symbols of a national security threat and are a menace to the political norms of the Iranian regime (Erdbrink, Reference Erdbrink2015).

The concept self–other and conspiracy theory

The concept of self–other in Iranian society is of paramount social importance. It has amplified the significance of some identity features, such as xenophobia, in the foreign policy of this country. Within Iranian society, xenophobia is rooted in the perceptions about conspiracy of the enemies and rival political groups. The foundation of conspiracy within Iranian society is the political mistrust towards the performance of other actors. However, such mistrust is not shared with anyone in this country. In Persian literature of Iran, the reference to subjects such as insiders and outsiders can be found in books like Shahnameh Ferdowsi as well.

Ferdowsi (940–1020 AD) has a particular view of foreign affairs which can be called the humanistic perspective of Iran in foreign policy. This view relies on Iranian identity and gives priority to the development of moralities and human values, avoiding falling into the trap of ethnic prejudice. Ferdowsi strived to portray the superiority of Iranians to the Turani Footnote ² people. Accordingly, he describes Iran as a country that due to its abundant natural resources and strategic position has always been subject to the greed of the envious. By ‘the envious’, Ferdowsi means Turani people, who are depicted as a symbol of evil (Ansari, Reference Ansari2012: 291). However, from the perspective of Ferdowsi, Iranians were not a symbol of absolute goodness as not all enemies were the symbol of absolute evil. Therefore, for Ferdowsi, Iranians were not the superior race, but throughout history, Iranian culture had had virtuous figures who were constantly threatened by enemies behind the borders, and had thus grown suspicious of the behavior of others. As such, Ferdowsi acknowledged the existence of a conspiracy against the interests of Iran.

Recognition of enemy forces and their leveraging power, coupled with a sense of vulnerability in the face of threats, has institutionalized the belief in the conspiracy theory. Conspiracy theory is the non-existent version of a conspiracy (Pipes, Reference Pipes1998: 10). Of course, if the response capability of Iran is increased, this conspiracy mentality may be subject to change. In the political culture of Iran, a conspiracy is plotted by those who are superior in terms of power and ability. Thus, whenever a political defeat or strategic failure develops, instead of focusing on its objectives and if there are reasonable grounds, reference is made to indicators that reflect the conspiracy and complicity of actors. Although such a mentality (conspiracy) is rampant in most cultures of the Middle East – that have been weakened and damaged by foreign intervention – the epitome of such a view can be seen in the Iranian culture (Zonis and Joseph, Reference Zonis and Joseph1994: 445–6).

The Iranian political experience suggests that no event pans out irrespective of other internal and external factors. Several reasons can be cited for the inculcation of conspiracy theory in the Iranian culture. Issues such as oil, geography, and authoritarian states, which are in fact geostrategic and geopolitical realities, are among the underlying causes of this theory. Victimization and oppression are the primary sources of this mentality. In an environment, bursting with the conspiracy, any success, wealth, and personal security is only achieved through a correct perception of the power equation and conspiracies at work. In fact, for their survival, individuals need to benefit from the political and social conditions. In Iranian folk literature, there is proverb that reminds us of conspiracy in the balance of power: when people grow suspicious of a conspiracy that is being plotted, they say, ‘There is bowl under the half bowl’.

The ambiguous political atmosphere results in negative interpretations of the outcomes of any situation. In some historical periods in Iran's foreign policy, a tendency towards the third power has been observed to be on the agenda. This reflects the defensive reaction to Iranian leaders in the foreign policy of this country. An orientation towards the United States, China, and Russia in the foreign policy of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the Islamic Republic of Iran is an obvious example of this case. However, it should be noted that people with a mistrust-based approach to others, in some cases without any justifiable reason, may employ patterns that reflect excessive trust. Graham Fuller argues that this is due to the lack of strategic understanding and awareness of the atmosphere of international relations. He writes:

In the conspiracy theory equation, different reasons have been proposed, each of which are treated as signs of mistrust of the social and international environment. Conspiracy theory in the mindset of Iran has its origins in the instability of power and the functions of the authoritarian structure in the political system of Iran and the international system. Conspiracy-based mentality is the upshot of insecurity. Security is not ensured when a group is faced with a stronger system. Insecurity against the will of the government, insecurity against the invasion of enemies (internal opposition groups and foreign invasions), and the lack of an organized legal will to defend the honor, character and, status of individuals are amongst the factors preparing the social and cultural ground for the nurture of conspiracy theory (Lambton, Reference Lambton1991: 13). Overall, when political phenomena lose their explanatory power, conspiracy theories gain prominence. The bitter historical experiences and memories of the Iranians about decisive battles, threats, and permanent crises have affected the nature of the foreign policy behavior of its leaders. A number of political and international conflicts over the last 300 years have marginalized Iran from the center of international relations. This has led to the formation of defensive attitudes towards foreigners among Iranians, giving rise to the concept of Persian xenophobia. The direct outcome of this concept is an aversion to enemies and foreigners. This historical experience has had a dual impact on the foreign policy of Iranian leaders. On the one hand, it has led to the establishment of cautious and suspicious foreign relations with some countries. A psychological and mental analysis of past events reveals that many of the weaknesses and problems of Iran are rooted in the type of relationship they had with other actors. Moreover, insiders interpret the course of international developments as a plot against Iran. After the Islamic Revolution, the incorporation of religious ideologies into the traditional political notions has encouraged xenophobia in foreign policy behavior of Iran.

