Within feminist scholarship, philosophy included, few topics have remained as divisive as that of pornography, whose pedigree as a polarizing subject matter extends well past the so-called “sex wars” of the 1980s. As an intellectual landscape, questions concerning pornography have covered issues of privacy, freedom of speech, power relations, censorship, artistic merit, fiction/fantasy, and of course, sexuality. In her 2013 book, “Why Internet Porn Matters,” Margret Grebowicz deftly spans this landscape, expanding the terms of debate in very short order. This addition to the Stanford Briefs collection is certainly timely—it arrives on the heels of the newly published “Feminist Porn Book,” and at a time when the Internet has been credited with expanding the production and distribution of feminist and queer-informed porn.
But how does the mode of distribution and consumption of pornography shape its social and political meaning? This question is at the heart of Grebowicz’s analysis, which treads between the two poles of the “sex wars” (i.e., pro-censorship/anti-porn versus anti-censorship/pro-porn), ultimately opening new discursive ground that should be of interest to a wide range of scholars, feminist and otherwise. Starting from the question of whether pornography is best understood as speech versus practice, Grebowicz argues for the importance of a speech paradigm, claiming that thinking about pornography in terms of speech/language enables a more robust understanding of the relationships between sex, speech, and power. Moreover, making this move allows Grebowicz to grapple with the enticing claim from feminist defenders of pornography, that the proliferation of pornographies is critical for resisting and subverting monolithic, heteronormative discourses of pleasure. Acknowledging the pull of this position, Grebowicz goes on to complicate it, through an analysis of the Internet as a unique medium with an attendant logic of distribution and consumption that undermines the potentially transformative value of pornography.
Grebowicz draws on the works of Baudrillard and Lyotard to critique the Internet as a mode of communication that perpetually incites discourse, compelling its users toward greater transparency and self-exposure. Part of a larger social imaginary within contemporary liberal democracies, this mode of communication simultaneously demands a certain kind of governable (masculine) subject. The seemingly limitless capacity for the circulation and sharing of pornographic information also compels greater and greater detail and visibility—the minutiae of sex and sexuality produce a culture of ‘hyperreality’ where nothing meaningful can be said. Such is the rub for pro-pornography feminists, whose hope for subversive speech is undermined by an imperative of communication, which is both foundational to, and fueled by, Internet distribution. This imperative undermines the possibility of meaningful speech, given the endlessly babbling and constant exposure, as well as the presumption that speech is simply offering truthful access to a priori interior states.
This argument certainly seems to trouble the notion that contemporary genres of feminist porn, including that which has been described as “local, fair trade, and organic”Footnote 1 might be easily and straightforwardly taken as liberating. In such genres, there is a conscious move away from the standards of mainstream heterosexual pornography, with its redundant images and archetype; there is a focus on fair and ethical production—in particular, ensuring that performers are able to contribute to plot lines, casting, specific sexual partners, specific sexual acts, and how they are represented on camera.Footnote 2 Frequently, interviews with performers are shown either directly before or after scenes, in which they offer insights into their particular fantasies and their experience with pornography; they “speak for themselves”Footnote 3 regarding their views of porn, pleasure, and fantasy. Grebowicz’s analysis certainly complicates the claim that this way of making pornography subverts the tenets of mainstream pornography: the imperative of communication imbued within Internet distribution ends up trapping even the ethical, fair trade varieties of pornography “in an (auto)erotic, self-referential, redundant circle” (p. 56).
But this is also where Grebowicz’s analysis runs into what might be its greatest challenge. On her accounting, the incitement to visibility and transparency that has been embraced by feminist pornographers (as in Nina Hartley’s instructional sex videos or Tristan Taormino’s feminist re-imagining of gonzo porn) reconfigures sexual pleasure as a fundamental right, thereby conflating sex with orgasm, and feminine with masculine. The fulcrum of Grebowicz’s argument here relies on an essentialist view of the feminine that is interwoven into theories of radical sexual difference, which may well be troubling to more than just a limited, liberal feminism. While feminist scholars have certainly critiqued universalist (masculinized) underpinnings of rights discourses, surely the notion of the feminine, depicted as fundamentally secretive and mysterious, and which is undermined by the logic of Internet distribution of porn, would also trouble those who are committed to constructivist understanding of gender, sexuality, and sexual identity. That radical sexual difference is itself somehow inevitable (and foundational) is problematic for more than second-wave liberal feminists. Likewise, there are those who would argue that sexual difference is but one contextual materiality of bodies,Footnote 4 and that to prioritize this one aspect of lived experience (even in an analysis of pornography) is problematic.
Granted, Grebowicz’s analysis is meant to complicate the idea that women’s sexual pleasure is simply about more sex, more orgasms, more often. The intellectual move she makes regarding sexual difference also enables an extremely interesting reading of Catharine MacKinnon in the latter chapters of the book. And so too are these arguments meant to complicate a view of (feminist) pornography as part of larger consciousness-raising projects, insofar as the mode of communication (Internet) undermines the very possibilities of transformative political speech (and action). But is the move toward essentialism, regardless of how subtle, really needed?
What might be more appealing to those who would sidestep the deployment of radical sexual difference as an explanatory tool, is a consideration of whether transformative possibilities may exist despite mass circulation and incitement to discourse prompted by Internet distribution. Jane Ward’s “Queer Feminist Pigs: A Spectator’s Manifesta” is the sort of work that would seem to offer an interesting counterpoint to Grebowicz’s analysis. Rather than focus on the means of production (and distribution), Ward altogether avoids a reliance on filmmakers of “queer” pornography, focusing instead on spectatorship, effectively circumventing the issues that Grebowicz raises for feminist and queer pro-porn theorists. If the claims of subversion, liberation, and resistance are undermined by the logic of communication afforded by Internet distribution, perhaps certain aspects of this challenge may be avoided by looking for ways to watch even the most mainstream porn. Is it possible to consume (Internet) porn, with all its babbling and emptiness, in a way that subverts, and which refuses the notion of any “authentic” sexuality?Footnote 5 Such a refusal demands critical reflection on who we consider “women” to be, and how they desire what they do. Offering the viewing of college reality porn as an example of mindful spectatorship, Ward writes, “…even within this less-than-liberating genre we can find ideas, gestures, and scenes that unintentionally provide fodder for queer orgasms, and opportunities for queer reflection.”Footnote 6 For Ward, queering porn on the spectator end requires attitudes and practices on the part of viewers—if this is indeed possible, such features undermine the mindless consumption that Grebowicz argues is endemic to Internet distribution of porn.
Nonetheless, such a challenge does little to undermine the importance of the book’s central claims, which are significant considerations for those thinking seriously about pornography. In particular, this is important scholarship for those embracing the notion that certain forms of pornography might be straightforwardly subversive. So it would seem that, as Grebowicz suggests, it matters that thinking about pornography moves beyond the means to production, to include the modes of distribution and consumption.
