It is proper on an auspicious occasion like this to invoke the memory of the man whose name adorns our proceedings. (Sir) George Prothero was a typical British historian of the Victorian and Edwardian age, best known as a pioneering Cambridge tutor, then as long-serving editor of the Quarterly Review. So surely he is quite irrelevant for my purposes today? But wait! Prothero's education – not unusually for one of his generation (he was born in 1848) – had included a spell at Bonn; he even translated a work of Ranke's. When the First World War came, the already very senior Prothero found himself, as head of a newly established History Section at the Foreign Office, overseeing investigation and judgement on the (recent) past of the belligerent enemy powers in central Europe.Footnote 1 At the end of hostilities, Austria-Hungary was in fact extremely prominent (comprising all of its first fourteen items) in the long series of Peace Handbooks, which, under the general editorship of Prothero, were issued to explain and justify the international decision to liquidate the Habsburg Monarchy and deprive its last ruler, Charles, recent successor to the venerable Francis Joseph, of his imperial title.
The Habsburgs had evidently lost the battle for publicity as well as the military contest. Long before the war they had often been associated with a style of secretive, unaccountable rule which seemingly set much store by the traditions of arcana imperii and tricked itself out with ponderous and (out)dated ceremonial. As monarch, Francis Joseph (about whom much more later) had still wielded important prerogatives known technically, and suggestively, as iura majestatica reservata – as opposed to those which he shared with his legislatures and which were therefore ‘communicata’.Footnote 2 He was notoriously resistant to novel means of spreading information, notably the telephone.Footnote 3
Perhaps the Habsburgs simply embodied the wrong kind of ‘empire’, as then understood and prized? They were not colonialists (likewise in the then current sense), with one exception to be treated near the end of this paper. Nor were they carriers of European values overseas. Indeed, the whole nature of the Habsburgs’ imperial credentials is problematic by that point, as we shall see, for other reasons. Yet at the same time the Habsburgs were the oldest ‘imperialists’ of all: members of the family had borne the title of emperor, with little interruption, for over six centuries. In the present context, the years around 1700 are the place to begin.Footnote 4
At that time two preconditions were set for the shift of Europe's one and only imperial dynasty to a modern exercise of its powers. Both involved both loss and profit. First, and very specifically in 1700, the extinction of the Spanish branch of the family meant a rupture with their Mediterranean-based globalism; but it allowed a concentration of lands and ambitions in the centre of Europe. Secondly, as a looser process around that date, what proved to be the definitive defeat of the previously chronic Ottoman menace would gradually deprive the Habsburgs of their ideological weapon of crusade; but, again in compensation, it brought vast territorial gains. Henceforth the extended ‘hereditary lands’ (Erblande) of the house of Austria would be nicely balanced, about half within and half outwith the Holy Roman Empire, of which they were long-time sovereigns.
The nature of imperium in that Reich was above all unique and in theory universal.Footnote 5 The emperor purported to be, on the one hand, ‘Roman’, i.e. inheritor of the hegemony of ancient Rome; even though now, by fragmentation and by the celebrated theory of translatio imperii, he controlled just that relic which was predominantly (as it came to be designated) German: ‘deutscher Nation’. On the other hand, he was ‘holy’, i.e. he embodied the sacred ecumenical role of the church; but that had now likewise become fragmented, and this time internally, by the Lutheran Reformation. The settlements of 1555 and 1648 helped to contain the religious breach in the Reich; while the global Roman idea could long be eked out through the anti-Turkish campaigns of the emperors.
By 1700, Emperor Leopold I had proved remarkably successful in consolidating and representing the powers of his office. Moreover, they were increasingly communicated through a heightened ‘baroque’ repertoire of imperial symbols, rituals and ceremonial. Intensive study of late has revealed the extent of that aulic cultural display – not inferior to, and hardly less influential than, the simultaneous imagery of the Sun King.Footnote 6 It rested on multi-media panegyric, in texts, music and theatre, architecture and elaborate decorative schemes. But there was little or no overt court propaganda. That seems to have remained largely true under Leopold's sons, the short-lived Joseph and then Charles VI, who incorporated or reincorporated Spanish traditions (and some of the formerly Spanish lands), as well as the ‘Caroline’ motif in the history of the Reich, from Charlemagne via the iconic emperors Charles IV and Charles V.
What was actually being conveyed? An inextricable blending of ‘German’ and ‘Austrian’ motifs.Footnote 7 Thus Catholic patronage and the so-called ‘pietas Austriaca’ pertained rather more to the Habsburgs as territorial rulers marked by counter-reforming zeal; Roman themes more to their dignity as Kaiser, especially as legends of the family's physical descent from ancient Italy, even from Greek gods, began to fade into the background.Footnote 8 The two together are well exemplified by the grand structures which celebrated imperial sovereignty even within some of the great Austrian monasteries, like the ceremonial stairways (Kaiserstiegen) at Göttweig and elsewhere. Depictions of authority might tend to emphasise the absolute character of hereditary dynastic power, or the popular mandate vouchsafed by the elective principle which still nominally underlay imperial dominion. And who could say to which side the associated armoury of symbols actually belonged? The double eagle (Doppeladler) had been used from the time of Emperor Sigismund of Luxemburg in the early fifteenth century onwards.Footnote 9 Then there were the black-and-gold (schwarzgold, schwarzgelb) colours; or the crowns and insignia; or the elaborate array of vestments, precious stones and the rest.
