There are many ways to bring the history of economics to undergraduate students (graduate students are seldom given the opportunity anymore). The textbook used will have a good deal to do with how this turns out. In some textbooks the story is told as an evolution in the capacity of economics to answer interesting questions through the construction of theories and their application. Indeed the subject taught this way used to be labeled “the history of doctrine.” The story line is usually heroic with emphasis on the achievements of a few brilliant individuals, each one advancing on the work of predecessors. Landmark texts of this kind include Alexander Gray’s The Development of Economic Doctrine (1931), J. A. Schumpeter’s History of Economic Analysis (1954), and Mark Blaug’s Economic Theory in Retrospect (1962). Another approach is to present the historical material through an ideological filter that may be to the right or left depending on the taste of the instructor and the students. Economists then are presented and appraised according to their conformity to the favored ideology. The early postwar text by Eduard Heimann, History of Economic Doctrines (1945), is an example of this kind. Or the history may be seen as a reflection of the social, political, and economic context in which the ideas emerged. Wesley Mitchell’s enormous Types of Economic Theory (1969) is the classic text of this kind. Finally, economic ideas may be presented as related closely to the lives of the economists themselves. Robert Heilbroner with his Worldly Philosophers (1953) was the pioneer of this approach and caught the attention of other textbook writers if for no other reason than through his sales in the millions of copies.
This text by Mark Skousen, a prolific writer on economics and finance, now in a second edition, is an amalgamation of the ideological—in this case neo-Austrian—and biographical styles. He says that he is answering the cry of free-market advocates for “a more balanced approach to the history of economics.” (10) Skousen complains that “the story of economics is traditionally told in a haphazard disjointed manner. In a sense, it’s not a story at all. There is no running plot, no engaging drama, and no single heroic figure.” (6) Skousen sets out to change that, and his story is roughly that Adam Smith, the hero, is the Newton of modern economics, sustained by disciples like Carl Menger, Alfred Marshall, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek, and Milton Friedman. Standing in the way of Smithian, Newtonian-like progress have been the villains: “cynics” like Thorsten Veblen and John Kenneth Galbraith, meddlers like John Maynard Keynes who “tried to reconstruct the building after it was halfway complete,” and unabashed critics like Karl Marx and the Utopians, whose main contributions, if any, were to make the mainstream founders reflect on and defend what they were doing. Going much further than Robert Heilbroner, Skousen sets out to keep the interest of his student readers by giving prurient details of economists’ lives that are supposedly titillating, unlike the approach of Heilbroner which was to present only those biographical facts that seem clearly relevant to an author’s economics. We are told by Skousen, among many other things, how Arthur Pigou may have been a Soviet agent, that Richard Cantillon was murdered by his butler, that Adam Smith may have been a pyromaniac, that J. B. Say is buried next to Jim Morrison, that David Ricardo lost his teeth and the hearing in one ear, that Marx had an illegitimate son and died in an easy chair, and that John Stuart Mill was “a chilly, bloodless man, overintellectual, undersexed, uxorious, priggish and humourless” (from an unidentified quote). By contrast Irving Fisher had fruit, toast, and acidophilus milk for breakfast while Hayek “went through a rearrangement of his own love life in the 1940s” (127).
Two main matters are at issue here: first, is this a good way to teach the history of economics? And second, taking Skousen on his own terms, does he do a satisfactory job of producing an appealing textbook? On the first point, it might be said that whatever turns the students on is legitimate. By contrast one may feel that Skousen denigrates the field as a whole by going to these lengths. Is it really necessary to treat the history as soap opera to gain the interest of students? The answer from the experience of this reviewer is definitely not. The students in his classes today seem fully engaged with big questions that interest them: How much has economics contributed to improvements in human welfare? Where did approaches like public choice come from? Why do micro and macro economics seem so often at odds? Do models that embody assumptions like rational expectations have a deep history? These students would be embarrassed to learn from their lecturer that Ricardo lost his teeth.
The second question is whether Skousen achieves the objective of producing a satisfactory text for his own way to teach the subject. For this reviewer the answer must be in the negative. This is simply a strange book on many grounds. For starters, considering the wealth of fascinating material on early economics, the assertion that “it all started with Adam” is unacceptable. Then the wholesale and unbalanced dismissal of the villains, Marx (“Marx madness” ugh!) and Veblen, is likely to be unpersuasive to thoughtful students. The happy ending of the story, the supposed triumph of neo-classical economics, is odd because toward the end of this book the coverage becomes mainly macro. Friedman is given a full chapter entitled “Milton’s Paradise” and the neglect of von Mises by the economics profession is deplored, but for some reason most of the Chicago Micro-Nobels are barely mentioned in this text: George Stigler, Gary Becker, Ronald Coase, etc. Robert Lucas is noted because of a divorce settlement in which, apparently, he negotiated away half the returns from any future Nobel winnings.
Physically the book can only be described as a mess, chopped up into short sections—sometimes as many as three to a page—with innumerable boxed asides. There are photographs of prominent economists, with the face appearing most often that of Skousen himself. Some but very little of the modern secondary work in the history of economics is mentioned. We are more likely to see references to Murray Rothbard, Walter Williams and Dinesh De Souza than to Samuel Hollander, Denis O’Brien, Mary Morgan, Malcolm Rutherford, or Donald Winch. Mark Blaug is for some reason referred to as “today’s annointed historian of economic thought” (97) and “historian extraordinaire” but Blaug’s work seems not to have influenced the text very much. For example, Thomas Malthus is pictured by Skousen as a false prophet of increased human suffering in contrast to Blaug’s famous characterization of Malthus as author of “a timeless open-ended apocalyptic fallacy.”
The manuscript for this book must have cried out for a good editor, not only to give it shape but to query the innumerable typos, careless mistakes, inconsistencies, and departures into irrelevancy. Partly the problem is that Skousen often dives into a complex subject and emerges a few sentences later with a confident conclusion, sometimes expressed in anachronistic terms. Here are a few examples. Can we really say that Marx “advocated command economies at both the micro and macro level” (8)? Or that Smith inherited the Hobbesian theme “from Montesquieu and, later, Nassau Senior” (28)? Can we safely address the complex question of the position of classical economists toward women in one page? (113) Did Ricardo really engage in “ethereal model building”? (53). Surely, diminishing returns are not set forth in Malthus’s first Essay, as suggested in Figure 3.1 (77). Jeremy Bentham’s famous panopticon should not be dismissed as simply a “totalitarian monster” (123), since it was part of a pioneering program of penal reform intended to rehabilitate convicts. The term “ophelimity” was suggested as an alternative to utility not, as Skousen tells us, to the science of “political economy.” (198). Jevons was interested in astronomy but was never an “astrologer” (205). Marshall did not “invent” the concept of elasticity; there were predecessors. To label Veblen a “sociologist” is just to call names. J. N. Keynes was never a professor at Cambridge; he was a university administrator. Finally, this reviewer appears in this book as Cranford (sic) Goodwin.
