In the wake of the collapse of communism, bilateral and multilateral international development donors expanded their work both geographically and thematically, providing technical assistance programs for postcommunist countries transitioning to market economies and democratic political systems. In Assisting Reform in Post-Communist Ukraine 2000–2012, Duncan Leitch provides a compelling analysis of Ukrainian efforts to redefine the relationship between the center and the regions and donors' effectiveness in shaping these outcomes by focusing on the fate of two public administration reforms, budget allocation and regional policy. Drawing in part from his own consulting experience on these projects from 2000–2009, as well as from additional interviews with many of the relevant players, Leitch's study highlights how old political practices endure despite the presence of new actors and institutions. While in the short run, an informal coalition of domestic and external actors was able to push through significant changes to one of the reform initiatives (budget allocations to the regions), in the medium to long term, both reform efforts foundered, and powerful vested interests, which benefited from long-standing norms of clientelism and patronage politics, were able to resist institutional change. Ultimately, Leitch argues, donor impact was minimal. In part, this failure was due to the “weak and inherently flawed” structure of aid, which tends to prioritize short term, finite technical assistance projects rather than long term, more amorphous projects like building strong institutions (221). Furthermore, in the Ukrainian case, donors needed better political intelligence; they relied too much on formal relationships with ministry officials and knew little of the preexisting patrimonial relationships that proved to be extremely durable. Leitch concludes with a recommendation to donors to focus on external incentives, such as European Union membership, which could empower embattled pro-reform domestic actors.

This book is valuable to scholars and development practitioners interested in democracy promotion, specifically good governance, particularly in postcommunist countries where the challenge of reimagining the state is especially arduous. Leitch skillfully takes the reader through two intricate policy narratives, untangling the critical constellation of domestic and international interests and alliances that determined the fate of each reform initiative as well as deftly dissecting the key steps and missteps in each policy lifecycle. While reforms are not impossible, they are difficult; the design and passage of policy reforms are only the first steps in an arduous process. Yet, we see that reform can happen when a “unique concurrence” (103) of cooperation between donors and key domestic actors creates a successful policy-transfer network. The true challenge, we learn, is in implementation.

While Leitch sees these two cases ultimately as failed cases of reform, this reader would take a different, more optimistic perspective. In the short term, one of the two reforms was successfully passed with a clear set of “lessons learned.” The implication of Leitch's argument is that donors actually can make a perhaps small but nonetheless critical difference, but only under certain conditions. Further, they are better at helping with rule selection rather than rule application, but could potentially improve their work if they made changes to some of their aid delivery practices. This seems to open a new door of potential policy prescriptions. The other implication, which Leitch does not fully explore in this work, is that the conditions which facilitate the successful passage of reform may be different from those involved in actual policy implementation, a potentially much messier endeavor and one which donors may inherently have less control over. The larger task of disrupting old habits and building new behaviors may be something around which donor influence is inherently limited. Perhaps this is why Leitch only has one policy recommendation—a credible offer of EU membership in order to empower proreform factions. This option seems highly unlikely. Does this make regional reform a lost cause? Are there any examples of postcommunist countries that have successfully undergone significant public administration reform that cannot be attributed to EU membership?

The current consensus in development studies is that good governance matters. Yet, there seems to be little knowledge of how to facilitate good governance particularly in societies that have historically lagged in this area, or what levels of governance are “good enough” to achieve positive policy outcomes. Given that many postcommunist countries are experiencing their own difficulties with deepening democracy beyond the adoption of key institutions, Leitch's book serves as a good jumping-off point for future areas of enquiry about what facilitates good governance, and what role donors can (and cannot) play in reshaping often deeply-imbedded norms of rent-seeking and recurring pyramids of power.