The imperial mystique itself still exercised a strong sway. It was not yet challenged directly by ideological rivals, even by the mightiest extra-European ‘empire’, that of Spain, or by the western monarchies that largely reserved imperial locutions for domestic consumption. Rather it was emulated, especially from Russia, where Peter I took the precise title of ‘imperator’ (rather than ‘tsar’) and finally gained grudging recognition from the Habsburgs of some sort of parity for a Russian empire (
), as successor to the Russian tsardom (
) of Muscovy, resting on an alternative genealogy, via Constantinople, of the same imperial claims and their symbolism, including the two-headed (dvuglavyi) eagle.Footnote 10
An event in 1740 undermined all of this: the death of Charles VI, leaving only a daughter, Maria Theresa. The Reich held to Salic law, so there was an enforced separation of the Kaisertum from the dynasty of Habsburg, or rather Habsburg-Lorraine, as it became with Maria Theresa's marriage to Francis of Lorraine. The formal but hardly transparent elective procedures threw up a new (Bavarian) emperor who was actually by then at the head of a coalition fighting to dispossess the young queen of most of the rest of her possessions. That put to the test a famous and ineffable document known to history as the Pragmatic Sanction, originally devised back in 1703 as a secret Habsburg family inheritance compact (‘pactum mutuae successionis’) to secure a future female succession: a transaction of highly dubious validity in imperial law – but an emperor could carry it through. In the process of gaining acceptance within and beyond the Austrian lands from 1713 onwards, it acquired some crucial and portentous extra wording, that the lands of the house were to be undivided (unzerteilt), or held ‘indivisibiliter et inseparabiliter’, as the Hungarian statute declared in 1723.Footnote 11
Challenged from abroad, the Pragmatic Sanction held at home. For us the point is that Maria Theresa needed a new legitimation for her own lands, independent of any imperial endorsement. Her relation to the Reich remained awkward, even after 1745, when her husband was chosen as emperor. Not for nothing was Habsburg dynastic authority vindicated at just this time by the massive genealogical and medievalist publications of a Swabian Benedictine historian, with a name that commanded attention: Marquard Herrgott, in his Genealogia diplomatica augustae gentis Habsburgicae (1737), and Monumenta augustae domus Austriacae (in eight volumes from 1750).Footnote 12 Yet the chief means of propagating the new goals was a massive programme of state-building initiated by Maria Theresa, backed by a reform party among her advisers and administrators, implemented for the first time by squarely Austrian bodies, and communicated by printed decree, instruction, exhortation and earnest Enlightenment treatise, as well as by the beginnings of belletristic engagement on behalf of the government.
Maria Theresa's eldest son, Joseph II, restored the organic bond with the Empire. Or did he? His coronation, vivente imperatore, in 1764 was a showpiece of the Old Reich, later recalled by Goethe in a celebrated chapter of his autobiography as one of ‘the symbolic ceremonies through which the German Reich, almost buried in so many parchments, papers and books, could for a moment be restored to life’. It is a quite homely event in the poet's extended narration, blending with his own teenage escapades and his first love for a mysterious girl called Gretchen.Footnote 13 For Joseph this introduced a phase of vigorous imperial activity, when he sought to breathe new life into the ancient institutions – he was not yet properly ruler of the hereditary lands anyway. However, he soon began to undermine his own position by headstrong methods and frustration at the limited scope he possessed to assert himself.Footnote 14 So Joseph turned to aggressive promotion of the extra- or even anti-imperial cause instituted by his mother: the campaign for an Austrian state and civic nationality. And note: that campaign was non-national or pre-national. There was as yet no sign of ethnic considerations on the governmental side, even though resistance to Joseph's centralising–standardising–regularising innovations contributed greatly to creating ethnic agendas in Habsburg central Europe.
