INTRODUCTION
Before 1988, there was no unified legal framework in Nigeria for the settlement of commercial disputes by arbitration or conciliation. Various states in the country had their respective legislation, which governed the practice of commercial arbitration within those states. Examples of such legislation were the Arbitration Law of Lagos State,Footnote 1 the Arbitration Law of former Eastern Region,Footnote 2 the Arbitration Law of Kano StateFootnote 3 and the Arbitration Law of Cross River State.Footnote 4 One common feature of the various state arbitration laws was that they all derived from the Arbitration Ordinance of 1914Footnote 5 (the Arbitration Ordinance), which was promulgated under British colonial rule.
However, for states that did not promulgate an arbitration statute before 1988, commercial arbitration was governed by the Arbitration Ordinance and the common law rules relating to arbitration as propounded by the courts in England.
In 1988, the Federal Military Government promulgated the Arbitration and Conciliation Decree No 11 of 1988 (the Arbitration Decree). The aim of the Arbitration Decree was to provide a unified legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement by arbitration of commercial disputes throughout the federation. The decree, which applied throughout the Federation of Nigeria,Footnote 6 covered domestic and international commercial arbitration. It did not however affect the application of any law in force by virtue of which any particular dispute may be submitted to arbitration only in accordance with the provisions of that law.Footnote 7 While it could be argued that this provision saved the application of the various state arbitration laws to arbitration proceedings conducted within the respective states, a more valid argument would appear to be that the provision saved the application of specific legislation or any rule of law by which certain disputes, though of a commercial nature, may be settled only in the manner provided by such legislation or rule of law. An example would be the settlement of trade disputes.
Under the military regime, decrees were superior to edicts enacted by the governments of the various states in Nigeria. Decrees were also superior to the unsuspended parts of the constitution.Footnote 8 The continued application of these laws followed the provisions of the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree, No 13 of 1984, which made decrees superior to edicts and allowed edicts to have effect provided they did not conflict with any decree in force. The effect of this would therefore seem to be that the various arbitration laws applied only in so far as they were not inconsistent with the Arbitration Decree. This proposition may however not be correct in view of the clear intention of the Arbitration Decree when it was enacted in 1988: to provide a unified legal regime for the conduct of commercial arbitration throughout Nigeria. The correct view would therefore seem to be that the Arbitration Decree repealed the various state laws on arbitration which were then in force.Footnote 9
With the enthronement of constitutional democracy in Nigeria, the Arbitration Decree became known as the Arbitration and Conciliation ActFootnote 10 (the Arbitration Act). Those arbitration laws of the various states, which survived the enactment of the Arbitration Decree, continued to apply as laws deemed to have been enacted by the House of Assembly of the respective state.
In the recent case of Compagnie Générale de Geophysique v Etuk Footnote 11 (Compagnie Générale), the Court of Appeal held that the Arbitration Act is the applicable law on arbitration in all the states of the federation and that the Arbitration Law of Cross River State as applicable in Akwa Ibom State did not govern a matter that otherwise should be governed by the Cross River State law. In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeal relied on the doctrine of “covering the field”, to the effect that, the Arbitration Act having covered the field, no state law could co-exist with it on the same matter.
This decision has raised questions as to the exact scope of the doctrine of covering the field vis à vis the federal structure of governance practised by Nigeria under her constitution. This decision has also brought to the fore the issue of the application of existing laws, or the saving provision in relation to them, under the constitution. Most importantly however, this decision has raised the constitutional issue of the extent of legislative competence of the federal and state legislatures under the constitution. Somehow, this decision would seem not properly to have addressed these issues, and perhaps may have raised more questions than answers.
This article proposes to investigate the constitutionality of the continued application of the Arbitration Act as federal legislation with application in all states of the federation, in view of the division of legislative powers among the federal and state legislatures under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (the 1999 Constitution). The resolution of this question will determine whether the 1999 Constitution has provided any field which the Arbitration Act may validly cover. In doing this, the article will analyse the facts and decision in Compagnie Générale in the light of the doctrine of covering the field under Nigeria's federal system of governance. This article will also argue that this case was wrongly decided.
ALLOCATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS UNDER THE 1999 CONSTITUTION
With Nigeria's return to constitutional democracy in 1999, the respective legislative powers of the Federal Government and the component states of the federation came to be regulated by the 1999 Constitution. The Federal Government has exclusive power to legislate on matters contained in the exclusive legislative list or as may otherwise be specifically permitted in any other provision of the constitution.Footnote 12 Both the Federal Government and each component state of the federation have concurrent powers to legislate on matters in the concurrent list,Footnote 13 while each component state has exclusive power to legislate on matters that are in neither the exclusive nor the concurrent legislative list; these are generally referred to as residual matters.
The legislative power of the federation is vested in the National Assembly to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the federation or any part thereof with respect to matters included in the exclusive legislative list or matters in respect of which legislative competence is vested in the National Assembly by any section of the constitution. The National Assembly's power to legislate on matters in the exclusive list is, as the name implies, exclusive to it and cannot be validly exercised by the House of Assembly of any state in the federation.Footnote 14 Furthermore, the National Assembly and a House of Assembly can each legislate on matters in the concurrent legislative list to the extent expressly stated in that list.Footnote 15 There is, therefore, a concurrence of powers between the National Assembly and House of Assembly, to the extent of matters in the concurrent legislative list.Footnote 16 However, the power of a House of Assembly to legislate on a matter contained in the concurrent list is limited by the requirement that such legislation shall only operate subject to its conformity with existing federal legislation on the matter. In such a case, the federal legislation is deemed to have covered the field sought to be tilled by the state legislation.
