Introduction
This article explores engagements with ordoliberalism and the associated concept of the ‘social market’ in British political discourse from the 1970s to the 1990s. It centres on the three moments where the language of social markets took influential roles in party policy discourses, linking together examples from the Conservative Party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Alliance and the Labour Party. While the engagements by the SDP and the Conservatives have been explored in isolation, this article identifies deeper engagement than has previously been identified and makes an original contribution to the literature by reading the three cases together as a shared phenomenon. Drawing together the grey literature of think tank reports and political journals that comprise party political policy discourses as well as published books and memoirs, and archival sources from within party political groups, this synthetic analysis identifies not isolated splutters of engagement with German terminology but a sustained and recurrent discourse that both engages with the history and thought of ordoliberalism and demonstrates overlaps with ordoliberal thought.Footnote 1
In structure, the article begins with an introduction of ordoliberalism and the concept of the social market economy and their circulation in the United Kingdom, Germany and internationally. It then proceeds through the three chronological cases, characterised by both political party and decade: the Conservatives in the mid-1970s, the SDP in the 1980s and the Labour Party in the mid-1990s. While it would be impossible to present an exhaustive account of all invocations of the term ‘social market’ across a three-decade period in one article, these are the only moments where the term is prominent in domestic political discourse. These interactions happen at crucial moments for the parties, just as they make their respective turns to neoliberalism and adopt market- and competition-centred models for economic and social policy. These cases demonstrate that ordoliberalism plays an important, and heretofore unrecognised, role in the history of neoliberalism, contributing both to the British history of neoliberalisms and the European and global history of ordoliberalism.
The examination of political discourses invoking ordoliberalism and social markets also draws further attention to the social and moral thought involved in the justification of neoliberalism in the United Kingdom. Scholarship on neoliberalism has long identified the economic thought of neoliberalism, and the impacts on social policy that resulted from introducing neoliberal policies and governmentalities.Footnote 2 More recent scholarship has drawn attention to the social and moral thinking within neoliberal thought and discourse and has particularly emphasised the impact of this thought on policy related to race, racism and poverty.Footnote 3 Drawing attention to the distinctive social thought of ordoliberalism, this article identifies the invocations of this thought in the United Kingdom and its prominence within the invocations and legacies of ordoliberalism in British discourse and governance.
Ordoliberalism and Social Markets
The circulation and dissemination of neoliberal ideas and policies is an established subject in the history of neoliberalism. The United Kingdom itself is something of an archetypical case for established narratives of circulation. Neoliberalism emerged in the 1930s and 1940s with the Walter Lippmann Colloquium and Mont Pelerin Society (MPS) and from the outset included members from the United Kingdom – including Friedrich Hayek, then working at the London School of Economics. In the 1940s and into the 1950s, British neoliberals were academic economists, primarily associated with the LSE and University of Manchester.Footnote 4 In 1956, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) was founded on the advice of Hayek. The IEA was more actively involved in popularising neoliberal ideas, engaging politicians, economic journalists and building a wider think tank infrastructure to professionally spread ideas as ‘second-hand dealers in ideas’.Footnote 5 The IEA remained tightly linked to the MPS and what has been termed the neoliberal thought collective.Footnote 6
In the 1970s, neoliberalism took a more visibly political form with the premiership of Margaret Thatcher, who championed the ideas of Hayek and Milton Friedman and drew on ideas from neoliberals in support of her political and economic reforms, including privatisation, financialisation and deregulation. Thatcher’s Government began a period of neoliberal hegemony, or at least widespread adoption of elements of the neoliberal ideational and policy programme, which spread to other political parties and were sedimented through engagement with international organisations as part of the Washington Consensus. In the period from the 1970s to the 1990s, neoliberalism in the United Kingdom is most associated with the neoliberal thought collective and its British representatives as well as the emergence of globalisation. However, such a homogenous account of neoliberalism in this period overstates the case, as literature has identified the pluralism of neoliberalisms within this thought collective.Footnote 7 This pluralism identifies a range of varieties of neoliberalism, at times in tension with one another.
One variety of neoliberalism that remains underexplored within British history is ordoliberalism. A German variant of neoliberalism, ordoliberalism arose in the 1930s and is associated with economists like Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Alexander Rüstow and Wilhelm Röpke and the journal ORDO. The approach became politically influential in the late 1940s when adherents, like Ludwig Erhard, took key roles in the economic governance of the Bizone of occupied Germany and, successively, West Germany. Ordoliberals were active within the neoliberal thought collective, with active roles shaping and contributing to the Walter Lippmann Colloquium and the MPS.Footnote 8 It was only in 1960 that a rift emerged within the MPS between Anglo-American neoliberalism and European ordoliberals.Footnote 9 For this article, it is worth noting that the involvement of the British IEA in the MPS and the associated decision to hold an iteration of the annual conference in the United Kingdom were precipitating incidents in the split.
In classifying ordoliberalism, we can identify three key components. The first is a focus on institutional structures. All forms of political neoliberalism centre on active involvement of the state to create the conditions for market competition. This can take various forms, including encasing markets through institutional independence and transnational governance or deregulation to avoid market distortions. Among neoliberalisms, the ordoliberal variant has a stronger emphasis on the cultural, legal and institutional conditions needed for the market economy, emphasising the role of competition policy and the notion of an economic constitution.Footnote 10 Thus, more emphasis is placed on the active role of the state in resisting concentrations of market power in private or public hands than in alternative varieties of neoliberalism, like the Chicago School. Second, in addition to these concepts, we can add the concept of Vitalpolitik, which links social policy and economic policy. This advocates for deproletarianisation, widespread private ownership of assets like shares and housing, claiming that distributed private ownership enables involvement in market competition, which cultivates virtues like responsibility and economic freedom.Footnote 11 Both of these components, institutional conditions and Vitalpolitik, reflect the neoliberal character of ordoliberalism, deriving from a critique of laissez-faire liberalism and its effects on the proletarian mass worker.
