In Captured Peace Christine Wade investigates the political, economic and social aftermath of the Salvadoran peace accords that were signed in early 1992. The implementation of these accords and the support by one of the first multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping missions has often been portrayed as a success story in ending civil wars. In her study, Wade takes a critical approach and argues that the Salvadoran elites (economic, military and political) effectively captured the peace process to suit their interests.
The book is a welcome overview of almost 25 years of post-war transition in El Salvador. After a discussion on elite capture in and after peace processes (Chapter 1), the author discusses the problematic implementation of the Salvadoran peace agreement in the period after 1992 (Chapter 2), the development of political parties and electoral politics (Chapter 3), the introduction and deepening of neoliberal economic policies (Chapter 4) and the ongoing exclusion and marginalisation of large parts of the Salvadoran population (Chapter 5). The chapters are empirically rich, informative and well documented. Focussing on developments at the national level, Wade succinctly summarises and analyses the evidence and debates on a broad array of topics such as civil society, neoliberalism, mining conflicts, gang policies, political parties, mass migration to the United State, etc. Although the broad range of the topics sometimes comes at the cost of some depth of analysis, the book does provide a very comprehensive account of the Salvadoran post-settlement era and is highly recommended to anyone interested in and puzzled by El Salvador's problematic post-settlement peace.
The focus that Wade places on the politics of peace implementation and the power struggles that accompany peace processes is interesting and important. Indeed, there can be little doubt that elites deeply influenced the post-settlement process in El Salvador. The evidence presented in the book clearly substantiates the conclusion that ‘Salvadoran elites, through their governing political party, ARENA, were not only able to limit the scope of the negotiations largely to institutional reform that they would oversee, they were also able to minimize their losses by manipulating various aspects of their implementation’ (p. 187). Nevertheless, the claim that elites actually captured the peace in El Salvador is too strong and simplistic. It suggests that a clearly identifiable group (the elites) won the continuing battle for peace in El Salvador. I would argue that the outcome was more nuanced.
While the study of Salvadoran elites is an under-researched subject, as Wade emphasises in her last sentence, the book could have provided a more structured and detailed overview of them. Wade acknowledges that Salvadoran elites are not a homogeneous group, as for instance demonstrated in the discussion about the different factions within ARENA, but many questions remain as to what happened to different elites (oligarchy, military, political party), how they related to each other, and how elite politics changed over time. There is also only limited attention to the relations of elites with the Salvadoran population, which is essential to explaining why ARENA (the main representative of ‘elites’) was for such a long time able to garner broad support. How did the party (re)develop and mobilise its support base? The left-wing elites and the ways in which they built their networks leading to electoral victories in 2009 and 2014 are only briefly addressed in the book.
Wade borrows the term ‘peace capture’ from Michael Barnett and Christoph Zürcher (‘The Peacebuilder's Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood’, in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (eds.), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, Routledge, 2009), who emphasise the negotiated nature of processes of peacebuilding between international actors (or peacebuilders), national elites and sub-national elites. These authors predict that the most likely outcome of peacebuilding processes is a compromise between these different stakeholders, implying that proposed reforms (such as democratisation, market reform, etc.) are only partly implemented. One of the reasons for this is that local elites are not sincerely interested in them. This seems to be exactly the case in El Salvador, and it is therefore somewhat surprising that Wade argues that El Salvador is not a case of ‘compromise’ but rather of ‘capture.’
The fact that elites were much better placed to protect their interests, in part as a result of their continuing control over state institutions, does not imply that they ‘captured’ the peace or the democracy (p. 113). The Salvadoran peace agreements were a sea change leading to a new political playing field in which left-wing elites (the FMLN in particular) gradually developed into one of the key actors in political life. In a captured peace process this would obviously not have occurred. Moreover, the term ‘captured peace’ also seems to imply a verdict about who is to blame for the failure of the peace process: right-wing elites. While the study shows that many of these elites did not seem to be genuinely interested in the type of reforms proposed in the peace agreements, it goes too far to argue that the problems that El Salvador confronts today are simply the result of the unwillingness of these elites to do better. There are many other actors, factors, and forces at play that influenced El Salvador's current situation.
The book closes with a useful reflection on the case of El Salvador and the future of peacebuilding in war-torn societies: take local elites seriously, pay more attention to the strengthening of institutions, and help former rebel movements make the transition towards political parties while giving them a role in a transitional power-sharing administration. In El Salvador this might have led to a more effective implementation of some aspects of the peace agreements. It remains to be seen, however, whether this would have led to consensus about a broader reform agenda – including economic reform. It is also doubtful that it would have helped to deal with the more awkward issues in the peace process, such as the legacy of impunity. In this regard the Salvadoran peace process is another sobering account of the limitations involved in fostering consensus about what peace entails and how it should be built.