As stated earlier, any matter not contained in the exclusive or concurrent legislative lists is regarded as belonging to the residual list; a House of Assembly can legislate on such matters to the exclusion of the National Assembly. Expounding on the existence of the residual list, Niki Tobi JSC stated in Attorney General of Abia State v Attorney General of the Federation:
“[T]he Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, like most constitutions, does not provide for a residual list. And that is what makes the list residual. The expression emanates largely from the judiciary, that is, it is largely a coinage of the judiciary to enable it [to] exercise its interpretative jurisdiction as it relates to the constitution. Etymologically, ‘residual’ merely means that which remains. In legislative or parliamentary language, residual matters are those that are neither in the exclusive nor concurrent legislative list.”Footnote 17
Therefore, to determine where the power to legislate on a given matter lies, resort must be had to the legislative lists in the 1999 Constitution. Where a matter does not fall under the exclusive or concurrent lists, it belongs to the residual list if no other provision of the constitution vests the relevant legislative power in the National Assembly, and only a House of Assembly can legislate on it. The exercise of legislative power by the National Assembly on such a matter would fall foul of the 1999 Constitution and be nullified by the courts.Footnote 18 In Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the Federation,Footnote 19 the Lagos State Government challenged the validity of the Nigerian Urban and Regional Planning ActFootnote 20 on the ground that urban planning is not a matter on either the exclusive or the concurrent legislative list, and can therefore only be legislated upon by a House of Assembly. The Supreme Court upheld the plaintiff's contention and held that urban planning is a matter on the residual list and, therefore, can only be legislated upon by a state. Also, in Attorney General of Abia State v Attorney General of the Federation Footnote 21 the Supreme Court nullified an act of the National Assembly which sought to monitor the distribution of monthly allocations to local governments, on the ground that local government is a residual matter under the 1999 Constitution and the National Assembly thus lacked the competence to legislate on it.Footnote 22
As already indicated, the law-making power of the Federal Government under military rule was largely unlimited, so that, before the 1999 Constitution came into force, the Federal Government legislated on matters which, under the constitution, are on neither the exclusive nor concurrent legislative list. Some other decrees and edicts were promulgated without regard for the limits that had been imposed on the exercise of legislative and executive powers under the earlier constitution. A saving provision was therefore incorporated in the 1999 ConstitutionFootnote 23 to ensure the smooth transitioning of these pieces of legislation to the new legal order. The 1999 Constitution also stipulates the conditions under which such laws shall continue to have effect either as an act of the National Assembly or as a law of a House of Assembly. As shall be demonstrated in the course of this article, the Arbitration Act happens to be one of the laws intended to be saved by this provision of the 1999 Constitution.
THE ARBITRATION ACT AS AN EXISTING LAW
Section 315 of the 1999 Constitution preserved all the laws that were in force in Nigeria before its promulgation. An existing lawFootnote 24 would continue to operate either as an act of the National Assembly (ie a statute with application throughout Nigeria, or in the Federal Capital Territory) or as a law of the House of Assembly of a state, depending on which of the legislatures has power under the 1999 Constitution to legislate on the subject matter of that existing statute. This section also recognized that, in their existing forms, some laws may offend certain provisions of the constitution and may therefore be voided by the courts. To save these statutes or particular statutory provisions from potential annulment by the courts, the constitution further provided that these laws could continue to operate with such modifications as would bring them into conformity with the provisions of the 1999 Constitution. Specifically, section 315(1) provides:
“Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, an existing law shall have effect with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of this Constitution and shall be deemed to be –
(a) an Act of the National Assembly to the extent that it is a law with respect to any matter on which the National Assembly is empowered by this Constitution to make laws; and
(b) a Law by a House of Assembly to the extent that it is a law with respect to which a House of Assembly is empowered by this Constitution to make laws.” (Emphasis added)
The Arbitration Act, having been in force before 1999, is an existing law that has been preserved by this section. The first question that arises is whether the Arbitration Act would continue to apply as an act of the National Assembly or a law of a House of Assembly. A similar question arose in Fawehinmi v Babangida.Footnote 25 In that case the Supreme Court considered the applicability of the Tribunal of Inquiry ActFootnote 26 (formerly the Tribunal of Inquiry Decree of 1966)Footnote 27 as an existing law under the 1999 Constitution. The respondent contended that the “tribunal of inquiry” is a residual matter and therefore the Tribunal of Inquiry Decree could not take effect as federal legislation with nationwide application because the National Assembly did not have legislative competence on the matter. Upholding the respondent's contention, a full panel of the Supreme Court held that the Tribunal of Inquiry Act was not applicable to the states as an existing law because the subject matter of the act was within the exclusive competence of the states. The Supreme Court therefore declared the act void in so far as it purported to apply in the states of the federation.
