Roy Grieve’s 2016 article in JHET, “Keynes, Mill, and Say’s Law: The Legitimate Case Keynes Didn’t Make against J. S. Mill” (vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 329–349), made a complex of arguments about the authors named in its title. According to Grieve, later and prominent readers of all three authors were correct to observe that, in a notable passage, Keynes misinterpreted Mill’s words as implying his allegiance to Say’s Law. And yet those readers were incorrect to conclude that Mill’s allegiance really lay elsewhere. It did not: although Keynes’s passage was wrong, he was right on other grounds to believe that Mill was, to his discredit, “deeply in thrall” to J.-B. Say.
So said Grieve. In short, his article presented his interpretation of Keynes’s interpretation of Mill’s interpretation of Say; and, along the way, Grieve’s own interpretation of Say’s Law. A long interpretative chain inevitably attracts close inspection by readers well practiced in finding weak links. First came a reply by James Ahiakpor; following it, a rejoinder by Grieve; and then responses by Steven Kates and, finally, Alain Béraud and Guy Numa. They are printed here in that order. Together they manifest the JHET’s usefulness as a forum for discussion of the articles published in its pages—and their own usefulness as a joint contribution to the historiography of Say’s Law.