Joseph II's self-presentation proceeded accordingly; however, it was also openly imperial. Curiously Joseph could only be an emperor – unlike his predecessors, he remained uncrowned in any of his realms, in order not to be hampered by oaths or other restraints on his authority. But he cultivated a markedly populist register as the Volkskaiser. Especially in Bohemia, among the Czech peasants, he became such a lidový císař; and probably the best-known image of this ‘people's emperor’ was of Joseph handling the plough there. Although in fact he apparently did so only once, and only for one furrow, at Slavíkovice in Moravia in 1769, the deed was commemorated in a monument and in endless prints and doggerel.Footnote 15 Yet (perhaps by the same token) the ideological challenge was to Joseph as ruler of Austria: within Germany, of course, that came mainly from Prussia. There was still little criticism of Kaiser or Reich as such: indeed a particular species of allegiance, Reichspatriotismus, spread widely among educated Germans in the later eighteenth century; while changing notions of empire in the wider world hardly impinged (the British especially, via Hanover, continued to be strong supporters of the Reich).Footnote 16
Joseph's death in 1790 introduced two and a half decades of turbulence: the nemesis of the old Reichsidee and the birth of a new one, with complex intertwining between the two. In the background there proceeded the dramatic penetration of French armies across the Rhine; deep divisions which opened up among and within the German states as they sought to manoeuvre; and the final assault on imperial institutions spurred by direct or indirect Napoleonic promptings.Footnote 17 That is not part of the present analysis, so I move to the caesura itself, as the Habsburgs experienced it: the years 1804 and 1806. I take the latter date first, for convenience of exposition.
After the Reichsdeputationshauptschluss, the battle of Austerlitz and the formation of the Rhine Confederation, the danger grew ever more real that Napoleon would either seize the imperial crown himself or press some client on the electoral college (which now had a Protestant majority anyhow). Therefore on 6 August 1806 a herald in full livery mounted the balcony of the Church of the Nine Choirs of Angels on Vienna's am Hof square (right next to the Austrian war ministry). He was there to communicate, in time-honoured style, an imperial decree of his master Francis II. Having rehearsed his standard titulature (including the claim to be ‘at all times augmenter of the Reich’), the emperor announced to the crowd ‘that we consider the bond, which has hitherto attached us to the body politic of the German Reich, to be dissolved’.Footnote 18
This was a unilateral declaration of disbandment (rather than just of abdication), and as such probably ultra vires in any case. It remains a subject of contention how much the extinction of the Old Reich actually mattered to contemporaries. Yet the dissolution evidently left a void for many, as well as giving rise to an intensive constitutional debate, which included some significant wider sentiment for a restoration at the end of the Napoleonic wars, before the German Confederation (Deutscher Bund) came to be imposed as a fruit of the negotiations at Vienna.Footnote 19
The Habsburgs’ own damage limitation was already in place earlier. When Napoleon had proclaimed himself ‘empereur des français’ in May 1804, he prompted an immediate response from Francis: the announcement, in August of the same year, that he himself would henceforth be a hereditary ‘emperor of Austria’ – thus (as it happened) automatically promoting himself from Francis the Second to Francis the First. Once again this was an act of highly dubious validity in imperial law (much in the way the Pragmatic Sanction had been); and for the next twenty-four months it created a bizarre spectacle of the same monarch reigning over two different but overlapping empires. Moreover, was not Austerlitz in the following year as a consequence really the battle of the Four Emperors?
Yet the implications of the démarche were less far-reaching than might at first appear. The decree stresses that it is a matter of title only – as if one should call oneself (say) ‘king of Jerusalem’ (which indeed the Habsburgs did). It confirms the continued existence of a ‘united Austrian body of states’ (vereinigter österreichischer Staaten-Körper), and explicitly introduces no change in governmental relations, so that each domestic ‘state’ retains its ‘existing titles, constitutions, privileges and arrangements’ (‘daß Unsere sämmtlichen Königreiche, Fürstenthümer und Provinzen, ihre bisherigen Titel, Verfassungen, Vorrechte und Verhältnisse fernerhin unverändert bey-behalten sollen’). A special rescript confirmed that for the Hungarian lands; but it applied elsewhere too, for example in Bohemia.Footnote 20 In other words, there was now an Austria emperor, but no Austrian empire.
These circumstances helped shape the ways in which the new message of empire was conveyed. The watchwords were dynastic legitimacy and a supranational Austria. That matched the mood and priorities of the conscientious, but small-minded and chronically suspicious Francis – at least, most of the time. He actually began his ‘new’ reign by unveiling a great equestrian statue to his revolutionary uncle Joseph II in the main square outside the Hofburg in Vienna. Then he indulged a brief fling with popular patriotism in 1808–9, encouraging a lively exercise in public relations which blended German, Austrian and provincial motifs, masterminded by the court archivist Joseph Hormayr.Footnote 21 But the French soon crushed the resultant uprising at Wagram, and Francis reverted to his natural immobility and authoritarian secrecy, especially once Napoleonic dominance had been overthrown and the Vienna Congress could trumpet on his own ground the virtues of legitimate authority.