Following the decision in Fawehinmi v Babangida,Footnote 28 the answer to the question as to the scope of the continued applicability of the Arbitration Act depends on whether the National Assembly or a House of Assembly has the power to legislate on commercial arbitration. A review of the exclusive and concurrent legislative lists in the constitution does not indicate any express or specific provision on commercial arbitration. It is however arguable that items 34Footnote 29 and 62Footnote 30 on the exclusive legislative list give the National Assembly power to legislate on arbitration; item 34 covers the power to legislate on labour matters, including the arbitration of labour and industrial disputes, while item 62 relates to the power to legislate over international and inter-state trade and commerce. However, this power must be limited to the matters covered in those items, namely labour disputes and disputes relating to international and inter-state trade and commerce, and would not extend to the settlement of disputes arising from intra-state trade and commerce.Footnote 31 The effect of this is therefore that arbitration of disputes arising from intra-state trade and commerce falls under the residual list and can be legislated upon only by a House of Assembly (or the National Assembly, but with limited application to the Federal Capital Territory). In Fawehinmi v Babangida, Ejiwunmi JSC, commenting on the applicability of the Tribunal of Inquiry Act as an existing law, said: “the 1999 Constitution did not make any provision for Tribunals of Inquiry. In the absence of such a provision, the National Assembly cannot pass a general law on tribunals of inquiry to affect the entire federation … It remains to be said that under the 1999 Constitution, the establishment of tribunals of inquiry is now a residual matter which only the states can promulgate.”Footnote 32
Thus, following the reasoning of Ejiwunmi JSC in Fawehinmi v Babangida, the Arbitration Act, though an existing law under section 315 of the 1999 Constitution, cannot continue to have effect as federal legislation applicable throughout the federation with regard to the arbitration of disputes relating to intra-state trade and commerce, as the settlement of intra-state commercial disputes is not a matter on which the National Assembly is empowered by the constitution to make laws. It is however correct to say that the Arbitration Act would survive as an existing law applicable to the arbitration of international and inter-state commercial disputes. It may also be possible to contend that the Arbitration Act would survive as an existing law applicable to the arbitration of intra-state commercial disputes since it is a matter in respect of which a House of Assembly may make laws.
The resolution of the first question poses a second question: whether the Arbitration Act would automatically apply both as an act of the National Assembly and as a law of a House of Assembly without any modification. Put differently, what happens where the appropriate authority has not exercised its power under section 315(2) of the 1999 Constitution to modify an existing law? Would the courts be left with the liberty of dissecting and reading the text of the law and making consequential modifications according to whether they apply in the jurisdiction of the National Assembly or a state House of Assembly? Or would the application of the law be deemed to be in abeyance, unless and until the appropriate authority makes the necessary modifications? The answer would seem to depend on the extent of the modification required to bring the existing law into conformity with the 1999 ConstitutionFootnote 33 and, as will be shown later, whether the provisions of the existing law are inconsistent with the provisions of any other law passed by a House of Assembly on the same subject. Of course, if no modification is required for a law to be applied in its existing form without violating the 1999 Constitution, then there may be no doubt that the law would continue to apply without further action.Footnote 34
While the president of the federation is vested with the power to effect the necessary modification in the case of an existing law that is intended to remain in force as an act of the National Assembly, the power to modify an existing law that is intended to remain in force as a law of a House of Assembly is vested in the governor of a state.Footnote 35 Any person appointed under or by any law to revise or re-write the laws of the federation or of a state may also validly make the necessary modifications to an existing law. Accordingly, it may be argued that, unless and until the appropriate authority pursuant to section 315(2) of the 1999 Constitution makes the necessary modifications to an existing law, the application of the existing law stands “suspended” in the jurisdiction of that authority.Footnote 36
In Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the Federation Footnote 37 Uwaifo JSC held that the National Urban and Regional Planning Decree No 88 of 1992 was deemed to be an act of the National Assembly but with limited application to the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, as well as a law of a House of Assembly. While addressing the question of the continued applicability of the decree as a law of the House of Assembly of Lagos State, he reasoned:
“Being an Act applicable in the FCT, I need not discuss the implications since they are not in issue in this case. As a law in Lagos, which is the plaintiff state, that state cannot be concerned with any of the provisions in it relating to the Federal Government. The Governor of Lagos or any person appointed by any law to revise or rewrite the laws of the State [as an ‘appropriate authority’ under section 315(4)(a)] can by order make such modifications in the text of that law (ie Decree No 88 of 1992), as it stands, in the manner he considers necessary or expedient to bring it into conformity with the provisions of the Constitution. He may do so by only omitting all the provisions relating to the Federal Government or may repeal the entire law as it applies to Lagos State per s. 314(4)(c) … Let me assume that he takes the first alternative. What will be left will be incoherent and incomprehensible because they are not amenable to the ‘blue pencil rule’; that is to say, the good is not severable from the bad as the sections relating to the State are invariably tied to the responsibility of the Federal Government under the Decree. This completely exposes as unrealistic any attempt to save any of the provisions which affect Lagos State.”Footnote 38 (Emphasis added)
Uwaifo JSC would seem to have preferred the second of the two options he proposed, ie the repeal of the entire statute by Lagos State. Nevertheless, in line with the decision of the majority of the justices of the Supreme Court who sat on the appeal, he gave reliefs and consequential orders that merely nullified certain provisions of the statute in question as those provisions applied to Lagos State,Footnote 39 apparently in line with his first option. It is however possible to justify the order made by Uwaifo JSC on the basis that Lagos State did not ask for an annulment of the entire statute; the court merely, as it is limited in its power to do, granted the relief sought by the plaintiff. One may therefore speculate that, had Lagos State asked for an annulment of the entire statute, the court would have granted that relief.