The third component of ordoliberalism is the social market economy, a concept developed by ordoliberal economist and public administrator Alfred Müller-Armack in the mid-1940s.Footnote 12 The social market economy continues the themes of Vitalpolitik by emphasising a dual character of markets and society in ordoliberalism. Effective market society relies on social embedding and the cultivation of appropriate social values, while markets are also naturally socialising and produce virtuous values for those who engage with them. A properly organised society thus achieves competitive markets and socially optimal ends as the same goal. The social market economy concept was crucial in the political history of ordoliberalism as it took prominence in the formation of the West German Christian Democratic Union (CDU), where ordoliberals were influential on the party’s economic posts, including Ludwig Erhard.Footnote 13 The term ‘social market economy’ became closely associated with Erhard’s economic approach, which was itself associated with West Germany’s economic recovery and strength, known as the economic miracle.
Scholars have contested the extent to which the policies developed by the CDU from this period onward reflect an orthodox ordoliberalism or incorporated other currents in the party such as Catholic social thought and conservatism.Footnote 14 The term also got adopted more widely in West German politics from the 1950s, including by the CDU’s social democratic rivals, the SPD, further genericising the term. As such, some ordoliberals draw a distinction between an ‘authentic’ understanding of the term and an ‘inauthentic’ understanding, adulterated through the influence of social democracy and lacking the essential commitments to Vitalpolitik.Footnote 15 This is made more difficult to disentangle by internal debates among ordoliberals on the scale and form of social security required to realise social markets. We can nonetheless note that this ordoliberal term remains in regular use for the political engagements of ordoliberals and for analysis of the West German economy.Footnote 16 Within this article, I identify how the invocations of the social market economy under study directly engage with ordoliberal economists and thought, rejecting the claim that the term was untethered from its ordoliberal origins.Footnote 17
Ordoliberalism as a thought collective is regularly presented as being primarily composed of economists and exclusively (West) German, and relatively isolated from the trajectory of broader neoliberalism. Stephan Pühringer’s account of neoliberal networks in Germany, for instance, presents them as self-contained and influential solely on German politics, with international engagements occurring solely through the MPS.Footnote 18 Some ordoliberal scholars indeed argued that the concept of the social market economy was historically and culturally specific to Germany.Footnote 19 While there may have been some reluctance to proselytise ordoliberalism, the ideas were not contained within the borders of West Germany. Scholarship on post-war Christian democracy has demonstrated the influence of ordoliberalism across borders, in the Netherlands and Austria.Footnote 20 Scholarship has also identified the influence of ordoliberalism on development policies in China from the 1970s as well as post-Soviet Europe.Footnote 21 What is new about the cases in this article is that they represent the spread of ordoliberalism in contexts where other variants of neoliberalism were already present.
A stream of contemporary scholarship where ordoliberalism is seen to have made an international impact is at the supranational level, specifically through the European Union. Here we see claimed influence of ordoliberals and ordoliberalism on the shape and content of European integration, including the Treaty of Rome and the Maastricht Treaty, as well as through European Union politics.Footnote 22 This exploration of the European Union and its precursors as subjects and vectors for ordoliberalism positions European integration as the crucial context for ordoliberalism moving beyond its parochial and domestic environs in Europe.Footnote 23 This article complicates such an account by presenting a case of the adoption of ordoliberalism where the European Community is not an influential factor and, if anything, presents a foil that ordoliberalism is justified against.
The actual historical literature on ordoliberalism in the United Kingdom is very limited, primarily representing a claimed lack of presence. This broadly represents the framing of varieties of neoliberalism as national cases, where German and Anglo-American varieties of neoliberalism are contrasted, assuming that Thatcherism and British neoliberalism must be analytically distinct. Scholars have identified similarities between ordoliberalism and the policies and economic thought of British figures as varied as Jo Grimond, Anthony Crosland and Nick Clegg without demonstrating direct engagement or influence.Footnote 24
Only two books, by Robert Ledger and Kenneth Dyson, have tried to investigate a British history of ordoliberalism and both find almost nothing.Footnote 25 Ledger claims that Thatcherite Conservative Keith Joseph was ‘one of the only Conservatives to take a detailed look at Ordoliberalism’ but that it had practically no influence, with British neoliberalism not meeting ordoliberalism’s social aims.Footnote 26 Dyson identifies influence on the economist Alan Peacock but concludes that ordoliberal and similar thought were marginalised by ‘the nature of Thatcherism and the New Right under figures like Keith Joseph’.Footnote 27 Beyond this apparent contradiction, these claims reflect the differing understandings of ordoliberalism used in the books. Ledger understands ordoliberalism as a ‘moderate’ counterpart to Austrian neoliberalism, primarily oriented to social outcomes, while Dyson emphasises the constitutional focus of academic ordoliberalism. In both cases, they argue that the moralist social thought of Thatcherism in practice is incompatible with the economic rationality of ordoliberalism. By contrast, this article understands moralist social thinking, sedimented in Vitalpolitik and the social market economy, as core elements of ordoliberalism and thus compatible with ordoliberal economics. The morally laden nature of ordoliberalism in fact will be demonstrated as central to ordoliberalism’s significance in British political discourse. This article also does not treat different varieties of neoliberalism as necessarily exclusive, allowing ordoliberalism to comingle discursively with other neoliberalisms. As this reflects an interpretive difference from existing historiography, this article focuses primarily on explicit invocations of ordoliberalism and the German social market economy, identifying direct engagements with ordoliberal thinking.
In addition to actually finding examples of a much more sustained engagement, this article has subtle but significant differences in scope from Dyson and Ledger. Dyson primarily examines engagements in academic economics, avoiding the party political and think tank discourses at the centre of this article. Ledger does look at political discourse, but limits his scope to Thatcherism after 1979, which misses both the influence of ordoliberalism prior to 1979 and the sustained influence on other political parties thereafter. For example, Ledger mentions David Owen but not his advocacy for social markets.
