Nationalism in the Republic of Ireland

The development of nationalism in Ireland included many aspects common to other nationalist movements of the time, such as the identification of a ‘nation’ defined by various ethnic markers and the belief in self-determination for that nation. Such nationalism had implications for policy, and successive Irish governments implemented protectionist economic policies and neutral foreign policies as the expression of Irish self-determination. However, independence was accompanied by partition, and, while southern Ireland developed as a nation-state, many argued that the project of national independence would not be finished until partition was ended. Thus the status of Northern Ireland remained an issue in the development of Irish nationalism.

Although the Irish Free State had given a form of recognition to Northern Ireland in the tripartite agreement of December 1925, it was the interpretation of the situation in the 1937 constitution which can be seen as the traditional expression of Irish nationalism.Footnote ⁴ This interpretation upheld the Irish right to self-determination and claimed a national territory of the whole island.Footnote ⁵ Whyte argues that there are two aspects to this traditional nationalist interpretation in relation to Northern Ireland: ‘(1) the people of Ireland form one nation; and (2) the fault for keeping Ireland divided lies with Britain’.Footnote ⁶ This nationalism is the touchstone against which other discourses are compared and is the type of nationalism most readily associated with Fianna Fáil.Footnote ⁷ However, Irish political parties had an ambiguous position on Northern Ireland and the early Troubles seem to be the first real test of the characterisation of the Republic's historic northern policy to this point – anti-partitionism in rhetoric but partitionism in practice.Footnote ⁸ Constitutionally sponsored irredentism disguised the inaction on the ‘national question’ and the widespread ignorance of attitudes and events within Northern Ireland.Footnote ⁹ However, while Northern Ireland may only have been used rhetorically within traditional nationalist discourse, it still represented a significant resource for politicians or public intellectuals.

By the late 1960s this traditional nationalism was being challenged from a number of areas. First, the social and economic situation in Ireland had led a new generation of public servants, intellectuals and politicians to begin to dismantle key building blocs of the traditional nationalist project, such as protectionism in economic affairs.Footnote ¹⁰ Second, there were the beginnings of a public questioning of the ‘national myth’ of independence; in particular the role of militant republicanismFootnote ¹¹ and the parliamentary origins of the Irish state were reassessed.Footnote ¹² Third, and connected to these developments, thinking on Northern Ireland began to develop. The initial developments were intellectual and the key questions were the position of Northern Irish Protestants and the British connection.Footnote ¹³ This development has been called ‘new’ or ‘revisionist’ nationalism.Footnote ¹⁴

Whyte argues that evidence of this revision can be seen as early as the 1950s.Footnote ¹⁵ Public figures such as Ernest Blythe and Donal Barrington argued that partition was a result of divisions within Ireland rather than British machinations and interests in Ireland. Barrington argued,

Britain was therefore seen as neutral on the question of a united Ireland rather than having a vested interest in maintaining partition.Footnote ¹⁷ Once this tenet of the traditional nationalist argument was challenged there were implications for nationalist goals, but revisionist nationalists remained nationalists and therefore considered the island to be the national territory and that Ireland as a whole constituted a nation. They therefore had to reconcile the desire for unification with the difficulties of an ethnically divided Ireland. For revisionists this involved directly addressing the ethnic divisions on the island and challenging the ethnic definition of the Irish nation as Gaelic and Catholic. However, it was also important to understand that developing a civic definition of the nation was not the same as addressing the bi-ethnic nature of the Northern Ireland problem.Footnote ¹⁸ Therefore the key idea was that the consent of the people of Northern Ireland was needed for unification. This meant the de facto recognition of Northern Ireland and the postponement of unification until a majority in Northern Ireland agreed to join the Republic of Ireland. The issue was how to bring about that consent, and here it should be noted that revisionist nationalism is more than simply an aspiration to a united Ireland; revisionist nationalists have wanted to create the conditions whereby that consent would be forthcoming.