In arriving at its decision to annul certain provisions of the statute, the Supreme Court, per Uwaifo JSC, relied on section 315(3) of the 1999 Constitution, which empowers a court of law or tribunal established by law to declare invalid any provision of an existing law on the ground of inconsistency with the provisions of any other existing law, a law of a House of Assembly, an act of the National Assembly or any provision of the constitution. It may therefore be deduced from this decision that the continued applicability of an existing law which requires modification as contemplated by section 315 of the 1999 Constitution, either as an act of the National Assembly or a law of a House of Assembly, is subject to one of two major factors: the making of the relevant modification by the appropriate authority; or the invalidation of the offending provisions by the court or any other competent tribunal upon an application to it. In the case of the latter, it is submitted that the application could be made even in the course of litigation where it is sought to apply the existing law. The continued applicability of the existing law is, in the technical sense, not put in abeyance, even though the continued applicability of its offending sections becomes in substance ineffectual and inoperable. The court may also in the exercise of its interpretative jurisdiction effect the required modification, and this is likely to be the case where the modification is not fundamental. It must nevertheless be added that, until an existing law is modified by the appropriate authority or by the court, lawyers may be in some difficulty when called upon to advise their clients. It is also possible that, until the Supreme Court exercises its interpretative jurisdiction with regard to any such statute, the specific contents of the statute would remain indeterminate.Footnote 40
While the strict words of section 315(2) empower the appropriate authority to “modify” the “text of any existing law”, it would seem on the authority of Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the Federation, especially the judgment of Uwaifo JSC, that the power to repeal any existing law is also included. It may however be argued that section 315(2) does not contemplate the repeal of an existing law because the object of the entire section is to ensure the continued applicability of the relevant law. The power to repeal the law exists outside section 315 and inheres in the relevant legislature as a component of its power to legislate on the subject matter covered by the existing law. It would therefore constitute an unlawful usurpation of the legislative power of a House of Assembly or the National Assembly for a governor or the president, as the case may be, to purport to repeal an existing law by virtue of section 315(2); any such purported repeal of an existing law would be void.Footnote 41
Be that as it may, yet another pertinent question is what happens to an existing law where the relevant legislative authority enacts a new law on a subject already covered by the existing law, the text of which is yet to be modified by the appropriate authority, especially where the new enactment makes no reference whatsoever to repealing or abrogating the existing law? In the view of the authors, the existing law would be held to have been impliedly repealed. According to Black's Law Dictionary, “implied repeal” is “the abrogation or annulling of a previously existing law by enactment of a subsequent statute which contains provisions so contrary to or irreconcilable with those of the earlier law that only one of the two statutes can stand in force”.Footnote 42 This definition conforms with the case law on this point, the landmark decision on the issue being Flanagan v Shaw.Footnote 43 In that case, Scrutton LJ, citing with approval AL Smith J in Kutner v Phillips,Footnote 44 stated:
“A repeal by implication is only effected when the provisions of a later enactment are so inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of an earlier one, that the two cannot stand together, in which case the maxim ‘Leges posteriores contrarias abrogant’ [‘later laws abrogate prior contrary laws’] applies. Unless two Acts are plainly repugnant to each other, that effect cannot be given to both at the same time, a repeal will not be implied, and special Acts are not repealed by general Acts unless there is some express reference to the previous legislation or unless there is a necessary inconsistency in the two Acts standing together.”Footnote 45
In the same case, Bankes LJ, citing with approval Dwarris on Statutes,Footnote 46 opined that “[e]very affirmative statute is a repeal of a precedent affirmative statute, where its matter necessarily implies a negative; but only so far as it is clearly and indisputably contradictory and contrary to the former Act in the very matter, and repugnant to such that the two Acts cannot be reconciled”.Footnote 47
What emerges from the foregoing is that the acid test of repeal by implication is whether the two statutes can coexist, in the sense that effect can be given to both at the same time. In the view of the authors, this could only be possible where one of the statutes is merely supplementary to the other, so that it takes the combined provisions of both statutes to create comprehensive legislation on the subject. This would not be the case where the later statute is so comprehensive on the subject that the former is rendered redundant. In other words, a statute could be held to have been impliedly repealed where the enactment of a subsequent statute on the subject renders the earlier statute redundant.Footnote 48
There is another side to this question. Suppose that the legislative authority of state X at the relevant time validly passed a law on a subject matter (the earlier law) and the subject matter is subsequently legislated upon (subsequent decree) by a body such as the Federal Military Government under a decree such as the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No 1 of 1984 (Decree No 1) without expressly repealing the earlier law. If, upon the exit of the military, a new constitution comes into force with similar provisions as the 1999 Constitution under which the subsequent decree becomes an existing law deemed to have been passed by state X (the deemed law), is it possible to say that the earlier law would revive to govern a situation that would otherwise have been governed by the deemed law subject to necessary modifications, simply because the earlier law was not expressly repealed by the subsequent decree and the necessary modifications have not been made to the text of the deemed law to make it practicable? Or is the earlier law to be regarded as having ceased to apply in state X? In other words, is there such a concept in law as a statute going into abeyance due to a subsequent overriding statute coming into force on the same subject matter, where the subsequent statute did not expressly repeal the earlier statute, such that the earlier statute would automatically come out of abeyance to become operational again without being re-enacted whenever the subsequent overriding statute ceased to have effect? In the view of the authors, once an enactment ceases to have effect by reason of the operation of a subsequent enactment on the same subject matter, that enactment is to all intents and purposes “repealed”; it is immaterial that the subsequent enactment did not expressly repeal it. Unless there is a provision in the subsequent enactment providing for the automatic revival of the earlier enactment upon the happening of an event, the earlier statute cannot regain force without being re-enacted by the relevant legislative authority. Support exists for this proposition in the Interpretation Act (the Interpretation Act), which provides: “[w]hen an enactment expires, lapses or otherwise ceases to have effect, the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall apply as if the enactment had then been repealed.”Footnote 49 Subsection (1) enumerates the effects of the repeal of an enactment. It follows from these provisions that the effect of a statute that at some point has ceased to have effect, say by virtue of the enactment of a subsequent statute, is the same as a statute that was expressly repealed, notwithstanding that the statute was not expressly repealed by the subsequent statute.
