In the classes on fascism that I teach at Arizona State University, the main driving question is a very basic one: ‘what is fascism?’ It is a simple question but, as the decades of academic research on fascism have shown, it has proven to be extremely difficult to answer. Scholars of fascism still debate the precise definition, sometimes heatedly so, and so I do not expect students to reach a consensus either. But this does not mean that it is a pointless endeavour to try to answer it. By spending an entire semester trying to understand what fascism was and is, students not only familiarise themselves with the debates on the topic but also can unsettle conventional wisdom previously taken for granted by scholars and the general public.
In particular, as in my own research, I have students answer this question by traversing the diverse history of fascism and seeing its global nature. Although fascism was first formally recognised as a distinct ideology and movement in inter-war Europe, the core ideas animating fascism, as well as its aesthetics and style of politics, were hardly exclusive to Europe. As a historian of Korean and East Asian political and intellectual history, I find that fascism has had a prominent role in Asian politics throughout the twentieth century. As I have written about elsewhere, there is a need to break fascism out of a Eurocentric framework and recognise it as the global phenomenon that it was.Footnote 1
I seek to impart the same lessons about fascism to my students. I consciously structure my courses on fascism to reflect the global perspective, starting with their titles: ‘Global History of Fascism’ for my undergraduate course and ‘Comparative Fascisms’ for my graduate course. My undergraduate and graduate courses diverge in their focus, with the former being a survey of fascist ideologies and movements while the latter is a historiographical exploration of how the scholarship on fascism has changed. However, both of these courses spend much of the time examining fascist ideologies and movements that were active outside of Europe, including in Asia and the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, they share the main theme that fascism’s history should be approached from as non-Eurocentric a perspective as possible. Not only does this approach shed light on fascism’s nature as a global phenomenon, but it also clarifies what the essence of fascism is and what has made it possess such durable appeal well past the Second World War.
When I start the first day of class by asking students what fascism is, they invariably mention one-man dictatorships, totalitarianism, global wars and the like. But students’ answers, for the most part, draw on the European historical experience. Throughout the rest of the term, I repeat the deceivingly simple question of ‘what is fascism?’ Their responses change as students are exposed to more and more case studies from the rest of the world.Footnote 2
My focus on globalising the history of fascism, however, does not mean that I discard the history of European fascism in the process. On the contrary, the European experience with fascism is a cornerstone in my teaching. Global histories of fascism still include Europe, after all. Rather than de-emphasising Europe, I instead decentre Europe by showing how European experiences of fascism were actually part of global trends in politics. In fact, having a firm foundation in the history of European fascism is necessary to explore fascism at a global level, in particular because the European experience has informed more general understandings of the concept. Moreover, given that most students who have some basic knowledge of fascism learned about it through the European experience, it makes sense to start the courses with Europe.
In both my undergraduate and graduate courses, I begin the semester with overviews of the intellectual origins of fascism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries before spending several weeks on Italian Fascism and German Nazism. My undergraduate course is driven by primary sources that include speeches and writings by Mussolini, Hitler and their followers, including Alfred Rocco, Giovanni Gentile, Alfred Rosenberg and Ernst Huber. Through these sources, we identify the core themes and motivations behind fascist politics. These include a mythical and organic conception of the nation, a subordination of the individual to the ethnic nation and state, and an intense distrust of both communism and capitalist liberalism. The Italian and German cases also emphasise the elevation of Mussolini and Hitler as paramount and flawless leaders who act as vessels for the will of the people.
I then introduce samples of the secondary literature on fascism, in which scholars based their definitions of fascism on these prototypical cases of Italy and Germany. We examine the writings of Stanley Payne, Roger Griffin and Robert Paxton and their conceptualisations of ‘generic fascism’. Although these authors diverge sharply on some issues, we can find broad areas of shared agreement. Drawing on these scholars, we can view fascism as a ‘palingenetic form of ultranationalism’ that promotes a mythic view of nationalist identity and history as a means to revitalise the ethnic nation, as a third way ideology rejecting both capitalism and communism, and as a movement based on ‘mobilizing passions’.Footnote 3
This overview of the secondary literature is important not just in distilling the European cases of fascism but also in providing students a template to use for comparison with non-Western case studies, which we turn to in the next section of the course. But it also sets the stage for an eventual critique of this scholarship. Each of these aforementioned scholars briefly discusses and then dismisses the possibility of fascism outside of Europe. But how do their definitions apply to contexts beyond inter-war Europe? Importantly, we also discuss how these supposedly generalisable definitions are derived from a narrow base consisting mainly of the Italian and German experiences with a smattering of other European case studies. We discuss the potential drawbacks of this process, namely the logical pitfalls that might arise from creating a generic model built on a limited empirical foundation.