Yet ‘legitimacy’ could be a weasel word, even for the Habsburgs. They had, after all, defaulted of late on their long-standing ideological assertion of a purely inherited patrimony, extended only by marriage agreements, as encapsulated in that slightly defensive, yet resonant catch-phrase: ‘tu felix Austria, nube’. The acquisition of Galicia in 1772 rested on (specious) medieval claims of Hungarian kings to portions of historic Poland; Bukovina was a naked land-grab from the enfeebled Turks; then Venice a mercenary transfer. In the event, Francis I grew mistrustful of all kinds of territorial allegiance, even the ‘Austrian’ one his predecessors had fostered. He presented himself as ‘father of the fatherland’, and expected solely individual loyalty to his imperial person. That went with the paternalist system, associated with Metternich, but at least as much tributary to the emperor himself, with paid informers and apologists, which came to be seriously challenged in the 1820s and 1830s.Footnote 22
We can see the problem if we contemplate the symbols of the new Kaiserreich. The Habsburgs could deploy regalia old and new. The venerable insignia of the Reich, headed by Charlemagne's crown, orb, sceptre and lance, had been ‘rescued’ from Nuremberg in the dark days of the 1790s; but they were not used (rather they were put on public show in Vienna).Footnote 23 Instead the resplendent Hauskrone, the ‘house crown’ commissioned by Rudolf II two centuries earlier for no obvious purpose (it had played a merely ancillary role in earlier rituals), was now drafted in as the chief jewel of Austria. It became conspicuous in iconography, as in Amerling's portrait of Francis, a superb depiction of the grandiose, sumptuous exterior and the care-ridden, vulnerable monarch within. Yet – as we shall see – that gained no practical function either. In fact only the imperial mantle for ceremonial wear was newly made.Footnote 24 Similarly with other accoutrements. Whereas the Doppeladler and the coat of arms, together with the schwarzgelb colours, were taken over more or less bodily from the Old Reich, a freshly conceived female figure came to represent ‘Austria’, evidently on the same lines as the ‘Germania’ now on display elsewhere in the Confederation and as France's ‘Marianne’, but usually adorned with a so-called mural crown rather than with any trappings of liberty.Footnote 25 Emblem or no, the actual meaning and denotation of ‘Austria’ remained deeply unclear.
And what of the arts? We have already seen (in roughest outline) the earlier role of the baroque image, then of the enlightened word. Reduced courtly budgets had largely put paid to the first, then censors crabbed the second. It is instructive to notice the Habsburg emperors’ relation to the one great creative achievement of this period in their realms: music's classical age. On the whole, a sharp decline of patronage can be detected, after Mozart, whom Joseph II still appointed Kammermusicus in the 1780s. Mozart's imperial opera La Clemenza di Tito was premiered at the Bohemian coronation of Leopold II.Footnote 26 But Schubert was just a boy chorister in the court chapel; it was left to Francis's youngest brother Rudolf to try to make up for the rest of his family as maecenas. The young Beethoven composed cantatas on the death of Joseph and on the accession of Leopold II. Yet his response to Napoleon's self-proclamation as emperor (removing the dedication of his ‘Eroica’ symphony) could hardly have been more different from the Habsburg one; and of course it is only the English-speaking world which, following the whim of a London publisher, labels his last piano concerto the ‘Emperor’ (though this is dedicated to the Archduke Rudolf).
The most notable musical connection was far more straightforward: Joseph Haydn's Kaiserhymne, freely offered by the patriotic composer as an imperial anthem, to counter the Marseillaise. However, let us bear in mind that in 1797 this wonderful melody, majestic but intimate, touching and a shade folksy, was still designed, with its trite deferential text, for the whole of the Holy Roman Empire.
By the 1830s the Habsburgs stood more and more in need of ideological support, as their commitment to legitimate dynastic rule dealt them a cruel blow in the practical sphere: Francis's elder son, and therefore inevitable successor, was a simpleton. Ferdinand was duly crowned in the various kingdoms of the Monarchy: in 1830 in Hungary, vivente rege; in 1836 in Bohemia; in 1838 in Lombardy-Venetia. The Prague occasion in particular seems to have been a real Volksfest, much appreciated throughout the Bohemian lands.Footnote 27 There was, however, no imperial coronation. Why not? Because the new hereditary principle of rule did not require it? But of course the Habsburgs had been territorial rulers of their so-called Erblande, explicitly ‘inherited’ lands, for centuries, fulfilling the appropriate rites of accession. I suggest two larger reasons: first a clash at the Hungarian diet, on which we need to pause.