Existing scholarship on social markets in British political history is likewise thin. As will be established throughout this article, of the three cases of engagements with social markets that comprise this article, the most, albeit still limited, attention has been paid to the Conservatives in the 1970s and SDP in the 1980s. These have primarily been contemporary analyses rather than historical scholarship and read through a specific party political lens. As exemplified by Ledger, social markets within the Conservative Party have been almost exclusively associated with Keith Joseph and the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS). A recent edited volume from Gary Love and Christian Egander Skov addresses this gap somewhat and has multiple chapters engaging with social markets and Conservatives and incorporating more figures but primarily examines international contexts, especially through the European Democrat Union.Footnote 28 Benjamin Thomas’s chapter identifies a time-limited ‘social market moment’ within the Conservative Party’s interest in the German Model in the 1970s, which overlaps significantly with what this article identifies as the first wave of social markets, but by limiting focus to the Conservative Party, the chapter overlooks the successive waves and longer period of influence on the SDP and Labour.
For the SDP, social markets have been interrogated as part of interpreting David Owen’s contributions to Liberal Party history, especially by his critics.Footnote 29 Tudor Jones’s work reads this as a specifically Owenite history but has placed it in a historical context.Footnote 30 By reading the three party discourses together, I demonstrate their commonalities and a recursive discourse across this period, of rediscovery and claimed distinctiveness, where the commonalities indicate a shared phenomenon – one that cannot be identified by only looking at the cases in isolation.
Conservatives and Wider Ownership (c.1972–9)
Neoliberal ideas were first introduced to party politics in the United Kingdom by the Liberal Party and, within it, the Unservile State Group in the 1950s and their namesake edited volume in 1957.Footnote 31 From this earliest moment, we can see traces of ordoliberalism. One of the contributors to The Unservile State was Alan Peacock, an economist at the LSE who had written a review of the first issue of ORDO in 1949.Footnote 32 The Unservile State cites the ordoliberal economist Wilhelm Röpke but does not mention ordoliberalism specifically.
The earliest direct engagement with the concept of the social market economy in British politics is from Michael Fogarty, a professor of Industrial Relations and a policy advisor for the Liberal Party, who associated with the Unservile State Group and had work published by the IEA.Footnote 33 In 1957, Fogarty published an academic book on Christian democracy in Europe, with underlying research likely predating The Unservile State. The book includes analysis of the CDU’s economic liberalisation, which he associates with ‘neo-liberalism’, specifically mentioning Wilhelm Röpke, as well as Ludwig Erhard’s ‘socialised market economy’.Footnote 34 The terminology of the social market reappears in a pamphlet written by Fogarty for the Liberal Party in 1961, although here it is used to advocate for co-determination.Footnote 35
The language of social markets and, with it, ordoliberalism, enters the Conservative Party discourse through discussions about ‘wider ownership’.Footnote 36 Wider ownership was a broad agenda within the party that sought to expand asset ownership in society. Focussed on particular asset classes like shares and housing, this drew on multiple logics including a desire for a more inclusive form of economic growth and the liberatory effects of a minimum level of ownership. This approach to the politics of ownership also extended to industrial relations. Here writers emphasise ownership schemes changing firm-level and societal industrial relations, a more individualist alternative to the Social Contract, as well as the role of corporatist structures like works councils to involve workers in decision-making. These were not all presented as capitalist beneficence; an alternative logic presented for these forms of corporatism was to undermine the power of trade unions.
In genealogical terms, the narrative of wider ownership drew from a number of inspirations. Within the Conservative Party’s own intellectual traditions, it was linked with the idea of the ‘property-owning democracy’ which had been in circulation since the 1920s.Footnote 37 Others drew on the work of the American Louis Kelso, who emphasised employee share ownership plans.Footnote 38 The sociological theory of embourgeoisement, which posited that affluence for some workers could change their social and political interests away from the proletariat, circulated, including among the Conservative leadership.Footnote 39 Other concepts that can be linked to wider ownership include ‘popular capitalism’, ‘worker capitalism’ and ‘new capitalism’, which all emphasised the need to resecure the bases for capitalism, and appealed to different wings of the party. Amid these varied influences, we can identify significant parallels with ordoliberal thinking, especially on Vitalpolitik, and it is notable how cleanly embourgeoisement mirrors deproletarianisation.
The ideas of wider ownership had thus been in Conservative Party discourse for a while before the 1970s, but they became linked to West Germany under the leadership of Edward Heath, and the influence of a key advisor of his, David Howell. Howell had a long-standing interest in ordoliberalism, having been convinced of its insights in his student days, meeting with Erhard and describing him as a ‘hero’, and he looked to integrate elements of Erhard’s approach into his political journalism and work for the Conservative Political Centre.Footnote 40
The influence of ideas from and about West Germany in this period factored into thinking about industrial relations. Whilst the United Kingdom’s economy was underperforming relative to comparator countries and in the midst of a series of industrial disputes, West Germany was performing better and had more cooperative industrial relations. The party under Heath explored a variety of corporatist elements of the ‘German Model’, including worker councils and Concerted Action, although explicit references to ordoliberalism were not made.Footnote 41 These reforms were incorporated as part of the wider ownership campaigns.
