Using a wide range of unpublished Israeli and British documents supplemented with published memoirs, diaries, and material from the foreign relations of the United States, Yoav Gelber denies that Jordan's King Abdullah and Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion had a secret understanding to divide Palestine between them. He disagrees with the earlier work by Professor Avi Shlaim, who concluded there was collusion between King Abdullah and the Israeli government. According to Gelber, Shlaim's work was influenced by a discredited source, Israel Ber, a senior member of the Israeli army's general staff who was later convicted of spying for the Soviet Union (p. 2). Which of the two scholars will win the debate remains an open question.

Territorial expansion had long been a Hashemite dream. According to Gelber, King Abdullah's desire to annex the West Bank preceded the United Nations' 1947 partition plan. Furthermore, Israel's preference for the enlargement of Jordan rather than establishment of an independent Palestinian state resulted from the absence of a Palestinian leader willing to accept Israel's existence (p. 128). Hence, high-level secret negotiations were held between Israel and Jordan, discussions that considered a possible peace treaty or, at least, a nonaggression pact. Abdullah appeared willing to make peace with Israel; however, his prudent ministers feared assassination and were concerned that they would be labeled traitors and that Jordan would be expelled from the Arab League. In addition, the future of Jerusalem was a sensitive issue. Although both Israel and Jordan were united in their opposition to the internationalization of the holy city, they did not achieve agreement. Meeting at the king's Shuneh Palace on 24 January 1950, the Israelis demanded control of the Old City's Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall. In response, the Jordanians asked for Arab neighborhoods in West Jerusalem. The Israelis said no. However, they appeared willing to finance housing projects in East Jerusalem by providing compensation to former Arab residents of West Jerusalem (p. 139).

A February 1951 excerpt from Ben-Gurion's diary suggests that the Israeli leader then considered attempting an agreement with Egypt first (p. 198). The king was distressed by his failure to achieve agreement with Israel. In June 1951, he told the visiting chairman of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, “I also know that my people distrust me because of my peace efforts. Despite all that, I know that I could get peace settled if I only had some encouragement and could get reasonable concession from Israel” (p. 205). The king continued to make efforts to achieve agreement until his assassination in July 1951. After Abdullah's murder, Amman was occupied with the issue of succession: the mental illness of Abdullah's son Talal and the youth of his grandson, soon to be King Hussein. According to Gelber, “The death of Abdullah thus marked the end of an epoch” (p. 209).

Relations between Israel and Jordan deteriorated as a result of Israeli retaliation against those Arabs who crossed the border into Israel. Infiltration had been a long-standing problem. Some farmers crossed to visit their lands that were now in Israel; others crossed to engage in criminal activity. Pressed by Washington and London, in June 1953 Israel and Jordan signed a new agreement to end infiltration. Infiltration continued, however, and in October 1953 Israeli forces, including a unit under the command of Ariel Sharon, attacked the West Bank village of Qibya. Israelis demolished houses and inflicted heavy casualties on Qibya's inhabitants, further widening the gulf between the two countries.

It is likely that debate over the relationship between King Abdullah and Israel will continue. One hopes that, in the future, scholars will be able to use additional unpublished American archival sources and, most important, Jordanian archival sources. Meanwhile, Gelber's sources are appropriate, and he uses them well. This book is a fine contribution to the literature. Although too dense for undergraduates, it will be very useful to experienced scholars working on the history of the Arab–Israeli conflict.