I am grateful to this journal for allowing me to reply to Jean-René Moret's critical engagement with certain aspects of my 2011 book, Atonement and the Logic of Resurrection in the Epistle to the Hebrews (henceforth ALR).Footnote ¹

There are numerous points in Moret's article with which I take issue. I will limit my response to two general concerns.Footnote ² First, Moret has not grasped how resurrection and atonement are inextricably linked in my argument. My response to this concern is woven throughout the specific issues I address below. Second, Moret often does little to engage with the specific arguments/exegesis I present. The modus operandi of his critique tends instead towards citing scholarly opinions that differ from my views, even though I argue in ALR against many of those very opinions. It would be useful to know why Moret deems faulty the evidence and argumentation I offer in support of my interpretations, particularly since these arguments establish foundational elements for my understanding of the nature of Jesus' heavenly offering in Hebrews (and thus also for ‘the mechanism’ of atonement). I discuss only three of what seem to me to be the more important examples of this general concern: (1) Hebrews' argument regarding Jesus' resurrection life as this relates to the eternal Son of God and Melchizedek; (2) the question of the nature of the heavenly sanctuary in Hebrews; and (3) the overlap between the language of perfection and purification in Hebrews.

First, then, towards the end of his essay Moret raises the following question in relation to part of the chronological aspect of my argument: ‘La résurrection est-elle l'origine de la vie perpétuelle du Christ, ou la manifestation de la vie que le Fils possède déjà?’ The question, however, overlooks key arguments in ALR. I state unequivocally that the narrative sequence that underlies Hebrews' Christology and soteriology draws upon ‘the full sweep of the significance of the Son's incarnation’.Footnote ³ This includes the claim that ‘the heavenly Son came into the world’.Footnote ⁴ ALR aims to demonstrate the presence and significance of this incarnational logic and chronology in Hebrews. I here note only two places where my argument falls to pieces if I am wrong about the role of the preincarnate life of the divine Son in this logic – my interpretation of the phrase ‘in the days of his flesh’ (Heb 5.7) and my identification of the syllogistic reasoning that informs the argument for the legitimacy of Jesus' high-priestly status in Heb 7.

My interpretation of Heb 5.7 depends upon my arguments for Jesus' bodily resurrection, the nature of Hebrews' dualism, and the author's implied cosmology (more on this below). I conclude that the time when the Son did not have flesh (a time implied by the comment that he suffered ‘in the days of his flesh’) refers specifically to the Son's heavenly life prior to the incarnation, and does not imply, as many argue, that Jesus' incarnation was a temporary affair that ended when he passed through the veil of his body and entered the spiritual realm of God's presence.Footnote ⁵

My arguments for how the eternal Son's pre-existence informs the argument for Jesus' post-mortem elevation to the office of high priest in Heb 7 are no less subtle and no less dependent on the Son's divine life. I state: ‘Melchizedek is like the Son of God (7:3), while Jesus, who is the Son of God (4:14), arises in the likeness of Melchizedek (7:15). The Son in Heb 1, as was noted, has divine attributes – he is a preexistent, heavenly being … The Son of Heb 1, though, is also the human being Jesus. The resurrection of Jesus … result[s] in Jesus being like Melchizedek – that is, possessing a heavenly, enduring life.’Footnote ⁶ This quote forms part of a larger argument regarding the likelihood that Hebrews assumes that Melchizedek is an angelic figure – one of the ministering/priestly spirits mentioned in Heb 1. Melchizedek's kind of heavenly life, I suggest, is the middle term in an implicit syllogism whose first premise is the eternal life of the Son of God. The syllogism intends to show that, in his humanity, Jesus arose from death to eternal life – life that is like that of Melchizedek. This is important for the author because, according to Hebrews' exegesis of Gen 14, it is Melchizedek's life, rather than his genealogy/tribal lineage (he has none), that qualifies him for his priesthood and explains why Genesis identifies him as ‘priest of God Most High’. Thus, while the author knows that Jesus was a mortal human being who really suffered and really died, he also assumes that the divine Son of God is eternal and that the human being Jesus is that Son. He does not move beyond these assumptions into a systematic explanation of how they relate to each other. (Obviously, however, such arguments informed or put ‘pressure’ on later systematic Christological reflection.)Footnote ⁷ The resurrection is the perfection of Jesus' humanity such that, as a now eternally incarnate figure, the Son's humanity enjoys incorruptible life.

