The Strategic Context

Since Germany was not directly involved on the ground in Central Asia after 1871, any attempts by its leaders to influence events there required considerable ingenuity and political finesse. The main engine driving Anglo-Russian rivalry in that region was the apparently inexorable expansion of Russia toward the Indus River. For most of Bismarck's chancellorship, this meant that the Great Game unfolded according to a fixed pattern. Following each new Russian conquest and the resulting expressions of British concern regarding the security of India, the czar and his ministers dutifully offered assurances that they had no intention of annexing any further territories.Footnote ¹¹ These promises were then invariably broken. With each transgression, contrite Russian diplomats routinely pointed to their impotence in the face of overzealous generals and provocations by Turkoman marauders. Great Britain, meanwhile, repeatedly drew a line in the sand, declaring that it would lead to war if Russia advanced beyond a certain point. It remained a cold war in the desert, however. In spite of Bismarck's concerted efforts to bring about hostilities between England and Russia, the two powers never came to actual blows in Central Asia—though they did nearly stumble into an armed conflict during the Penjdeh Incident of March 1885, when Afghan troops under British command became engaged in a brief but bloody border skirmish with the Russian army.Footnote ¹²

The Great Game was executed according to a predictable playbook during these two decades, just as Bismarck's participation was characterized by a basic continuity extending back into the pre-imperial era—a consistency partly attributable to the fact that the primary aim of the chancellor's policy was dictated by the dilemma of being situated in the center of Europe: exposed to powerful revisionist states on two sides, Bismarck needed to hold Russia in check to secure Germany's borders, and Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia was perfectly suited for this purpose. For obvious reasons, Bismarck vehemently denied this fundamental truth and proclaimed his deep desire to preserve the peace there. But his diplomats were not always as discrete. In 1870, for example, General Lothar von Schweinitz, the Prussian military plenipotentiary to Alexander II, had a lengthy conversation with the British minister in Munich, Robert Morier, in which he stated the obvious with astonishing candor:

Schweinitz had previously expressed similar sentiments in his official reports. In 1865, for example, he emphasized Prussia's interest in seeing Russian armed forces diverted away from Europe and toward Asia, noting, “May the currently latent, but in the future colossal, might of our Eastern neighbor continue in the same direction it has taken” into Central Asia.Footnote ¹⁴ Sixteen years later, as German ambassador in St. Petersburg, he reaffirmed the correctness of his earlier assessment, underlining in particular how beneficial it was for Germany that the “ambitious and restless” officers in the Russian army find a diversion and outlet for their energy in the desolate wastes of Central Asia.Footnote ¹⁵

Schweinitz's perspective was by no means unique among German statesmen. As a lifelong Russophile, his arguments tended to represent the moderate end of the political spectrum. As a result, he often distanced himself from the more hard-line position taken by the Foreign Office. After returning from a visit to Berlin in May 1885, for example, he wrote to his friend and colleague Heinrich VII Prince Reuss, “I was relieved to see from your letter that you also did not desire the Anglo-Russian war [in Afghanistan]; not everybody was of that opinion. Ignoring all other dangerous eventualities I can only assert one thing with certainty: Russia would not emerge from a war in the steppes and on her coasts with a weakened or destroyed army like, for example, France after Mexico.”Footnote ¹⁶

Schweinitz clearly favored a diversionary strategy in Central Asia, but was not an advocate of fomenting war in the region. It is interesting that his comments about the views prevailing in Berlin—and presumably in the imperial chancellery—indicate that he was in the minority in this regard. The ambassador's criticism of the hardliners in the Wilhelmstrasse suggests that Bismarck hoped that Russia's mighty military machine would be crippled by a long and costly war with Great Britain in the same way that the French imperial army had been hobbled through its disastrous campaign in Mexico from 1862 to 1866.Footnote ¹⁷

A Prussian staff officer who had accompanied Russian forces during a campaign against the khanate of Khiva provided a more alarming, and likely more mainstream, perspective in 1874. His observations about the prevailing views among Russian military leaders served only to underline Germany's interest in encouraging Anglo-Russian conflicts in Central Asia:

This report likely served as confirmation of Bismarck's own firmly held conviction that Dmitri Miljutin, the Russian minister of war and architect of the modernization of the army, harbored a strong desire for war with Germany, a sentiment he disseminated to the officer corps.Footnote ¹⁹ In any case, it was Bismarck himself who, in an audience with the kaiser at the end of the Anglo-Russian war scare in May 1885, most eloquently expressed the implications of this situation for German foreign policy:

At this same imperial briefing session, Bismarck made an explicit reference to the commonality between his Central Asian and Eastern policies. Looking back, he argued that the Russian army would have inevitably been used against Austria-Hungary if it had not invaded Turkey in 1877. What he did not specifically confess to the peace-loving, Russophile kaiser was that his own Eastern policy in the months leading up to that conflict had contributed greatly to ensuring that Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. This underlying goal of embroiling Russia in an armed conflict with another power was the fundamental link between both threads of his peripheral diversionary strategy in southeastern Europe and Asia.

There can be no question, then, that the long-term goal of German foreign policy was to ensure that Russia—and in particular the Russian army—remained preoccupied with conflicts in Central Asia. The only discernible shift over time was one of emphasis. As Russia consolidated its position in Asia by subjugating the Turkoman tribes, it became increasingly necessary that the British army and navy provide the adversary Bismarck required to tie down Russia's armed forces, his key objective. An Anglo-Russian war in Asia thus emerged as a more pronounced German objective after 1878—a cynical policy that grew out of a particularly sober realization: if Germany ever became engaged in a conflict with Russia, France would immediately attack Germany's western border to reclaim its lost provinces in Alsace and Lorraine. But even without the threat of France, German leaders had come to fear Russia's ever-increasing power, as Schweinitz's comments from 1865 had already suggested. As the country increasingly harnessed its vast population to expand the ranks of its already formidable armed forces, deep-seated anxiety spread in Germany about the Eastern “colossus.” This existential angst would plague German statesmen, soldiers, and citizens until July 1914, when it played a key role in the outbreak of World War I.Footnote ²¹

The Great Game thus offered Bismarck a way to deal with the threat posed by Russia, while simultaneously representing an opportunity to solve one of his more difficult diplomatic challenges—namely, creating a European constellation strong enough to preserve the peace and status quo in Central Europe. This was not a trivial task in an era of shifting borders, with most of Germany's neighbors looking to expand or reclaim lost territory. On the one hand, France, Russia, and Italy were all committed to revising the existing borders in Europe after 1871 in order to right old wrongs; on the other hand, Austria-Hungary and Germany had an equally strong desire to hold on to what they already had acquired. Bismarck wished, therefore, to secure the support of Great Britain to tip the scales in favor of the status-quo powers.Footnote ²² And although the British government had a similar interest in ensuring that a stable balance of power was maintained on the European continent, Britain's potential usefulness as a means to keep France and Russia in check was limited by its status as a naval power and an island nation. In recent years, British governments had also pursued a strict policy of nonintervention in continental affairs. This meant that there was little likelihood of winning Britain as an ally to keep the peace in Central Europe.Footnote ²³

