The generic title of Beiner's latest book does little to convey the very specific problem with which it wrestles. On its face, it is a survey of twelve twentieth-century thinkers—Arendt, Oakshott, Strauss, Löwith, Voegelin, Weil, Gadamer, Habermas, Foucault, MacIntyre, Rawls and Rorty—who exemplify Beiner's understanding of political philosophy as “a dialogical enterprise conducted in relation to superlatively ambitious articulations of ‘the human good’” (x). This understanding of political philosophy is far from uncontroversial; Beiner acknowledges that it flies in the face of the liberal argument that questions concerning the ultimate good for human beings are properly answered by individuals in private and that political philosophy should confine itself to clarifying the conditions under which individuals can live together in peace even as they pursue their different conceptions of the good life. By drawing these twelve “epic theorists” into each other's company and by engaging them in critical discussions which are richly interlaced with references to conversations and debates with his own friends and contemporaries, Beiner vividly substantiates this idea of political philosophy as a public dialogue about the human good which is subject to rational adjudication.
Despite the initial framing of the subject matter as a controversy between liberals and nonliberals, it is not only the liberals in the book who are gingerly lifting their skirts over the robustly normative enterprise in which Beiner insists they are all immersed. With a few possible exceptions, all are averse to doing political philosophy in Beiner's sense or, more precisely, all are averse to admitting that they are doing political philosophy in his sense; as with MacIntyre and Strauss, they are at the very least reticent about giving a full and open account of the normative foundations of their own thinking. Beiner is not unaware of the paradox of defining political philosophy in terms of doing what those he designates as political philosophers are so conspicuously trying to avoid being seen doing; it is exactly this perplexing tendency of contemporary political philosophy that he wants to bring into the foreground and put to the test.
Each chapter unfolds as a kind of forced confession in which Beiner draws from each thinker the comprehensive normative vision which they have attempted to “obscure, elide, or hedge” (170). Driving this interpretive method is the idea, credited to Aristotle, that human beings by nature desire to answer the question of how we ought to live. Nature will out in the end: “if one pitches it out through the front door, it will slip back in through the back door” (liii, n. 27). For Beiner, the antifoundationalist and antidoctrinal facades behind which contemporary political philosophy is conducted impoverish our thinking by relieving us of the dialogic requirement of justifying our normative positions; as well, they suppress the epic conversation on the human good which endows our otherwise unheroic lives with splendor, Beiner's conception of political philosophy here converging with Arendt's conception of politics.
The most potent engagement in the book takes issue with Strauss' understanding of political philosophy as an esoteric enterprise whose truths are accessible only to genuine philosophers, and then only after painstaking exegesis. Beiner's impatience with Strauss' esotericism—it is “supposed to protect the philosopher against the wrath of the multitude … but let's face it, it also protects Strauss against the intellectual obligation to justify his claims” (84)—could easily be extended to the entire company assembled in the book. Although traditional constraints on thinking and expression have been lifted in post-enlightenment liberal societies, contemporary political philosophers would seem to be following Strauss in repudiating the benefits as well as the duties that come with their greater freedoms; like Strauss' philosopher, they “conduct their intellectual business by whispering to each other, not by trading reasons and counterreasons” (81). The ascendancy of liberalism, positivism and postmodernism has not extinguished the human need to pursue the question of how to live through to its end. The result: we are all esotericists now.
Beiner's call for the revival of a political philosophy more directly focused on truth is complicated by the fact that he appears to privilege the continuation of a conversation of epic proportions over its actual truth content. The pursuit of the question of how to live is only meaningful if one can presume there is a single authoritative answer, Beiner maintains, but this kind of closure is unlikely if not impossible since every answer is susceptible to criticism; even if it were possible it would be undesirable, he suggests, because it would end the conversation. Moreover, the principal qualification for inclusion in the political philosophy pantheon is the epic reach of one's questions and answers rather than their rectitude or persuasiveness; as he suggests in a discussion of Arendt and Oakeshott, “getting it wrong” does not invalidate one's status as a political philosopher (39).
The question inevitably arises whether, despite its evident anchorage in Plato and Aristotle, Beiner's understanding of political philosophy owes more to the moderns than to the ancients in giving greater weight to splendor than to truth. Beiner's insistence on the “fundamental chasm” (224) between theory and practice is entirely appropriate to this understanding; in view of some among the company assembled here, we might count it a great benefit. But not only is the “chasm” between theory and practice flatly contradicted by the governing tendency of Beiner's own critical engagements, it has the unfortunate effect of deflating the value of the enterprise he has set out to elevate. If the ambitious critiques and visions which are offered by political philosophy in the epic tradition have no bearing on our citizenship, it is unclear why we would care enough about them to join the conversation in the first place. By the same token, it is difficult to imagine how our citizenship could ever be insulated from our nature as “wonder-experiencing … and foundation-seeking animals” (226). If nature will out in the end, better it return through the front door than the back.