The negotiation of the Sunningdale communiqué occurred during the term of a Fine Gael–Labour coalition government in the Republic. Competing discourses on the nation were a significant difficulty for the new coalition, as several prominent members of the government held views that were different from the traditional nationalism of the state. In this government revisionist nationalism was most closely associated with Garret FitzGerald. However, the coalition had to balance traditional nationalism with revisionist nationalism, which was seen as ‘soft’ on the national question, and also had to contend with the position of Conor Cruise O'Brien. O'Brien argued, even in the 1970s, that the ideal of unity was more a cause of division in Ireland than a solution.Footnote ¹⁹ Revisionists such as Fitzgerald, on the other hand, held on to unity as a more immediate ideal, but postponed until the consent of Northern Ireland should be obtained.Footnote ²⁰ O'Brien eventually endorsed unionism, but what stops Fitzgerald from crossing that line is the extent of his proposed recognition of unionist identity, which was essentially religious and economic recognition rather than political recognition.Footnote ²¹ These divisions impacted upon the distribution of ministerial portfolios in the coalition government. Conor Cruise O'Brien claimed that he was denied the foreign affairs portfolio on the basis of his views on Northern Ireland, which necessitated appointing FitzGerald to that post instead of the more obvious finance portfolio.Footnote ²²

In the context of the early twenty-first century revisionist nationalism is seen as dominant, since it precipitated important alterations in republican ideology which enabled the 1990s peace process to occurFootnote ²³ and was therefore cited as responsible for bringing about the 1998 Belfast Agreement. This was not the case in the 1970s. The revisionism of the early 1970s was part of the process by which the meanings, although not the labels, of nationalist ideology began to be altered.Footnote ²⁴ However, the differences or ideological space between the ‘traditionalism’ of Fianna Fáil and the ‘revisionism’ of Garret FitzGerald were open to question in the early phase of this process. The British ambassador in Dublin in 1973, Arthur Galsworthy, noted,

During the negotiations for the Sunningdale communiqué the influence of traditional nationalism was seen in two ways. First, traditional nationalism can be seen in the limits of the intellectual analysis of the revisionists and their proposals for a settlement in Northern Ireland. Second, traditional nationalism dominated the perceived obstacles to Irish government policy: the Irish constitution, Fianna Fáil and republicans in the south, and public opinion.

The constitution was an obstacle in terms of what the government could offer on a status declaration and on extradition, and it was the constitution which was to deal the first real blow to the credibility of the Sunningdale communiqué when Kevin Boland, who had left Fianna Fáil over the 1971 arms trial scandal, challenged its legality in the Irish courts. The issue of status could be seen as an area where revisionist nationalism could have sponsored a resolution. Indeed, in 1998, the reformulation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution along revisionist lines was a key part of the agreement. In 1973 there were members of the government who favoured amending the constitution, but there were concerns that the government would lose a referendum on the matter. The government had concluded that, if a referendum was to be attempted, the best course of action would be the adoption of a completely new constitution rather than selected deletions and amendments.Footnote ²⁶ However, neither course of action was pursued and, as a result, the Irish declaration on status had to be ‘proofed’ against a legal challenge. The declaration was upheld by the Irish Supreme Court, but the defence used by the government was as damaging to the fate of the communiqué as the challenge itself.Footnote ²⁷ The government utilised the strongest case possible against the challenge, but this defence argued that the Sunningdale communiqué did not change the position of the Irish state in relation to Northern Ireland:

This meant that the government had not moved from the irredentist position in the constitution and effectively repudiated the gains which the Ulster Unionist Party leader Brian Faulkner claimed he had made from the declaration. This therefore undermined Faulkner's credibility among unionist voters,Footnote ²⁹ since the intention of the Irish declaration on status was to allow unionists to interpret the position of the Irish state in a revisionist nationalist manner.

Fianna Fáil was an ever-present consideration in terms of the constraints which the party placed on the coalition, again in terms of status and recognition. The coalition was keen to keep a nominal bipartisanship in place but, to do so, had to ensure that its leader Jack Lynch could support the communiqué against the more republican members of his party. Lynch has been regarded as a conciliatorFootnote ³⁰ and, indeed, many of his speeches and statements contain elements of ‘new’ or ‘revisionist’ nationalism which was associated more with Garret FitzGerald.Footnote ³¹ However, Lynch had to contend with the republican wing of his party, which placed constraints on his ability to endorse a revisionist position on Northern Ireland. Sinnott's research found that Fianna Fáil members of the Dáil (TDs) were more likely to see identity as the central issue in Northern Ireland, more likely to cite Britain as a central problem and to advocate Irish unity as a solution, rather than some form of reconciliation with and within Northern Ireland.Footnote ³² These constraints were particularly evident in the Dáil debates over the Sunningdale communiqué, as the Fianna Fáil deputy leader Joe Brennan argued that the step-by-step progress towards unity as envisaged in the government's interpretation of the communiqué was not enough:

