In 1935 Karl Löwith published his path-blazing work Nietzsches Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkunft des Gleichen. He focused on Zarathustra's famous doctrine of the eternal return of the same and its relation to the will to power. With great learning and sensitivity, Löwith considered the eternal return in its context in the history of philosophy from the pre-Socratics to Hegel and beyond and assessed it in terms of its psychological and moral function, logical coherence, and correspondence or noncorrespondence to nature. In a letter to his friend Löwith, Leo Strauss fully appreciated the majesty of the book, yet also mentioned a shortcoming: it does not suffice simply to take Nietzsche's teaching of the recurrence as it were at face value and then to evaluate its consistency and cogency. For above all one must penetrate to Nietzsche's deeper intention in order to understand the meaning of his philosophy. Even if Strauss's observation will not serve to resolve all of Nietzsche's paradoxes, for serious scholars it can stand as the beginning of wisdom.
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What is a philosopher? This question, so lucidly simple as to allow of an etymological answer, “a friend or lover of wisdom,” yet so perplexingly complicated as to require whole libraries of dialectical and psychological investigations, hovers in the background of all Platonic dialogues. One may soundly affirm, in the spirit of Descartes, that a philosopher relentlessly seeks the deepest truths and refuses to accept any authority or any opinion without rigorous empirical and logical verification. Such a beginning, though not misleading, leaves open fundamental questions that Nietzsche pursues from the outset in Beyond Good and Evil. Does philosophic activity itself derive from prejudices or dogmas or irrational impulses? What in us really seeks truth, and for what in life is truth good?
Professor Michael Gillespie of Duke University has just published an impressive tome on Nietzsche, the mature culmination of a lifetime of reflection. Gillespie ambitiously attempts to develop, on the basis of close familiarity with Nietzsche's entire corpus, Nachlass, and letters as well as a large body of commentaries, an authentic, comprehensive, probing account of Nietzsche's (chronologically) final teaching. To a considerable extent Gillespie succeeds, and we can be grateful for his achievement. Yet we recall that Zarathustra loves his life even more than his wisdom, and a fortiori more than his teaching. Moreover, as Gillespie is well aware, Zarathustra teaches his disciples not to remain pupils but to become independent, that is, to transcend the received lessons of their teacher. The richest heritage Nietzsche leaves us is by no means his teaching but his example, his mode of living and thinking.
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Gillespie is of course familiar with, and cites, Laurence Lampert's fine volumes Nietzsche's Teaching and Nietzsche's Task. Gillespie's Final Teaching, in turn, evidently reflects an effort to (re)think the Nietzschean teaching through to the end (within the acknowledged limits imposed by the 1889 onset of insanity) and therewith to unite the doctrine declared in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and the task indicated in Beyond Good and Evil. The teaching of will to power and eternal recurrence, which Gillespie rightly sees as one vast, unified conception with many aspects, ultimately serves the Nietzschean task, namely a revaluation of all values that will radically transform moral and political life throughout Europe. Unlike less reliable interpreters such as Kaufmann or even the often perceptive Nehamas, Gillespie will tolerate no evasions; he fully faces up to the horrendous, violent, bloody, vastly destructive consequences that Nietzsche foresees when he declares himself dynamite.
In his treatment of Nietzsche's quasi-apocalyptical extremism, Gillespie presents a model of scholarly rigor and political sobriety. He expresses grave doubts about, and objections to, the anticipated suffering and devastation, especially in view of the manifest unlikelihood of any near-miraculous transformation to the superman. Even taking into account Nietzsche's powerful critique of the West, Gillespie points to continuing merit in liberal democracy despite its ills and to a much higher likelihood of its perseverance, as well as far greater prospects for the survival of biblical religions, than Nietzsche considers possible or warranted.
Should Nietzsche have succeeded in extirpating egalitarianism, Christianity, liberal democracy, socialism, and even the modern scientific project from European life and in replacing them with severe, new aristocracies ruling over regimented warrior societies worshiping new gods in place of the biblical God—what then? Gillespie's answer, correct as far as it goes, is that the superman thus replaces the last man, so humanity has been redeemed. If one presses a bit further than Gillespie, one might discover that Nietzsche considers a new political order of rank and new gods necessary above all to destroy the self-evidence of philosophy or science and to call it radically into question again, just as it was at best dubious vis-à-vis the authority of the regime and the gods in the epochs of Homer and Socrates. Presumably Nietzsche ignites his explosives not to annihilate the philosophic life but in an almost desperate effort to make it questionable and thereby to save it.
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Nietzsche regards Socrates as the single vortex and turning point of all history down to the nineteenth century. One might accordingly benefit from shining the light of Plato upon Nietzsche's modern replacement of Socrates. Although Nietzsche characterizes Plato as a dogmatist, an attentive reader might first notice the relative inaccessibility or obscurity of Platonic-Socratic doctrines. To the extent one nonetheless can distill actual teachings, one might perhaps follow Aristotle's practice and roughly divide them into theoretical and practical.