These structural and political barriers to realizing the chancellor's vision of a static deadlock on the continent—strengthened by British support—could be overcome, though, if England were suddenly to share a border with Russia in Asia. After all, it seemed to be just a question of time before the Russian and British imperial frontiers in that region would meet. Great Britain was, in a sense, already a continental power there by virtue of its possession of India. As a result, Russia's advance toward India—which, as this article will demonstrate, was something Bismarck actively sought to encourage—was quickly altering the basic dynamics of European power politics in Germany's favor by exerting pressure on London to join the chancellor's elaborate system of checks and balances aimed at keeping the peace in Central Europe. Even if Great Britain did not ultimately become an active participant in Bismarck's diplomatic system, Anglo-Russian tensions still served Germany's broader strategic aims by forcing Russia to ally with Austria and Germany in the Three Emperors’ Alliance in order to protect its European flank and thereby isolate France on the continent.

It is in this regard that clear parallels to Bismarck's Eastern policy emerge once more. Throughout his career, the German chancellor had advocated a territorial partition of the Ottoman Empire among the other Great Powers. One of the salient features of the configuration he sought to bring about would have involved Russia taking possession of Constantinople (the entrance to the Black Sea) and Great Britain occupying the Dardanelles (the entrance to the Mediterranean). Had Bismarck been able to conjure this into existence, this Great Power constellation would have resulted again in Great Britain having borders contiguous with the Russian empire. In his frank and wide-ranging conversation with Morier in 1870, Schweinitz alluded to Germany's strategic linkage of both regional conflicts: “It has always puzzled us … that England should object to the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia. Once there, she overlaps Europe, whose permanent business it then becomes to keep her in order.”Footnote ²⁴ Of course, “overlapping” Europe meant overlapping with Great Britain, at least in part. Although Bismarck never explicitly stated that securing British collaboration was an objective of his Central Asian policy, the German dossiers on the Great Game provide some clear indications that this was one of his goals. In 1879, the Russian ambassador to London, Count Pyotr Šuvalov, made a case for Britain's potential occupation of Afghanistan as a result of the Second Afghan War: “The English can annex Afghanistan, as far as I am concerned; the closer they get to us, the better; as soon as we can get at them on dry land, they will become a great deal more pleasant to deal with.”Footnote ²⁵ It was certainly no coincidence that this comment echoed Schweinitz's stated desire to see Russia and England become more directly engaged with one another through an “overlapping” Russian presence in Constantinople. Šuvalov, a confidante of Bismarck, often looked to Berlin for assistance in furthering his career ambitions. As a result, Šuvalov often played to Bismarck's personal vanity by tailoring his statements to German diplomats to align with the known views of the chancellor.Footnote ²⁶ It is likely, therefore, that his remarks reflected the German chancellor's own views about the desirability of England and Russia sharing an Asian frontier.

Irrespective of Bismarck's intentions, the reality on the ground was that in the two decades after 1871, the construction of strategic railways in Central Asia by both England and Russia was shrinking the distance between both powers by bridging the vast wastelands that had previously acted as a buffer. The natural chemistry of imperial rivalry was already moving two powerful empires toward a potentially explosive collision, with German encouragement merely acting as an external catalyst. It was no coincidence, therefore, that in the aftermath of the war scare of 1885, one of the first acts of the new Conservative government of Lord Salisbury was to offer Bismarck an alliance against Russia that aimed to preserve the integrity of Afghanistan and protect Persia.Footnote ²⁷ Bismarck later denied that such a proposal had ever been made to him, but clearly had little interest in these British feelers.Footnote ²⁸ From his perspective, Russian expansion and the resulting escalation of Anglo-Russian tensions made any formal treaty dangerous and redundant. The mere fact of their increased proximity in Asia ensured that Bismarck could enjoy the cooperation and support he desired from England and Russia at no political cost to Germany. But the offer itself showed how his endeavors to influence the Great Game were paying the anticipated political dividends. The British government had been forced to recognize Germany's importance in determining the fate of Central Asia and had begun to push for a closer political alignment with Berlin. This corresponded to Bismarck's avowed strategic aim, already articulated in the famous Kissingen memorandum, namely the use of peripheral conflicts to engage Great Britain in neutralizing the danger posed by Russia.

Interference in the Domestic Politics of England and Russia

The long-term strategic aims of German policy in Central Asia were twofold, then: to provide a diversion and outlet for the Russian army and its martial ardor, and to engage Great Britain to act as an effective counterweight to Russia's growing military power. Over time, however, the chancellor pursued a number of secondary objectives, many of which played important roles in determining the magnitude and direction of his involvement in that region. Researchers have neglected these important nuances even more than they have ignored the overall significance of Bismarck's participation in the Great Game. But they are of considerable importance, for they not only explain his continuing need to manufacture tensions in Central Asia but also throw new light on neglected aspects of the more general nature of his statesmanship.

Bismarck's subordinate aims can be classified into two distinct groups whose policy objectives nevertheless often overlapped. The first set involved an important and recurring theme in the chancellor's diplomacy that has been largely overlooked by most studies of this period: his repeated attempts to support or overturn certain foreign leaders and regimes.Footnote ²⁹ Throughout the 1870s, Bismarck's desire to replace the Russian chancellor, Prince Alexander Gorčakov, with a minister more friendly to Germany had a significant impact on how he manipulated Anglo-Russian tensions in Asia. Similarly, from 1880 to 1885, Bismarck's campaign to topple the Russophile British prime minister, William Gladstone, became, for a brief period of time, the main focus of his Central Asian policy. The second group of goals (discussed later) involved the chancellor's periodic exploitation of the Great Game in support of more urgent policy priorities concerning the fate of the Ottoman Empire.

After 1871, Russia's Gorčakov exploited French hostility in an effort to control Germany and ensure its continued diplomatic support; to that end, he pursued what the Germans called a “pendulum policy” (Schaukelsystem) in which he played Paris and Berlin off against each other.Footnote ³⁰ Bismarck viewed this maneuver as a clear threat to German security. At the same time, he considered Count Šuvalov—a confidante of Alexander II and the head of the Russian secret police—as a potential successor to Gorčakov in St. Petersburg: a conservative statesman who wished to align Russia closely with Germany and Austria-Hungary in a monarchist alliance.Footnote ³¹ Šuvalov and Gorčakov were nevertheless bitter rivals fighting for the favor of their sovereign. Bismarck believed that Germany had a considerable stake in the outcome of this domestic power struggle, and thus used German influence at court and in foreign affairs to promote Šuvalov as the more capable Russian statesman. This personal rivalry quickly spilled over into Central Asia, where it briefly became a major factor in the Great Game.

