T.’s book helps fill a disconcerting gap in the systematic analysis of early Greek epistemology. This earliest period in Greek thought is typically analysed from the perspective of cosmological and ontological reflections, leaving broadly-understood epistemological and epistemologico-methodological problems marginalised. T.’s book boldly addresses these last problems and demonstrates their undeniable rank. In this way, he not so much contributes to a paradigmatic change in the way we think about early Greek thought as he indicates an alternative plane on which the extant fragments of these thinkers’ works can be analysed. From this point of view, T.’s book is necessary; it is especially necessary for those who view this period in the history of human thought as already well known and ordered.

Each problem is analysed from a particular perspective, which determines the way in which sources are selected and evaluated. T. reduces systematic epistemology to the problem of the interaction between gods and mortals. Despite his critical formulation of the problem, he analyses early Greek epistemology from a theological perspective, or more precisely: anthropotheological. For T., ‘Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides inscribe and pursue questions of epistemology within a theological framework’ (p. 309). In my view, this thesis is too strong; it would be more valid to say that these thinkers simply contemplate epistemological problems in language common at that time: language coloured by theology.

T. takes care both to exclude interpretative extremes (e.g. treating the Presocratics as either rationalists or religious sages) and to emphasise the significance of epistemological questions. One may get the impression that in regards to both matters T. sets the analysed problem up in a way that is comfortable for him. In the first case, the meaningfulness of T.’s thesis flows from the overt extremeness of the polar counter-examples; in the second, the problem of epistemology is not only – as Hesiod first noted – ‘the problem of understanding the nature of the interactions between mortal and divine’ (p. 102). The analyses of fragments from early Greek thinkers are conducted in light of a broad religious, historical and literary context. Due to the obvious lack of an earlier philosophical context, it would not hurt to supplement these analyses with the later philosophical context – that is, with an attempt at considering these ancient texts from the point of view of the theoretical tools of mature epistemology.

The book is made up of six chapters, an appendix containing the trajectory of the kouros’ journey in Parmenides’ poem, a bibliography, an index locorum and a general index. Chapter 1 discusses the concepts of rationality – irrationality, philosophy – religion, and especially the relationship between theology and epistemology. In the views of Hesiod, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles, T. notices ‘different models of divine disclosure and divine intervention which, in different ways, facilitate or even necessitate critical human reflection and human inquiry’ (p. 51).

Chapter 2, building on reflections in Chapter 1.5, according to which Hesiod is the precursor of philosophical epistemology, contains an in-depth analysis of verses 27–8 of the Theogony. Reflections on this passage are supplemented with inquiries into the alleged epistemological optimism in the Works and Days. The cognitive uncertainty of mortals that results from the possibility of the Muses’ stating falsehoods is in my opinion strongly linked with the problems of humility (opposed to ὕβρις) and justice (δίκη) thematised in the Works and Days.

In Chapter 3 T. rather narrowly concentrates on the essence of divine disclosure in Xenophanes. These analyses reveal T.’s characteristic way of approaching the subject. First, he correctly notes that fragment B18 does not in any way negate divine disclosure, after which he states exaggeratedly that the essence or goal of this fragment is to reconceptualise the problem of divine disclosure. This way, he omits all intermediate interpretations, radically reducing the fascinating complexity of B18. Other ‘epistemological’ passages of Xenophanes, including B34, B35, B36 and B38, are also analysed from this perspective.

Chapters 4 and 5 discuss complex problems connected with Parmenides’ epistemology, including a key problem for T., namely the relationship between divine disclosure and argumentative reasoning in the poem. Chapter 4 contains a description of the physiological theory of human cognition, whereas in Chapter 5 T. answers the question about how mortals can grasp what-is, belonging to Alêtheia. In his view, ‘the mortal agent is nonetheless capable of sustaining the qualitatively different thinking of Alêtheia by momentarily coming to think with – or as – his divine (fiery, aethereal) soul’ (p. 161).

In the final summarising chapter (6), T. follows the interrelations in these three thinkers’ views and returns to the problem of the alleged opposition between rational and irrational or reason and revelation. This chapter also discusses the later relationship between epistemology and theology, using as an example the significance of the daimôn and the Muse in Empedocles.

In T.’s view, already in Hesiod epistemology's central problem concerning the epistemic limitation of mortals comes to the forefront. This problem can be broken down into three parts: the nature of the mortal, the nature of the divine and the relationship between the two. The thinkers analysed in this book undertake and develop these problems in various ways. A significant problem arises, however, when we take into account T.’s literal reading of these ancient Greek texts. Speaking from a meta-epistemological standpoint, all inquiries into the three problems mentioned are conducted in these texts from the perspective of mortals. These mortals’ reflections then culminate in certain epistemological stances. Treated literally, these thinkers’ texts do not rise above the epistemic level. Fair treatment of their texts requires that care be taken not to confuse the epistemological level and the epistemic level; fairness cannot be identified with literality. For example, on the basis of epistemological passages in Xenophanes analysed earlier (B18, B36, B34), T. writes regarding B38 that ‘we should take the theological language of this fragment seriously’ (p. 136). As a result of this approach, T. concludes: ‘B38 shows only the influence of divine action on mortal perceptual experience and so belief-formation’ (p. 136). It is my view that serious treatment of the theological language of the so-called Presocratics does not result automatically in a literal reading of their texts. This theological language was initially the only language available to express philosophical content; only later does philosophical language sensu stricto appear, alongside and as a result of the inquiries of these thinkers. Moreover, such literal readings often lead to a reduction of the philosophical complexity of their thoughts to one dimension – in this case, theological: theological language → theological enterprise. This peculiar over-appreciation and monopoly of one interpretation can be expressed in the terminology of complementarity and equality (e.g. p. 162).

T. believes that Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides ‘reconsider the nature of the divine and reconceptualise its role in human reflection and inquiry’ (p. 318). This suggests that he views early Greek epistemology from a theological perspective. In my publications, I try to consider the opposite interpretative dependency. In accordance with this proposal, epistemological criticism indicates the possibility of viewing epistemological inquiries as primary vis-à-vis other types of inquiries, be they cosmological, theological or ontological. Only a comprehensive analysis of these relationships, one that does not monopolise a one-sided perspective, will allow us a fresh look at early Greek thought. The declared goal of the book is to strike a balance between critical reasoning and religiousness, philosophical epistemology and theology. However, this balance is disrupted in the conclusions. T. writes: ‘the philosophical epistemology which emerges in Hesiod, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles was an essentially theological enterprise. As such, this enterprise was not only influenced by Greek religion but was itself one part and aspect of Greek religion’ (p. 346).

T.’s book deserves to be analysed and discussed by readers, both on account of its subject matter and of the passionate way in which T. treats it. It is a valuable study, with earnestly argued theses, and is undoubtedly inspiring. One can only hope that it contributes to an increased interest in early Greek epistemology.