This debate of 1835 in Hungary is normally dismissed – if noted at all – as evidence of the triviality of the country's ancien regime; but in fact it reveals a shift in fundamental constitutional realities. It began soon after Francis's death, with a grievance of the patriotic opposition in the Lower House that Ferdinand, though already crowned king as the Fifth, is now ruling, in the language of his decrees, as the First, i.e. using his imperial style: an insult to Hungarian independence and status in Europe. The Habsburg side justified the practice with historical examples: Hungary had always recognised the imperial title as senior. It became a central counter-proposition that things were now different: the Holy Roman Empire had commanded respect (it had guaranteed the jus gentium and so forth); whereas ‘little’ Austria, formerly just an archduchy, now ‘overshadows’ Hungary, ‘swallows it up’. The next weeks saw the title issue mixed up with a range of liberal demands for free speech, a separate army, peasant emancipation, and the like. The issue yielded some diverting episodes – as when the loyal address on the new ruler's name-day could not be sent because the diet was locked in an impasse about how to address the envelope – but it also gave rise to major speeches by rising liberals, among them Ferenc Deák, who seized on this pretext to develop his argument that the Pragmatic Sanction involved a mere personal union with ‘Austria’. The affair lasted nearly six months and generated over thirty debates. All were precisely recorded and distributed for maximum effect by the skilful and eloquent young lawyer, Lajos Kossuth.Footnote 28
A second uncertainty for the makers of Habsburg ceremonial lay in the still unfinished business of the ‘Reich deutscher Nation’. A German dimension of the imperial legacy could not be gainsaid: Austria held the presidency of the German Confederation, and no sort of clear boundary could be drawn in relations between Austria and the rest of Germany (roughly they prefigured what in the post-Second World War situation between West and East would be called ‘deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen’).Footnote 29 Thus cultural influences readily operated in either direction. One instance would be the appropriation in the 1840s of Haydn's Kaiserhymne tune for Hoffmann von Fallersleben's stirring text, ‘Deutschland Deutschland über alles’. However, in political terms the rest of the Confederation tended to have the better of these interactions, given Austria's tough censorship and conservative ethos. Moreover, acceptable – and permitted – traditions in the latter were broadly Habsburg-dynastic and ‘Austrian’ in a loose sense (as with the historical dramas of Franz Grillparzer), rather than embracing the larger heritage of the Old Reich as a whole.Footnote 30
The immediate ‘pre-March’ years confirmed all the weaknesses of Austrian identity and the emotional bankruptcy of the paternalistic Kaiserreich. Footnote 31 As a leading critic, Viktor von Andrian-Werburg, famously put it in 1843, Austria was a ‘purely imaginary name . . . not a people, not a land, not a nation’; its regime had (literally) ‘no idea’.Footnote 32 When revolution came it resurrected the whole German issue, which flooded (back) into Austria as a national movement and occupied the space left empty there by the stunted domestic literary and intellectual development since the 1820s. And many Germans still hungered for their own Reich, as was evident in the terminology of 1848, whereby the provisional government appointed by the Frankfurt parliament was designated a Reichsregierung and its head of state an imperial vicar (Reichsverweser) – a post occupied by the maverick liberal Habsburg, Archduke Johann.Footnote 33
The revolution that broke out in March 1848 issued in a series of largely divergent campaigns, constitutional but above all national, which, led by Germans and Magyars, nearly brought down the whole Habsburg edifice. They culminated by October (the month of George Prothero's birth) in a popular uprising in Vienna and civil war in Hungary. One large step towards the recovery of the old order was an out-and-out dynastic stroke: the childless and witless Ferdinand was swept aside (not least for the concessions he had made to Kossuth and others), and replaced by his nephew, the teenage Francis Joseph: shades here of those earlier unilateral, arbitrary and at best only semi-licit acts of the Habsburgs we have already encountered in 1713–23, 1804 and 1806. The vigorous young monarch now set himself to face down his detractors at home and in the rest of Germany, and to reassert a distinctively Austrian idea of Empire. He was helped by the fact that, for all the reprehension of his policies in some quarters abroad, the Monarchy remained a European great-power desideratum: indeed, Russia was willing to step in and help quell the Hungarian rebellion. But the Habsburgs learned one important thing from their revolutionary experience: the old anational or supranational ways were obsolete; the future would have to be multinational.
The 1850s were the sole decade of Austria in its fullest designation.Footnote 34 The Sylvester Patent of 31 December 1851, which restored absolute rule, declared that ‘the lands united under old historical or new titles with the Austrian imperial state form the indivisible components of the Austrian imperial hereditary Monarchy’.Footnote 35 The ideological programme now launched thus combined authoritarian and multinational themes; and it was underpinned by a much more professional style of official propagation. A typical image of the time was the one illustrated by August Strixner, of the Empire's peoples, in their various costumes, sitting or standing in a boat (filled well beyond health and safety levels!) steered by Francis Joseph and the allegorical figure of ‘Austria’. On the sail is the slogan viribus unitis, the personal device of the emperor and a further significant manifestation of his purpose, as of the continuing overlap with a legitimation of dynastic rule.Footnote 36
The wider projection was of a ‘modern’ Austria: a state dynamically transformed by administrative centralisation, as advertised in the colossal statistical compilation by Karl Czoernig, Österreichs Neugestaltung, and the complacent compendium entitled Rückblick by Bernhard Mayer. Yet the antithetical notion of a ‘Catholic great power’, indeed the last defender of the universal objectives of the Roman church, also belonged to the public rhetoric.Footnote 37 And these messages still needed to be backed by publicity abroad to counter the poison of émigré detractors, and by spies to infiltrate their networks. Quaintly, one of the most effective of those spies, Gustav Zerffi, would go native in Britain and end up at the head of the Royal Historical Society, like Prothero after him.Footnote 38
This Reich, however, continued to eschew communicating by any kind of coronation, even though some plans existed for a consolidated Austrian–Hungarian–Bohemian one.Footnote 39 In that, as in other respects, there was an evident French and Napoleonic exemplar for Habsburg stances, as there had been for the declaration of empire in 1804 (even though at that juncture Bonaparte had had himself crowned). So it is fitting to cite a typical statement of the regime's purpose as offered to Louis Napoleon in 1858 by Francis Joseph's ambassador in Paris, Baron Alexander Hübner: ‘Every power has a moral foundation, a principle from which one cannot turn away with impunity. Austria has as principle the recognition of the unalterable rights of the sovereign and a rejection of the efforts of nationalities to organise themselves in national states.’ The French emperor appears to have demurred.Footnote 40
Napoleon III shortly afterwards administered a celebrated open rebuke to that very diplomat, a gesture which initiated for Austria the catastrophes of 1859 and 1866. It lost wars to France and Prussia: as a result of these the new states of Italy and Germany could be established, from which the Habsburgs were wholly excluded. At home the autocratic regime collapsed, and after years of political turmoil Francis Joseph had to concede not only constitutional government throughout his realms, but wide-ranging autonomy to Hungary under the terms of the so-called Compromise law of 1867. In the present context, we need to consider three consequences of this painful adjustment to changing realities.