At the end of 1872, Šuvalov was sent to London as a special envoy to discuss rising tensions in Central Asia. He was a surprising choice for this sensitive peace mission, given that he had no previous diplomatic experience. His assignment was also a thankless one: Šuvalov was entrusted with the challenging task of providing personal assurances to the British crown that a punitive Russian action against the khanate of Khiva would not lead to its annexation. Given the pattern of previous Russian advances, it was really a fool's errand, as Bismarck recognized immediately. The German leader suspected with good reason that Gorčakov's real purpose in selecting Šuvalov was to neutralize his domestic rival.Footnote ³² Although the Russian emissary's peace mission was initially considered a complete success, Gorčakov almost immediately reneged on the promises he had conveyed via Šuvalov: the Russian annexation of Khiva in 1873 completely undermined Šuvalov's credibility in London. His subsequent appointment as Russian ambassador to London in 1874 was, then, clearly a further attempt by Gorčakov to discredit his foe permanently: his broken promises in Central Asia had undermined his credibility and thus meant that he was unlikely to succeed in this new post.

Bismarck did not concede defeat, however, and he did not desert his protégé. Instead, he proceeded to turn the tables on Gorčakov by attempting to use Central Asian tensions to his own advantage, just as Gorčakov had tried to use them to defeat his rival. Bismarck made his strongest play to that end during the first half of 1875, bolstering earlier efforts to ensure that England and Russia remained at daggers drawn in Asia. Cleverly exploiting the growing distrust in London arising out of further Russian conquests in Asia, the German chancellor suggested in both capitals that Gorčakov was the real source of English fears. He argued, for example, that the Russian chancellor's Francophile sympathies had caused British leaders to view Russian actions in Central Asia with greater concern, and that Šuvalov offered a much more attractive alternative.Footnote ³³ More specifically, Bismarck tried to broker a territorial compensation agreement in the spring of 1875 that would neutralize English opposition to greater Russian expansion in Asia while further isolating France.Footnote ³⁴ He proposed that Russia support British attempts to seize control of the Suez Canal in exchange for London's acquiescence in future Russian conquests in Asia. An arrangement of this type would have served German interests while, at the same time, strengthening the domestic position of the new Russian ambassador in London vis-à-vis Gorčakov.

Bismarck was surprisingly candid about the domestic political aspect of his proposed Anglo-Russian accord. In a conversation with the British ambassador to Berlin, he outlined his reasons for advocating Russian concessions in Egypt in exchange for gains in Asia:

At the same time, Bismarck made the case to Šuvalov that brokering this far-reaching accord might give him the upper hand against Gorčakov.Footnote ³⁶ Although nothing came of this clever gambit, it was nevertheless indicative of how Bismarck sought to play the Great Game in the 1870s. Backing Gorčakov's rival remained a secondary priority, however. When confronted with actions by Šuvalov that threatened to reduce Anglo-Russian tensions in Central Asia, Bismarck was quick to disavow his protégé.Footnote ³⁷

When Gorčakov was finally replaced in 1881, it was by Nikolai Giers, not Šuvalov. The German chancellor's efforts to promote Šuvalov were not just futile; in fact, they likely contributed to the Russian politician's fall from imperial grace. Germany was made the scapegoat for Russia's failure to achieve all it had desired at the Congress of Berlin, where Šuvalov had made the fatal decision to align himself with Bismarck during the deliberations. There was thus some truth to the famous comment that the image of Bismarck shaking Šuvalov's hand in Berlin—captured by Anton von Werner in his famous painting of the congress—did indeed break Šuvalov's neck.Footnote ³⁸

Undaunted by the negative outcome of this first attempt to use Central Asia to influence the internal affairs of other countries, Bismarck simply shifted his efforts to exploit the Great Game against a much more pressing domestic political threat in Great Britain. The election of William Gladstone as British prime minister in April 1880 was seen in Berlin as a political catastrophe of the first order. Gladstone's condemnation of the Ottoman Empire in 1876 and his hostile rhetoric toward Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, before and during his election campaign indicated that there was a solid basis for closer British ties with Russia under the new government in London. In addition, Gladstone's Slavophile sympathies—personified by his close friendship with the Russian writer Olga Novikoff—ushered in a new era of Anglo-Russian détente that seemed to be moving toward a formal alliance. One immediate result of Gladstone's election was a substantial reduction in tensions between Great Britain and Russia in Asia, accompanied by rumors of a bilateral pact aimed at ending their long-standing rivalry.Footnote ³⁹ This development clearly threatened Bismarck's plan to entangle both powers in conflicts in Asia. In order to bend this situation to Germany's advantage and prevent the two powers from forming an anti-German alliance with France, the chancellor decided to push for a change of government in London before it was too late.

Of course, Bismarck was well aware that bringing about the fall of a foreign government was an extremely risky proposition, which made it prudent to proceed cautiously. Increasing indications of a deepening Anglo-Russian rapprochement at the end of 1884 nevertheless forced him to pursue this course of action more energetically. Apparently triggered by a meeting between Gladstone and Alexander III in Copenhagen at the end of 1883, the chancellor started to use the Central Asian question against the British prime minister in a more aggressive and overt manner beginning in February 1884. This exploitation of the Great Game to influence domestic politics in Great Britain was only one part of a multipronged diplomatic offensive designed to bring down the Liberal cabinet in London.Footnote ⁴⁰ Setbacks in the Sudan, along with a variety of domestic embarrassments, had made Gladstone vulnerable at the start of 1884, and Bismarck seemed determined to make the best of this opportunity. In addition to engineering diplomatic humiliations for England in Africa (the establishment of German colonies in South-West Africa, East Africa, and Cameroon) and Egypt (German opposition to England in negotiations with the international debt commission about an agreement to service large European loans to British-occupied Egypt), the chancellor attempted to solve the apparently intractable problem of using an unwilling Giers to assist him in toppling the most pro-Russian English government in recent memory by using humiliating defeats in Central Asia to cripple it.