I identify a shift in language on this theme in 1974, with the formation of a new think tank, the CPS. In retrospective evaluation, the CPS is characterised as the archetypal neoliberal/Thatcherite think tank, co-founded by Margaret Thatcher and developing many Thatcherite ideas and policies. However, at its formation, the CPS was more closely associated with a different Conservative shadow minister, Keith Joseph. An alternative to the party’s internal Conservative Research Department, which was more sceptical towards neoliberalism, the formation of the CPS proved somewhat controversial, but Heath approved Joseph and Thatcher’s involvement on the understanding that the CPS would focus on policy learning from comparative European institutions. From the outset, the CPS had a sharp focus on West Germany and specific advocacy for the ‘social market economy’, terminology Joseph began using a few years prior. Original names proposed for the think tank included the ‘Erhard Foundation’ and the ‘Institute for a Social Market Economy’.Footnote 42
The first pamphlet put out by the CPS was Why Britain Needs a Social Market Economy, making this connection public and presenting a programmatic statement from the think tank. The pamphlet highlights Erhard and Müller-Armack and discusses the economic and social benefits of market economics as well as the need for restrained state actions to enable a functioning market order.Footnote 43 In 1975, the internal papers of the CPS reveal its goal as ‘to influence the climate of public opinion in favour of social market policies … to be both more radical and more public in the examination and promotion of social market policies’.Footnote 44 In 1976, Konrad Zweig, an economist who had been educated in ordoliberal networks, wrote a pamphlet for the CPS on German monetary policies, incorporating history, theory and a contemporary analysis of the social market economy with clear links to ordoliberal politics and thought.Footnote 45
As Thatcher became leader of the Conservative Party in 1975, these ideas moved from think tanks into the official policy processes of the Conservative Party, especially through a key economic policy group, the ‘Economic Reconstruction Group’ (ERG), which included Howell, Joseph and the Shadow Chancellor Geoffrey Howe.Footnote 46 This group continued a number of the policy lines initially developed under Heath. Zweig, the ordoliberal economist who had written for the CPS, was commissioned by the Group to produce a report on the Concerted Action proposals.Footnote 47 Zweig’s analysis draws heavily on ordoliberal sources, with the second half of the report dedicated to presenting ‘the neo-liberal critique’ of Concerted Action, reproducing the contemporary position of ordoliberal economists.Footnote 48 Zweig also prepared a shorter report for the ERG recommending a Council of Economic Experts, another West German innovation associated with ordoliberalism.Footnote 49 The key economic policy statements of the opposition years, The Right Approach and The Right Approach to the Economy, continue the influences of the wider ownership and social market policy discourses. Appearing during the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, these documents committed the party to employee share ownership, termed Profit Sharing, widening home ownership, works councils and Concerted Action.
The CPS was not the only think tank in the British neoliberal ecosystem to engage with the ideas and people of ordoliberalism. Zweig published a report for the Adam Smith Institute, another neoliberal think tank, discussing the content and history of the social market economy. Here, he discussed ordoliberalism specifically, a term not used in the CPS pamphlet.Footnote 50 Christian Watrin, an influential ordoliberal economist, provided the foreword for this publication. At the IEA, Josef Molsberger delivered a talk in 1984 on the social market economy, identifying its differences from Austrian economics, historical genealogy and institutional focus, and discussing prospects for the concept in the United Kingdom.Footnote 51 The lessons to be learned from Germany were understood through an explicitly ordoliberal lens. Watrin and Molsberger were also both involved in shared policy workshops held between the Conservative Party and the German CDU.Footnote 52
As a result of all these invocations, the language of social markets appears in the contemporary analyses of the Conservative Party and Thatcherism from Andrew Gamble. Gamble’s best-known analysis of Thatcherism is his 1988 book The Free Economy and the Strong State, but he had been actively developing the underlying analysis during the late 1970s. In this earlier period, he highlighted ‘social market doctrine’, the economic element of the Conservative programme, which blended into economic populism to form Thatcherism.Footnote 53 The dual character of a neoliberal economy, supporting and facilitated by a strong state, characterises both his analysis and subsequent scholarship on neoliberalism. It is worth recognising that although Gamble uses the term ‘social market doctrine’ to refer to an economic half of Thatcherism, it is really the combined whole, the free economy and the strong state that capture an ordoliberal understanding of social markets.
In references to social market doctrine, Gamble is somewhat imprecise, identifying actors like Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek as proponents, and his analysis examines what would later be classified as generic neoliberalism. Despite this broader referent, Gamble’s analysis correctly identifies core elements of ordoliberal history.Footnote 54 By drawing on earlier analysis of ordoliberal thought, from Carl Joachim Friedrich, Gamble developed his account of Thatcherism and neoliberalism.
These engagements with the concept of the social market and ordoliberalism were likely not happenstance. The 1970s also represent a beginning of a period of organising by ordoliberal networks in Germany to influence policy and advocate for ordoliberalism.Footnote 55 Flemming Falz has identified the actions of networks like the Ludwig–Erhard–Stiftung to draw influential politicians, journalists and academics together to shape public discourse through the ‘myth of Ludwig Erhard’, a discourse linking Erhard, the social market economy and the economic miracle.Footnote 56 A key actor within this network was Wolfram Engels, an ordoliberal economist and commentator, who also led efforts to set up a West German branch of the Bow Group, an influential network of young Conservatives.Footnote 57
If this constellation of ideas, wider ownership, ordoliberalism and social markets, was so important for Conservative economic thinking in the 1970s, why did it disappear so dramatically when Thatcher became the prime minister in 1979 and not appear in most accounts of Thatcherism in practice?Footnote 58 The shortest answer is that changes in the leadership of the CPS shifted power towards a new leadership less committed to a politics based on social markets. Concerned that the term was criticised by Friedrich Hayek and confused the public, these actors, like William and Shirley Letwin, encouraged Thatcher and the party to avoid the language of social markets.Footnote 59
Given that those individuals and institutions advocating for social markets were regularly also participants in the mainstream British neoliberal networks, it is tempting to follow Gamble in flattening the ordoliberal and Anglo-American neoliberal currents in this period and reading social markets as a linguistic blip in the unfolding of Thatcherite neoliberalism. However, the variety of neoliberalism that emerges from the social market discourse has important deviations from Anglo-American neoliberal orthodoxy, with a stronger moral drive and emphasis on social relations, and the engagement with West Germany’s economic thought and history is far from cursory. A draft speech for Thatcher, from 1978, notes:
It is this conviction [Christianity] which led me … to opt for what I call the social market economy, not primarily on economic grounds, but on moral grounds, because it entailed the widest spread of responsibility. It has also proved economically most beneficial, but that is an added bonus.Footnote 60
Similar readings of the significance of social markets are supported by contemporary and retrospective accounts from the key actors in the social market discourse. Across actors, the explicit language of ‘social markets’ is directly identified as key part of their arguments and is accompanied by criticism of the trajectory of policies and the Conservative Party after it dropped this terminology.Footnote 61
I argue instead that although the language of social markets was dropped, it remained latent in the justifications underpinning policies pursued by the Thatcher government. Key policies in the shift of ownership away from the state, which is associated with the neoliberal era, were accompanied by the emphasis on a popular distribution of ownership championed by the wider ownership campaign, through invocations of ordoliberalism and the social market, and in the ERG where ordoliberalism had been discussed. Right to Buy did this transparently, while the privatisation of public services was accompanied by attempts to sell these new shares to the mass public, characterised by the ‘Tell Sid’ marketing campaign. Private pensions, which massively expanded private share ownership, were a policy spearheaded by the CPS’s wider ownership working group, itself led by Nigel Vinson, who had written Why Britain Needs a Social Market Economy.Footnote 62 This emphasis on expanded ownership may not have been solely inspired by ordoliberalism but had been articulated using its terminology during the opposition years and marked a divergence from orthodox Anglo-American neoliberalism.