Lynch tentatively supported the communiqué, but there is evidence that this put him in difficulty with his party and many of his TDs were observed telling people around the country that Sunningdale was a ‘sell-out’.Footnote ³⁴

Finally, during discussions with British ministers and civil servants, there were continuing references by Irish ministers to the role of public opinion in the Republic. There were no clear indicators of how flexible public opinion was on key aspects but Irish ministers were clearly of the impression that a strong Irish dimension as part of a package deal, involving acceptable safeguards for the minority in Northern Ireland, was a minimum requirement.Footnote ³⁵ Therefore a Council of Ireland was crucial and they could not have won a referendum on Articles 2 and 3. They thought that it was important that the British should take it into consideration in their dealings with the Irish government. It is obvious that public opinion in Ireland was more involved and invested with ideological concerns than its British counterpart, at least in the minds of Irish politicians and civil servants.

The Irish government as a conference participant

Another major difference between 1973 and 1998 was the political framework within which the Irish government operated. In 1998 it was widely seen as a joint facilitator with the British government of the negotiations, effectively the culmination of over a decade of developments starting with the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement.Footnote ³⁶ In 1973 the Irish government was a participant in the negotiations and frustrated by the British government, which frequently resented what it saw as Irish meddling.Footnote ³⁷ This is evident during the Sunningdale conference. The Irish government had been concerned that the conference should have a neutral chairpersonFootnote ³⁸ but the British resisted this pressure and the issue ‘resolved itself’ as the British prime minister Edward Heath assumed the chair at the start and did not vacate it. While the Irish delegates seemed pleased by Heath's performance,Footnote ³⁹ this disguises the British role as chair and the Irish role as delegate.Footnote ⁴⁰

The difference in roles was accompanied by policy differences, where the Irish government had an agenda and policy goals which were more than simply obtaining agreement between unionists and nationalists. This was clearly shown by the British position on the evolution of a Council of Ireland. They took a neutral position, but the limits of their neutrality were defined by what unionists would accept and they were worried that the Irish government would, by scaring unionists, destroy the possibilities of a deal. At a meeting with the Irish ambassador in London in January 1973,

When the newly elected coalition met the prime minister in March 1973 they requested that the White Paper should contain as much detail as possible in order ‘to avoid much useless discussion and acrimony in the North in the period leading up the creation of a Council’. The prime minister responded that too much detail would lead people, already opposed to the Council, to refuse to co-operate.Footnote ⁴²

The Irish government implicitly acknowledged the differences between themselves and the British government, as a memorandum from FitzGerald, the minister for foreign affairs, stated.

This impression can only be confirmed by the almost disinterested position taken by the British on the Irish government's document during a meeting between the ambassador and Northern Ireland Office (NIO) ministers in October 1973. Here, the British explicitly explained that their position was one of ‘benign neutrality’ on the Council and that they had no ‘theological problems’ with executive functions for a Council of Ireland. Moreover, British interest in a Council of Ireland was ‘contingent rather than direct’.Footnote ⁴⁴ The Irish government recorded the NIO departmental secretary, Phillip Woodfield, as remarking:

This struck a chord with some in the Irish civil service who were concerned with the unionist reaction if the full scope of the Irish plans were realised:

The main issue for the British government in its discussions with the Irish government was not a Council of Ireland but the case that the Irish were taking to the European Court on Human Rights against the British government concerning internees in Northern Ireland. The British exerted considerable pressure to have the case dropped and they issued several warnings of the implications of the case for the process.Footnote ⁴⁷

Interpretations of the Council of Ireland

The Irish government's status as a participant in the negotiations is crucial because of the stress that it places on the centrepiece of the Sunningdale communiqué, the Council of Ireland. Recent literature in British political science has begun to examine the way in which the interpretations of institutions by politicians and civil servants influence the way in which those institutions function.Footnote ⁴⁸ Although the Council was never established, the interpretations of its purpose, functions and prospects were all crucial in shaping how it was discussed and its potential form. During the initial discussions a number of different possible types of council were identified on the basis of their potential role in bringing about unity. These ranged from a minimal official-level sole body to a maximal three-tiered body composed of parliamentary, executive and official levels. In addition, the potential growth of a council was also a consideration. In other words, could a minimal Council of Ireland evolve into a stronger one, and how?

