Introduction
One could argue that hindsight has traditionally been a greater driver of curricular change in national military academies than visionary foresight. Yet, like so many other conflicts in history, the opening wars of the twenty-first century demanded change in ‘real time’. This was observed during the 2003‒2010 War in Iraq as the lessons of Operation Desert Storm 1991 were repeatedly studied prior to deployment. The rapid fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, while not unexpected, paved the way for a liquid combat environment which quickly mutated into an unmanageable insurgency. In contrast to many of his peers, Major General David Petraeus was well positioned to help reconfigure strategic thinking because research for his doctorate at Princeton had compelled him to consider the leadership legacy of counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam. It has subsequently been suggested that the military effectiveness of Petraeus was not based on his repeating the lessons of Vietnam but rather in learning from them as a comparative model. Mark Moyar stated that Petraeus “had the astuteness to recognize the differences between Vietnam and Iraq and the creativity to come up with new solutions”.Footnote 1
The following essay submits that South Asian military history, a subject rarely encountered in the defence colleges of NATO member nations, had much to offer as a catalyst for thought in terms of case studies and comparative approaches to conflict management in Afghanistan. That is not to suggest that an understanding of South Asian military history would have altered the course of events for those International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) nations that sought to adapt to the new conditions of warfare they encountered in Afghanistan.Footnote 2 On the contrary, for one reason or another, South Asian military history failed to be considered as relevant to the war in Afghanistan (2001–2014), and that failure accounts in large measure for its omission from the curricula of most Western centres for professional military education. Whether through obscurity, self-marginalisation, or its advocates failing to make a viable case for its relevance, South Asian military history was not included in the education of NATO officers bound for deployment in Afghanistan. This paper briefly looks at a specific historic modelling theory, that of military labour market dynamics in the period 1790‒1820, then places that information in juxtaposition to a selection of events drawn from Afghanistan 2001–2014. The resulting observations do not yield a blueprint for the future of Afghanistan. They do however, in a manner analogous to Petraeus's use of Vietnam to stimulate new thought on Iraq, highlight the value of comparative historic modelling as drawn from outside the immediate combat environment.
Contemporary Afghanistan and Historic South Asia?
It is British colonial war fighting, in particular the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars, that readily comes to mind when we look for historic comparisons to help us understand modern insurgency in provinces like Helmand.Footnote 3 While the temptation to compare the events of 2001–2014 to Britain's previous Afghan wars is understandable in terms of referencing the study of foreign military intervention in Afghanistan, the analytical models that it yields are too restrictive. That type of chronological juxtaposition – Afghan War historic to Afghan War contemporary - is counterproductive if we wish to explore new directions in historical case studies that lend themselves to conflict management. The consideration of a greater regional picture and a more diverse cultural matrix could shed additional light on both the contemporary and historical milieu. Thomas Barfield's valuable anthropological insight certainly strengthened the concept of regional connectivity by highlighting a view of Afghanistan as the highway of empires rather than its stereotypical portrayal as the graveyard of empires.Footnote 4
Pashtun insurgents, Arab mercenaries, village elders debating local defence, coalition troops pinned down behind mud walls by small arms fire, is mental imagery which may seem to be drawn from recent Afghan history; but it also reflects aspects of warfare in India experienced during the 1790 to 1820 period.Footnote 5 During the thirty-year span under consideration, Britain's alliances and security needs in South Asia led to the launching of five major wars, multiple counterinsurgency campaigns and several regional deployments.Footnote 6 It was an era in which the East India Company fought its way out of the three peripheral coastal enclaves of Madras, Calcutta and Bombay to seize the subcontinent. Many of those actions were deemed fundamentally necessary for regional as well as global security as understood in London during that era. These were military campaigns that had a bearing on the breadth and depth of Britain's imperial footprint. In terms of conflict management it was a unique period, when the British military establishment in India looked to the greater South Asian environment for adaptable solutions rather than imposing upon India rigid western styles of war that had proved difficult to manage. This historic cross-cultural fusion in military thinking can be detected in the large scale recruiting of “irregular native cavalry” during that era.
The Manipulation of Military Labour Markets
During the late eighteenth-century wars in India, it became apparent to British observers that there was often an opportunity to sway the balance of power or have a direct impact on the outcome of local wars by purchasing enemy troops out of service. East India Company officers were well acquainted with the phenomenon, with the result that such activity often passed without notice in their memoirs. In contrast, many of King George III's troops were imbued with a fierce sense of national identity, and seemed to be taken aback by the wholesale negotiation and bartering of South Asian armies.Footnote 7
In terms of modern historical analysis, it was not until the 1980s that a concerted effort was made to place these transient employees in a greater societal and historical context. In 1990 the term “Military Labour Market” was popularised by the Dutch scholar Dirk H. A. Kolff in a book that explored the transitory nature of employment in South Asia's armies.Footnote 8 Kolff was interested in why South Asian soldiers had a tendency to treat their employment opportunities in a way that differed greatly from that found in proto-modern western armies where duty and allegiance followed nationalistic trends. Historically speaking, South Asian soldiers often revolted or changed sides during wars in an effort to extract the most favourable employment conditions.