Paradoxically, it was Russia that fired the first shot in the Asian phase of Bismarck's campaign to oust Gladstone. Earlier British governments had stated repeatedly that Russian occupation of the ancient city of Merv would be viewed as a casus belli. For their part, leaders on the Neva had given assurances that they had no intention of seizing that oasis. But Giers, the new Russian chancellor, confided to Bismarck that Russia had only promised not to conquer Merv, but not ruled out accepting an appeal from the elders of that city to be placed under the protection of the czar.Footnote ⁴¹ It likely came as no surprise in St. Petersburg, then, when the February 1884 capture of Merv was dramatically stage-managed as the “voluntary subjugation” of the city fathers to a single low-ranking Russian officer, Lieutenant Maksud Alikhanoff. On the one hand, this well-orchestrated coup was timed to ensure that the strategic city was secured before the pro-Russian Gladstone ministry fell. On the other hand, every effort was made by Giers to soften the blow in order to avoid undermining Gladstone's already precarious position at home.Footnote ⁴² Although he was undoubtedly delighted by this turn of events, Bismarck was infuriated, at the same time, by Russian attempts to mitigate the ensuing domestic backlash against the Liberal government he so strongly desired. His anger is almost palpable in a memorable dispatch that he sent to his ambassador in Russia, in which he argued strongly but in vain against any Russian efforts to prop up a British government that, he claimed, was seeking to replace the monarchy in England with a republic—and thus represented a grave threat to the continental monarchies, especially Russia.Footnote ⁴³

By contrast, Bismarck found a much more sympathetic ear in Vienna for his efforts to fan the flames of the Great Game and thereby undermine Gladstone's domestic position. Because the British prime minister was an outspoken critic of Austrian policy in southeastern Europe, Austrian leaders were interested in contributing to any political reversals for Great Britain in Central Asia—even if it meant helping Russia, their main rival in the East. Austrian Foreign Minister Gustav Kálnoky supported an aggressive Russian stance in Central Asia and consequently provided diplomatic support to St. Petersburg, with the explicit intention of contributing to Gladstone's fall from power.Footnote ⁴⁴

As the tensions between St. Petersburg and London grew in the ensuing months over the demarcation of the new Russian border with Afghanistan, the German Foreign Office offered every assurance to Giers that its support for Russia in Central Asia was not part of a nefarious plan to bring down Gladstone.Footnote ⁴⁵ But it was exactly that, of course. The chancellor also used the press to contradict warnings by Russian journalists that Russia was making herself a party to ongoing German efforts to bring about the fall of Gladstone through aggressive actions in Central Asia.Footnote ⁴⁶ These denials did not remove lingering suspicions in London and St. Petersburg, but they did underline the complex intermingling of domestic and foreign policy at work here. As a result, this phase of the Great Game saw Giers and Bismarck become locked in a delicate and dangerous diplomatic dance: they were united in pursuing some common interests (i.e., Russian expansion in Central Asia) but separated by conflicting political agendas concerning the fate of the Gladstone government.

The stakes in this battle over the fate of the British government were especially high for the Russian foreign minister. Attempts by Giers to advance in Central Asia in a manner that shielded Gladstone from domestic critics were perceived as weakness by Alexander III and Russian public opinion and thus endangered his own position at home.Footnote ⁴⁷ In spite of the fact that Russia had no interest whatsoever in supporting Bismarck's campaign to oust Gladstone by embarrassing his government in Central Asia, Giers was rapidly losing credibility in Russia and therefore had little choice but to sanction taking a hard line there. The result of this belligerent posture was a skirmish between British-led Afghan forces and the Russian army near the town of Penjdeh on March 30, 1885, which ended with the former retreating with considerable loss of life.Footnote ⁴⁸

Gladstone faced a difficult choice as a result of this clash: accepting this military embarrassment or going to war with Russia. He cleverly avoided choosing between equally unpalatable alternatives by charting a judicious course between both. The prime minister placated jingoistic public opinion by making preparations for war while initiating third-party arbitration, behind the scenes, in order to save face. Not wishing to harm Gladstone's position at home any further, Giers took whatever steps he could to soften the blow by assisting the Liberal government to fend off attacks by the opposition.Footnote ⁴⁹ But the damage was already done. The chancellor had achieved his key goal by adding yet another diplomatic defeat to Gladstone's growing list. Soon after this further foreign policy fiasco, the British government finally fell. The victory of the Conservatives under Salisbury was certainly not entirely the result of Bismarck's maneuvers, but the setbacks Germany inflicted on the Liberal government in Africa, Egypt, and Central Asia were undoubtedly a major factor in bringing about Gladstone's defeat.

The Great Game and the Eastern Question

The second group of subordinate goals that Bismarck pursued in Central Asia concerned the Eastern Question, i.e., the struggle to control the current and former territories of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire. Germany, England, and Russia all recognized that these two regions were closely linked from a strategic perspective. In fact, many Russians saw the march toward India primarily as a means to pressure Great Britain into making concessions in the Ottoman Empire, particularly with respect to an eventual Russian seizure of Constantinople and the Straits. In 1878, Šuvalov had gone so far as to confide to the British foreign secretary, Lord Derby, that “Russia does not want to invade India, nor to conquer Afghanistan; but she does wish to establish herself in such a position on the Indian frontier as to be able to prevent England from interfering with her when she next moves on Constantinople.”Footnote ⁵⁰ Many English statesmen accepted this logic and viewed Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia in these terms. In his conversation with Morier in 1870, General Schweinitz summarized German views on the strategic linkage between both regional conflicts as follows:

What this meant in practice was that Bismarck frequently exploited tensions in Central Asia to serve his political agenda in Turkey. In the spring of 1875, for example, he was eager to create tensions between France, Russia, and England over the partition of Europe's chronic “sick man.” Although the Eastern Question lay dormant at this time, he sought to reactivate it by overstating to statesmen in London and St. Petersburg the danger of an Anglo-Russian conflict in Asia, and, in the process, to stop Russia from blocking British attempts to control the Suez Canal.Footnote ⁵² As noted earlier, he found little interest in London and St. Petersburg for this kind of grandiose territorial accomodation, but such a move was still indicative of the political leverage the Great Game provided to Bismarck. He exploited imperial rivalries in Asia whenever he could to support his grand strategy in Europe of using peripheral conflicts to divide the other Great Powers. The specific tactic he employed in 1875 was the first of many attempts to use Anglo-Russian tensions in Asia to exert influence on the Eastern Question.