In sum, my argument depends on the author of Hebrews assuming that the Son of God has divine, eternal life. Apart from this assumption, the argument of Heb 7 explaining how Jesus became qualified to be the high priest he is confessed to be collapses and, by the same token, Jesus would not be qualified to be the high priest who serves in the heavenly sanctuary.

Given my arguments on these points, I am puzzled by Moret's question (noted above). I am equally puzzled, however, by his comment in n. 53: ‘Il faut cependant noter avec Kibbe … que la vie impérissable mentionnée en 7.15 n'est pas nécessairement une qualité nouvelle acquise à la résurrection, mais que le Fils la possédait avant l'incarnation ; en particulier 7.3 voit Melchisedek rendu semblable au fils de Dieu et non l'inverse!’ The very comparison Moret denies between the Son and Melchizedek is in fact made in Hebrews when (assuming that the human Jesus is the Son of God) the author asserts that Jesus arose in the likeness of Melchizedek.

Moret's question about whether Jesus' resurrection in Hebrews should be viewed as imparting eternal life to Christ or as a manifestation of Christ's already eternal life fails, in my view, to take seriously the death and resurrection of the humanity of the incarnate Son (that is, it fails to take seriously the chronology of Hebrews' implicit Christological narrative). Instead of citing Michael Kibbe, who curiously claims that my reading of Hebrews is ‘Socinian’,Footnote ⁸ it would be more useful to know what Moret finds problematic about my actual argumentation for Jesus' resurrection and his elevation to the role of high priest. I emphasise this because the question of when, as a human being, Jesus was qualified to become a high priest (in spite of his human Judahite lineage (on this see esp. Heb 7.14 and 8.4)) is more important and determinative for my interpretation of the mechanism of atonement in Heb 9–10 than is my engagement with the views of J. Milgrom about blood and purity (with which, in any case, I argue that the author of Hebrews only partially agrees).

A second point of disagreement between Moret and me worthy of greater discussion concerns the nature of the heavenly sanctuary. Moret asserts, ‘À notre sens, la réalité ultime est la présence divine, et le sanctuaire en est une métaphore.’ This is fair enough. Moret stands with a well-represented position in the commentary literature. Slightly frustrating, however, is the fact that I offer arguments against just such a view,Footnote ⁹ none of which are addressed by Moret. As with the question of the Son's life and Jesus' elevation to the office of high priest in Heb 7, however, my assessment of the nature of the heavenly sanctuary is foundational for my interpretation of the depiction of Jesus' sacrifice in Heb 9–10, and thus also for the mechanism of atonement in Hebrews. In my view, how one assesses the nature of the heavenly sanctuary embroils one in the issue of the cosmology assumed by the author of Hebrews. Many seek to show that Hebrews' cosmology is more Platonic or even Philonic in nature. I argue (1) that this is incorrect, and (2) for a different assessment of the heavenly sanctuary language in Hebrews. I demonstrate, particularly in chapters 2–3 of ALR, that Hebrews shares a great deal with the kinds of cosmological assumptions implicit in Jewish apocalyptic texts. (This also helps one recognise that the author of Hebrews conceives of Jesus' resurrection as a discrete, bodily event – the kind of event many other apocalyptic Jews hoped for when they spoke of resurrection.) The bodily ascension of a human being through the heavens and into the tabernacle/temple structure where God sits enthroned in the highest heaven (the structure that Moses saw when he ascended the mountain) does not easily cohere with common Middle Platonic cosmological speculation (e.g. Philo). Yet, if Hebrews is more properly apocalyptic in this sense, then the language of Jesus passing through the heavens, entering into and moving through the heavenly sanctuary, appearing before the face of God, removing sin by the sacrifice of himself (9.24–6), and then sitting at the Father's right hand (cf. 1.3) cannot simply be read as metaphor for Jesus' transition into ‘la présence divine’.