. . .no single employer could provide to the full the security or wages the innumerable peasantry were in search of, this background also explains why Indian peasant-sepoys, whether in the service of the Mughal or the British East India Company, did not easily resign themselves to having only one master. Their need to keep several options open not only formed their ‘mutinous’ character, it also explains why ascribed identities, whether caste, ethnic, or genealogical, were much less important in North Indian history than traditional anthropological observation suggested.Footnote 9
This was a proto-national South Asian environment largely free from the concept of swearing allegiance to a flag or some other manifestation of the nation state. Loyalty to a leader, or to a cause, was well known, but so was the principle of collective bargaining power. War was an opportunity to make money and if one was employed as a soldier then periods of warfare offered the greatest market leverage in terms of extracting the most favourable wages, pensions and benefits. Kolff's concept of a military labour market relates to a theoretical military employment pool, or societal marketplace for military skills, in the broadest sense of the term. In today's world, this warrior ‘workforce’ or martial skills exchange may be seen to contain professional soldiers, militiamen, paramilitary policemen, insurgent fighters, enemy combatants or that type of occasional warrior referred to by David Kilcullen as the “accidental guerrilla”.Footnote 10
The Third and Fourth Anglo-Mysore WarsFootnote 11 and the Second Anglo-Maratha WarFootnote 12 were the major conflicts that left the East India Company astride the subcontinent in terms of territorial control. These sanguinary campaigns gave the British considerable experience with local military labour markets and negotiating the defection of enemy troops. Although the limited purchase of opposing enemy forces had been used by the British in India since the 1750s the process picked up a great deal of momentum in later years. The Mysore Wars had seen wavering peripheral allies bought out of enemy service.Footnote 13 But by the time of the Anglo-Maratha campaigns of 1803, the British were actively conducting widespread battlefield negotiations as part of a strategy to buy entire battalions out of service and have them join the armies of the East India Company. However, this amazing opportunity to deprive the enemy of soldiers, while augmenting one's own strength, came at a heavy financial price.Footnote 14
By the beginning of the Second Anglo-Maratha War in 1803, the British had worked out a payment, employment and pension scheme that rewarded enemy officers who brought over their troops when they defected.Footnote 15 In some cases we see elaborate behind-the-scenes negotiations to ‘turn’ entire battalions and have them march into British service. In other cases we see the defection of culturally specific warrior groups loyal to individual clan or tribal leaders. The dynamics of the military labour market were such that loyalty to a political cause was secondary to the opportunity to profit from war. One of the key rationalisations offered for defection was that attached to ‘payment of arrears’. It was quite common for troops in service to Maratha powerbrokers to have their pay held two months in arrears. At the siege of Agra in 1803 we find the British negotiating under fire to procure the enlistment of three battalions of Maratha infantry, based on the promise of paying wages in arrears and the right to a pension. Not only did the Maratha troops offer to come into British service, they also offered to bring with them thirty two pieces of artillery. Shortly afterwards, seven additional battalions came over, bringing with them their small arms, ammunition, artillery and regimental colours.Footnote 16 The battlefield recruitment of entire battalions greatly reduced the enemy's field strength and devastated command and control structures by removing senior officers and non-commissioned officers (i.e. sergeants). This manipulation of the existing military labour market represented a cross-cultural conflict management technique used by the British to reduce the duration of the war and minimise casualties. Having proven a dramatic success in the 1803 campaign, this policy of buying the loyalty of enemy troops accelerated in the 1804–1805 Maratha campaign that targeted Jeswunt Rao Holkar and his forces.
Governor General Richard Wellesley's desire to bring the Second Anglo-Maratha War of 1803–1805 to a speedy conclusion clouded his judgement with regard to fiscal responsibility. In his desire to crush remaining Maratha resistance to the Treaty of Bassein, he rapidly brought the East India Company (EIC) into ever-increasing debt for the sake of acquiring enemy soldiers.Footnote 17 His deficit spending helped ensure battlefield success, but it increased the magnitude of a financial nightmare, which he hid as long as possible from the EIC's Court of Directors in London. No one had really thought this through with regard to the long-term implications of peace and stability. Hiring enemy soldiers out of service had a dramatic impact on conflict reduction. But the lack of loyalty within the military labour market meant that if the East India Company failed to maintain timely payments, those troops might rejoin their former employers or strike out on their own as freebooters.
Thousands of the troops that were bought out of enemy service during the conventional battles of 1803 were regular infantry. Yet following the conclusion of the 1803 campaigns, the stage was set for insurgent warfare in 1804 and the purchase of enemy combatants then known as ‘irregular troops’. Some of these men were hardened veterans; others were unemployed peasants who chose the military labour market rather than the alternative of starvation. Tens of thousands flocked to take advantage of the regularly paid cash wages offered by the East India Company.Footnote 18 Richard Wellesley's runaway spending on the war began to attract official government investigation; he was recalled to London and replaced by the elderly General Charles Cornwallis.Footnote 19
By August 1805 the size of deficit spending to control the South Asian military labour market was apparent to Governor General Cornwallis. The elder statesman realised that if he kept these troops on the books he would not be able to pay them and once their pay began to fall too far into arrears they might desert to the enemy – or worse – turn on the British from within their own ranks. Rightly or wrongly, Cornwallis rationalised that it was better to try and pay them off and discharge them, than to become greatly indebted to them while they were in service as they could mutiny. Unfortunately it was now apparent that the flow of cash from London had been deliberately cut in an effort to halt Richard Wellesley's fiscal irresponsibility. To make matters worse, all of the East India Company's profits in India had been spent on the war. Cornwallis found himself in the unenviable position of having to consider appropriating the East India Company's bullion shipment to China in order to make a down payment on the arrears owed to a vast number of former enemies that had been taken into service.
In August of 1805 the ailing Cornwallis wrote to John Malcolm:
Our treasury is now completely emptied; we can send home no investment, and I am reduced to the necessity of taking the very disagreeable step of stopping the treasure destined by the Court of Directors for China, in order to have a chance of being able to get rid of a part of our irregular forces.Footnote 20
Cornwallis's untimely death kept him from gaining control of a situation that had the potential to disrupt the political as well as military inroads that had been made. Was it better to plunge the East India Company into even greater debt? Did it make sense to release all these former enemy soldiers back into the South Asian military labour market where they might find ready employment with opponents? Or perhaps worse, to release them upon a largely defenceless civilian population that was bound to be alienated by wide-scale plundering.
Cornwallis's successor, Sir George Hilaro Barlow, officially assumed control of the Governor Generalship in October 1805 and to say there was a sense of immediacy in his termination of the Second Anglo-Maratha War is an understatement. Barlow wrote to Viscount Castlereagh,
. . .all War expenses throughout our Indian possessions shall be reduced the moment that these expenses can be safely discontinued and my attention will be particularly directed to the relieving our Finances from all charge whatever on account of our irregular troops.Footnote 21
Irregular units of all description became favoured targets for Barlow's budget axe. The irony was that these irregulars – the troops most readily hired away from the enemy - were arguably among the most effective in counterinsurgency operations as they knew the enemy's modus operandi and their logistical needs were considerably less than regular troops. Various ethnic groups featured in the general description of ‘irregular troops’ and we know that Pashtun horsemen were highly valued for their ability.Footnote 22 Without authorisation for further employment they could not be used to outflank the Maratha leader Jeswunt Rao Holkar who was in the Punjab and heading towards the Afghan border. There was to be no stunning decisive battle to end the Second Anglo-Maratha War. The British were within just a few weeks of a complete battlefield victory, but having pursued Holkar into the Punjab they found themselves negotiating a peace treaty for fiscal reasons.