First, in Hungary Francis Joseph could now at last submit himself to a coronation. It was an occasion of the utmost splendour. Yet in essential respects it took place on the Hungarians’ terms. They held it to purge the ‘illegal’ transaction of December 1848, never recognised in their statutes. Henceforward ‘Ferenc József’ was their king, and no longer their emperor at all. Moreover, since the remaining joint affairs of the whole Monarchy – mainly the army and the diplomatic service – were now managed jointly with Hungary, it soon became a moot point how far those were still imperial either. Thus the terminology of empire was gradually and messily dismantled.
The semantic agenda of the Compromise created a strict parity, with locutions as with institutions: ‘Österreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie’ or ‘Österreichisch-Ungarisches Reich’ were initially agreed as alternatives by both parties to describe the totality of the Habsburg realms. But Hungarians soon undermined any ‘Reich’ usage, for the joint dealings of the Monarchy.Footnote 41 The epithet ‘common’ (gemeinsam and közös) tended to impose itself (and always in Magyar texts). So too did the famous alliterative abbreviation ‘k[aiserlich] und k[öniglich]’, to differentiate clearly the Habsburgs’ styles of rule in the separate halves of their dominions.Footnote 42 Worse was to follow, for Hungarian politicians were now free to develop further their own ideology of monarchical statehood, the ‘theory of the holy crown’, which led some of them by the early twentieth century to an assertion of full sovereignty for their country.Footnote 43 As one of them put the matter in 1909: ‘Austria and Hungary connote therefore, as the dual appellation implies, not one Reich, but a lasting union (Vereinigung) designed for certain international purposes.’Footnote 44
Alongside this body-blow to imperial thinking, Bohemian frustration about coronations, or the lack of them, might appear trivial. Yet this too, as the second of our considerations, diminished the scope of the Habsburg Reichsidee. Unlike Hungarians, Czechs had been happy to call their previous ruler ‘Ferdinand V’; they made no apparent objection to the accession of Francis Joseph either (indeed, Czech representatives seem to have applauded it at the time as much as the Germans). Nevertheless, that gala in 1836 had raised their expectations: Czechs from then on sang ‘God save our dear king Ferdinand’;Footnote 45 and they showed him especial favour when he settled in Prague castle during his long enforced retirement. After the collapse of absolutism, Czech politicians and aristocrats gained four successive promises from Francis Joseph that he would have himself crowned in Bohemia. One of them involved the notable historian Antonín Gindely, who drew up plans for the ceremony on the basis of reliable archivalia. Yet the event never happened, not even during the First World War, when another great historian, Josef Pekař, was associated with a scheme for the coronation of Emperor Charles I.Footnote 46
Whereas Czechs were less obsessed than Hungarians with the idea of the crown as such, it assumed in Bohemia too the attribute of a sort of – frustrated – national mission, as an alternative to the increasingly discredited imperial or Austrian loyalty (connoted by the disparaging term rakušanství). That undermined the prospect of any Slav-based imperial polity, though such a solution had been advocated by a series of major Czech figures. It was first adumbrated by Joseph Dobrovský, whose pioneering appeal on behalf of the Habsburgs’ Slav subjects was delivered on the occasion of the Prague coronation of Leopold II and in the presence of the emperor.Footnote 47 Then the theme was taken up by national leaders, from František Palacký, who linked it with what he presented as the authentic Austrian mission of federalism, to Pekař, who saw Bohemia as the true base of Habsburg imperial claims.Footnote 48
Thirdly, there was now a further more direct menace, indeed a rival: a real German Empire, a Deutsches Reich and a Deutscher Kaiser, laying claim eo nomine to the inheritance of the Holy Roman Empire, or at least to the acceptable face of it, which meant its medieval face (and accordingly using the earlier single-headed eagle as its emblem), and tracing wholesome Prussian antecedents. Thus Austria was left with the legacy of what was widely perceived, as served up in the master narrative of the Borussian school, to have been the later decay, division and patriotic deficit of the Old Reich.Footnote 49 That supreme communicator of Germanic antiquity, Richard Wagner, after all, not only appropriated key episodes from the history of the Reich, beginning with Henry the Fowler, for his national operas, but even relocated the climax of the Nibelungenlied on the Rhine rather than the Danube.Footnote 50