From the beginning of the discussions the Irish government was in favour of a ‘strong’ Council.Footnote ⁴⁹ The assumption was that a strong Council would be an institutional mechanism which would unify Ireland and a meeting of ministers and senior civil servants recorded the conclusion that ‘if the British Government saw its involvement in a Council as a step towards its disengagement from the North, the Irish Government would favour this’.Footnote ⁵⁰ The link between a strong Council and a united Ireland was, by and large, an obvious and unquestioned progression for the civil servants and ministers discussing these options. Indeed the question was not whether a Council of Ireland would lead to unity but whether

An Inter-Departmental Unit on Northern Ireland (IDU) report on the Council of Ireland of June 1973 even stated that one of the basic objectives of a Council would be ‘to establish an institution which would have within itself the potential for development into a legislature and a Government for the whole island’.Footnote ⁵²

This interpretation was considerably influenced by the entry of Ireland and the United Kingdom into the European Economic Community (EEC) and the institutions and rationale of this emerging supra-national body figured prominently in Irish and British discussions on a Council.Footnote ⁵³ Nevertheless, the actual rationale for the Council was rooted in Irish public discourse. A senior civil servant in the department of foreign affairs, Noel Dorr, provided the most sophisticated rationale of the Council:

1. (a) To provide for harmonious common action in certain limited matters where the interests of North and South overlap – solely in order to promote these interests more effectively and rationally . . .

2. (b) To act as a symbolic North–South link sufficient to induce the bulk of the minority in the North to accept, work and live for the moment under new political structures which are now to be created in the new area; and sufficient in consequence to allow Dublin to accept the new settlement.

3. (c) To involve the common interests of North and South in pragmatic projects of mutual benefit – to such an extent as to encourage and accustom them to working together over a period; and in this way to promote reconciliation and set both parts of the island on a converging path without necessarily specifying the ultimate shape or timetable for possible unity between them.Footnote ⁵⁴

He argued that ‘These aims are not mutually exclusive. Each in turn comprehends and goes beyond, those listed above’.Footnote ⁵⁵ These aims seem to be the very essence of revisionist nationalism with its emphasis on consent and reconciliation. However, the basic difficulty with the revisionist nationalist position is that it is presumed that reconciliation will lead to territorial unity. It is still obvious that at this stage territorial unity is what is supposed by unity.

Moreover, the Irish government had to be firmly committed to such a project:

The proposals drawn up by the Irish civil service and supported by the government clearly demonstrated commitment:

The Council, in revisionist nationalist terms, was intended to bring about reconciliation between north and south, which would lead to a united Ireland. A government decision on the declaration it would make on status at the negotiations stated: ‘That . . . the aspirations of a majority of the people of this island to its political unity shall be pursued through reconciliation alone’.Footnote ⁵⁹ Reconciliation is thus tied to the aspirations of Irish nationalists to a united Ireland. However, there is a significant difficulty with this formulation. Reconciliation was conceived as reconciliation between the two states north and south, and not between people. This was evidenced by the manner in which it was envisaged that reconciliation would occur, which was through increased co-operation and the harmonisation of laws and practices through the Council of Ireland.Footnote ⁶⁰ However, communal identities did not inhere precisely within the two states. Northern Ireland contained a significant number of northern nationalists who wanted recognition of their identity and interests. This was necessary if reconciliation between unionists and nationalists was to occur. However, reconciliation requiring territorial unity in the sense which was proposed by the Irish government necessitated reconciliation between Irish nationalism and Ulster unionism. Traditional nationalists were quite clear that unionists should not have the right to deny Irish self-determination on a 32-county basis, but revisionist nationalists were willing to discuss the nature of unionist identity and how that should be accommodated within Irish nationalism and an Irish state. It is at this intellectual juncture that the idea of reconciliation is important. According to revisionist nationalist thinking, the obstacle to unity was not the British state but Ulster unionists, which in turn meant that reconciliation between Irish nationalists and Ulster unionists was the means to achieve Irish unity.