By the late spring of 1806 a large number of the East India Company forces that had been mobilised for the Anglo-Maratha campaigns of 1803–1805 had been ordered to stand down. The EIC's battalions were reported to be in their cantonments and their enlistment figures were to be permanently fixed.Footnote 23 Virtually all irregular forces who had been recruited out of enemy service, or from within the catchment basin of the area of operations, were said to be either discharged or awaiting such orders. While that news may have pleased critics of the war, many inside the East India Company knew that the discharge of those troops would inevitably fuel a greater cycle of insurgency. Inadvertently, the British attempts at cross-cultural conflict management – by means of manipulating military labour markets in 1803–1805 – helped sow the seeds for the Third Anglo-Maratha War of 1817–1819.Footnote 24
As early as 1806 reports began to circulate that raiding by demobilised light-horse irregulars was getting out of hand and that local forces were incapable of standing up to bands of insurgents who numbered in the tens of thousands.Footnote 25 One particularly noteworthy leader who drew the allegiance of irregular horsemen was Amir Khan (1768–1834). He was one of many freelance military leaders who was able to leverage his kin, clan and charisma to form independent armies for hire. Khan was a skilled Pashtun military leader, said to be of the Buner tribe, and, from 1803 to 1817, the East India Company compiled countless letters, reports and documents citing what were commonly referred to as Amir Khan's “depredations”. Amir Khan's irregulars were numerous and he was deemed powerful enough to seize Jaipur, which at the time was a buffer state.Footnote 26
In battle Amir Khan showed great skill in exercising the tenets of mobile warfare. He used that tactical talent to further political advantage by often engaging opponents who were on the periphery of British protection. He probed diplomatically as well as militarily to see if anyone was likely to come to the rescue of a potential target.Footnote 27 On 7 September 1809, he boldly wrote to John Richardson, the Governor General's agent in Bundelkhand, asking him “to point out the limits of the Honorable [sic] Company's possessions in that part of Hindoostan”.Footnote 28 Richardson treated the request seriously as his intelligence operatives in the field (hircarrahs) had reported that Khan's forces totalled 50,000 horsemen, of which 30,000 were said to be “fit for action”. Richardson reckoned that even if his spies had exaggerated by doubling the actual figure, Khan's force was still a major threat. Earlier that year (1809), British experience suggested that rapid reaction forces featuring British-trained cavalry detachments operating in conjunction with 1,000–1,200 sepoy infantry would be enough to engage enemy irregular horse units up to 15,000 in number.Footnote 29 Amir Khan had more than that number and possessed artillery that could neutralise the advantage offered by limited numbers of sepoys. Within three years, however, British counter-insurgency experience in Central India forced a change in doctrine: rapid-reaction forces for the defence of Hyderabad evolved as a triad composed of cavalry, infantry and much heavier mobile artillery.Footnote 30
In contrast to contemporary rhetoric, where so much has been made of refusing to negotiate with those who reject Western norms of conventional warfare, the British made a consistent effort to engage Amir Khan in an on-going dialogue extending over more than seven years. In May of 1810 Khan sent an envoy (vakil) named Shaheed Khan to meet with Archibald Seton, the British Resident at Delhi. The vakil relayed that Amir Khan's army was in a dangerously unstable state and that Amir Khan needed the help of the British to defuse the situation before something went tragically wrong. The volatility was said to be brought about by the army's pay being too far in arrears; if something were not done soon the troops would mutiny and engage in uncontrolled plunder on a scale that would endanger political stability. The case was made that the British should either grant Amir Khan revenue-bearing lands (a jaghir) in Rohilkhand, or they should permit him to engage in acts of military conquest sufficient to appease his troops’ demands for arrears by means of plundering to the point where they could then safely be discharged.Footnote 31
As if to further complicate this Faustian proposition, Shaheed Khan went on to outline more specific aspects of the alternative proposals tendered. The jaghir that Amir Khan coveted happened to belong to a British ally to whom military support was granted by means of a subsidiary alliance treaty. To guarantee protection but then compel territorial forfeiture was not an option. Archibald Seton, as the British Resident at the Mughal court in Delhi, knew that Amir Khan's negotiating platform rested upon a greater imperial stage. It was only seven years since the Mughal emperor had been taken into British custody, and many of Delhi's former tributary states chafed with resentment. The British government in Bengal reviewed Seton's report and agreed wholeheartedly with his observation that even if a jaghir were provided, Amir Khan could not, or would not, “abstain from his habits of plunder and extraction”, placing the British in the awkward position of appearing to have sanctioned such activity.Footnote 32 As the distance from Delhi increased, alliances became more fragile. This suggested that a combined strategy, to underpin the security of Hindustan, would require the military containment of Amir Khan in conjunction with some limited form of engagement via dialogue.
