Senem Aslan’s book, Nation-Building in Turkey and Morocco, attempts to tackle the old question of the relationship between nation-states and their ethnic minorities through a historical and comparative analysis of Kurds in Turkey and Berbers in Morocco. The author duly wonders why the aspiring Turkish and Moroccan state elite have, since the start of their respective nation-building projects, pursued different strategies in terms of dealing with their major contending ethnic minorities. Despite their (somewhat overemphasized) similarities in many regards, Senem Aslan argues that Kurds in Turkey and Berbers in Morocco have had quite different experiences with their respective nationalizing states: while Berbers have had a relatively peaceful and compromising relationship with the Moroccan state, Kurds have had a more violent and confrontational relationship with the Turkish state. The analysis in the case of Turkey relies on a rich array of primary and secondary sources, whereas the Moroccan case relies more heavily on others’ assessments, though some primary sources (specifically, newspaper accounts and personal interviews) are used in the discussion and analysis of more recent developments.

The main argument of the book is that variation and change in state-building and nation-building strategies explains what kind of an outcome emerges in terms of relations between the state and (ethnic) minorities. The better a given state is able to adopt and adjust its policies and strategies in the face of new challenges and new actors, the more it will be able to contain these challenges and accommodate and integrate the challengers, and the more likely it will thus be able to achieve a more stable and durably peaceful political regime and an effective state rule and social control. The general argument of the book runs as follows: at its emergence and initial stages of formation, the level of a given state’s autonomy from social centers affects its state-building strategy, which, coupled with its ideology (rigid or soft nationalism), then conditions its nation-building strategy; subsequently, once that is formed and becomes resilient, the long-term outcome of state-minority relations is largely conditioned by it.

Chapter 2, entitled “Policies of ‘Extreme Makeover’: State-Kurdish Relations in the Early Turkish Republic,” relies on a variety of primary documents from the state archives in examining the state- and nation-building strategies of the emerging Turkish state during the single-party era (1923–1950), thereby attempting to show how the state’s ideological rigidities and inflexible, comprehensive, and intrusive strategies toward the Kurds—with the ultimate aim being a total transformation of their ordinary daily lives, a policy that the author calls “extreme makeover”—led to a series of major violent conflicts between Kurds and the Turkish state. This entire so-called “civilizing mission,” Senem Aslan argues, failed to achieve its intended results, and paradoxically curtailed the very possibility of establishing state power and authority in Kurdish areas.

Chapter 3 then turns to the case of Morocco and looks at the initial stages of state-building and national identity formation from the time the country achieved independence in 1956 up to 1980. Despite the fact that it encountered a similar problem of Berber tribal resistance to the expansion of state authority, the Moroccan state, according to Aslan, adopted a more flexible and accommodating nation-building strategy as compared to the Turkish state. The king established the state’s rule over Berber society by integrating Berber notables and tribal leaders into his political and administrative network. Moreover, the definition of Moroccan national identity was much more flexible and inclusive. This, the author argues, was the main reason behind the lack of politicization of Berber identity and the absence of a violent and confrontational relationship between the Moroccan state and the Berbers.

Chapter 4, entitled “The Making of an Armed Conflict: State-Kurdish Relations in the Post-1950 Period,” returns back to the case of Turkey. Although, in the introduction, the author claims that change and variation in regime type does not determine whether state-minority relation ends in violent conflict or peace, this chapter demonstrates that, as soon as the multi-party era began in Turkey in 1950, state-minority relations suddenly and radically transformed. State intrusion began to decline, the “makeover” project was abandoned, and Kurdish power centers started to get integrated into the political system. However, in the 1980s, with the curtailments brought to the democratization process by the military regime, the Kurdish movement began to be radicalized. In other words, a new wave of “extreme makeover” policies was initiated, in the long run giving way to more mobilization and support for the radicalized Kurdish movement. Thus, change in the regime actually did matter.

Chapter 5, the last chapter before the conclusion, examines the relationship between rising Berber activism and the Moroccan state in the post-1980 period. Despite its initial radicalism, this chapter argues, Berber activism has remained peaceful and conciliatory and not taken the form of a nationalist mobilization. Pushing her argument even further, the author argues again that the main reason behind the Berber movement’s “failure” and lack of appeal and support was “carefully formulated state policies” (p. 165).

There is no doubt that this book is a product of long and studious research. The book is highly readable and very well organized. Nevertheless, it suffers from some of the typical troubles that afflict dual-case comparative analysis. The major problem has to do with the choice of cases. The author repeatedly contends that the cases she has selected are similar in many regards. However, apart from the fact that they have both been nationalizing and centralizing states with a major and initially contending and dissident ethnic minority, the (over)emphasis on the similarity and comparability of Turkey and Morocco does not prove very convincing. Especially in terms of the initial conditions, the two cases have some major differences. Morocco, for instance, had a colonial past as the colonized, whereas Turkey inherited an imperial legacy. Furthermore, Turkey experienced a series of long wars before achieving independence, whereas Morocco’s independence was relatively peaceful. What is more, the international context was quite different when the respective countries’ state-building and nation-building processes initially started. In terms of percentage of the total population, the Berbers in Morocco constitute a much more sizable group (about 40%) than the Kurds of Turkey (about 15–20%). The author herself even occasionally admits that the social structure of Morocco was very different than that of Turkey (p. 84). However, if one wants to causally explain a difference in outcome—in this case, the presence or absence of violent conflict between a state and a minority group—one has to make sure that the cases in question at least share similar initial conditions. Particularly in the absence of a control case, analytically and methodologically there remains very little to causally link the outcome of state-minority relations with state strategies.

Rather than retrospectively building the argument based on the outcome, the analytical and theoretical framework might have been more effective had it concentrated instead on the relational and interactive dynamics between the state and societal actors that existed or emerged during the processes of state- and nation-building. This would, at least, have allowed more credit and agency to be given to Kurds and Berbers, rather than confining their role in affecting the outcome to a mostly reactive and contingent one. Here, one needs to look not for a direct causal link between choice in the state policy of nation-building (X) and the development of a violent ethnic movement (Y), but rather for a causal chain: X triggering the sequence a,b,c, which yields Y. Here, it is not only X, but also the sequence of events triggered by X that has an effect on the outcome, which means that in the absence of the sequence a,b,c, X will not necessarily lead to Y. X may indeed open the way for Y, but a different sequence of a,b,c may just as well divert the process to another outcome (Z) different from Y. Actually, to her credit, in her analysis of individual cases Senem Aslan follows a similar logic of historical causation, drawing attention to both regularities and irregularities in the causal chain. She does an excellent job, especially in her analysis of the Turkish case, of laying out the intricacies, nuances, richness, and unpredictability of the interactive processes that occur between the state and societal actors. Her depiction of how central state policies were actually carried out and even contested, reformulated, and twisted both by local state administrators and societal actors on the ground is remarkable. But when it comes to drawing general arguments and conclusions based on comparative analysis of the two cases, the causal logic seems to lose its grip. This is typical in dual-case studies when one imposes one’s theoretical expectations too stringently on individual cases, since dual-case studies can rarely settle questions about the importance of factors that differ across cases. Nonetheless, such factors can surely help identify at least some of the likely causal patterns. Therefore, the conclusions of this book should be read as such.

To conclude, despite its limitations and occasional historically unevinced statements—such as the statement about the Alevi Kurds of Dersim actively supporting the Turkish army during the Sheikh Said rebellion (p. 50)—students of comparative historical analysis, who are familiar with the challenges and difficulties of such research and the amount of time and labor it requires, will certainly appreciate and welcome Senem Aslan’s book.