The continued application of the Arbitration Act as a law of a House of Assembly without further action would depend on whether any modification is required to bring it into conformity with the provisions of the constitution. It would seem that the Arbitration Act would need to be modified to bring it in conformity with the provisions of the constitution as a valid law of a House of Assembly, to the extent that the Arbitration Act contains express provisions that relate exclusively to international commercial arbitration:Footnote 50 a matter that borders on international commerce, which is within the exclusive competence of the National Assembly. However, the Arbitration Act is not voided by reason of the relevant state authority's failure to effect this modification, although those provisions that offend the constitution remain void and unenforceable and may be annulled by the court.
The Arbitration Act would nevertheless continue to apply as an act of the National Assembly with regard to disputes arising out of inter-state and international commerce, as well as disputes arising out of transactions in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. This creates a duality of laws regulating arbitration in the states: while the arbitration laws of the various states govern domestic arbitration within the states, the Arbitration Act would continue to govern arbitration within the states where the subject matter relates to inter-state and international commerce. It would seem that no modification is required in the current text of the Arbitration Act in this regard.
COMPAGNIE GENERALE DE GEOPHYSIQUE V ETUK
In this case, the respondent (a landlord) and the appellant (his tenant) entered into a tenancy agreement (the Agreement) under which the appellant occupied the respondent's building in Eket, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria. The tenancy was for a term of two years from 13 March 1992. Clause 6 of the Agreement was to the effect that all disputes, differences and questions which may at any time arise between the parties out of, or in respect of, the Agreement would be referred to arbitration by two independent estate valuers to be agreed upon by the parties. The appellant terminated the tenancy and gave up possession of the property on 25 January 1994. Upon entering the premises, the respondent allegedly discovered extensive disrepair and damage to the building and consequently engaged the services of a building contractor who prepared an estimate for the rehabilitation of the building. Based on the estimate, the respondent instituted an action at the High Court, Eket, claiming the estimated sum for the cost of the repairs and a further sum as damages for “breach of tenancy agreement”. Following the service of the processes, the appellant successfully applied for a stay of proceedings in the action pending reference to arbitration.
However, following some initial disagreement between the parties in their effort to appoint two arbitrators as contemplated by the Agreement, the respondent appointed one arbitrator and requested the appellant to appoint the second arbitrator. There was no reply from the appellant. After six months of inaction from the appellant, the respondent gave notice to the appellant that, unless the appellant appointed its own arbitrator within seven days, the respondent would appoint his own arbitrator as a sole arbitrator pursuant to the provisions of section 7(1)(b) of the Arbitration Law of Cross River State,Footnote 51 applicable to Akwa Ibom State (the Arbitration Law). The appellant failed to comply with the notice, whereupon the respondent appointed his arbitrator as sole arbitrator.