Vakil Shaheed Khan's subsequent request for the authority to plunder the Maratha heartland in the Deccan was equally unacceptable. Knowing that such an expedition could trigger a third round of Anglo-Maratha warfare, Seton made it clear that the British field-force stationed in Malwa would be dispatched to intercept Amir Khan's men. The degree to which Amir Khan had calculated British reaction is not known, but it is likely his request was a ploy as Shaheed Khan then dropped all further reference to the Deccan and began to inquire about the status of British relations with the Sindh. The vakil pressed in particular as to whether the British would come to the military rescue of the ruler of Sindh, who was not bound under terms of a subsidiary alliance treaty. Seton replied that while it was true that there was no defensive alliance in position, the Governor General's government in Bengal would not condone unwarranted aggression towards Sindh.Footnote 33
Amir Khan's two proposals divided British opinion, which was possibly his true motive, namely to create twin negotiating stances. On 16 June 1810, Neil. B. Edmonstone, Chief Secretary to the Government and de facto head of British intelligence in India, sent a letter to Archibald Seton in Delhi.Footnote 34 The letter, filed with the Secret and Political Department and later forwarded to the East India Company's Board of Control, is noteworthy in revealing British cross-cultural assumptions during that era. Edmonstone detailed his perception of Amir Khan's negotiating strategy and what he deemed to be its hidden objectives. On the surface Amir Khan appeared to be asking the British to reveal their best offer if he could negotiate a jaghir in return for surrendering his forces and ceasing his insurgent activities. But Chief Secretary Edmonstone cautioned Seton that there was more to Khan's bargaining stance and they could expect protracted negotiations before the Pashtun leader was willing to give up the fight. Edmonstone warned that Amir Khan was using the negotiation process to discern which settlements the British considered secure and which they considered at risk. “His real object has been and still is to ascertain what states and territories the British Government would protect from his violence and exactions”.Footnote 35 The Chief Secretary believed Khan had rightly concluded that the British would only offer him settlement lands on the periphery and adjacent to what they deemed safe areas under their control. Given such a premise Khan's requests exposed which settlements the British were most likely to defend. The implication was that the Pashtun ‘Soldier of Fortune’ would then use this intelligence to deduce his list of soft targets for a renewed round of warfare.Footnote 36
Whether or not Chief Secretary Edmonstone's assumptions were correct is debatable, but it took another seven years for Amir Khan to agree to lay down his arms and adopt a peaceful profile. A year before he capitulated though, in 1816, it had appeared that Khan's attacks on Jaipur might trigger direct British military action against him, but calm heads prevailed and a vakil was once again despatched to Delhi. Amir Khan did ultimately triumph in obtaining legal recognition for lands he occupied and he was granted a hereditary ruling title. Following the signing of a treaty in 1817 Amir Khan was made the Nawab of Tonk, a principality with a capital located about 96 kilometres from Jaipur in Rajasthan.Footnote 37 As Nawab, he was entitled to all the trappings of royalty including the right to live off tax revenue generated by his territory. In return for his recognition as ruler of Tonk and the accompanying revenue settlement, he had to surrender 52 battalions of troops to the British.Footnote 38 In later years Amir Khan suggested that it was not the financial incentives that were the determining factor in his acceptance of treaty terms, rather it was the realisation that he was vulnerable to a pincer movement by two British field armies, commanded by Donkin and Ochterlony respectively, that were being prepared for operations against the Pindarries.Footnote 39 Despite the negotiations having granted political legitimacy to arguably the most notorious Pashtun military leader of that era, the outcome was considered a major British coup in that it removed Amir Khan from the hostilities that we now refer to as the Third Anglo-Maratha War, 1817–1819.
The Cyclical Pattern of Warfare
As we have observed, British forces used the manipulation of the South Asian military labour market extensively in the period 1790–1820. The occasional purchased defection of enemy troops in the Third Anglo-Mysore War, 1789 to 1792, and the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War of 1799 became a widespread practice in the Second Anglo-Maratha War of 1803–1805. The cost of controlling military labour markets during the latter conflict, got totally out of hand and resulted in the termination of payment orders. With funding removed tens of thousands of combatants were released into society and, as early as 1806, they were amassing in increasing numbers.Footnote 40 Limited attempts were made to mollify a few of them, but these efforts were unsuccessful as infertile lands with no capacity for sustained economic livelihoods were distributed as compensation. Disgruntled military settlers and de-mobilised former enemies – who had been taken into British service on what amounted to a temporary basis – returned to the armies of regional warlords. Their presence contributed to increased banditry and multiple outbreaks of insurgency.Footnote 41
The land was again plagued with insurgent bands numbering in the tens of thousands and these larger collections of men found employment with politically marginalised enemies of the British. The process inevitably set the stage for the Third Anglo-Maratha War of 1817–1819 and counterinsurgency operations involved all three East India Company Presidencies including Madras.Footnote 42 While that war witnessed a limited return to the purchasing of enemy forces, it was conducted with much greater fiscal restraint. In the case of Amir Khan we see a protracted negotiation lasting for years and ultimately producing a buy-out focused on political legitimatisation and integration. While British regular forces went on to inflict heavy casualties on their enemies in the 1817–1819 war, civil law also played a role in ultimately defeating the cycle of insurgency. Wartime General Orders for the summary execution of insurgent leaders (found in the commission of predatory acts) eventually gave way to robust anti-insurgent laws.
By the mid-1820s vast irregular armies had disbanded; peace and prosperity took hold. The restoration of stability and the growth of local economies proved one of the greatest tools for effective counterinsurgency. Historian Douglas Peers has characterised India during this period as a garrison state built on the tenets of “military fiscalism”, with land revenues being used to pay for a vast army.Footnote 43 With its huge standing army British India employed hundreds of thousands of troops and in that way kept many transitory soldiers and the disenfranchised from flooding local military labour markets. In turn, the soldiers spent their pay in cities, markets and towns. This dividend of peace was in part funded by the soldiers themselves and the prosperity cycle which eventually prevailed was in part fuelled by their disposable income; while physical security was underwritten by their military presence. Many cantonments sprang up and morphed into suburbs of market towns and urban centres, the economic growth that this redistribution of military spending engendered, at least in some small part, a more stable society.
Afghanistan and Military Labour Market Manipulation, 2001–2014
In considering the application of a military labour market model to Afghanistan, it is important to distinguish between so-called mercenary employment by the Taliban and greater societal employment within a national security framework. Antonio Giustozzi estimated the mercenary component of active Taliban forces “usually recruited ad hoc for short term jobs” as just ten to twenty percent of total Taliban forces. He was, however, quick to point out that our stereotyping of the Taliban forces did not help us to understand them as an enemy.