The SDP and Reconstructing Social Democracy (c.1981–7)
By the 1980s, a language of social markets had declined within the Conservative Party, but very quickly made a resurgence in a new party, the SDP. The SDP arose as a split from the Labour Party in 1981 and reflected an internal debate about the content of a modern social democracy that dated back to the 1960s.Footnote 63 Those who would form the SDP had advanced a liberal revisionist critique of the Labour Party’s platforms and ideology, which were criticised as too statist, deferential to organised labour and opposed to European integration, and hence culpable in British economic decline. Soon after formation, the SDP formed a political cooperation pact with the other party of the political centre, the Liberal Party. The combined parties were known as ‘the Alliance’ and jointly contested the 1983 and 1987 general elections, doing poorly on both occasions.
The terminology of social markets was tied to David Owen, a founding member of the SDP who became its party leader after the 1983 election. Owen began using the term in 1981 but adopted it more systematically in 1983 with his first party conference speech and in a programmatic essay published in Economic Affairs, a journal run by the neoliberal IEA.Footnote 64 In 1984, the party conference adopted the social market economy as party platform and identified that it should be incorporated in all further policy-making.Footnote 65
Owen’s personal understanding of the genealogy of the term is unconventional, as he claimed it was ‘particularly associated with the 1959 Bad Godesberg programme of the German Social Democratic Party, when the German Social Democrats abandoned Marxist economics and achieved electoral success with thirteen years of a Social Democratic/Liberal coalition government’.Footnote 66 This claim is erroneous, as the term has a Christian democratic and ordoliberal genealogy and social markets are not mentioned in the Bad Godesberg programme – facts seized upon by Owen’s contemporary critics inside and outside the party.Footnote 67
Analyses of Owen’s attitude to social markets suggest that the concept’s muddiness was a result of it not being a deeply considered position but rather a result of political positioning. David Marquand, a critic of social markets within the SDP, suggests that the language of social markets reflected an attempt by Owen to have a distinctive original contribution to the political thought of the new party and to draw a sharper contrast with the ‘failed’ socialism of the Labour Party. Social markets presented Owen as new and original within the British social democratic tradition.Footnote 68
Owen’s articulation of social markets changes a bit throughout the 1980s, but his arguments broadly suggest that social democrats need to embrace markets and competition more, which would both improve economic performance and have social justice benefits. Initially, this included a soft focus on labour market reforms, positioning the SDP as critical of the trade unions, but his position evolved to more undifferentiated support of marketisation. These positions were divisive within the Alliance, and his policy positions caused tension with the Liberal Party, where the appeal to the political right led to characterisation as dilute or covert Thatcherism.
Owen did attempt to distinguish his position from Thatcherism, with the claim that his approach was more socially oriented.Footnote 69 Key elements here were a commitment to popular ownership, industrial democracy and competition policies intended to resist concentrations of economic power. He was critical of the social values developed under unrestrained capitalism, meaning Thatcherism, and positioned his decentralist and distributist approach as a way to develop better values, linking market economics with social policy.Footnote 70 Although scholars of the SDP have pointed to these characteristics as reflecting differences between his views and neoliberalism and a distinctive understanding of social markets, the parallels with the wider ownership language of the 1970s and the social thinking of ordoliberalism are unavoidable.Footnote 71
While Owen’s invocation of social markets was abstruse and ad hoc, it drew others in the SDP into more sophisticated invocations of the term. Alex de Mont, who worked for Owen, had written a pamphlet on the concept before Owen had become leader and the party published it after the change in leadership.Footnote 72 De Mont’s pamphlet argues for a need to reconstruct social democracy, with the social market economy offering a means to do this. Understanding social democracy as liberal representative democracy utilising reformism to achieve social justice, de Mont examines ‘old-style’ social democracy and the Thatcherite right and finds both lacking. Thatcherites are correct, he claims, about the value of markets in promoting freedom and justice and in identifying that many ‘old-style’ social democratic policies to constrain markets actually harm social justice. However, he claims the right is insufficiently attentive to concentrations of power, specifically identifying how privatisations had shifted monopolies of power in the public sector to concentrations of power in the private sector, and how state action would be needed to allow markets to properly function specifically.
A slightly different position is taken in a paper by Nick Bosanquet, a social policy wonk also active within SDP policy circles.Footnote 73 Bosanquet identifies that the social market economy had been supported by different political tendencies including Owen, Keith Joseph and German Christian democrats. Nonetheless, he makes the case for a social market economy as a ‘serious non-socialist alternative to the New Right’. His approach is tied to a moral commitment to equality which he identifies with freedom and life chances for the least favoured in society. In Bosanquet’s analysis, elements of market economics are unavoidable for the pursuit of growth and social justice. However, he remains concerned about the social impacts of unfettered markets, which he associates with the New Right. As such, he calls for social markets as a form of market economy with a more active state to align markets to social ends, requiring political and economic reforms. In both cases, attempts to move social markets into social democratic ground ultimately return to central conceptual resources of ordoliberalism.