Although the appellant was invited by the arbitrator to participate in the proceedings, it sent no representative. Eventually, an award was made in favour of the respondent. Subsequently, the respondent brought an application at the trial court to enforce the award; however the appellant brought an application in opposition, essentially challenging the validity of the award. One of the bases on which the appellant challenged the award was that the parties had not agreed on the choice of arbitrator. Relying on the Arbitration Act, the appellant contended that, in the circumstances of its failure to appoint its own arbitrator, the respondent should have applied to the court for an order either appointing an arbitrator for the appellant or appointing a sole arbitrator for the parties, instead of making the appointment without a court order. The respondent argued that the applicable law was the Arbitration Law and not the Arbitration Act and that, under the provisions of the Arbitration Law, he could validly appoint a sole arbitrator without reference to the court. The two applications were heard together. In its ruling, the trial court held that the applicable law was the Arbitration Law and accordingly dismissed the appellant's motion. The court therefore granted the respondent's application to enforce the award. It is against this ruling that the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The issue that determined the appeal, as framed by Ekpe JCA,Footnote 52 was the question of the law that applied to the dispute, having regard to the Arbitration Act on one hand and the Arbitration Law on the other. In resolving this question, the Court of Appeal held that the applicable law was the Arbitration Act and not the Arbitration Law. Though the three justices of the Court of Appeal were unanimous in their decision that the applicable law was the Arbitration Act, Ekpe JCA, who read the lead judgment, and Olagunju JCA appear to have approached the question from different perspectives. Ekpe JCA invoked the constitutional law doctrine of covering the field as a basis for his decision. According to his lordship, both the Arbitration Act and the Arbitration Law were existing laws under “our Constitution”.Footnote 53 Unfortunately, his lordship did not indicate which of the constitutions he applied to the case.Footnote 54 However, there are reasons to believe that his lordship was referring to the 1999 Constitution. Certainly, he could not have been referring to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 (1979 Constitution). When the Arbitration Act was enacted as a decree in 1988, the Federal Military Government had assumed overriding legislative power in the country and so the provisions of the 1979 Constitution on the allocation of legislative powers as between the Federal Government and respective state governments had been suspended. Thus no question of “covering the field” could have arisen. Further, the Arbitration Act having originally been promulgated in 1988 was later in time than the 1979 Constitution, so the act could not have been contemplated as an “existing law” under the 1979 Constitution. Moreover, in view of the fact that the appeal came before the Court of Appeal in 2001 and judgment was delivered in 2003, it is most probable that the learned justice was referring to the 1999 Constitution. Olagunju JCA was however specific in his view that the Arbitration Act was an existing law under the 1999 Constitution.Footnote 55
While the authors concede that the Arbitration Act is an existing law under the 1999 Constitution, they take the view that the Court of Appeal was wrong in reaching the decision that the Arbitration Act, having covered the field, was the law applicable to the dispute as opposed to the Arbitration Law. As argued earlier, the Arbitration Act would continue to apply as existing federal law only in respect of international or inter-state commercial arbitration. The doctrine of covering the field would therefore only apply if the dispute before the Court of Appeal arose out of an international or inter-state commercial transaction. However the dispute arose out of a tenancy in respect of a property located in Akwa Ibom State and between parties who were, at the material time, resident in that state. The dispute therefore arose from an intra-state commercial transaction, and so the arbitration contemplated under the Agreement was an intra-state commercial arbitration. The Court of Appeal fell into this error when it came to the threshold determination that arbitration was a matter within the concurrent legislative list of the constitution. It would seem that the Court of Appeal was led into this error by the respondent, when he argued that “arbitration is a matter in the concurrent legislative list and that both the state and the federal governments are competent to legislate upon it”.Footnote 56 Thus it was not argued before the Court of Appeal whether arbitration was a matter on the concurrent legislative list of the constitution. It is therefore possible that the Court of Appeal would have come to a different decision had its attention been properly drawn to the fact that arbitration was not listed as a matter on the concurrent list.
It is also arguable whether the Arbitration Law survived as an existing law under the 1999 Constitution. In his concurring judgment, Olagunju JCA, while agreeing that the doctrine of covering the field was applicable to the case, went further to examine the validity of the Arbitration Law after the promulgation of the Arbitration Act, and took the view that the Arbitration Law was impliedly repealed by the Arbitration Act. In reaching this conclusion, his lordship interpreted section 35 of the Arbitration Act, which would seem to have saved existing state laws on arbitration, as very limited in its intention and effect. In his words:
“It is attractive to conceive section 35 of the Act as saving the state laws on arbitration so as to allow them to run concurrently with the federal act. Decidedly, that will be a misreading of that section, which in the context of the balance needed for the benefit created by the Act must be a concession to another act of Parliament prohibiting, on ground of policy, submission of certain disputes in sensitive areas of public service to the general run of arbitration with absolute freedom but instead permitting a resort to arbitration only in accordance with specific procedure [sic] as might be laid down by another act that may be designed to be more amenable to certain regimented sectors of our national life. But that is not the same as saying that the State arbitration laws have been allowed by that section a free rein to run in parallel with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.”Footnote 57
However, further in his judgment, his lordship would seem to have revived the application of the state arbitration laws, when he concluded:
“The implied repeal of the State laws on arbitration is without prejudice to any agreement that incorporates the use of arbitration under the moribund State laws which would continue to be enforced or observed by virtue of sub-sections 6(1)(b) and (c) of the Interpretation Act, cap 192 of the Laws of [the] Federation of Nigeria, 1990 … But any arbitration clause in any agreement made under any state law is to continue to be enforced if such clause is not inconsistent with provisions of the Act.”Footnote 58
It is perhaps on the basis of this revival of the Arbitration Law that the learned justice applied the doctrine of covering the field and held that the Arbitration Act had covered the field.
In reaching this conclusion, Olagunju JCA traced the legislative history of the Arbitration Act and indicated that, at the time the Arbitration Act was promulgated in 1988, it operated as a decree of the Federal Military Government, which prevailed over state legislation on similar subject matter. His lordship also referred to the editorial note to the 1990 revised edition of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria to the effect that the “Arbitration and Conciliation Act was promulgated under Decree No 1 of 1984 and item 67 of the Exclusive Legislative List in Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979”. Arbitration was therefore considered part of the exclusive list in the 1979 Constitution.