Austria limped along as a kind of quasi-Reich. Most of the time it contained only one ‘half’, or ‘Reichshälfte’ (though the very locution implied its pair!); and even this half, notoriously, bore no official name, beyond that of being ‘the kingdoms and lands represented in the Parliament [Reichsrat]’.Footnote 51 Or perhaps it was rather one of two separate interconnected Reichs, since Hungarians defined their own country more and more as a distinct empire (birodalom). The Austrian state incorporated plenty of imperial terminology, especially conspicuous to describe bodies – Reichsrat, Reichsgericht, etc. – which had introduced genuine constitutionality: shades, it might seem, of the participatory element that had always characterised the Old Reich. And from 1893 Austria had its own imperial history courses: Reichsgeschichte, a subject prescribed particularly for law faculties, as an account of the common Habsburg past (and embracing that of Hungary till 1867), which yielded important textbooks by Czech as well as German writers.Footnote 52
The core ‘imperial’ discourse, inherited from the 1850s, remained that of multinational parity, local autonomies and the furtherance of diversity.Footnote 53 This last now included full religious toleration (with the pietas Austriaca reduced to the private devotions of the Habsburgs). The aspiration was reflected best of all in a collective ethnology of the Habsburg lands, begun under the patronage and with the active involvement of the heir to the throne, Rudolf, whence its familiar designation as Kronprinzenwerk. This huge enterprise: 24 volumes appearing over 16 years, 432 authors, 264 artists, was designed to show the common purpose among the peoples of the Monarchy and to promote strategies of convergence. Yet it tended also to accentuate differences, not least in that it all had to appear simultaneously in a parallel Hungarian version (though this was markedly less successful in marketing terms).Footnote 54 Moreover, the old-fashioned official language (of Volksstämme and the like) and sentiment which underlay such programmes were increasingly folksy and outmoded. Nor could any real progress be made towards federalism, as the central state bureaucracy was needed at every turn to sustain the political process.Footnote 55
That is a large story, not for today. Suffice it now to note that the weakness of ‘Austria’ as a symbol or identity left dynastic fealty as the basic focus for imperial allegiance, the more so as the ageing Francis Joseph became a fairly popular and even iconic figure across much of the Monarchy by the end of the nineteenth century. Tales grew of his dedication to the state and to the individual concerns of his subjects, of his military and hunting prowess, of his virtues, notably accessibility, clemency and fairness.Footnote 56 As time went on, the display of the emperor's defence of familial values and love of children gained poignancy through the tragedies of his own private life. And during much of his reign Francis Joseph took on the role of a classic princeps ambulans, with regular ceremonial visitations to all parts of his realm.Footnote 57 Then came more and more anniversaries, centenaries, jubilees. Yet it proved harder and harder for him to line up all his ducks in a row. Thus the great Bohemian exhibition of 1891 took place with only Czech and no German participation; the golden jubilee of 1898 brought frictions in Hungary (hardly surprisingly, since Francis Joseph's reign there only counted from 1867); then the diamond jubilee in 1908 was both ignored by Hungarians and boycotted by the Czechs.Footnote 58
Historians these days have become more sensitive to the reserves of dynastic loyalty in the late Monarchy; as also to the ways in which they were deliberately stage-managed, from the very beginning of the reign onwards.Footnote 59 Yet Francis Joseph always remained a reluctant idol: his most penetrating biographer wrote of the emperor's ‘contemptuous rejection of every art, great or small, which might have popularized monarchical activity’.Footnote 60 And it was a wasting asset, non-transferable. Only later, too late, would distinguished literary versions of the ‘Habsburg myth’, in the writings of Joseph Roth, Robert Musil, and co., suffuse the vanished imperial cause with an aura of nostalgia.Footnote 61 At the time it was challenged on its own terms by the continuing locus just across the border in Germany of a revived and galvanic Kaiserreich. Even the sublimest musical celebration of imperial rule, the younger Johann Strauss's Kaiser-Walzer of 1889, was in fact written for the opening of a new Berlin concert hall, and originally called ‘Hand in Hand’ – Francis Joseph firmly attached to the young and fresh-baked William II.