Theoretically, one might say, Plato through his Socrates teaches that what most truly is exists always, and what is known has a higher ontic status than what remains unknown. Yet this supposed theoretical teaching is manifestly open to a grave objection stemming from the dialogues themselves. For judging both by content and even by any conceivable count of words and pages, the life and example of the emphatically mortal Socrates is far more central and fundamental to Plato's works than any teaching about eternal ideas. We are thus invited to ask whether the apparent theoretical teaching is somehow ironic, and whether the true “theoretical” lesson is simply to wonder and to pursue indefatigably and fearlessly, like Socrates, the most important questions, for example about the nature of human virtue and the relationship between the eternal and the temporal.
Socrates's practical teaching is perhaps best articulated in the Republic. There we learn that politics will remain unfulfilled and miserable unless and until philosophers rule. For many reasons we must consider this teaching, too, an example of Socratic irony. Actual, nonphilosophic rulers would never voluntarily forfeit their power to philosophers. The nonphilosophic multitude can never recognize philosophers for who they really are. Philosophers do not by any means wish to rule. A full re-education of the youth, in order to develop the best political order, would require the involuntary expulsion of all persons older than ten years, meaning parents would have to abandon their children or be killed. One might venture to guess that on the practical level Plato through Socrates counsels, in lieu of extremist reforms that are doomed to fail, philosophic resignation and political moderation; and that his only surviving extreme desire is to liberate a few, gifted, erotic individuals to a single-minded pursuit of human excellence.
Under close scrutiny, the theoretical and practical teachings lead to the same conclusion. The philosophic life surely replaces the two dogmas Nietzsche imputes to Plato, namely, the pure spirit and the good as such. Gillespie does refer briefly to the philosophic life, and he hints at awareness of the implications; but in order to concentrate on Nietzsche's final teaching, he does not develop them. Yet with Gillespie's help, we may now ask whether, compared to Plato, Nietzsche's final teaching represents progress or decline. Just as for Plato, for Nietzsche the most fundamental fact is eternal, namely, the eternal return of the same as an expression of the will to power that encompasses all coming into being and all passing away—unless, as for Plato, the fundamental fact might be the human being who knows or wills. If the eternal recurrence can provide solace for human beings troubled by their mortality, Platonic myths about the immortality of the soul can serve the same function with no less plausibility. If the heart of the matter is for the eternal return to restore to human life its seriousness by emphasizing that everything we do will be repeated over and over without change forever, what makes that psychological manipulation superior to the simple Socratic exhortation of his fellow Athenians to think not about honor or wealth but about how to make themselves and their lives the best possible? One might regard the radical perspectivism of the doctrine of will to power as the full perfection of skepticism that becomes aware of its own limitations; yet even such a form of reflection that comes full circle might turn out to be another version of Socrates's knowledge of his own ignorance. Nietzsche justifiably insists that the greatness of soul of a philosopher entails a comprehensive Yes-saying not only to all human existence but to the whole of nature. We may wonder, though, if such an affirmation requires Zarathustra's histrionic Dionysian dithyrambs. Perhaps it will suffice for sensitive eyes and ears to observe a single, quiet example in Xenophon's Symposium of Socrates's privately singing and dancing.
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What, to repeat, is a philosopher? Gillespie is doubtless aware that in Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche answers directly, “a human being who constantly experiences, sees, hears, suspects, hopes, dreams extraordinary things; who is struck by his own thoughts as from without, as from above and below. … A philosopher [is] a being who often runs away from himself … but is too curious not ‘to return to himself’ again and again.” Nietzsche doubts a philosopher can ever have final and authentic opinions: “there is something arbitrary about … stopping here … not digging deeper there. Every philosophy hides a philosophy … and every word is a mask.” Zarathustra explicitly encourages his pupils to repudiate him, and to regard every “truth” as false if it is not followed by at least one laugh. Nietzsche contends that Zarathustra, like all great minds, is a skeptic. Dionysus, too, like all gods in Nietzsche's view, is a lover of wisdom, not its possessor. As a god, he is shameless; as a philosopher, beyond good and evil.
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It would be a grave injustice not to mention three particularly fine gems that adorn Gillespie's volume. First, in magisterial fashion he interprets Nietzsche's principal works as musical compositions. His evidence is convincing. Second, he includes a brilliant, and in our view sound, comparison of Dostoevsky's Christian-existentialist psychology with Nietzsche's anti-Christian version. Third, he presents a novel argument, distinct from those of Löwith and Martin Heidegger, to the effect that in important respects Nietzsche's understanding partakes malgré lui-même of Christian elements, for instance, the death of God and especially the central role of will in the creation of nature. Gillespie compels us to wonder whether Nietzsche's good European ultimately represents a decline rather than an ascent from Goethe's.
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Connoisseurs who have whetted their appetite on the delectable morsel of Nietzsche's Final Teaching might also enjoy feasting on the Socratic-Nietzschean question of Heinrich Meier's recent masterpiece, What Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?
