Although America is a nation that was born through riotous acts of popular refusal, its once robust conception of democratic politics has largely been reduced to enervated electoral procedures. On this point, among much else, Jason Frank and I agree. One of the helpful insights provided by his review is to highlight that alongside the progressive evolution of increasing (if often grudging) acceptance of political dissent has been a second narrative of loss, that of a narrowed range of oppositional practices accepted as democratically legitimate. This was indeed a “minor” narrative in my book, largely because it was a minor narrative during the Founding: Only the subsequent history up to our own time has made it enduring and dominant. One purpose of the book was to recover this early moment of multifaceted political engagement precisely to substantiate the contrast.
Frank is also helpful in pointing to where the argument could and should have gone further. For example, I might have clarified more fully that dissentient democracy is less about individual conscience than shared self-government, and how individual disobedience can sometimes hinder rather than advance collective resistance. In fact, the few references to the much more individualistic Mill were largely an effort to make this tension clear.
Readers of our two reviews will, however, see that Frank and I disagree about some other important matters. He wishes that I had developed certain aspects of the argument further, and my unwillingness points up methodological as well as substantive differences. We are both more historically oriented than most political theorists, but we differ in how far we are willing to go in connecting historical arguments to contemporary theorists or even to more distant historical sources. For example, I criticize Frank for taking up Rousseau when Frank maintains that Rousseau had no discernible influence on Publius, whereas he faults me for failing to lay out a broader intellectual history that was unfamiliar to my historical sources.
We can, of course, put concerns about historical fidelity aside by theorizing on our own, but in this particular case, it is not clear that we can do so profitably. Frank would have me specify more fully which oppositional practices are sanctioned by dissentient democracy. But as I explain in the book (pp. 12–14), the line between popular disorder and democratic disorder, between endorsing force and eschewing it, depends on the circumstances. Force is at the margins of legitimate dissent, but political anger can be democratically productive in certain situations. At this point, event overtakes theory, hence my exacting attention to illustrative if forgotten historical examples that can still speak to us.
Frank is certainly right that there are irreducible tensions between popular sovereignty and constitutional liberalism. The larger point was and is that constitutional liberalism cannot quite accommodate a genuine democracy—certainly not a robust conception of democracy that is theoretically compelling and, as it happens, historically recoverable. This does not mean that constitutionalism is not worth pursuing, but it does mean that we must remind ourselves of what can be lost in translating popular sovereignty into constitutional form, and reform our constitution and our political culture accordingly.