. . .The idea that the Taliban are mostly a mercenary force is at odds with strong evidence showing the commitment of Taliban fighters and their readiness to fight to the last man, as well as with the meagre results of the reconciliation programme.Footnote 44
In assessing the applicability of the military labour market model to Afghanistan, this paper is not identifying a significant potential for luring hardcore Taliban out of military service. In other words, given Giustozzi's estimation of the minimal mercenary component within the Taliban, there is little chance that even a well-funded buy-out of Taliban mercenaries would make a lasting difference to the prospects for peace in the long term. Rather this essay is more concerned with identifying the potential risk of demobilised or unpaid government forces (army, police and private security contractors) contributing to an ungovernable warlord state; should they lose their incentive to serve the Karzai government and offer their service to Taliban leaders, or other competing powerbrokers who may emerge in the decade from 2014 to 2024. The greatest relevance of 1790–1820 to 2001–2024 has to do with how one proposes to peacefully withdraw the financial aid that keeps hundreds of thousands of Afghan soldiers and police in service.
Multiple observers have attributed the initial military success of American-led forces in Afghanistan, in driving the Taliban from power in 2001, as dependent upon the delivery of large payments to the Northern Alliance. But what became evident over time, in the period 2001–2014, was a distinct lack of coordination in applying such funding techniques across the national spectrum. In fairness to the United States, it should be pointed out that a host of national and international players dabbled in the manipulation of Afghanistan's military labour markets. There were several different programmes drawing huge amounts of cash towards the desired ultimate outcome of purchasing peace. Some sought to return Taliban fighters to the land as agriculturalists, others were aimed at hiring potential recruits away from the Taliban by increasing the size of the Afghan National Army or one of the various police forces, and then there were separate hiring initiatives aimed at private security firms such as those that guarded logistical convoys. Much like Richard Wellesley's uncontrolled spending on buying-out opponents in the Second Anglo-Maratha War, unbridled spending on an Afghan national security structure has created a fiscal time bomb.
One of the key lessons to be learnt from India 1790–1820 was that the payment of arrears, to keep fighters in service, had to be done in a timely fashion; this was crucial to sustain loyalty. That the Taliban know how to subvert those not paid regularly can be seen from the vantage point of Kamdesh district of Nuristan Province. In 2006 American forces opened Combat Outpost Keating and the local villagers were duly impressed with an initial round of gift giving and the distribution of “pencils, notebooks. . .and pencil sharpeners. . .along with prayer rugs and winter gloves for children”.Footnote 45 The outpost, which leads to known infiltration routes on the Pakistani border, was badly situated on low ground and the nearest air support was provided by helicopter gunships based forty minutes away in Jalalabad. By the spring of 2007 it was apparent that the area was susceptible to both enemy subversion and logistical isolation.
American military trainers were said to have confided to journalists that they had little faith in their Afghan pupils. The local Afghan police chiefs complained that their officers were not being paid; ominously they were quoted as saying, “they will walk off the job”.Footnote 46 Overland logistical lines were not secured and reports came in of supply trucks being ambushed by men wearing Afghan National Army (ANA) uniforms. Whether they were Taliban masquerading in ANA uniforms, deserters, or rogue members of the ANA engaged in recreational looting, was never established. The local Shura leader Fazal Ahad, concerned about the rapid deterioration in security, arranged to meet with American troops for further security discussions. He was consequently carjacked and then executed by the Taliban.
A change of strategy in the war dealt the outpost another blow as a reconsideration of grand strategy meant military resources had to be reallocated. Despite history's mixed verdict on the wisdom of decisive battle theory, a decision had been taken to push for victory in Helmand as the central front of the war. In the Autumn of 2009, General Stanley McChrystal decided that limited peripheral forces should withdraw so that they could be more effectively concentrated for redeployment within Helmand. That left Combat Outpost Keating on what was effectively a front line without easy reinforcement.
On the night of 3 October 2009, the Taliban attacked in earnest and the ensuing fire-fight lasted over eight hours. The action cost eight American lives and twenty two were wounded. The three hundred strong enemy force was heavily armed and exploited the cover offered by nearby buildings in Kamdesh such as the police station, which they readily occupied. Perhaps it should come as no surprise that the police station became a Taliban centre of resistance, although subsequent reports did not link police deserters with Taliban forces. Only the appearance of air support and the arrival of fresh troops by helicopter saved the command post from being over-run. Within a matter of days the base was declared closed. The withdrawal was complete. The evacuation was so hasty that munitions stockpiles were abandoned. Later, as the ammunition stores were being casually searched by the Taliban, American air force jets returned to bomb the storage areas.
The lessons from Combat Outpost Keating revolve around a number of security issues ranging from the prompt payment of local wages to logistical isolation and the void created by strategic change, in this case the shift from peripheral interdiction to centralised concentration in Helmand. Like Combat Outpost Keating, the security of peripheral bases was also a problem for the British in India during the 1790 to 1820 period. This often boiled down to issues associated with logistical resupply and the hard-learned lessons imposed by retreat. What the British in India added to the local convoy system was robust and regular escort services composed of local troops under East India Company officers.
That lesson was reinforced at great human expense during a disastrous logistical failure in the Third Anglo-Mysore War when Maratha allies were placed in charge of convoy security. During the debacle Maratha troops failed to arrive on time with vital food supplies. British forces had to retreat during their monsoon campaign to lay siege to the enemy's capital in Mysore. General Robert Abercromby's men had to manhandle their huge iron siege guns through the mud since monsoon sickness and starvation had killed most of the draught cattle needed to pull them. To make matters worse, the men were weakened by a diet of starvation rations and even camp followers were reduced to eating the putrid flesh of dead draught cattle. The humiliating monsoon retreat of British forces during the Third-Anglo Mysore War left an indelible image on the minds of those who had witnessed it.Footnote 47 It was a turning point in not only logistical planning but also in local alliances and security sub-contracting.