As quickly as the SDP adopted a platform of social markets, they also dropped the language. By the 1987 general election, the term was out of favour and did not appear in the Alliance’s election manifesto.Footnote 74 This coincides with the end of the SDP as a major political force, as they opted to merge with the Liberals into what would become the Liberal Democrats. This was resisted by Owen and some dedicated Owenites. As the Liberal Democrats formed in 1988, Owen left for the much smaller ‘continuing SDP’ which lasted until 1990.Footnote 75
A lasting institution that emerged out of the continuing SDP was the Social Market Foundation (SMF), which was set up to be a think tank for the party and featured the involvement of many Owenites, including Owen himself.Footnote 76 The first publication from the SMF was a manifesto of sorts, setting out the think tank’s understanding of the term ‘social market economy’.Footnote 77 This draws on ordoliberal thought, quoting Erhard, Röpke, Böhm and Rüstow and distinguishes their thought from the neoliberalism of Friedrich Hayek. Here markets are praised for being efficient, liberating and moral, but the pamphlet also identifies that some efficient market outcomes require correction because they undermine the market order.Footnote 78 The influence of ordoliberalism is clear, with a focus on legal and institutional contexts for markets, competition policies and monetary policy. The paper does identify co-determination as a constitutive element of the ordoliberal social market economy but is cautious towards it, blaming it for German economic stagnation in the 1980s, reproducing the ordoliberal criticisms of ‘inauthentic’ social markets.Footnote 79
As might be expected, the SMF underwent an identity crisis with the end of the Owenite SDP, but it continued as a non-partisan think tank. Throughout the 1990s, however, it drifted towards the Conservative Party and the political right but retained members from Labour. A number of these former Owenites were warmly received in the Conservative Party, with Danny Finkelstein, who had been the think tank’s Director, leaving to be Director of the Conservative Research Department in 1995. The SMF remains as a leading think tank in the present day.
Beyond the SDP, social markets and the networks propagating them remained in circulation in the 1980s. A notable highpoint is 1985, when the IEA’s journal Economic Affairs published a number of articles engaging with ordoliberalism. In the first issue of the year, Josef Molsberger, an ordoliberal economist, provides an extended overview of ordoliberalism and the social market economy before finishing with a warning of the risks the left poses to the security of the social market economy, pointing to the years when Karl Schiller was the minister for economics.Footnote 80 Two issues later, a pair of responses were published from former Treasury Ministers, Jock Bruce-Gardyne of the Conservative Party and Dick Taverne of the SDP.Footnote 81 The same issue also features a supplement written by the Kronberger Kreis, an influential ordoliberal think tank, dealing with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Economic Community.Footnote 82 Here, the authors are deeply critical of the CAP, presenting it as an economic and political failure that might endanger the European Community and call for radical market-based reforms.Footnote 83
The 1980s also saw the publication of a number of English-language edited volumes about ordoliberalism. In 1982, the Ludwig–Erhard–Stiftung published their volume, an ordoliberal reader that situates ordoliberalism in connection to Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek.Footnote 84 In 1989, Hans Willgerodt, the long-time editor of ORDO, and Alan Peacock published a two-volume set of primary source essays from ordoliberals and contemporary analyses by ordoliberals and like-minded economists.Footnote 85 Both volumes include sustained discussion of the social market economy, with the term also appearing in their titles. They are clear about the relationship between ordoliberalism and the social market economy, although some papers question whether contemporary policies were deviating from ordoliberalism. The effort and resources involved in translating these into English reflect a clear attempt to propagate ordoliberalism among Anglophone audiences.
Indicative of still simmering discussions about social markets among some Conservative politicians, John Butcher, a Conservative MP, made a series of comments in the House of Commons praising Ludwig Erhard and Walter Eucken between 1987 and 1993, but the comments are most concentrated in 1987 and 1988.Footnote 86 In these comments, Butcher conceptually groups Eucken, Erhard, the German economic miracle and tight monetary policy. Butcher identifies the social market approach of Eucken and Erhard with the approach of the Conservative Government and declared: ‘If I have a favourite economist and a favourite Chancellor of the Exchequer, the economist would be Eucken and the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be Erhard.’Footnote 87
These are likely the only mentions of Eucken or any ordoliberal economist in the history of Parliament.Footnote 88 Butcher was a junior minister in the Department of Trade and Industry for five years but also a ‘Maastricht Rebel’, abstaining against the Government during votes on implementing the Maastricht Treaty. One of the mentions of Eucken is specifically in the context of these Maastricht debates and invoked as a reason to oppose the Maastricht Treaty. Butcher identifies that Eucken and Erhard’s thought was the basis for West Germany’s economic success and economic miracle and claims that European integration was contrary to their principles and imperilled future success.
Labour and Stakeholder Capitalism in the 1990s (c.1994–7)
Transitioning into the 1990s, the concept of the social market was again politically orphaned, with the Owenite SDP no longer in existence, and the Conservative Party continuing the trajectory of Thatcherism and post-Thatcherite neoliberalism. Where social markets were invoked by Conservatives, these were often returns to the concept from those involved in earlier discourse.
A new voice was David Willetts, who mentions ordoliberalism, the Freiburg School and social markets in publications in 1992 and 1994 entitled Modern Conservatism and Civic Conservatism.Footnote 89 Willetts was a rising intellectual figure in the Conservative Party, having worked as an advisor for Treasury policy in the Thatcher Government until 1987 before leading the CPS and Conservative Research Department and becoming a Conservative MP in 1992. Whether ‘civic’ or ‘modern’, Willetts draws on ordoliberal language and history to call for an alternative to communitarianism and to neoliberalism, meaning presumably Anglo-American neoliberalism and particularly the market fundamentalist rhetoric of Thatcherism in government, one that is more aligned with his account of Conservative values, identifying Germany as a positive model. Coming right after Thatcher’s leadership, these texts return to the language from its start to reassert the case for an ordoliberal-inspired market order. In a criticism that Anglo-American neoliberalism is insufficiently attentive to social and moral values, Willetts echoes his CPS predecessor Keith Joseph’s claim that ‘monetarism is not enough’. He does mention both Joseph and Owen’s invocations of the social market, and it is noteworthy that Civic Conservatism was published by the SMF.