In subsequent weeks, we apply these conceptual definitions of fascism to ideologies and movements beyond Europe that possess significant convergences with European fascisms. The Asian case studies are particularly informative. We analyse primary sources from Imperial Japan, such as the state propaganda document Kokutai no hongi, translated as the ‘cardinal principles of the national polity’, which assailed Western individualism for thoroughly clashing with Japanese native values of collectivism and social harmony; as well as proceedings from a conference titled ‘Overcoming Modernity’ that criticised Western capitalist modernity as a form of disease infecting Japan.Footnote 4 For China, we examine the book China's Destiny, attributed to Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek and depicted by his critics as ‘China’s Mein Kampf’. In this book, Chiang called for a palingenetic ‘national reconstruction’ and ‘rehabilitation’ through a Confucian-based native ideology instead of adhering to either individualistic liberalism or class-based communism.Footnote 5 Finally, I assign extracts from ideological texts produced under South Korea’s first President, Syngman Rhee, which promoted a state doctrine called the ‘One People Principle’ (ilminjuŭi) that heavily emphasised Koreans’ blood-based homogeneity and unity based on descent from the ancient mythical progenitor Tan'gun, in addition to strident critiques of communism and capitalism for their harm to national harmony and their subjugation of the Korean nation.
After examining these Asian case studies, we revisit the question of what fascism is, and how the secondary literature stacks up. At this point, students have generally noted the strong convergences in ideas between European fascists and Asian nationalist ideologues. The key differences are the absence of a Mussolini- or Hitler-like dictatorial figure in Japan or Korea that exercised absolute political power, as well as the lack of a mass fascist party. However, even then, the Emperor maintained an infallible and transcendent position in Imperial Japan in which all acts were carried out in his name, while Chiang Kai-shek certainly aspired to attain a position in Chinese society along the lines of Hitler. Moreover, even without a major fascist party, youth in Japan, China and Korea were routinely mobilised for political activity and violence and deeply committed to nationalism.Footnote 6
What emerges from this comparison is the commonality across Europe and Asia in the following areas: the adherence to virulent and palingenetic ethnic nationalism; a collectivist subsummation of the individual into the organic nation and state; and a strong opposition to communism, capitalism and liberalism in favour of an idiosyncratic ‘third way’ that combines and overcomes these ideological paradigms for the sake of the nation. Although some disagree that we can consider these East Asian case studies as squarely ‘fascist’, students have generally reached a consensus that, at the very least, these ideologies carried strongly fascistic overtones. Instead of treating fascism in a dichotomous way, such as by judging something (i.e., ideology, movement, regime, aesthetics) or someone as either exclusively ‘fascist’ or ‘non-fascist’, it is more productive to understand fascism as a ‘difference of degree’ in a gradient scale.Footnote 7 As a result, students have expressed critiques of the previous secondary literature constraining the applicability of fascism, in alignment with more recent scholars’ arguments noting the circular Eurocentric logic of earlier generic fascist models.Footnote 8
But once again, this critique of the Eurocentrism of previous generic fascism is not meant to discredit the European historical experience with fascism. Rather, the East Asian cases enhance the generic fascism model by showing significant commonalities with European fascism, which, as mentioned above, students have observed. Generic fascism's main issue was not with the content of the model itself, but its misapplication in a very limited geographic range.