The judgment of Olagunju JCA is however difficult to follow. First, having determined that the Arbitration Act impliedly repealed all state legislation on arbitration, it was no longer open to the learned justice to invoke the doctrine of covering the field. This is because the doctrine applied only in a situation where federal and state legislation both exist at the material time;Footnote 59 the Arbitration Law had ceased to exist by 1988. Secondly, having also held, arguably though,Footnote 60 that arbitration had become an item on the exclusive legislative list of the 1979 Constitution (as amended and modified by Decree No 1), he also left no scope for the operation of the doctrine of covering the field. This is because the doctrine applied only if the two pieces of legislation under consideration were validly made; arbitration being a matter on the exclusive list at the time, any law purportedly made by a state on that subject became null and void since the state lacked the legislative competence to make the law. Thirdly, it is doubtful whether his lordship's interpretation and application of section 6(1)(b) and (c) of the Interpretation Act to revive the applicability of the Arbitration Law is correct. Section 6(1)(b) and (c) of the Interpretation Act would seem to operate to save acts done, or rights and liabilities arising, under a law that had been repealed before that repeal.Footnote 61 The section does not operate to affect acts, rights or obligations that arise after the repeal of an enactment. Legislation that has been repealed ceases to have effect and is deemed to have been obliterated from the statute book. In the authors' view therefore, irrespective of the implied repeal of the Arbitration Law, the applicable law would ultimately depend on when the cause of action for which the parties are in court arose. It is the time when the cause of action arose that would determine whether the right, privilege, obligation or liability being claimed or sought to be enforced by the plaintiff accrued under, and should be governed by the provisions of, the repealed enactment or the extant enactment. However, his lordship, Olagunju JCA did not seem to interpret the provisions of the Interpretation Act thus, though he quoted it. He appeared to have interpreted it to mean that the provisions of the repealed enactment would only apply if they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the extant enactment. This is implied in his lordship's conclusion: “[t]he long and short of the effect of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is that the act superseded the states' laws in arbitration. But any arbitration clause in any agreement made under any state law is to continue to be enforced if such clause is not inconsistent with any provision of the Act.”Footnote 62
In effect, in the view of his lordship, the determinant factor as to the continued application of the provisions of a repealed enactment is not the time when the cause of action arose but the content of the provisions of the extant enactment vis à vis those of the repealed enactment. The authors beg to disagree on this point. It is their position that the view expressed by his lordship would make nonsense of the provisions of section 6(1)(c) of the Interpretation Act upon which the view is purportedly anchored. For it is obvious that the purpose of the section is to save the already accrued rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities of parties to an action, which may have accrued before any change in the law, such that the repeal of an enactment would not have the effect of retroactively making an otherwise unlawful act lawful, or an otherwise lawful act unlawful. Therefore, if the provisions of a repealed enactment could not apply to define the rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities which may have accrued to parties before the repeal, unless those provisions are consistent with the provisions of the extant enactment on the matter, the courts might as well apply the provisions of the extant enactment without reference to the repealed enactment for the result will be the same. If this is so, the provisions of section 6(1)(c) of the Interpretation Act are useless.
However, as argued earlier, this view of his lordship cannot be correct. The fact that the lawmakers thought it necessary to enact the provisions of section 6(1)(c) of the Interpretation Act underscores the point that sometimes the application of the provisions of the repealed enactment to a given set of facts would yield a different result from the application of the provisions of an extant enactment on the matter. Moreover, the intention of the lawmakers that the provisions of the repealed enactment should apply to the facts where they arose before the repeal of that enactment, irrespective of what the provisions of the extant enactment may provide, accords with the principle against retroactive legislation.Footnote 63
His lordship would still have reached the conclusion that the Arbitration Act applied to the dispute without recourse to the doctrine of covering the field. Having made the threshold determination that the Arbitration Act impliedly repealed the Arbitration Law, the learned justice should have terminated his inquiry at that point. He would then have held that the question of the applicability of the Arbitration Law had become redundant. It would then have become logical for the learned justice to hold that the Arbitration Act applied to the dispute, unless he found another reason why the Arbitration Act would be inapplicable.
The fact that the Arbitration Act is an existing law under the 1999 Constitution is immaterial to the facts of this case. This is because the law that defines the substantive rights of parties to an action is the law in force at the time the cause of action arose.Footnote 64 The cause of action in this suit arose in 1997 when the respondent appointed a sole arbitrator,Footnote 65 and the 1999 Constitution had not been promulgated at that time. Thus, the legal order and the legislation that should apply to the dispute must be the legal order and the legislation that were in force in 1997.Footnote 66 The proper point of reference for the determination of the question of the law that applied to the dispute, as between the Arbitration Act and the Arbitration Law, should have been the applicable legal order as at 1997.
