On May 29, 2025, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Court) rendered a major advisory opinion (Opinion)Footnote 1 on the relationship between human rights and the climate emergency. The Opinion was a response to Chile and Colombia’s request on the scope of the obligations of states under the American Convention of Human Rights (Convention) regime. The Court focused on the scope of states’ obligations to respect and guarantee the relevant substantive and procedural rights, including those of individuals belonging to vulnerable groups. The Opinion’s vast scope, detailed reasoning, and novel dimensions are of particular significance to the development of international human rights law obligations in relation to climate change. It deals with a plethora of issues, most notably, nature as a subject of rights, the jus cogens nature of the obligation not to cause irreversible damage to the climate, an independent right to a healthy climate, regulation of the conduct of business enterprises, substantive and procedural rights, climate induced human displacement, and environmental defenders. Significantly, the Opinion is a milestone to the current historic climate change international law movement, as one of the three recent opinions by international courts on this matter.
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On January 9, 2023, the Republic of Colombia and the Republic of Chile submitted a request for an opinion to the Court to clarify the scope of state obligations under the Convention, in their individual and collective dimension. They sought the opinion on how to respond to the climate emergency within the framework of international human rights law, paying special attention to the differentiated impacts of this emergency on individuals from diverse regions and population groups, as well as on nature and on human survival on our planet.
The two states posed two main questions: First, what is the scope of the obligations to respect, guarantee, and adopt the necessary measures to ensure the exercise of substantive rights (including social and economic rights) and procedural rights, under the American ConventionFootnote 2 and the Protocol of San Salvador,Footnote 3 in relation to the harm caused or exacerbated by the climate emergency? Second, what is the scope of the human rights obligations, including the exercise of the rights without discrimination, in relation to environmental defenders, women, Indigenous Peoples, Afro-descendant and peasant farmer communities, and other vulnerable groups?
The Context of the Climate Emergency, Non-discrimination, and Differentiation
The Court centered the Opinion around the socioeconomic effects of climate change and its links to inequality among states and within populations (paras. 42–216). The people who contribute the least to the climate crisis are the most affected, and it is the poorest and most unequal regions in the world, with the least greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, that accumulate severe climate debt (paras. 100, 203).
Building on the latest scientific consensus and the existing global legal framework,Footnote 4 the Court defined the context of the decision as “a climate emergency” (para. 43), stemming from the triple planetary crisis of climate change, pollution, and biodiversity, which “threatens the well-being and survival of millions of people throughout the world” (para. 42). In this regard, the Court emphasized that the climate emergency is characterized by the confluence and interrelation of three factors: the urgency of effective action; the severity of the impacts; and the complexity of the required responses (para. 184).
The Standard of Enhanced Due Diligence
Relying on the concept of climate emergency, the Court articulated the enhanced due diligence obligations of states to prevent environmental harm. The content of the standard of enhanced due diligence will depend on the specific risks to each of the human rights that are threatened in the context of the climate emergency (para. 234). The way in which enhanced due diligence is put into practice in each case will depend on the specific risks faced and the measures required (para. 235).
Specifically, such measures include, inter alia, the adoption of proactive preventive measures to avoid the worse climate scenarios, the utilization of the best available science in design and implementation of climate actions, the integration of human rights perspectives into the formulation, implementation and monitoring of all policies and measures related to climate change, strict compliance with procedural rights, and appropriate regulation of corporate due diligence (para. 236).
Nature as a Subject of Rights
One of the major findings of the Opinion was the recognition of nature as a subject of rights. The Court stated that the recognition of nature’s right to conserve its ecological processes contributes to the strengthening of a truly sustainable development model (para. 279), and it places positive obligations on states to adopt measures for the protection, restoration, and regeneration of ecosystems (para. 283).
Moreover, the Court connected the rights of nature with Articles 2 and 26 of the Convention—domestic legal effects and the progressive development of economic, social, and cultural rights respectively (para. 281). Consequently, states have the positive obligation to adopt measures to guarantee the protection, restoration, and regeneration of ecosystems, based on the best available science, guided by the principle of non-retrogressivity, and respective of the value of traditional knowledge and procedural rights (para. 283).
The Jus Cogens Nature of the Obligation Not to Cause Irreversible Damage to the Climate and the Environment
The Court, for the first time, attributed jus cogens status to an environmental related rule. The Court referred to this rule in a number of novel ways: as the legal recognition of the obligation to preserve the equilibrium of the ecosystem in the face of anthropogenic conducts that give rise to irreversible harm (para. 293); the non-derogable prohibition of irreversible environmental damage (id.); and the peremptory prohibition to generate massive and irreversible damage to the environment (para. 294). In all its formulations, it was clear that the rule stems from the universal value that present and future generations should have a habitable planet to live on (para. 287).
First, the Court noted that international environmental law established fundamental principles, including the obligation erga omnes obligation not to cause transboundary environmental harm (para. 287). Moreover, the Court noted that if there were no peremptory prohibition under international law of conducts with irreversible impacts on the equilibrium of ecosystems, it would logically undermine the conditions sine qua non for the enforceability of fundamental human rights that are already protected by peremptory provisions (para. 290). In addition, from a juridical perspective, the rule could be deduced from general principles of law, such as the principle of effectiveness (para. 292).