The cases of China and Korea are also useful for teaching because of the anticolonial and postcolonial postures of their nationalisms. Due to the Axis Powers’ conduct during the Pacific War and Second World War, fascism has been strongly associated with aggressively expansionist nationalisms. But how then do we account for the rise of fascism in anti-imperial nationalisms? The answer is directly related to fascism's critique of Western modernity, about which anticolonial activists also expressed discontent.Footnote 9 What the East Asian case studies demonstrate is the importance of the question of modernity to fascism, namely how fascism represents an alternative, nationalist form of modernity in opposition to (while incorporating elements of) capitalist liberalism and communism. Authors like Roger Griffin and Jeffrey Herf have already highlighted the centrality of an alternative modernity in fascism in their works, but the East Asian cases reinforce the importance of this feature.Footnote 10
For many East Asian nationalist figures, as the aforementioned primary sources used for class readings show, both capitalist liberalism and communism represented Western forms of modernity that they believed were unsuitable for their respective societies.Footnote 11 They certainly wanted the fruits of modernity in the form of industrialisation, technological progress and a powerful state. But many of these nationalists, like their counterparts in Europe, did not want the byproducts of capitalist liberalism, including social dislocations and class divisions, the spread of individualism and what they perceived as selfish pursuit of private interests at the expense of the public good and the deterioration of public morals. Nor did they approve of class conflict advocated by communism, which threatened to fracture the nation, strongly preferring class and social harmony and national unity. For anticolonial and postcolonial nationalists as a whole, including in China, distrust of Western forms of modernity was enhanced by the colonial experience at the hands of Western powers. For Koreans, who were colonised by the Japanese (1910–45), their scepticism of Western modernity was also influenced by Japanese anti-Western perspectives to which they were heavily exposed under Japanese colonialism; widespread distaste for Western modernity endured after independence in 1945 and the establishment of North and South Korea in 1948. It is not a surprise that fascist ideas had broad appeal among the colonised.Footnote 12
As a result of this expansive geographical inquiry, the initial question of ‘what is fascism?’ also morphs. In addition to asking whether a case study can be considered ‘fascist’ – in the sense that there is a preordained definition of fascism that is then applied to a country – I also ask students whether we should revise or expand our definition of fascism based on the additional case studies. By the end of the term, after examining the various case studies, students generally have found this theme of modernity to be a major connecting thread that also helps explain fascism’s notable characteristics of virulent ethnic (and sometimes racialist) nationalism, collectivism, anti-communism and anti-liberalism.
The case of Korea also introduces the question of whether fascism arose after 1945. The final third of the course explores fascism’s relationship with postwar politics. Given the resurgence in public interest in fascism that has accompanied the dramatic rise in right-wing politics in the twenty-first century, many students have also expressed curiosity about fascism’s relevance to contemporary politics.
The question of fascism’s relevance today is a topic that I also cover, although the decision to do so came with some trepidation. I cannot deny that I have considered whether to limit the scope of my courses on fascism to the twentieth century. However, the connections between fascism and contemporary politics in the twenty-first century are too strong to ignore. Whether consciously or not, contemporary intellectuals and activists have drawn inspiration from fascism to shape their own ideologies and movements. I want to provide a space for students to explore these connections in an academic and intellectually rigourous manner. At the very least, even if one might disagree whether today's politics amount to fascism – which several students have expressed – my courses can provide students with sources and intellectual tools to make that decision for themselves.
A final exercise for the term is to read and discuss news coverage of right-wing politics since the 2010s as well as the current debates about the applicability of the term ‘fascism’ to movements like Trumpism and the Alt-Right. In general, the majority of my students have identified parallels between contemporary politics and fascism, and have found the previous weeks’ discussions of fascism's global history helpful in informing their opinions about fascism’s relevance in the twenty-first century. The phrase ‘Make America Great Again’, for example, is a textbook case of palingenetic nationalism. Moreover, what fascist or fascistic ideologies and movements have shared across the world, whether in Europe or Asia, is a deep hostility towards Western liberal modernity. Such is the case in contemporary right-wing movements in Europe and the United States. Even as Western right-wing movements frequently portray their cause as a defense of the ‘West’, this vision of the ‘West’ is not one based on capitalist liberal principles, but rather one that is xenophobic, authoritarian and openly skeptical of liberal democracy.
Exploring the history of fascism from a global perspective offers many benefits to students’ (and scholars’) understanding of fascism as a whole. By expanding our inquiries about fascism beyond Europe, we can see broad-based factors that connect political movements across space and time. It can even help identify what animates contemporary right-wing movements. Of course, this will require faculty members to step outside their comfort zones and teach about countries and societies they may not be too familiar with. But as someone who has had to do this for my own teaching, I have found it to be an enriching endeavour, both individually and in the classroom.
In sum, when teaching fascism, it is important to decentre Europe and approach it from a global perspective. Doing so will not only enhance students’ understanding of fascism as a concept, but it will, by extension, also improve public discourse on the relevance of fascism to contemporary politics. The main European cases of Italy and Germany are integral, as I have mentioned, because they embodied the core features of fascism that can also be found elsewhere, and were what drew people around the world to fascism. But only discussing these two cases inherently limits students’ understanding of what was truly a global political phenomenon. Paradoxically, only by broadening the cases studied can the true significance of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany be understood.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Joshua Arthurs and Michelle Kahn for their comments on earlier versions of this essay. I would also like to thank them, Max Ward and Marla Stone for their valuable insights on the topic of teaching fascism in the classroom during the roundtable at the American Historical Association Annual Meeting in 2026.
Sungik Yang is an assistant professor of history at the School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies at Arizona State University. He is an intellectual and political historian of modern Korea and East Asia. His forthcoming book examines the rise of a fascistic political culture in postcolonial Korea during the Cold War.