The East India Company was willing to use local troops to protect convoys but preferred to place them under their own officers. This accounts for references to sebundy (local militia) accompanying the march of brinjarry (itinerant merchants) grain convoys. Local troop levies occasionally contained former enemy combatants who had the tactical knowledge to deal with ambushes in familiar terrain. The real turning point in terms of quelling peripheral insurgency, however, came slowly over time when local stakeholders had more to gain than lose from cooperation with the British. The key difference between the British historical model in India and that of Afghanistan 2001–2014 comes down to the British willingness to stay in India for generations and interact with the local economy in a mutually symbiotic fashion as both employer and consumer. Granted, in India the British had a greater range and diversity of economic interests to engage with than is the case in contemporary Afghanistan. Nevertheless, by outsourcing a considerable portion of their logistical needs to local entrepreneurs, the East India Company's armies contributed to the local economy.Footnote 48 The resulting trickle-down prosperity could be said to have resulted in greater cultural ‘buy in’ as local economies grew towards what became a national network. The East India Company's armies came to rely on indigenous procurement agents in secure urban areas to supply much of the army's needs. These agents benefited from a clearly transparent contractual system introduced by the East India Company.Footnote 49
ISAF's convoy system in Afghanistan differed in that assisting nations were greatly responsible for supplies and local private contractors responsible for transportation and its security. The largest convoy system in Afghanistan was covered under an American supply chain contract known as Host Nation Trucking (HNT). Valued at $2.61 billion dollars, the HNT contract was the source of much debate in Washington. The programme was investigated by Democratic Congressman John F. Tierney of Massachusetts, Chair of the Subcommittee on National Security and the Foreign Affairs Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. That some of the Congressional Committee envisaged a security model like that used by the East India Company can be seen in the recommendation that American forces should assume direct contractual responsibility for supply chain security providers: in essence, take command of the warlord armies providing security. The report warned that “if the United States is going to use small armies of private security contractors to defend its massive supply chain in a war zone, the Department of Defense must take direct responsibility for those contractors to ensure robust oversight”. It stated, “the U.S. government needs to have a direct line of authority and accountability over the private security companies”.Footnote 50
That convoys need security goes without saying, but there is little indication that ISAF seriously considered the historic model of using Western officers over local warlord armies.Footnote 51 For political reasons in support of the development of Afghan self-sufficiency, there was no modern equivalent of Richard Wellesley's subsidiary alliance system to place motley collections of fighting men under ISAF officers. Tierney's Congressional report clearly reflected concern that American funding of private armies, in support of logistical security, left Afghanistan exposed to future social ills. No one ventured to guess how the decommissioning of a series of private warlord armies would take place with the withdrawal of funding linked to NATO supply contracts. Perhaps most damning was the executive summary of Tierney's report as it clearly placed the Host Nation Trucking programme at odds with American foreign policy.
The findings of this report range from sobering to shocking. In short, the Department of Defense designed a contract that put responsibility for the security of vital U.S. supplies on contractors and their unaccountable security providers. This arrangement has fuelled a vast protection racket run by a shadowy network of warlords, strongmen, commanders, corrupt Afghan officials, and perhaps others. Not only does the system run afoul of the Department's own rules and regulations mandated by Congress, it also appears to risk undermining the U.S. strategy for achieving its goals in Afghanistan.Footnote 52
Funding Peace or Fuelling Failure?
In July of 2010 it was announced that Afghan President Karzai had signed a decree authorising the use of massive amounts of foreign aid to lure an unprecedented number of combatants out of Taliban service. The New York Times reported that:
With $200 million from Japan and other allies, and an additional $100 million in Pentagon money, American military officers will soon be handing out money to lure people away from the insurgency.Footnote 53
The combined allocation of $300 million – although far from a drop in the bucket – was well short of the funds needed to reduce the appreciable level of violence. Nor did that type of policy take into account what may be termed the Taliban's competitive bidding for specific commanders. We now know, from previously classified reports made available by WikiLeaks, that the Taliban were also willing to spend large amounts of money to secure key military leaders. In February 2008 Afghan National Army Brigade Commander Major General Jamaladin received a direct telephone solicitation from Taliban Commander Mullah Ezat to quit his service in the ANA for $100,000.Footnote 54 This was not their first bid but rather represented the Taliban's best offer. Perhaps the most frightening aspect of this bidding war lay in the consideration that ANA generals were paid as little as $11,340 per year at that time.Footnote 55
The significance of the spending disclosed in 2010 was that it showed the potential problems in sourcing the amount of money needed if prolonged conflict management and ultimately peace was the objective.Footnote 56 The Pentagon's contribution of $100 million was noteworthy in terms of the American budget deficit at that time and the orthodoxy of intervening in military labour markets as a form of cross-cultural conflict management. But months after additional funding for “reintegration” was announced, only $200,000 had been spent by America, with “little or nothing by other donors”. Unfortunately this drop in funding also coincided with a dramatic drop in the number of enemy combatants coming into service with Afghan National Security Forces. The question of historic timing versus the number ‘coming in’ became quite relevant.
. . .by the most optimistic estimates, a few hundred in the last six months. It is not clear whether that is because of the lack of a program that would provide them with jobs, security guarantees and other incentives, or because most Taliban no longer see the insurgency as a losing proposition. In the past five years, a poorly funded Afghan reintegration effort, the Peace and Reconciliation Commission, recorded 9,000 Taliban who sought to join the government side—compared with 100 since April, officials said. “It's almost dead,” said Muhammad Akram Khapalwak, a top official at the nearly moribund commission in Kabul. He said employees there had not been paid in three months. “The Taliban know the government doesn't have a single policy for peace and reconciliation”.Footnote 57
In late November 2011, the World Bank released an economic study that it carried out in conjunction with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's Ministry of Finance entitled Transition in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond 2014. The report contained worrying news about the economic likelihood of building a fiscally sound security environment.Footnote 58 Aside from showing that foreign aid in 2010–2011 was roughly the size of nominal Gross Domestic Product ($15.7 billion), the study revealed the degree to which Afghanistan's security remained dependent upon foreign-aid spending. The World Bank presented its study with two budgets. The first was the so-called External Budget that is funding by foreign donors. The second budget was termed the “Core Budget”, meaning the funds that actually flow through the Afghan treasury as opposed to those donated from outside.
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• Core Budget – $3.3 billion, of which $1.3 billion is spent on security
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• External Budget – $13.8 billion, of which $8.6 billion is spent on security
Given that aid-driven security spending was more than six times greater than domestic spending on security – and that both combined failed to produce a secure domestic environment – it was evident that the sudden curtailment of such aid held the potential for disaster.
Is It All About Money?