Finally, state practice, the elaboration of multilateral environmental treaties, the United Nations General Assembly resolutions and the case law of regional courts constitute a process of progressive consolidation that should be interpreted as an emerging juridical recognition of the non-derogable prohibition of irreversible environmental damage (para. 293).
A Human Right to a Healthy Climate as an Independent Right
The Court recognized a right to a healthy climate as an independent right under the Convention, deriving from a right to a healthy environment, in alignment with the evolution of international human rights law and international environmental law (para. 300), including its own jurisprudence, as was clear in the Court’s decision of Inhabitants of La Oroya v. Peru Footnote 5 (para. 297). The Court found that given the urgency, specificity, and complexity of the actions required to protect the global climate system, (para. 300), it is relevantly distinct from other forms of environmental damage (paras. 298–300). Therefore, a recognition of a right to a healthy climate responds to the need to endow the Inter-American legal order with an independent legal basis on which the state obligations, relating specifically to the climate crisis, can be clearly defined, and complied with, independently of other duties relating to environmental protection (para. 300).
In its collective sphere, the right protects the interests of present and future generations of human beings and other species (para. 302) while in its individual sphere, the right to a healthy climate protects the possibility of each individual to live in a climate system free from dangerous anthropogenic interference, a pre-condition to the enjoyment of other human rights (para. 303).
Regulation of the Conduct of Business Enterprises
The Court stressed that business enterprises are essential in addressing the climate emergency (para. 345). It found that states should adopt legislative and other measures to prevent private entities from committing violations of the Convention rights (id.). Such measures include the enactment of legislation that requires business enterprises to conduct human rights and environmental due diligence (para. 347) and its effective implementation (para. 348), the investigation, prosecution, and sanctioning of private entities for failing to comply with national mitigation strategies (para. 356), and the prevention and punishment of acts of corruption (para. 357). Moreover, the Court held that states should establish differentiated obligations for mitigation targets to business enterprises, based on their respective responsibilities for their impact on climate change and their actual and historical contributions (para. 350). Finally, the Court linked the regulation of corporate conduct with the standard of enhanced due diligence and mitigation strategies, which include strict supervision and monitoring of private entities that generate GHG emissions (para. 353).
Obligations Arising from Substantive and Procedural Rights
Substantive Rights
In relation to substantive rights, especially regarding climate adaptation, the Court noted that there is a close relationship between the rights to life and personal integrity (Articles 4 and 5 of the Convention respectively), which is particularly evident in relation to human health (para. 393). Moreover, the Court stated that climate-induced damage constitutes a severe threat to the capacity of present and future generations to enjoy the right to life (para. 394). Consequently, states have specific duties to protect the life, personal integrity, and health of individuals, in the context of climate emergency (para. 400). Such measures include the enhancement of health care systems and the design and implementation of medical training programs, to address the management of emergencies and diseases from climate change (para. 402).
In addition, states have an obligation to protect private property and housing (para. 406), which is linked, inter alia, to the protection of communal ownership of ancestral lands, essential to the cultural identity of Indigenous peoples (para. 407). Finally, the Court emphasized the importance of international solidarity (para. 408) and active cooperation for the prevention and reparation of property damage (para. 411) and urged states to refrain from adopting policies or measures that dispossess people of their homes or property without adequate compensation or resettlement (para. 412).
Procedural Rights
In relation to procedural rights, the Court stressed the importance of access to climate-related information as a guarantee to the rights of life, personal integrity, health, a healthy environment, and climate (para. 500), for which states must establish adequate systems of production, collection, analysis, and dissemination of information (para. 505). Moreover, it found that the right to participate in climate-related matters is linked to Article 23(1)(a) of the Convention, the right of citizens to participate in the conduct of public affairs, stressing the importance of environmental decisions being made in a participatory, inclusive, and non-discriminatory manner (paras. 531–32). In addition, it emphasized the importance of procedural rights in strategies and plans under the standard of enhanced due diligence (para. 468).
Furthermore, the Court linked the right to an effective remedy (Article 25(1) Convention) with access to justice (para. 556), stressing that the strict requirement of the proof of a direct causal link between climate change induced damage and the individual could be an unjustified obstacle to effective access to justice (para. 552). Instead, due to the complexity of evidentiary matters in climate cases, states are obliged to adopt alternative probative standards that will consider the best available science and exposure of people on significant climate risks (para. 553).
Finally, the Court included within the scope of obligations stemming from procedural rights the right to science and the recognition of local traditional and Indigenous knowledge (paras. 471–87), by adopting an evolutive interpretation of the Convention rights.
Climate-Induced Human Displacement
The Court placed climate-induced displacement within the ambit of freedom of movement and residence (Article 22 Convention), recognizing two aspects of states’ obligations: the prevention of migration and the protection of people displaced. The Court put more emphasis on the former than the latter.