Central Asia once again played an important role in German Eastern policy after 1885, when the Bulgarian crisis dominated European politics. The region was thrown into turmoil after a Russian-backed coup that year had unseated the ruler of Bulgaria. This crisis led, in turn, to mounting tensions between Russia, which sought to regain control of her satellite, and Austria and Great Britain, which were resisting this Russian push. One of Bismarck's key long-term goals in the Balkans was to see Russian armed forces tied down there and thus diverted away from the German border. The fact that Russia and Great Britain were embroiled in long and often acrimonious negotiations between 1885 and 1887 over new Russian borders with Persia and Afghanistan was thus of considerable usefulness to the German chancellor in his efforts to achieve that goal. It even appeared at times as if the two powers would come to blows over the dispute. That possibility increased after Gladstone was replaced by a more Russophobic Conservative administration under Lord Salisbury in 1885.Footnote ⁵³

The resulting spike in Anglo-Russian tensions in Central Asia played into Bismarck's hands, of course. He sought to manipulate growing concerns in London about a possible conflict in Asia in order to urge the British government to cease its opposition to aggressive Russian plans in Bulgaria as a means of averting a war on the Afghan border.Footnote ⁵⁴ Bismarck's motivation in this case was to make it as easy as possible for Russia to become entangled in Bulgaria by reducing the resistance of the British to their rival's aggressive plans in the region. At the same time, he suggested in London that the most effective means of countering Russian incursions in Afghanistan was by applying effective pressure “in Constantinople.”Footnote ⁵⁵ His intention was clearly to push England toward active collaboration with Italy and Austria in the Mediterranean Agreements of 1887, which were aimed at countering any Russian moves against the Ottoman Empire.Footnote ⁵⁶ In effect, Bismarck was using the Great Game to encourage Russia to move forward into the Balkans while simultaneously exploiting its actions to create a coalition of powers that would resist such an advance. When England and Russia finally resolved their Asian border dispute in 1887, the chancellor saw this as a major setback for his strategy. As soon as he heard about the settlement in Central Asia, he warned his colleagues in Rome and Vienna that they could no longer rely on England as an active participant in any anti-Russian bloc.Footnote ⁵⁷

There can be no doubt, then, that Bismarck had a significant political stake in ensuring that the Great Game continued to be played vigorously by both participants. His main interest in sustaining a certain level of conflict was based on the realization that whenever tensions in that region decreased, his ability to exercise political influence in St. Petersburg and London dropped proportionately. But this conclusion leads to a more challenging problem, namely determining how Bismarck was able to adjust tension levels in Central Asia to serve his purposes. Could Germany, in fact, exert any real influence over events in those distant lands? That is the subject of the next two sections.

Mechanisms for Influencing the Great Game (I): Dynastic Ties

German diplomats seemed convinced that Berlin had contributed materially to Russia's successes in the Anglo-Russian conflict in Asia. Count Georg Münster, the German ambassador to London, boasted as early as 1874 that Russia owed its mastery of the Caspian Sea and its rapid advance toward India entirely to Germany.Footnote ⁵⁸ This assessment may have been true to a certain extent, but it oversimplified an extremely complex diplomatic situation in which the offering of strong and open German support for Russia was highly problematic. In reality, even the friendly expression of German benevolence toward Russian expansion in Asia was fraught with political risk. In 1881, General Schweinitz explained to the German Foreign Office one of the most fundamental obstacles to assisting Russia in the Great Game: “Of course nothing would be more suited to making a Russian advance in Asia unpopular [in Russia] than the loud applause with which we greeted it.”Footnote ⁵⁹ The German ambassador recognized that pushing Russia in the desired direction—i.e., farther into Central Asia and thus farther away from Europe—required considerable tact and subtlety in order to avoid triggering the opposite response. For two decades, the chancellor found a variety of effective, yet indirect, means to achieve his desired goals and thus showed himself to be up to this difficult task.

Among the most important of the political back channels Bismarck used to that end were the close dynastic links between the Romanovs of Russia and the Hohenzollerns of Germany.Footnote ⁶⁰ Kaiser Wilhelm I was the uncle of Alexander II, and they had a close personal relationship. Although the intimacy between the two courts was diminished somewhat following his nephew's assassination in 1881 (the German emperor did not have the same close personal friendship with the new czar), Wilhelm I nevertheless maintained traditional dynastic ties with Alexander III. Both Russian rulers admired the martial successes of the German emperor and were open to fatherly advice from him, especially in military matters. From Bismarck's perspective, what made these family ties such a useful tool in the Great Game was the fact that Russia's rulers, in particular Alexander III, were such strong advocates of acquiring military laurels on Central Asian battlefields.Footnote ⁶¹ Although neither Russian emperor trusted Bismarck—in fact, they disliked him intensely—they did trust their uncle/great-uncle, who had a deep and sincere fondness for his neighbor in the East.Footnote ⁶² This personal relationship offered Bismarck a powerful if indirect means of encouraging the czar's imperial inclinations in Asia: assurances of German support for Russian expansion toward India had more credibility when given by a trusted relative than by a ruthless and despised statesman such as himself. For this reason, monarchical gestures of friendship and support—such as congratulatory telegrams from the German emperor on the occasion of Russian victories over Turkoman tribes—were of considerable political consequence in furthering Bismarck's policy objectives.Footnote ⁶³ Without understanding this underlying dynamic, it is impossible to comprehend the amount of effort the chancellor invested in controlling the flow of information about the Great Game to his sovereign.

A key objective of the resulting censorship was to ensure that Wilhelm I did not become so concerned about tensions in Central Asia that he would advise his relatives in St. Petersburg to exercise caution in the region. It was in this connection that Bismarck encountered a recurring challenge in Count Münster's conscientious reporting from London.Footnote ⁶⁴ In 1878, just as England stood on the brink of the Second Afghan War, the German ambassador noted in one of his reports that “war would be unavoidable if it were not for the vast steppes, on the one hand, and the ocean, on the other, separating England and Russia.”Footnote ⁶⁵ When the German emperor read this alarming statement, he noted in obvious consternation in the margin, “!! Why?” (sic). As a direct result of this episode and the concern it raised with the kaiser, the ambassador received two dispatches with guidelines for future official reports about the situation in Central Asia. The first advised him to stick to a “less colorful recording of the facts.”Footnote ⁶⁶ The second was far more specific—as well as revealing in terms of the motives behind Bismarck's efforts to control Wilhelm's perception of Asian affairs.Footnote ⁶⁷ Münster was reminded in this dispatch that the emperor “was filled with concern at the thought that his imperial nephew might be pulled into any military entanglements.” The message then spelled out the potential negative political effects of worrying the kaiser, referring specifically to a telegram Wilhelm I had sent to Alexander II at the end of 1876 in which he expressed his wish that the inexperienced Russian army be spared the rigors of a winter campaign against Turkey.Footnote ⁶⁸ As Münster knew, this imperial intervention had, at that time, undermined the chancellor's efforts to coax Russia into attacking the Ottoman Empire. The Foreign Office clearly wanted to avoid a repetition of this setback in Central Asia; the German emperor was to receive no communications, then, that might have led him to caution his nephew against intervening in the fighting in Afghanistan.