Effects of social perceptions on Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign policy orientation

Iran's foreign policy orientation since the 1979 revolution has been organized according to the ‘radical non-aligned pattern’, signs of which are apparent in Iran's foreign policy slogans. Using the ‘Neither East, Nor West’ slogan lays the basis for an increased application of the radical non-aligned orientation. The slogan is currently inscribed on the entrance to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building. Some have considered this slogan a reaction to the bipolar structure of the international system. However, the slogan survived even after the fall of the bipolar system. This means that the slogan is not a function of a particular structure, and must be analyzed and evaluated according to the identity, ideological, and normal indices of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Takashi Inoguchi argues that a country's approach toward international politics can be divided into three paradigms: Westphalian (national rule), Philadelphian (society-oriented rule), and Anti-Utopian (conflict and rule of the cultures). Each of these paradigms explains parts of the orientations and functions of a country's foreign policy (Inoguchi, Reference Inoguchi1999: 173–4). Naturally, Iran's foreign policy since 1979 does not correspond with any of these approaches. The main reason for this must be sought in the obvious differences in Western countries’ foreign policy regarding Middle Eastern political units, including Iran.

Inoguchi’s approach to the first school of thought is the conception of global politics with state sovereignty as its key concept. The second schoolis related to the role of the masses and the development of the idea of a Republic. All the classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger, are advocates of national rule and national interests in the form of the Westphalian paradigm (Inoguchi, Reference Inoguchi1999: 176). Inoguchi consideration of the third school of thought as premised on the key concept of loss of sovereignty. Naturally, the Anti-Utopian paradigm must be considered as the evolutionary form of the Philadelphian paradigm. If the social groups are to be considered as the pivots of foreign policy, the role of authoritative political systems in devising and executing foreign policy will be reduced (Inoguchi. Reference Inoguchi1999: 175).

Iran's foreign policy orientation is a combination of Inoguchi’s three indices; each of his analytical systems forms a part of Iran's foreign policy. In fact, using a compound of policies could increase the country's activity and competitive ability. Inoguchi argues that globalization would lead to peace and economic development, and the market forces and the rise in people's expectations would be the driving force behind this process. Countries that do not possess the ability to compete regionally and internationally are marginalized, whereas if they are more correspondent with regional and international indices of power, they are able to play a more important role in foreign policy (Inoguchi, Reference Inoguchi1999: 182–3).

The structure of Iran's foreign policy has caused the emergence of two sets of ideas in the decision-making processes of the country in international politics. This has led foreign actors to receive different and sometimes opposing signals from Iran. Signals sent abroad by a country form the country's image in the minds of foreign actors. This image will eventually affect those actors’ perceptions and interpretations of the country, and will be the basis for interactions with the country. Therefore, opposing signals will lead to inconsistency in the responses to a country's diplomatic efforts (Sajjadpour, Reference Sajjadpour2007: 67–8). However, such inconsistency has formed three functions at the operational level of Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign policy which are based on radical non-aligned orientation:

1. (1) Competing regional influence of the superpowers: according to this function, perceptual and ideological templates in Iran's foreign policy would require supporting radical states, revolutionary groups, and those who seek independence. Iran's foreign policy literature considers any element which restricts Iran's and other radical states’ interests to be aggressive, and, therefore, is treated as core to political and security opposition by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Thus, while radical non-aligned policy means criticizing powerful states’ interests, it can be organized in the form of Westphalian national rule or anti-utopian reactions to cultural conflicts.

2. (2) Increasing regional and international aid: in order to be executable in foreign policy, radical non-aligned policies should not only possess a negating nature, but should also include a supportive function. This means that a supplementary part of regional competition with superpowers is related to Iran's support of allied and influential actors in foreign policy. A country using this pattern must have the capability of practical support. This is a manifestation of the connection between domestic and foreign policy. Max Weber stresses the importance of establishing a universal relationship between comparative politics and international relations. This view has led some researchers to study Iran's foreign policy based on Weber's typology of traditional and in-transition societies. According to these studies, Iran's foreign policy, because of its ideological and prophetical nature, supports allied states in the regional system and international politics.

3. (3) Improving the solidarity of the forces inside the structure: the third function of radical non-aligned orientation is coordinating domestic social forces and actors which must play the ‘participatory’ role in Iran's political orientation. It must be noted that Iran has been in transition since the Pahlavi dynasty, and that after the 1979 revolution, has entered the renovation stage. This renovation has always caused critical challenges for the ruling system, one of which is the solidarity of social forces. In brief, it could be said that coordinating political processes with transnational actors requires passing through numerous crises.

Elements of this function in Iran's foreign policy should be analyzed based on elements of the Philadelphian paradigm (society-oriented rule, norm-oriented rule, and social participation). If there is coordination and solidarity among Iranian social forces, then the notion that in-transition societies and states are merely actors directed by superpowers would be in question. Countries which are able to pass through evolutions of domestic policy (renovation crises) and foreign policy (international politics crises) would have the capability to devise solidarity within their domestic and foreign structures. Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has tried to ignore the considerable influence of the international system on its foreign policy. This is pursued in the framework of autonomy in foreign policy. Iran's behavior indicates that the country seeks national and regional solidarity through consolidating political authority and improving regional cooperation.