Western powers saw the value of using cash as a conflict management tool, but it is not clear whether they also understood military labour market manipulation in a social and cultural context. For their part, the Taliban were adept at exploiting other non-monetary means of motivating individuals to fight. The seemingly opportunistic but nevertheless well-calculated appearance of insurgents at Afghan funerals and memorial services confirmed the enemy was quite able to read grief cycles as an ideal time to recruit. This recruitment method hinged on a desire for revenge rather than mere cash to pull additional fighters to the Taliban's side. When motivated by emotion, or a desire for revenge, some of these occasional members of the military labour market were better used against focused targets: those that held significance in the context of retribution. There is also circumstantial evidence to suggest a ‘maximum effectiveness’ time limit associated with revenge or grief-linked recruiting. As we shall see, this relates to the contextual reinforcement of their grief – through revenge-focused target selection – which helps to off-set any second thoughts about desertion or failing to engage in battle.
In the actions of Mullah Juma Khan we can see a Taliban leader who went to the home of a deceased insurgent to pay his respects and take advantage of just such a recruiting opportunity.Footnote 59 The fallen Taliban soldier had been killed by retaliatory mortar fire in Ghaziabad District in Kunar Province on 3 May 2009. The dead man, apparently skilled in the deployment of mortars, had met his fate while attacking the East Observation Post at the Tsunel Vehicle Patrol Base in Ghaziabad District. Mullah Juma Khan arrived at the deceased's house with approximately 40 armed men, maintaining that they had come to pay their respects. In addition to the usual assortment of Kalashnikovs, Juma Khan's men carried four heavy machine guns and a mortar. While at the home of the dead man this insurgent band happened to meet another 40 guests from the Gojer tribe who were also said to have come to pay their respects to the deceased. Juma Khan exhorted those assembled to carry on the fight against western troops and the Afghan National Security Forces. The Mullah also cited the deaths of other local villagers, including a woman who had been nursing a child, urging the crowd to continue the struggle, he specifically sought to channel potential new recruits towards the same objective associated with the deceased. The Mullah directed them to join in an attack on the Tsunel Vehicle Patrol Base East Observation Post, and the 40 members of the Gojer tribe also agreed to the raid. Before concluding his speech, Mullah Juma Khan impressed upon his new found followers that if together they concentrated their assault they would not waste their lives in single combat, which had been the fate of an another local man who sought revenge. This latter observation strengthens the conclusion that Juma Khan realised that mere incitement to action ran the risk of yielding unfocused and therefore easily dealt with minor attacks. In this example the key to successfully exploiting the situation lay in organising the bereaved and channelling their efforts into a larger assault force.
In the preceding example we see grief-related recruiting techniques within the military labour market, but it is important to stipulate that the deceased was indeed an enemy combatant. From 2008 to 2012 there was an increasing amount of research done on the relationship between civilian deaths and what were termed ‘revenge attacks’ by enemy forces. While the infliction of civilian casualties is to be avoided in any ‘hearts and minds’ counterinsurgency effort, the link between civilian casualties and recruiting within military labour markets has not been studied as deeply. Contemporary statistical analysis demonstrated that on average each civilian killed produced an additional 0.03 attacks per 1,000 population within a six-week period. The average ISAF-inflicted civilian casualty incident resulted in two civilian casualties. That means that in an average-sized district of 83,000 people there were an additional six incidents reported as “significant activity” in the six weeks that followed a civilian casualty incident.Footnote 60 This well-defined six-week period between a civilian casualty and subsequent significant activity suggests a window of opportunity for anyone who sought to mitigate enemy attempts to recruit for a follow-up or revenge attack. This analysis may be interpreted as suggesting that compensation payments and counter recruiting efforts must be timely, but they must also be followed up on a regular basis to obstruct the enemy from recruiting during that six-week window.
The statistical analysis went on to point out that the recruitment of fighters in rural Afghanistan was not a problem and that aggressive operations with high levels of civilian violence increased recruitment opportunities.
In sum, the empirical evidence from Afghanistan sheds light on the way in which insurgent groups operate. In particular, it appears that while in high population-density, urban conflicts (such as Iraq) information flows are a critical component to counterinsurgency operations, in more rural insurgencies the most salient factor is the availability of fighters. To the extent that counterinsurgent forces engage in unpopular and aggressive operations that generate specific local grievances, they are likely to facilitate increased recruitment and support for insurgent groups. Thus, the counterinsurgent force faces an asymmetric problem.Footnote 61
What Can We Learn from the British Experience in South Asia, 1790–1820?
The historic vignettes presented thus far (1790–1820) would seem to offer no fewer than three pertinent lessons that were potentially applicable to Afghanistan, 2001–2014.
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1. In the case of using deficit spending to manipulate military labour markets, we saw the budgetary pitfalls of using cash to buy the enemy out of service. The net impact of Governor General Richard Wellesley's massive spending, aside from indebtedness, was the short-term purchase of military victory at the cost of building an unsustainably expensive military force.
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2. We then observed that the discontinuation of buying enemy troops out of service fuelled an insurgency cycle, eventually culminating in the Third Anglo-Maratha War. Unemployed soldiers and demobilised irregulars joined the growing bands of freebooters (Pindarries) on an unprecedented scale, helping to explain the size of the lawless bands encountered from 1806 to 1817.
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3. Attempts to reduce the insurgent threat level and number of insurgents on the eve of war in 1817 led to increased pressure to conclude negotiations with the likes of Pashtun warlord Amir Khan, which resulted in a triumphant political conversion but in reality took seven years to accomplish. The latter point underscores the absurdity of short-term negotiation timescales as applied to conflict resolution involving larger collections of enemy forces.
The British colonial experience in South Asia from 1790 to 1820 suggests that today's enemies more often than not become tomorrow's allies in the process of state formation and the evolution of governance. That was in large part due to indigenous leaders’ roles as powerbrokers who could deliver fighting men who in turn could serve the cause of either peace or war. With the exception of Tipu Sultan of Mysore, who was killed defending his fortress at Srirangapatna in 1799, virtually all of the East India Company's major military opponents during this period eventually became British allies or at the very least neutral subordinates heading tributary states. Many had their leadership roles confirmed as hereditary titles that lasted well into the twentieth century. By recognising and legitimating the political conversion of major military opponents the British intervened – or some may say interfered – in a political process, not of their own making, that ultimately evolved along democratic lines. That the British had overseen this process on a grand scale from 1800 to 1947 – roughly 150 years – suggests that they took a long-term view of political affairs in South Asia. Although one may argue that this was an imperial process that suffered from all the ills and excesses of colonialism, it was nevertheless one of the few examples of magnitude we can cite where a western power delivered a comprehensive and evolving political vision to span the ‘medieval’ and modern era.