Münster either had trouble taking this hint or believed himself honor-bound to keep his sovereign informed, regardless of the wishes of his superior. In the spring of 1885, when tensions between England and Russia over Central Asia had once again reached a critical point, Münster dutifully filed report after report indicating that war was imminent.Footnote ⁶⁹ He also ignored further unmistakable signals from Bismarck that he wished his ambassador to present the situation in a more peaceful light.Footnote ⁷⁰ In obvious exasperation over the ambassador's noncompliance, the chancellor even threatened to resign if Münster did not toe the line in his reporting.Footnote ⁷¹ A private letter from Bismarck's son finally clarified the chancellor's position, and the ambassador immediately became apologetic: “Had I received even the slightest indication that your father did not want to worry His Majesty through reports in that sense … I would have communicated my observations in the form of private letters.”Footnote ⁷² It was a common practice in the German Foreign Office to use private letters to circumvent the normal workflow for official reports, which were routinely sent to the kaiser for review.Footnote ⁷³ Private communications to the chancellor or secretary of state were not presented to the emperor and were usually classified as secret. Münster was thus not apologizing for the substance of his reports but rather for having selected an inappropriate channel to convey his message.

The damage was already done, however. In the spring of 1885, the German emperor noted on a report from St. Petersburg about the widening conflict in Central Asia, “I still believe that England wants war.”Footnote ⁷⁴ And, as Bismarck had feared, the kaiser was quick to share his concerns with his grandnephew in St. Petersburg. Through the good offices of his brother-in-law, Grand Duke Carl Alexander of Saxe-Weimar, Wilhelm I counseled Alexander III to avoid taking any action that might jeopardize the peace.Footnote ⁷⁵ A subsequent investigation by the German ambassador in St. Petersburg found that this fatherly advice had been well received in St. Petersburg and may, in fact, have influenced the czar's subsequent decisions.Footnote ⁷⁶ This was, of course, exactly what Bismarck had wanted to avoid. After receiving confirmation of this unwelcome monarchical meddling, he prepared a lengthy memorandum that he then presented to the emperor in person.Footnote ⁷⁷ But even Bismarck dared not make any direct reference to his knowledge of the grand duke's actions, for this would have not only compromised his sources at the court in Weimar but also constituted an unacceptable intrusion into the emperor's private sphere, as well as his imperial prerogative.Footnote ⁷⁸ In general, Bismarck had to be careful about expressing his anger and frustration about his sovereign's unwanted interference in affairs of state. The carefully edited memorandum thus became a masterly mixture of brutal frankness and respectful chastisement. After outlining in a surprisingly frank manner the overriding German interest in seeing the czar's army tied down in Central Asia, he admonished the aging monarch in a polite but firm manner that Germany was in danger of becoming the scapegoat for frustrated Russian ambitions in Central Asia:

Here was a clear example of how Bismarck strove to influence the course of events. Russia was to be left with no doubt at a dynastic level that Austria and Germany would support their ally in the Three Emperors' Alliance in the event of a conflict in Central Asia. By assuring the czar that his flank was protected by Germany, the chancellor clearly hoped that Alexander III would follow his martial instincts when dealing with Great Britain in Afghanistan.

There was a special urgency in the mid-1880s of convincing Russia of the reliability of German benevolent neutrality in Central Asia. The kaiser was approaching his ninetieth year and was in poor health, and the crowning of a new emperor seemed imminent.Footnote ⁷⁹ The challenge for Bismarck, then, was that the prospect of a sudden change of regime in Berlin might make Russian leaders reluctant to rely too much on continued German support in Asia. In fact, it was rightfully feared in St. Petersburg that the new emperor would adopt a pro-English policy in the region. The Crown Prince, Friedrich Wilhelm, and his English wife, Victoria, both favored a much more vigorous course of action by Great Britain in Central Asia. During the crisis of 1885, the Crown Princess was openly jingoistic, preaching the necessity of war with Russia to restore British prestige in India and in Central Asia.Footnote ⁸⁰ Her husband was similarly convinced that Russia was pursuing a premeditated plan aimed at invading India and felt that Germany should aid Britain in resisting such aggression.Footnote ⁸¹

As a result of this domestic uncertainty, Bismarck faced a daunting diplomatic challenge in making Russia feel secure enough to risk a military encounter with Great Britain in Central Asia. He tried to deal with this problem by using a variety of tactics. In St. Petersburg, Schweinitz was given the task of downplaying the possibility of an anti-Russian swing in German foreign policy after the kaiser's demise.Footnote ⁸² As a staunch conservative and former confidante of the crown prince, the German ambassador was ideally suited to deliver this message. Bismarck also took an active role himself by personally reassuring the czar. During the meeting of the three emperors in Skierniewice on September 15, 1884—itself a gesture designed to shore up Russian resolve in Asia—the chancellor offered Alexander III evidence that he was already taking steps to block a pro-English shift in foreign policy after Wilhelm's death. More specifically, he averred that the sole purpose of his foray into colonial expansion in 1884 was to drive a wedge between Germany and Great Britain so that the next emperor would have no choice but to continue his policy of close ties with Russia and Austria.Footnote ⁸³ This assertion has given rise to a whole genre of literature that has viewed this tactical ploy as a true reflection of the chancellor's motives for imperial expansion. In reality, it was just another masterful move in the Great Game—something that becomes even clearer when one considers its context, namely a response to concerns articulated by Alexander III about the direction of German foreign policy after the death of Wilhelm I.Footnote ⁸⁴

This clever colonial concoction served Germany's interests in Central Asia in a number of ways. First, it helped to conceal a key goal of Germany's colonial offensive—and of the country's simultaneous support for Russian incursions in Central Asia: to undermine the domestic position of Gladstone. Many Russians correctly believed that the true reason for German encouragement of their conquests in Asia was to bring down the Russophile Liberal government in London. This concern acted, in turn, to restrain Russia in its dispute with Great Britain. Second, by making it appear that structural barriers were being erected to prevent a radical pro-English diplomatic realignment after Friedrich Wilhelm succeeded his father, Bismarck's claim was intended to embolden Russia to take a more energetic stance toward England in Central Asia. His contrived rationale for the acquisition of colonies was intended, in short, to reduce Russian qualms about engaging in a conflict with Great Britain out of fear that a sudden change of monarch in Berlin might make Germany a British ally overnight. It is ironic that similar considerations may have also convinced British leaders to avoid war, for the apparently imminent succession of an Anglophile ruler in Berlin made it seem advantageous for them to put off any conflict with Russia in Central Asia until after the reigning Russophile kaiser had died.Footnote ⁸⁵

