Most American history professors are careful to teach their students that southern Democrats did not impose their regime of segregation and disfranchisement on a passive or defeated population, but the depth of black southerners’ resistance is still being plumbed. Blair Kelley's 2010 study of streetcar boycotts deepens understanding of popular protest against Jim Crow segregation.Footnote 1 R. Volney Riser's Defying Disfranchisement examines its counterpart in the realm of voting rights, a protest conducted chiefly in the courts, not the streets. Riser chronicles in unprecedented detail black southerners’ crusades against disfranchisement from the passage in 1890 of Mississippi's pioneering plan of poll taxes, literacy tests, and “understanding” hurdles, to the founding of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People—a development that Riser says (without much elaboration) “changed everything” (6).
Needless to say, this story doesn't end well. None of these challenges—from Alabama, Louisiana, Virginia, South Carolina, and Mississippi—made a dent, though in contrast to Plessy v. Ferguson's explicit embrace of segregation, federal courts never quite endorsed disfranchisement. Even Williams v. Mississippi (1898), Riser suggests, was not what many historians have taken it to be—an endorsement of formally colorblind suffrage qualifications, whatever the racially discriminatory effects might be. The Supreme Court ruled instead that discriminatory application of these provisions simply had not been demonstrated in this instance. Significantly, the Court twelve years earlier had stricken California laws that were shown to have been enforced to the disadvantage of Chinese laundrymen.
More generally, though, jurists tied themselves in knots not to rule on the constitutionality of measures and practices that left large numbers of African Americans voteless. They hid behind the long-standing doctrine that political questions must be answered in the political, and not judicial, sphere. Courts would not second-guess the outcome or conduct of elections, leaving it to legislatures or Congress to address black southerners’ grievances. In the Supreme Court's 1903 Giles v. Harris decision, jurists went further, shooing voting rights cases off into logical mazes where justice had little hope of being found. In Giles, Oliver Wendell Holmes suggested that if election officials were acting fraudulently, or southern state constitutions allowed them to make mockeries of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, courts would be participating in that fraud and embracing that unconstitutionality should they require that African Americans be admitted to the tainted electoral systems. In an era when judges, to many progressives’ dismay, regularly overturned states’ efforts to regulate business and the terms of labor (often citing the Fourteenth Amendment), Holmes essentially declared federal courts powerless to act when it came to states’ infringement of voting rights.
This sad story, however, is not simply one of justice undone by judges’ fecklessness, formalism, or racism. The better-known civil rights cases of the mid-twentieth century were often superintended by the supremely talented Thurgood Marshall and his formidable NAACP legal team. By contrast, these earlier efforts not only hit a juridical stonewall but foundered, too, upon the haplessness of those conducting them. Many of the heroes of this tale simply botched their cases. “Abysmal” (41); “spectacularly disastrous” (52); “they had screwed things up” (126): this is the language Riser uses to characterize activists’ work. He concedes that these men were litigating what had not been litigated before. The black attorneys involved defied disfranchisement simply by appearing in southern courts. But, Riser insists in the case of Cornelius Jones, who bumbled Williams v. Mississippi, “no patronizing cliché excuses poor lawyering” (68). Antidisfranchisement activists also allowed intramural rivalry and showboating to undermine their efforts.
Riser offers a conspicuous exception to all this bad lawyering—Wilford Smith, who argued Giles and other Alabama cases, surreptitiously bankrolled by Booker T. Washington (Riser treats the Wizard's sub rosa role in challenging disfranchisement in welcome depth). Careful and self-effacing, Smith was the first black attorney to win a case before the U.S. Supreme Court, Carter v. Texas. This 1900 decision showed federal courts were far more disposed to act against African Americans’ exclusion from the jury box than from the voting booth—not an inconsequential thing given that black southerners took their right to serve on juries very seriously indeed and given that Democrats often denounced black jury service in the same foul breath as they denounced black voting. Although the talented Mr. Smith did not prevail in Giles, he seems almost an emblematic figure for this stretch of African American history, speculating in Harlem real estate and going on to lawyer for Marcus Garvey's Black Star line. Still, Smith has been so lost to that history that Riser is not able even to establish the year of his death.
Riser underscores that neither Wilford Smith nor his less skilled counterparts fought for universal manhood suffrage but, instead, for a suffrage equitably restricted. They could hardly have done otherwise. Some Radical Republicans had hoped the Fifteenth Amendment would positively guarantee the right to vote, anticipating the discriminatory effect of property or educational qualifications. Instead, the amendment simply prohibited the denial of that right on racial grounds. With other sorts of suffrage limitation permissible, Riser's activists “fought for fairness, for fair and fairly attainable voting qualifications, fairly designed, and fairly applied” (160). One should not, however, overstate the damage that victories won on these terms would have done to disfranchisement. They would, indeed, have done justice to the many black southerners who were “propertied, educated, and taxpaying” (167). But they would also, presumably, have taken the ballot away from many whites who were not but who were allowed to vote by indulgent election officials or through jerry-rigged exemptions like the grandfather clause. That would have been more fair, but fairness of that sort would have done its own kind of violence to democracy—with many poorer African Americans remaining voteless and many whites becoming voteless. Even in the inequitable system that prevailed, as J. Morgan Kousser has shown, white voting fell sharply, too.Footnote 2 Riser concedes at one point that tolerating restrictions of any sort could be “extremely dangerous. . . . [Whenever] suffrage was restricted, those restrictions always disproportionately affected blacks, immigrants, the poor, and other differentiated groups” (94), but he also suggests that a fair application of Alabama's voting restrictions would “destroy disfranchisement” (1).
This dissonance is one indication that although Defying Disfranchisement is a vital, vividly written, and deeply researched book, it is not always a carefully edited one. It deserves a broad readership, but Riser does not always describe the disfranchisement measures being challenged and the legal principles being wielded in a manner certain to be clear to nonspecialists.