By that time Habsburg sovereignty not only needed German support; it also needed new forms of communication. Its final throw was actually to join in the business of ‘empire’, as conventionally understood in the parlance of the Atlantic world. For in 1878 Austria-Hungary at last acquired a foreign colony, albeit a piece of contiguous territory and well within the bounds of the European continent. The occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina at one level reversed the Habsburgs’ pro-Ottoman policies of most of the nineteenth century (and a positive enthusiasm for the Turks in Hungary), and raised suspicion of a return in the northern Balkans to the domineering Catholicism of 200 years before; though in fact it soon sought conciliation of the local Muslims. The occupation was driven by the usual colonial claims of the day, decked out with a specifically Hungarian piece of flag-waving, since the crown of St Stephen had briefly exercised suzereignty over the territory in the Middle Ages. Here was the standard image of a self-imposed mission of improvement out of duty, flanked by the normal economic calculations of the period.Footnote 62 We should also observe, not for the first time in the present account, that the seizure of Bosnia initially attracted more condemnation at home, in both halves of the Monarchy, than it did abroad.
Their engagement with modern ‘imperialism’, however, would soon lead the Habsburgs down a slippery slope. From the outset the new international posture rested, emotionally and diplomatically, on the Dual Alliance with Germany formally negotiated in the immediate aftermath of the occupation. ‘Hand in hand’, indeed; but with the Second Reich leading. By 1908, practical necessities, as well as codes of prestige and honour, dictated the full annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. That unleashed forces, within the region and beyond, which led directly to 1914: the assassination of the heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, in the Bosnian capital Sarajevo and the outbreak of European war. On one hand the war, fought with the combined resources of the ‘Central Powers’, i.e. of Mitteleuropa, as it now increasingly came to be called, reinforced an old-new German centre of gravity and locus for the Habsburg imperial idea. On the other hand, it delivered the destiny of Austria-Hungary over to its military arm.
The Austrian army, albeit less prominent in politics and society than its German equivalent, had retained the local ‘Reich’ traditions most intensely. The longest terminological survivor of the ancien regime was the war office, the Reichskriegsministerium, only officially renamed as a ‘common’ ministry in German documents as late as 1911, and then under the protest of Franz Ferdinand, who sought to use it as the nucleus of a restored ‘Kaisertum Österreich’.Footnote 63 The assassination put paid to that; and then the resulting hostilities soon showed how little Austria-Hungary's fighting services could sustain their position without massive German support. In the end they could not do so at all. It is a crowning irony that on 1 November 1918, the day when the war ended in the Adriatic, the pride of the fleet, greatest battleship in the Habsburg navy, was sunk by a mine with all hands, having never fired a shot against the enemy. Its name was Francis Joseph's imperial motto: Viribus Unitis.Footnote 64
By the war years the fabric of imperial allegiance was anyway wearing very thin, thinner still after the death of the veteran Francis Joseph in 1916. Not till the previous year had the last of the symbols of Dual Monarchy been finally agreed, with the promulgation after decades of haggling of a joint coat of arms.Footnote 65 Only then too, in 1915, did the non-Hungarian territories gain the official designation ‘Austria’. The material as well as the ideological armoury of independent Habsburg imperial rule was exhausted. And that occasioned the reckoning with the entire Habsburg political edifice, as it commended itself to the likes of George Prothero. Which is where – in the old cinema parlance – we came in.
My final task is to indicate, very briefly, what conclusions may be drawn from the narrative and analysis I have essayed here. I communicate them, following the style of today, in six bullet points.
• The imperial issues surrounding the Habsburgs’ status and authority formed a significant irritant in themselves. To the end, the most deadly critics of their empire – whether Holy Roman or Austrian – were domestic ones.
• The issues were part of an overall opacity of political culture in Habsburg central Europe, and of the dynastic bond as such in lands where the imperial dignity never acquired a territorial vis-à-vis. The fate of the magnificent but mothballed Hauskrone is a case in point.
• The issues are a sign of the stunted growth of any conception of ‘Austrianness’, and its profound vulnerability to nation-based identities.
• That all added to an insecurity about the ‘imperial’ mission, in the age of imperialism, of Europe's oldest imperial dynasty, especially its ever more erratic and excitable stances in the Balkans up to 1914.
• At root there was always the German factor, given the irreducible linkage between the central-European Reichsidee and the ‘deutsche Nation’. The Habsburgs could never jump over their own shadow; neither could they fill the vacuum left by the termination of the First Reich or thereafter correct the imbalance generated by the instauration of the Second.
• And last but not least, the legacy. The Nazi German Empire, which completed the nemesis of the Reichsidee, replicated much of the constellation of Mitteleuropa as already established during the First World War. Yet – as would be familiar to readers of Mein Kampf, where Hitler vents some of his most venomous tirades against Austrian political traditionsFootnote 66 – it could only have been erected on the ruins of the Habsburg imperium. If for no other reason, I hope that the claims of my subject to have been both an essential precondition for, and a foremost obstacle to, the coming of the Third Reich will leave you persuaded that it has been deserving of your attention.