Mechanisms for Influencing the Great Game (II): Diplomatic Channels and Back Channels

In the end, all of these attempts to assure Russia that it could continue to rely on German support in Central Asia were in vain. As the chancellor lamented in May 1885, just as a peaceful resolution of the Anglo-Russian crisis appeared increasingly likely, “The Russians would have moved forward more energetically in the Afghan question if they did not fear that our emperor would suddenly expire overnight.”Footnote ⁸⁶ This comment highlighted Bismarck's frustration about not being able to embolden Russia enough to engage in a regional military confrontation with England, as well as his conviction that the domestic political situation in Germany (i.e., uncertainty about the future of the monarchy) had played a decisive role in undermining his efforts to encourage Anglo-Russian conflict in Asia. Frederick von Holstein, at this point still the chancellor's loyal lieutenant in the Foreign Office, expressed with even greater frankness a similar sentiment in his diary, complaining that the peaceful resolution of the Anglo-Russian conflict was a “major misfortune” for Germany.Footnote ⁸⁷

Dynastic ties also played an important role in another common tactic employed by Bismarck to influence outcomes of the Great Game. Throughout his chancellorship, he selectively shared information with London and St. Petersburg about each other's respective position in Central Asia in order to manipulate decision-makers in both cities. In 1885, for example, Bismarck tried to convince Wilhelm I that England was not preparing for a war against Russia, but was instead seeking to reinforce its European troops in India out of concern that native princes there might use their local armies to rise up against British rule.Footnote ⁸⁸ This argument, clearly intended for Romanov ears, furthered the chancellor's Asian political agenda in two ways: it provided some reassurance to Russia that Britain was not serious about an armed conflict, and—because Bismarck's unmistakable underlying message was that a majority of Indian potentates would revolt as soon as Britain was at war with Russia—it served as an incentive for Russian aggression. To reinforce both indirect nudges to action, the chancellor also made a point of informing his sovereign, a trained soldier, about the deficiencies of British logistics in Asia.Footnote ⁸⁹ But it is doubtful that Kaiser Wilhelm passed on any of this selective intelligence to St. Petersburg, since he did not wish to say or do anything that might have led to war.

The emperor's grandson was much less squeamish in this regard, however, and for that reason, Bismarck also used the future kaiser to influence the Romanovs.Footnote ⁹⁰ With the assistance of his son Herbert, Bismarck seems to have been successful in converting Prince Wilhelm into an effective proponent and propagandist for Russian aggression in Asia. The prince's resentment toward his English mother made him ideally suited for the task, and the future emperor's Anglophobe sentiments and the sway Bismarck held over the young Hohenzollern emerge with brutal clarity in the following comments made by the prince in the spring of 1885: the transportation of British troops to India

Clearly the chancellor understood how to play upon the young prince's hatred of England and to put it to good use to serve his policy objectives in Central Asia. The most important aspect of the whole maneuver was that none of this information would come directly from Bismarck. Given the deep distrust toward Bismarck in St. Petersburg and London, there was too much risk that any direct communication would have had the exact opposite effect.

Bismarck also employed other less regal individuals as informal emissaries whose mission was clearly to intensify the level of conflict in Central Asia. From a day-to-day perspective, the sharing of reports and letters between London and St. Petersburg provided the German ambassadors in those cities with ample material to fan the flames of Anglo-Russian hostility. But the chancellor had to be careful when employing official channels that led directly back to him. He preferred instead to use associates to share information intended to sway decisions made by the principal players in the Great Game. One of his favorite intermediaries was his banker, Gerson von Bleichröder.Footnote ⁹² Since he was viewed as a close confidante of Bismarck, his utterances were generally regarded as semiofficial. It was, therefore, of some import to the government in London when Bleichröder visited the British ambassador in April 1885 and spoke to him in a manner suggesting that he “appeared to consider war to be inevitable and said that every day lost in declaring it would now increase our disadvantages.”Footnote ⁹³ The German push for Britain to go to war was subtle, but unmistakable. It was likely not coincidental that the de facto chief of the German General Staff, Count Alfred von Waldersee, had conveyed a similar message to the British military attaché two weeks earlier.Footnote ⁹⁴ Given the consistency of these statements by semiofficial messengers, there seems little question that the chancellor was behind the belligerent signals being sent to London.

The evidence of Bismarck's complicity emerges even more clearly in another targeted German “indiscretion” committed in 1884. Two years earlier, the German military attaché in London had filed a report containing details about the activities of his Russian colleague which indicated that all his efforts were single-mindedly devoted to obtaining materials that would assist in an upcoming major Russian push toward India.Footnote ⁹⁵ These observations were of such a potentially explosive nature that the chancellor personally ordered the report to be designated “top secret”: the attaché was not to speak about it to a soul, not even to his military superiors.Footnote ⁹⁶ Yet, two years later, after Bismarck had launched his diplomatic campaign to bring down Gladstone, he apparently lifted this restriction. At this point the former German attaché in London provided a complete account of what he had witnessed to the British military attaché in Berlin.Footnote ⁹⁷ Once again, Bismarck's intent was clearly to stir up anxiety in London over Russian intentions in Central Asia.

Bismarck did not rely solely on personal messengers, however, to influence developments in Central Asia. He also made extensive use of the mass media for that purpose. The intensity and manner in which he sought to employ the press varied during the two decades of his chancellorship, but, in general, he used newspapers in three different ways to attain his objectives in the Great Game. One was simply informational: he employed journalists to make public—especially in London—certain facts about what was happening in Central Asia.Footnote ⁹⁸ He tried to sway statesmen in St. Petersburg in a similar fashion. In 1885, for example, he instructed the semiofficial press to disseminate information he had already communicated through dynastic channels concerning the potential for a revolt by the Indian princes in the event of war with Russia.Footnote ⁹⁹

A second kind of newspaper article was more reactive or defensive in nature. This type of journalistic material consisted primarily of rejoinders, often triggered by insightful reports in foreign newspapers that Bismarck was seeking to stir conflict between Russia and England in Asia to serve his own ends. Since these sorts of story only undermined his efforts to achieve precisely that goal, he was all the more eager to deny them officially.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ The third type of newspaper article sought to influence directly leaders and public opinion in London and St. Petersburg through editorials that presented a point of view that he wished to convey but that was far too dangerous to articulate through diplomatic channels. In May and June 1875, for example, rumors were circulating that Russia and Great Britain had not only come to an understanding in Central Asia but that this also might lead to an alliance between the two rivals. Bismarck was apparently concerned enough about this prospect to instruct the Foreign Office to draft an article that would confront this “chimera” head on. The requested piece of inspired journalism was to argue that Germany might just as easily put aside its differences with France in response to an Anglo-Russian rapprochement in Asia.Footnote ¹⁰¹ Similar articles later appeared in the German press in 1885 that firmly reinforced Berlin's strong backing of the Russian position in the ongoing border dispute with Great Britain over the boundary between Afghanistan and Russia's newly acquired territory around Merv. The intention here was, no doubt, to assure Russia of German support in the event of further military entanglements in Central Asia.Footnote ¹⁰² For the most intense period of Bismarck's engagement in the Great Game in 1884 and 1885, the dossiers of the Foreign Office are full of newspaper articles and reports from embassies marked with the chancellor's penciled directive “ + ”—a code designating items that were to be utilized in the press.Footnote ¹⁰³