By way of recapping applicable historic theory, Dirk Kolff and Douglas Peers provide two useful but very different tools for understanding the dynamics of war and peace in the period under discussion. Dirk Kollf's military labour market is a model in which military service or soldiering is explained in terms of meeting an employment demand. In contrast, Douglas Peers’ model of a garrison state can be seen as the incorporation of private armies and enemies into a standing army, providing domestic security and paying a peace dividend in the redistribution of wealth generated by regular pay and pensions. Taken together or as a synthesis, we can see the military history of Hindustan, 1790–1820 as demonstrating that the East India Company did not become the dominant player in the military labour markets of India overnight.
Obviously Kolff and Peers wrote their works about India; but in this paper they are brought together into comparison with modern Afghanistan to help demonstrate the potential application of South Asian military history to the case study method needed to stimulate creative thinking in conflict management. The hiring of fighting men out of enemy service, or at the very least hiring them out of the enemy's potential recruitment basin, has been going on since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The goal of building a vast standing Afghan National Army or ANA of 350,000 while admittedly far from a garrison state, is intended to make the ANA the dominant military employer with sufficient numbers to bring lasting security. If Kolff and Peer's work is applicable, then future efforts to manage conflict in Afghanistan, via manipulation of military labour markets, depends upon renewable economic resources and the societal acceptance of a large standing army. The sad reality, however, has been an over-reliance on spending billions of dollars to attain strategic goals that cannot be sustained without adequate funding.
American Funding for Afghan Security (figures are in $ millions) Footnote 62


The Totals for Fiscal Years 2002–2013 are:

The above chart does not include an additional $ 1,081.74 million appropriated for Afghanistan under the Foreign Military Financing initiative, the International Military Education and Training programme and the National Defense Authorization Act 1207 transfer provision (Global Security Contingency Fund).
Conclusion
‘Buy-outs’ with limited non-renewable funding tend to be tactical and not strategic in nature. They may remove combatants from a given battle or for a limited time, but they do not purchase lasting allegiance. To be most effective, the terms of payment must be cash paid in a timely manner. The type of combatant most often found within a volatile military labour market will only remain loyal as long as his pay is regular and delivered quickly. Short-term buy-outs lead to short-term allies and that presents a separate security threat. Short-term allies have a chance to learn about standard operating procedures at first hand before they depart to join other forces. This form of intelligence leakage may be halted by long-term employment practices, but once again, at what price?
The continuing danger of military labour market management in Afghanistan is that of underfunding and a failure to commit the type of bridging budget needed until lasting solutions are found. The United States – cited here as ISAF leader – does not have a great depth of historic knowledge when it comes to the modern management of military labour markets. Yet the current strategy in Afghanistan is greatly dependent upon the financing and mastery of a military labour pool of national proportions. The historic British model suggests that the successful control of such markets should not be approached on a short-term tactical basis but considered on a lengthy strategic basis. If we consider the peak of British military labour market manipulation as running from 1790 to 1820, it seems reasonable to speculate that the United States should be prepared to commit to a management process that encompasses one to two generations (20 to 40 years) if it hopes to permanently transform a potential warlord environment into something approaching a garrison state capable of providing national domestic security unassisted. While the attainment of a garrison state is not necessarily a desired outcome, it may well prove a more reasonable evolutionary goal than the attainment of western liberal democracy on a 15-year timeline.
Is this not all just a bit of nonsense – looking at Afghanistan's future from Hindustan's military past? The East India Company has no modern equivalent, but it was uniquely positioned in history to address the interconnectivity of economics, security and territorial control. Obviously military history is better used to provide a series of reference points rather than as a map for conflict analysis. The temptation exists to employ history as a script or playbook, but its real value comes in aiding pattern recognition to stimulate the alternative thinking needed to navigate aspects of contemporary affairs. Hindustan's military past (1790–1820) warns of the dangers of underfunding military labour markets and the disaster of rapid demobilisation. ISAF and donor nation allies did not do enough to deliver three basic items that should have been seen as key to long-term peace and stability in Afghanistan.
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1. External powers failed to help the government of Afghanistan to extend real control (political, military and financial) to the nation as a whole. While security improved in some areas, there was never a time during the ISAF intervention when the entire country was rendered safe and secure for the general population.
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2. Although ISAF oversaw a tremendous increase in the size of the combined Afghan National Security Forces, they were never sufficiently well integrated into society to become a truly national security institution.
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3. There was a complete failure to establish a substantial and lasting national framework for economic reconstruction. In fact, a foreign aid dependency was created that became welded to a bloated military labour market that poses a national security threat if it collapses.
The origins of this paper can be traced back to a series of discussions about the potential value of South Asian military history as a component part of a more culturally diverse curriculum in western military academies. Although the existence of historic parallels between India, 1790–1820 and Afghanistan, 2001–2014 may be interesting to some, the existence of such similarities can in no way be construed as yielding a roadmap for conflict management. Professional military higher education has been undergoing change since the 1990s and the appearance of a pedagogical shift is exemplified by the Marine Corps University's use of Case Method teaching. Events from Britain's colonial wars in India, 1790–1820 are ripe for incorporation into historic case studies. Ultimately, however, it is not the lessons of conflict management that have bearing on the future of conflict management but the individuals who study them and decide how and when to utilise them.
Appendix: Military Labour Market Expenses
The records of the East India Company contain a number of accounts pertaining to troops hired on what amounted to the military labour ‘spot market’. The following entry from 1804 is one of eight pages from a single pay ledger entry for irregular mounted units. Note the first unit is composed of Pashtuns.Footnote 63 The three-column entry system represents pay as delineated in rupees, annas and paise.
Paid Capt. Campbell's Abstract for the Pathan HorseFootnote 64

Paid to Capt. Campbell's Abstract for the GuzeratFootnote 65 Horse