However, it seems that the primary rationale for a Council was that it was a key demand of northern nationalists in order for them to have an institutional link with the south to provide recognition of their Irish identity. As Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave said at the opening of the Tripartite Conference,

The argument here is not that this line of thought is not compelling and it is not even argued that these functions are necessarily mutually exclusive; a Council of Ireland could have performed both of these functions if unionists and nationalists interpreted it in this way, but unionists were not interested in the reconciliation aspect of a council and this was known by the Irish government.Footnote ⁶² However, it is important to note that these two functions are analytically distinct. The discussions during the executive negotiations and at the Sunningdale conference were not about how a Council of Ireland would bring about reconciliation. They were complicated political negotiations which saw unionists agree to a three-tiered Council of Ireland as an effective quid pro quo for a unionist majority on the executive and nationalists argue for a Council on the basis of an institutional recognition of their national identity. To frame the Council of Ireland as a means of reconciliation belies its importance for northern nationalists and misrepresents the terms on which unionists agreed to its establishment.

It also underestimates the importance of northern nationalists to Irish government policy formulation on Northern Ireland. Northern nationalists operated as a powerful influence on Irish government policy, and their position within the traditional nationalist discourse on the nation is an important constraint on the extent of the reconciliatory aims of the revisionist nationalist project. It is significant that after the fall of the Northern Ireland Executive Conor Cruise O'Brien wrote a memo for the government expressing these concerns. He argued that the search for a nationalist consensus between the government, Fianna Fáil and the north's Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) was preferred to – and effectively killed – the other consensus which was also being attempted with northern unionists.Footnote ⁶³

Far from seeking institutions to reconcile unionists to Irish nationalism, the Irish government effectively sponsored northern nationalists. The Irish ambassador in London, Donal O'Sullivan, told Whitelaw in January 1973, ‘unless the proposals for a settlement went far enough in meeting the interests of the minority and in convincing them of the possibility of further development in the future they and Dublin were unlikely to accept them’.Footnote ⁶⁴ Arthur Galsworthy described the relationship thus:

The coalition government, and particularly Fitzgerald, were tuned into SDLP thinking because grass-roots SDLP members were more suspicious of the nationalism of the coalition than the nationalism of Fianna Fáil. This was shown by the report of a tour which the attorney general, Declan Costello, made of SDLP constituency associations at the request of John Hume, a leading SDLP politician, in July 1973. Costello reported that there was widespread dissatisfaction with the Irish government, which was perceived as ‘soft’ on unionists. According to Costello, this derived from the positions of prominent members prior to the election, particularly Fitzgerald and O'Brien; the Taoiseach's Blackrock speech, which downplayed unity in favour of reconciliation within Northern Ireland and between north and south;Footnote ⁶⁶ the shelving of a legal case which the Irish government was bringing against the British government in the European Court of Human Rights in respect of the internees in Northern Ireland; the failure of the government to support the public attitudes of the SDLP and the failure to criticise more strongly the unionist positions; and the perception that, by meeting other groups, such as the New Ulster Movement, they appeared to treat the SDLP as merely another northern grouping. The SDLP were keen to have the closest possible relations to work out a common negotiating position. Paddy Devlin (SDLP) even leaked news of the attorney general's visit to the Sunday Press and then boasted of his actions. He claimed that the government was deliberately trying to downgrade the SDLP because of its close links with Fianna Fáil. Costello noted, ‘Whilst I attempted to disabuse him of his ideas and of his obviously deep-seated suspicions of certain members of the Government, it is highly problematical whether or not I was successful’.Footnote ⁶⁷

These differences were brought to the fore in October 1973 over policing. The SDLP was pushing for substantial reforms to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in order to provide ways for the minority community to identify with the police. They argued that this could happen if policing was linked to the Council of Ireland.Footnote ⁶⁸ This would require co-operation from the Irish government, but there were divisions within the government on the issue. The first indications of difficulties emerged in summer 1973, when there was a difference of opinion between Irish civil servants and FitzGerald on the matter. Secretary to the Taoiseach Dermot Nally stated bluntly, ‘Policing should not be given to a Council. Courts and ombudsman type work might be associated with it’.Footnote ⁶⁹ However, FitzGerald recommended that the government should include control of a reformed Northern Ireland police force as an ideal position. Failing this, increased co-operation between the two forces, common courts and a common law enforcement zone around the border were desirable.Footnote ⁷⁰ Further legal studies identified significant difficulties with any such proposals,Footnote ⁷¹ and the minister for justice, Patrick Cooney, was opposed to significant changes to the status quo.Footnote ⁷² The British took advantage of the situation and attempted to play the Irish government off against the SDLP.Footnote ⁷³ Indeed, this was a recurring theme of discussions of British strategy during meetings between the SDLP and the Irish government.Footnote ⁷⁴ When the Irish government finally showed their proposals to the SDLP the reaction was ‘strongly negative’. The SDLP told the Irish government that they were ‘partitionist’ and indicated that Dublin was not sincere in its attitude towards Irish unity. They threatened that, if this was the case, the SDLP might have to go to Fianna Fáil in order to get support on the policing issue.Footnote ⁷⁵