Keith Joseph published a pamphlet with the CPS arguing that the social market and ordoliberalism still had lessons to offer for John Major and the UK.Footnote 90 In this, he mentions Eucken and Müller-Armack. However, he presents a social market economy as synonymous with a market economy and indicates that the ‘social market economy’ is primarily useful discursively to engage with critics of markets. Nonetheless, there are elements he stresses as lessons to be learned. These involve the need for government activities to maintain the market order, the virtues of decentralised ownership and decision-making and the interrelation of competition and co-operation within capitalism.
In the 1990s, however, the real developments in party political discourse related to social markets and ordoliberalism occurred in a party that had largely been missed in earlier waves, the Labour Party. The Labour Party had been engaging with ideas that overlap with what we have seen in social market discourse since the 1970s but using the different terminology of ‘economic modernisation’.Footnote 91 This discursively called for incorporating markets into economic thinking but also an understanding of socio-economic democracy as involving decentralising power and empowering communities. We have seen elements of this discourse in the section on the SDP as it had substantial overlaps with liberal revisionism. In policy terms, the proposals of these economic modernisers, including employee share ownership schemes, workers councils and wider ownership, mirrored the proposals and rhetorics of the neoliberals they opposed, causing tension for the modernisers.Footnote 92 The modernisation discourse had exhibited a resistance to social markets in earlier decades due to long-standing scepticism of the private sector and marketisation in favour of a commitment to socialism. In the 1990s, however, this changed with changing thinking about the politics of ownership and the concept of the stakeholder economy.
The politics of ownership moved modernisation discourse towards accommodation with, rather than resistance to, private enterprise. The most significant development of this turn was the changing of Clause IV of the Labour Party Rule Book in 1995, removing an explicit commitment to common ownership of the means of production. This reflected two parallel currents in Labour Party thinking, a shift in socialist theory which legitimated market socialism as a valid form of socialism, and the ‘new politics of ownership’ which argued that, with private forms of ownership unavoidable, socialist economics should credibly identify preferred forms of private ownership and control.Footnote 93 By conceding the existence and even value of markets and private ownership, these thinkers sought to advocate for distinctively socialist values and principles to shape these modes of private ownership. In concert, these represented attempts within the Labour Party to develop a new form of socialism or otherwise discover an alternative form of capitalism to neoliberalism.
Conceptually, these discourses united in the concept of stakeholder capitalism and invocation of the social market economy.Footnote 94 Stakeholder capitalism refers here to a form of corporate ownership and control driven not solely by shareholders and shareholder value but rather by mechanisms to involve all stakeholders in the firm, including, where relevant, labour, management and consumers. This is intended to transform society by recognising all citizens as valued stakeholders, as well as to transform the governance of firms by giving all stakeholders a voice in decision-making. Mechanisms to achieve these aims included proposals for employee share ownership and industrial democracy, giving workers more voice and control. It is interesting to see references within the stakeholder capitalism literature recognising their similarities to ideas from neoliberals and the New Right, but here the authors claim that their arguments appropriate and subvert the neoliberal ideas.Footnote 95 Andrew Gamble’s active role in these discussions is especially remarkable in light of his writing on the Conservative ‘social market doctrine’ in the 1970s.
The highest profile proponent of the stakeholder economy for Labour was the journalist Will Hutton. Hutton blamed the shortcomings of the New Right on them having followed an American model for the economy, an amoral system that disembeds the state and markets from society. The solution he suggested was reforms to the constitution of the state, facilitating economic and political decentralisation and inclusion and developing a moral economy, proposals that echo ordoliberalism. For his proposals, Hutton directly pointed to Germany and the social market economy as a model. Hutton’s understanding of the key characteristics of social markets diverges from that of the ordoliberals by emphasising co-determination, but he positively cites Müller-Armack on the need for the need to produce and regulate a market order.Footnote 96
In a different article, Hutton emphasises the Catholic character of social markets and criticises contemporary invocations of the term by Conservatives. For them, the social market represents competition, privatisation and deregulation, continuity with Thatcherism. This, he claims, ‘is not what Ludwig Erhard did in the 1950s. Nor has it anything to do with the social market as espoused by the German, Dutch and to a lesser extent Italian Christian Democrats’.Footnote 97 Hutton’s analysis of what ordoliberals like Erhard believed is certainly contestable, but it is clear that ordoliberalism presented a model he sought to emulate.
At a similar time, David Goodhart, a journalist for the Financial Times, wrote a pamphlet on social markets for the progressive think tank, the Institute for Public Policy Research.Footnote 98 Goodhart identifies the social market economy with ordoliberalism, mentioning Erhard and Müller-Armack, and praises ordoliberals as having a more realistic view of markets than Hayekians. Goodhart claimed that the actually existing social market, which he largely praised, had diverged from ordoliberal thought but also indicated that in recent years, especially with the tensions introduced by reunification, the reformed social market was less stable than it had been. Keith Joseph, Goodhart suggests, was more influenced by ordoliberal theory than the practice of social markets.Footnote 99 Nonetheless, Goodhart claims that social markets and ordoliberalism represent a compelling alternative to Anglo-American neoliberalism and a model for social democrats. In reference to the stakeholder economy, Goodhart praises German supervisory boards, works councils and co-determination for enabling a focus on long-term interests rather than share-price maximisation.
Another author writing about ordoliberalism and social markets in association with the Labour Party in this period was the political theorist Maurice Glasman, writing primarily in the New Left Review. Glasman’s argument is convoluted, drawing heavily on Karl Polanyi and the Solidarność movement in Poland.Footnote 100 In brief, he identifies the social market economy as the driver of the success of the post-war German economy. However, while he recognises that the concept of the social market economy is associated with ordoliberal thought, he rejects the characterisation of social markets as ordoliberal, presenting it instead as based on social democracy and Catholic social thought. Social markets, understood by Glasman as relating to communitarian self-administering civil society, are thus an alternative to neoliberal marketisation and its domination through forces like the European Community.Footnote 101 In advocating for social markets, Glasman argues against ordoliberalism and European integration.