It is only when one considers all the channels that Bismarck was using to promote conflict in Central Asia that the true significance of the following remark by General Waldersee at the end of the Penjdeh Crisis in 1885 can be fully appreciated: “The chancellor knew how to act in such a manner that nobody could accuse him of agitating for war.”Footnote ¹⁰⁴ In view of his efforts to do just that, it was indeed a virtuoso performance. Yet, his clever maneuvering could not alter the fact that he was correctly seen by Russian and British politicians and journalists as a troublemaker in Central Asia. Salisbury, for one, certainly had no doubts that “Bismarck wishes war” in that region.Footnote ¹⁰⁵

The most obvious way of affecting events on the Asian steppes was, of course, by bringing Germany's considerable diplomatic influence to bear in foreign capitals. As noted earlier, Berlin was already providing Russia a major service in this regard by promising to observe benevolent neutrality in the event of an Anglo-Russian conflict. Bismarck also gave direct assurances on this point at critical junctures.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ He would even occasionally advocate explicitly in official dispatches that Russia annex certain territories in Central Asia—“as a service to maintaining peace in Europe.”Footnote ¹⁰⁷

Opportunities for Bismarck to furnish diplomatic support for Russian expansion in Asia began to widen at the beginning of 1884. The Russian capture of Merv meant that Persia became the new front line of Anglo-Russian rivalry, and Bismarck exploited the extension of this conflict to Tehran almost immediately. His first step was to ensure that he could continue to play the game effectively in this new arena by reestablishing diplomatic relations with the shah of Persia. This move was noted with suspicion in London, where it was recognized for what it was: a hostile act.Footnote ¹⁰⁸ In fact, the new German envoy had received a clear directive from the chancellor just before departing for his new post, namely to “advise the Shah to seek a close association with Russia.”Footnote ¹⁰⁹ But the chancellor went even further in his efforts to clear a path for further Russian advances toward India through Persia. He also pressed his ally, Austria-Hungary, to support Russian ambitions in Tehran, arguing that it would be in the interest of both powers “to exploit the Anglo-Russian conflict in that remote region in order to provide Russia a useful service” and thereby to demonstrate the advantages of being part of the Three Emperors' Alliance.Footnote ¹¹⁰ Bismarck also noted that it would benefit Austria to encourage Russian entanglements outside of the Balkans, where Vienna had much more at stake. As discussed earlier, Austria fell in line and fully supported Bismarck's efforts to encourage a forward Russian policy in Central Asia. For his part, the German ambassador in St. Petersburg made sure that Russian leaders were aware of the actions being taken by their allies to expand their sphere of influence into Persia.Footnote ¹¹¹ And, in order to leave absolutely no doubt about his readiness to promote Russian interests in Central Asia and to encourage further an aggressive Russian posture, Bismarck instructed the German ambassador to make statesmen on the Neva aware that “if the Russians were inclined to advance in a Persian direction, Germany would not create any difficulties for them.”Footnote ¹¹²

Bismarck's direct diplomatic intervention in the Great Game was not restricted to opening doors that would facilitate Russian expansion in Central Asia. He also aggressively employed his leverage with foreign potentates to close doors to Great Britain, if that was what was required to achieve his goals in the region. The most notable instance of this kind of diplomatic intervention took place in April 1885, when the outbreak of war between Russia and Great Britain appeared imminent. In strategic terms, Britain still relied on its naval supremacy in the event of a war against the Russian army in Central Asia, not least because of the logistical considerations involved in sustaining a major land campaign over such great distances. It was, therefore, almost a prerequisite for any British military action—defensive or offensive—to ensure that the Royal Navy could send its ships through the Straits into the Black Sea in order to attack Russia along its exposed southern coast. But when the British government pressed the sultan for permission to allow its fleet to pass through the Straits, it was confronted by international opposition led by Bismarck. This united front of the Great Powers against Britain was partly a result of the fact that permission for warships to pass through the Turkish straits would have represented a violation of international treaties, in particular the 1878 Treaty of Berlin.Footnote ¹¹³ But the real motivation behind European resistance was the position taken by the German chancellor, who had quickly instructed his ambassador in Constantinople to apply strong political pressure there to keep the Straits closed.Footnote ¹¹⁴ He also reached out to France and Austria-Hungary for support in stiffening the resolve of the Ottoman ruler to reject this British move.Footnote ¹¹⁵ Although Bismarck presented this démarche as a service performed in the interest of peace, his primary purpose was to eliminate any concerns that Great Britain could attack Russian forces in the Black Sea if they continued to advance in Central Asia. By slamming this door shut—and making sure that St. Petersburg knew it was shut—he was once again giving a green light for the Russian army to advance further toward India. British statesmen were clearly correct, then, in interpreting the German action in this manner, and Bismarck did not deny it when British diplomats confronted him with this accusation.Footnote ¹¹⁶

Finally, the chancellor's ability to exercise political influence in the Great Game was not restricted to the actions he took. He could also guide events in the desired direction by refusing to take any action at all. During peak periods of Anglo-Russian tension in 1884 and 1885, Great Britain repeatedly approached Germany to mediate the dispute. In this case, it did not matter whether it was the despised Gladstone or the favored Salisbury who made the request: Bismarck consistently refused to become involved.Footnote ¹¹⁷ His official reason for declining to mediate was that he had only earned the anger and disappointment of both parties the last time he had helped to resolve an Anglo-Russian conflict, i.e., at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.Footnote ¹¹⁸ This complete abstention stood in stark contrast to his stated public position regarding the Great Game, of course: that Berlin was eager to do everything it could to prevent a conflict between these two powers with which Germany was on friendly terms.Footnote ¹¹⁹ Bismarck's refusal to mediate was clearly inconsistent with his professed desire to preserve the peace in Central Asia, but it was entirely consistent with his overriding interest in seeing the armed forces of Russia tied up in a conflict with Great Britain far removed from Germany's borders.