The limits of reconciliation

Given the rhetorical importance to the Irish government's position of reconciliation with Ulster unionists, it is unfortunate that the SDLP position was so dominant in Irish government policy. As one senior civil servant in the NIO at the time remarked, ‘I've thought for a very long time that too much of the Irish government view of how the Unionists would react has really come through the filter of the opinion of somebody like John Hume . . . I'm not sure that either the British Government or the Irish Government had any very reliable feeling about what the reaction in Northern Ireland might be to certain things that were going to happen’.Footnote ⁷⁶ The SDLP was understandably attempting to maximise its gains at the negotiating table, and pursuing an alliance with the Irish government made sense in those circumstances. However, this alliance tied the Irish government into a strategic game of outmanoeuvring Faulkner, rather than seriously addressing issues necessitated by a policy of reconciliation. For example, Hume told Irish civil servant Sean Donlon in September 1973 that

The Irish government had an unrealistic picture of the predicament facing Faulkner. They were being told that Faulkner was politically vulnerable but unlikely to be removed as UUP leader and should be pressurised into making concessions. Moreover, when FitzGerald recommended that ‘at the earliest appropriate date, our present range of consultations with political parties in the North be extended to include official Unionists’, his reasons were not in the interests of balance or equity but were strategic.Footnote ⁷⁸

It is obvious that the Irish government had very little appreciation of the unionist position and politics beyond public statements. The British foreign secretary, Sir Alec Douglas Home, remarked after consultations with Irish officials,

The Irish government did not give any substantive concessions to the unionists on a Council of Ireland. Instead, the assistance that the Irish government gave to unionists was through megaphone diplomacy or choreographed political statements and actions. Cosgrave's Blackrock speech on 21 June 1973 was designed to make as much impact on the Assembly elections as possible and in particular its message of reconciliation was designed to appeal to moderate unionist opinion.Footnote ⁸⁰ After Sunningdale the Irish government undertook five sequenced events in an attempt to assist Faulkner in advance of the crucial Ulster Unionist council meeting on 4 January 1974. On 31 December Cosgrave would send a message to the Executive reiterating the status declaration in the communiqué. On 1 January an announcement would be made of the date for the first meeting of the Legal Commission on Law Enforcement. On 2 January there would be an announcement regarding the Adaptation Order, providing that people accused of murder in the north could be arrested and tried in the south. On the night of 2 January, there would be arrests of suspects in the border areas. Finally, on 3 January there would be a meeting of the Garda commissioner and the RUC chief constable.Footnote ⁸¹ These moves spectacularly backfired when the Irish government had to release the suspects, which further undermined Faulkner's interpretation of the Irish government's commitments on security.

However, the attitude of the Irish government towards the implementation of a Council of Ireland was the clearest indication that reconciliation was subservient to Irish nationalist goals. When British officials at one meeting stressed the difficulties of getting a Council of Ireland past unionist opinion, the Irish government advocated the imposition of a Council of Ireland.Footnote ⁸² Indeed, a memo prepared in the aftermath of this meeting stated,

It is at this point that the twin policies of reconciliation with Ulster unionists and recognition of northern nationalist identity clash.