What then was the applicable legal order in 1997? In 1983 there was a military coup d'état which not only brought to an end the democratic order under the 1979 Constitution but effectively overthrew the legal order established by that constitution. Consequent upon the military take-over, several decrees, amongst them the Decree No 1, were promulgated to establish a new legal order. Decree No 1, which came into force on 31 December 1983, extensively suspended and / or modified the provisions of the 1979 Constitution. More importantly, what was left of the 1979 Constitution was subordinated to Decree No 1 as well as any other subsequent decrees.Footnote 67 Another noteworthy point about Decree No 1 is that it abrogated the existence of the legislative autonomy of the component states of the federation, which was the hallmark of the federal system established by the 1979 Constitution. In its place, Decree No 1 enthroned a unitary system under which the Federal Military Government was empowered to legislate for the entire country in respect of any matter whatsoever.Footnote 68 The implication of the resultant order was that the legislative power of the component states of the federation was merely as may be permitted by the Federal Military Government.Footnote 69 Hence section 2(4) of Decree No 1 provided that, if any law enacted before 31 December 1983 by the House of Assembly of a state or having effect as if so enacted, or made after that date by the military governor of a state, was inconsistent with any law either made by the National Assembly before 31 December 1983 or having effect as if so made, or made by the Federal Military Government on or before that date, the law made by the National Assembly, or by the Federal Military Government as the case may be, prevailed and the state law, to the extent of the inconsistency, became void. Also, section 16(1) of Decree No 1 provided that existing lawsFootnote 70 should continue to have effect with such modifications as may be necessary to bring them into conformity with the 1979 Constitution as amended, suspended, modified or otherwise affected by Decree No 1 or any other decree, until that law was altered by an authority having power to do so. The effect of these provisions of Decree No 1 on the Arbitration Law is that, though it survived as an existing law, it could be altered by the Federal Military Government in the exercise of its overriding powers to legislate on anything whatsoever. This legal order remained in place until 29 May 1999.
In 1988, the Federal Military Government, in exercise of the powers conferred on it by Decree No 1, promulgated the Arbitration Act, which came into force on 14 March 1988. Section 58 of the Arbitration Act provides that it shall apply throughout the federation. Moreover, the long title of the Arbitration Act describes the act as an “Act to provide a unified legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement of commercial disputes by arbitration and conciliation”. In effect the purpose of the Arbitration Act was to abrogate the system whereby the various component states of the federation operated their respective and differing laws on arbitration. No doubt it would have been ideal if the Arbitration Act had expressly repealed the existing state laws on arbitration. Yet, notwithstanding that it did not do so, there is no denying that the operation of the Arbitration Act left no scope for the application of the various state laws on arbitration. Having expressed in its long title that the Arbitration Act ushered in a “unified legal framework”, it would appear idle to argue that it left room for the continued applicability of the various state laws on arbitration at the same time. The only outstanding question would be as to whether the Arbitration Act impliedly repealed the arbitration laws of the various states or whether the arbitration laws of the various states merely went into abeyance. As discussed earlier, there is no prevailing concept in Nigerian law of a statute going into abeyance due to the coming into force of a subsequent statute on the same subject matter (that did not expressly repeal the earlier statute) and then automatically coming out of such state of abeyance to become operational again.Footnote 71 The Arbitration Act therefore impliedly repealed the arbitration laws of the various states, in view of the reality of the existing legal order when it was promulgated, especially in view of the earlier argument on the concept of implied repeal and considering the fact that it was the Federal Military Government, which had the legislative authority to modify existing state laws, that enacted the Arbitration Act instead.Footnote 72
However, whether or not the Arbitration Act repealed the arbitration laws of the various states or such laws merely went into abeyance (if any such principle still exists and could apply to the facts of this case) there can be no argument that, in 1997, the Arbitration Act prevailed over the Arbitration Law. The Arbitration Law is a re-enactment of the Arbitration Ordinance, which came into force on 31 December 1914. By the re-enactment in the Laws of Cross River State, 1981, it governed arbitration proceedings in the then state of Cross River, which included the territory comprising the present Akwa Ibom State. The re-enactment was done by the then Cross River State House of Assembly under the 1979 Constitution but was over-ridden by the Arbitration Act in 1988. There was therefore no scope for the Arbitration Law to apply to the facts of Compagnie Générale in 1997.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore the authors' view that the applicable law to the facts of Compagnie Générale is the Arbitration Act, not on the principle of covering the field but on the basis of its being the only extant general enactment on arbitration at the time the cause of action arose, ie the appointment of the sole arbitrator by the respondent in 1997.
Assuming, but not conceding, that the determination of the law applicable to the dispute in Compagnie Générale was properly reached by reference to the 1999 Constitution, it is however submitted that the Court of Appeal was wrong to have reached the conclusion that the Arbitration Act was the applicable law. As argued earlier, under the 1999 Constitution, arbitration of intra-state commercial disputes is a matter within the exclusive legislative competence of the House of Assembly of a state. To the extent that the underlying dispute in Compagnie Générale related to an intra-state commercial transaction, the Arbitration Act could not validly apply. The law applicable to the arbitration would be the law applicable to arbitration in Akwa Ibom State; whether or not this is the Arbitration Law would depend on whether the Arbitration Act repealed the Arbitration Law in 1988 or whether the Arbitration Law merely went into abeyance upon the enactment of the Arbitration Act. If the Arbitration Act repealed the Arbitration Law, the law applicable to the arbitration in Compagnie Générale would be the common law principles of arbitration, in the absence of a modification to the Arbitration Act or the enactment of a new Arbitration Law by the legislature of Akwa Ibom State after the 1999 Constitution came into force. It is also possible for a court, on the authority of Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the Federation,Footnote 73 to exercise its interpretative jurisdiction to modify the Arbitration Act to come within the scheme of the 1999 Constitution and apply it as the Arbitration Law of Akwa Ibom State. This last option is however fraught with the practical difficulties highlighted in this article. It would therefore seem that the best approach that would enable lawyers to advise their clients properly on intra-state arbitration would be for each state either to modify the Arbitration Act to apply as its arbitration law or to pass a new arbitration law, as Lagos State has done.Footnote 74