Significantly for this discussion, a cosmology and corresponding conception of Jesus' resurrection and ascension into the heavenly sanctuary (rather than his transition into an abstract spiritual realm) make it difficult to conclude that Hebrews collapses or merges Jesus' death on the cross into his entrance into heaven, where he offers himself to God. I simply do not agree, as Moret does, with Attridge's conclusion that ‘Christ's sacrificial death is not an act distinct from his entry into God's presence’.Footnote ¹⁰ Jesus is not, as Moret's view seems to presuppose, simultaneously appearing before the Father's heavenly presence/in the heavenly tabernacle and dying on the cross. It is precisely the recognition of the presence of Jesus' bodily resurrection in Hebrews that calls this reduction or conflation into question. To state the obvious, much of the argumentation of my book aims to show why I think permutations on such readings of Hebrews are incorrect.Footnote ¹¹

All of this, however, further suggests that the mechanism of atonement in Hebrews works differently from what Moret and so many others in modern times claim. If Hebrews affirms the bodily resurrection as a discrete event, then Jesus' heavenly offering of himself as a sacrifice to the Father is not easily (or, at least, not coherentlyFootnote ¹² ) reducible to the crucifixion. Many of those with whom I engage in ALR's introduction recognise these problems to one degree or another and offer accounts of how to solve them, accounts that downplay or dismiss Jesus' resurrection. Just here, however, my view diverges. I understand that Moret might disagree with these conclusions, especially about the nature of the heavenly sanctuary, but some engagement with my arguments rather than merely asserting an opposing view would be useful, especially because, once again, my arguments concerning the sanctuary in the heavens and the corresponding cosmology this implies matter much more for my exegesis of Heb 9–10 and my conclusions about the mechanism of atonement in Hebrews than does my critical use of Milgrom's interpretation of purification in Leviticus.

As a third example I note that Moret and I agree that the language of purity merges with the language of perfection in Hebrews. Where we disagree is how this applies to Jesus. Here Moret's account of purification is, in my view, mistakenly reductive. Moret implies that my account of purity and atonement is more concerned with resolving the interconnected problems of death and physical impurity than with the problem of the moral aspect of sin. But this is not accurate. I argue for both. Moreover, a peculiar attribute of the Day of Atonement sacrifices is that they deal with both moral impurity (sin) and ritual impurity (issues of mortal physicality). Both the problems of sin and the problems of ritual impurities are ‘purified’/resolved on the Day of Atonement. In contrast, Moret reduces purification in Hebrews to nothing more than a moral category. But this presents a problem, particularly given that perfection and purity language overlap in Hebrews. What does it mean that Jesus had to be perfected?

Moret has an answer. He appeals to those who argue that Jesus' perfection is primarily a matter of his being prepared for his office.Footnote ¹³ As with the second issue I discussed above, this is fair enough. Moret has again endorsed an interpretation well represented in the commentary literature. But, again, I differ significantly from this interpretation, and again Moret does not engage with my interpretation and arguments. This is a pity since here the logic of Jewish sacrificial concern with ritual purity as scholars such as J. Milgrom, J. Klawans and J. Sklar describe it (in spite of their differences) makes very good sense. The perfection of Jesus is the purification of his body, the removal of the corruption of mortality. This is precisely why Jesus, as a human being, can, after the resurrection – that is, after the purification/perfection of his body – draw near to God and serve him in the heavenly sanctuary.

At the risk of being pedantic: much of the argumentation of ALR intends to challenge the two most central and interrelated reductions Moret reaffirms: (1) the reduction of purity in Hebrews only to a moral category (this correlates closely to Moret's corresponding reduction of the sacrificial offering of blood only to effecting ransom); and (2) the reduction of Jesus' offering (i.e. his ‘sacrifice’) only to the event of his death. In my view, the arguments Moret offers against my interpretation of Jesus' sacrifice and of purification in Hebrews (the mechanics of atonement) rebound and ultimately disallow my account of Jesus' resurrection in Hebrews. If I may be gently provocative, Moret's consistent reference in his footnotes to my book by the short title Atonement, rather than Atonement and the Logic of Resurrection, offers a kind of synecdoche for what I take to be the primary way in which he has misunderstood ALR's overarching argument. When, therefore, Moret concludes by stating, ‘En dépit des mérites de [Moffitt's] étude quant au rôle de la résurrection, sa compréhension du mécanisme de la purification et sa vision de l'offrande du Christ ne peuvent être maintenues face aux données de l’Építre’, I cannot agree. If I am wrong about the mechanism of atonement in Hebrews (that is, if I am wrong that the author of Hebrews thinks that, after his death and resurrection, Jesus effects atonement by ascending through the heavens as the great high priest and presenting himself to the Father in the heavenly sanctuary as the ultimate Yom Kippur sacrifice), then the merits of my arguments about Jesus' resurrection and the role it plays in Hebrews are dubious at best. If I am fundamentally wrong about where Hebrews locates Jesus' offering of his sacrifice to the Father, this is most likely because I am wrong about the logical foundation upon which my account of atonement in Hebrews stands – Jesus' resurrection.