The connection between the Council of Ireland and the opinion of unionists in bringing about unity was not considered because it was invested with ideological assumptions about the nature of Ulster unionist identity. The first paper prepared by the Irish civil service on a Council of Ireland in November 1972 included some ‘guiding principles’ for North–South institutional links. It was here that the principle of a dynamic council was first set out: ‘in order to make definite progress towards ultimate unity any North/South institutional link established must be strong with a built-in dynamic for development and organic growth. It should be evolutionary and not static’.Footnote ⁸⁴ The workings of the Council should include as many safeguards as possible and machinery for resolving deadlock ‘to ensure that when an all-Ireland Council is established it will be effective, durable and incapable of being wrecked by Unionist intransigence’.Footnote ⁸⁵ Moreover, the terms of reference should be set out clearly at the beginning,

Paper 2, written by the IDU, repeated this concern: ‘It would appear desirable when deciding on the Council's terms of reference to ensure that it cannot be rendered ineffective by Unionist intransigence’.Footnote ⁸⁷ By September 1973, Nally was suggesting to the Taoiseach that there should be four criteria for the transfer of functions to a Council: the possibility of economic benefit, the potential for development, potential to improve security and, finally, political advantage, which was explained: ‘Insofar as we are concerned, this means the development of a unification mentality. Insofar as the majority in the North are concerned, the meaning could well be otherwise. For this reason, this criterion might well be under-emphasised at this point’. As the Council of Ireland Paper 1 stated,

The Council of Ireland was to have ‘real growth potential’ in order to bring about unity, but this growth was to be achieved with or without unionist consent.

Conclusion

The Irish government's position at the Sunningdale conference was conditioned by a number of strategic and ideological factors. Their fraught and nascent relationship with the British government made them a participant rather than facilitator in the process, but this merely reflected other processes involved rather than determined their role. The constraints of traditional Irish nationalism were the main influences on how they interpreted proposals for new institutions and the strategic forces in play in Northern Ireland. Traditional nationalism operated in explicit ways, such as the position of Fianna Fáil or the constraints of the Irish constitution, but it also conditioned thinking in more subtle ways. It is important to remember that revisionist nationalists had the same long-term objective as traditional Irish nationalism which it was competing with at this time. Traditional nationalism created a national frame among politicians and civil servants which included the whole island and created an affinity with northern nationalists, and these created contradictions in the thinking of those who were developing revisionist nationalist ideas.

The Council of Ireland agreed at Sunningdale reflected the ideas of Irish nationalists, north and south, and was aimed at securing the short-term objective of recognising northern nationalist identity in Northern Ireland. However, the Council also had a longer-term aim of achieving a united Ireland and it is this aim which involved addressing the complex relationships between unionists, nationalists and the Irish state in an intellectually sophisticated manner. The Irish government thought that a concept of reconciliation, which stressed co-operation through mutual interests and consent concerning constitutional change, would address these relationships and bring about a united Ireland. Unionists would later argue that the neo-functionalism which informed nationalist ideas on north–south co-operation and the ideas on the nature of potential institutions to give effect to that co-operation, like the Council of Ireland, showed that the aspirations to reconciliation were merely rhetorical. According to this neo-functionalist argument, the institutions would develop in such a way that would create a de facto united Ireland and make Unionist consent irrelevant for unification.Footnote ⁸⁹

It is undoubtedly the case that many civil servants and politicians in the early 1970s agreed with this reading, especially as they were heavily influenced by the emerging European model. However, there are some more subtle implications of the dual aims behind the Council of Ireland. The point is not that revisionist nationalism had no purchase on the idea of reconciliation; Irish civil servants and politicians were, without doubt, sincere about creating the conditions whereby unionists would consent to a united Ireland. The problem is that the Irish government misunderstood the conditions necessary for unionists to consent to a united Ireland. The Irish government continued to believe that unionist opposition to a united Ireland centred on economic and cultural problems and therefore falsely believed that it could create the conditions for unionist consent. Since unionists saw themselves as British and wished to remain within the United Kingdom the only probable circumstance in which they would countenance a united Ireland would be within the United Kingdom. Irish nationalists could not deliver this condition for reconciliation because they would cease to be Irish nationalists and, as revisionist nationalists remained Irish nationalists, they could not envisage such an eventuality. Thus their revisionism was constrained by their inability to recognise that they would be unable to achieve their goal of a united Ireland because the end point of the process of reconciliation was not shared by unionists, the other party to the process.

Revisionist nationalism, with its emphasis on consent, could have sponsored rhetorically a peace process, but the influence of traditional irredentism, together with the need to provide recognition of northern nationalist identity in Northern Ireland, clashed with the aims of reconciliation with Ulster unionists. It is at this intellectual juncture where the Council of Ireland is important. The nuances within this revisionist political discourse were insufficient to sustain a project of reconciliation when it was asked to sponsor an institution which needed a firm rationale and purpose.