Regarding prevention, the primary responsibility lies with states to prevent the circumstances that would lead to forced mobility or displacement that may be caused directly or indirectly by impacts of climate change (para. 422). States must apply the standards of enhanced due diligence and of relevant substantive and procedural rights, within the climate emergency context. Moreover, states should not actively engage in conduct that would expose people to displacement (para. 428) and, instead, should establish strategies to prevent possible risks in transit routes, monitor and prevent human trafficking (id.), and protect especially vulnerable groups, such as children (para. 434). Relocation of parts of the population should only occur as a last resort measure, when it is unavoidable and necessary (id.).
In relation to people displaced across international borders, the Court, in a laconic part of the Opinion, refrained from using the term climate refugees. It found that states are responsible for having domestic regulatory mechanisms that will guarantee legal and humanitarian protection, such as humanitarian visas, temporary residence permits, and/or protection under refugee status or similar (id.), to provide displaced persons with protection from non-refoulement (para. 433).
Environmental Defenders
The Court stressed the essential work of environmental defenders in the context of the climate emergency (para. 566), pointing out their fundamental role in strengthening democracy and the rule of law (para. 563). The Court found that the right to defend human rights, as an autonomous right, protects the free exercise of activities aimed at the advancement of human rights and fundamental freedoms (para. 561). Nevertheless, as the Court pointed out, certain groups of environmental defenders, such as women, Indigenous people, and Afro-descendant people, are particularly vulnerable to violence and negative stereotyping (paras. 571–72).
Drawing from, inter alia, the Escazú Agreement,Footnote 6 the work of special rapporteurs,Footnote 7 and its own case law, the Court found that states have a “special duty of protection” toward environmental defenders (paras. 566). Ultimately, states have the obligation to refrain from unlawful restrictions in the work of defenders, such as using the law to delegitimize their work or criminalize their activities with measures such as judicial harassment, arbitrary detention, violation of judicial guarantees, and the use of force to dispel peaceful protests (paras. 570, 587). Moreover, in line with the standard of enhanced due diligence, states have the obligation to prosecute and punish crimes against environmental defenders, which extends to acts committed by private parties (para. 581) and compile and keep up-to-date disaggregated data of verified cases of harmful acts against environmental defenders (para. 575). Finally, states have the obligation to adopt a system for transparent and opportune investigation of crimes against environmental defenders (para. 583).
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The Opinion is likely to be significant in furthering the understanding and application of human rights law and climate change, as a distinct area of international law, for a number of reasons.
First, the Court recognized nature’s right to conserve its essential ecological processes, linking it to Article 2 of the Convention and the Protocol of San Salvador—the general obligation to adopt domestic legislative provisions—and intergenerational equity (paras. 279–80). While the rights of future generations are not expressly protected under the Convention human rights regime, by adopting the integrative approach between the rights of nature and the obligations deriving from Article 2, the Court placed intergenerational equity at the heart of the specific obligations of states in relation to climate change. This approach has the potential of creating concrete state obligations to adopt legislative measures that will take into account the rights of future generations, going a step further from the interpretation of the International Court of Justice, which, while mindful of the rights of future generations, considered intergenerational equity as playing a role infra legem, without displacing or exceeding the limits of the applicable law.Footnote 8 However, it is less clear whether the obligation to enact legislation in relation to the rights of nature extends to the regulation of business enterprises. In this regard, the Court used the open-ended formulation of “states and other stakeholders” when considering the proper framework that would ensure that Nature is a structural component toward sustainable development (para. 281).
Second, a unique finding of the Court was that the rule to prevent irreversible damage to the environment (in all its formulations) is a jus cogens norm, with a likely future implication that any existing international rule, which conflicts with it becomes void and terminates.Footnote 9 While the rule has the potential of incentivizing states to adopt more stringent climate measures, the jus cogens character of the rule can create confusion as to its exact content and application. Due to its general scope and broad environmental implications, it would be more useful if it created erga omnes obligations, where potentially conflicting norms would be interpreted in light of the rule, instead of being declared void ab initio. The International Court of Justice followed a similar approach, where it observed that certain rules of international law relating to global common goods, such as the climate system, may produce erga omnes obligations.Footnote 10 Moreover, as it was pointed out in the dissenting opinions, there is little evidence of state practice and opinio juris to substantiate a new jus cogens norm in this context.Footnote 11
In addition, while the status of climate refugees has been discussed by the United Nations Human Rights Committee in the Teitiota landmark Communication,Footnote 12 it has not previously made its way into international human rights Courts’ jurisprudence. In this regard, while the Court recognized that states should observe the principle of non-refoulement, it did not directly align the responsibilities of states with Convention rights, such as the right to life. Therefore, it did not go beyond the existing parameters laid out in the Teitiota Communication. Consequently, there is little to offer to cross-border climate displaced people, who, still, must prove that they have been victims of persecution to establish a claim under refugee law.
Finally, both the recognition of a justiciable right to a healthy climate and the obligation of mitigation targets, as part of the right to a healthy environment, could augur a new era of jurisprudence before the Court, based on climate mitigation targets alone, similar to the developments before the European Court of Human Rights.Footnote 13 However, the precise parameters of standing within the American Convention context are still unclear.