What drew these thinkers to the concept of the social market at this moment, especially as they draw on some alternative conceptions of what a social market economy means? Looking at the references cited in the publications provides some insight. One shared reference is Michel Albert, especially his work Capitalism against Capitalism, which is cited by both Goodhart and Hutton. Albert’s concept of Rhenish capitalism offers a similar argument to the stakeholder economy and the ordoliberal narrative of the social market economy. Furthering this connection, Albert published an article discussing his concept of Rhenish capitalism in Political Quarterly, engaging with work on stakeholder economics and discussing the social market economy.Footnote 102
In addition, Glasman, Hutton and Goodhart all positively reference the work of Wolfgang Streeck, especially his work Social Institutions and Economic Performance, as a source for understanding the German economy. This is most notable in the Goodhart and Glasman analyses, as both focus attention on the Handwerk process, a distinctive element in Streeck’s work. In his book, compiled of essays from the 1980s, Streeck does not actually discuss ordoliberalism or social markets but does emphasise the social and cultural conditions for industrial relations and the distinctiveness of these in Germany.Footnote 103 Here the German system and its socio-economic institutions are praised as an alternative to neoliberalism. It seems that Streeck’s emphasis on the institutional and cultural precursors for the German economic system encouraged Labour thinkers to learn more about these social institutions and thus the social market economy. While this exploration was intended to find an alternative variety of capitalism to neoliberalism, it instead settled on an alternative variety of neoliberalism to the Anglo-American elements of Thatcherism.
The stakeholder economy briefly caught on in the Labour Party and gained support from the new leader, Tony Blair. Blair criticised Conservative and Liberal Democrat invocations of social markets for treating the ‘social’ and the ‘market’ as distinct entities. Instead, he claims ‘the true meaning is surely that the market’s importance is recognised but is itself subject to the needs of society’.Footnote 104 This conception of directed markets is not distinctly ordoliberal, but Blair is both identifying himself with a ‘truer’ understanding of social markets and recognising the interrelation of society and markets in ordoliberal thinking.
The commitment of the leadership to the stakeholder economy was, however, treated with scepticism within the party. While the concept could be aligned to a radical transformative project, the party leadership’s interpretation was much more restrained, unwilling to meaningfully challenge the control of shareholders.Footnote 105 By the first general election for New Labour, in 1997, the terminology of the stakeholder economy had been dropped by the leadership.Footnote 106 Nonetheless, references to stakeholding remained in New Labour’s policy rhetoric when discussing alternatives to state ownership, pensions and decentralising power.Footnote 107
Where the stakeholder economy made a lasting impact was in social policy, particularly in discussion of social inclusion and citizenship. Ruth Levitas identified how Hutton’s discussion of the stakeholder economy, which stressed the mutual rights and obligations of firms, capitalists and workers, was adapted by New Labour into a focus on the stakeholder society, which had an emphasis on how work embedded workers into a broader society.Footnote 108 Linked to discourses condemning the emergence of dependency and an economic underclass, the discourse about stakeholding became a justification for workfare initiatives condemning the unemployed, blamed for not participating in the economy and hence not having a stake in society. The link between a job being a precondition for inclusion in society and the moral condemnation of not taking part in this marketisation has clear parallels to the ordoliberal Vitalpolitik. Unlike most of the other examples in this article, these policy discussions do not seem to have involved mention of ordoliberalism or social markets. However, contemporary analysts both identified the continuities with the stakeholder economy but also commented that these policies were distinct from the communitarian or Christian socialist logics articulated by New Labour figures but that they instead featured similarities to Christian democratic systems and ordoliberalism.Footnote 109
Discussion
In an article in Marxism Today in 1991, Charlie Leadbetter, an important economic advisor to Blair and New Labour, described the social market as ‘like an old pop song which is constantly being re-released by modern performers anxious to do cover versions of it’.Footnote 110 This characterisation is borne out in this article. Across three waves of social markets, we see three different parties in successive decades ‘discover’ the language of social markets and claim it for themselves. Although actors in each successive wave claim that their invocations are wholly distinct conceptions from those that had come before in British politics, and the latter two waves position their conceptions against neoliberalism and Thatcherism, their conceptions are actually remarkably similar and ultimately accept neoliberal precepts and policy reforms.
Markets and competition are understood through competition policy and a focus on the distribution of power and resources in society. In particular, modes of economic and industrial democracy through wider share ownership, works councils and employee share ownership plans contribute to the decentralist liberalism required to underpin market relations. This liberalism is accompanied by concern about the harm that lack of asset ownership poses, presenting a wider ownership agenda as a moral and social policy alongside producing efficient market relations. These characteristics reflect the ordoliberal variety of neoliberalism. This concretely establishes a historical phenomenon that has heretofore been rejected within the history of neoliberalism in the United Kingdom, namely the sustained existence of ordoliberalism within British politics and political discourse.
This identification establishes two contributions to the history of ordoliberalism in Europe. The first concerns the relationship of social markets and ordoliberalism. Although scholars of social markets as a political programme have questioned the relationship between social markets in practice and ordoliberal theory, this article demonstrates that in all three British cases, use of the concept of social markets went alongside direct engagement with ordoliberalism and ordoliberal theory. Although these moments can be quite fleeting when read in isolation, brought together they present a sustained engagement with an ordoliberal variety of neoliberalism over more than thirty years.
The second contribution to the history of ordoliberalism is the absence of European integration as a factor in the dissemination of ordoliberal ideas. The European Community does not appear as a vector of ordoliberal ideas nor are policies enforced or encouraged by the Community drivers of adoption of ordoliberalism. In fact, in the rare cases where the European Community is mentioned alongside ordoliberalism, in parliamentary debates about the Maastricht Treaty or in IEA publications by the Kronberger Kreis, ordoliberalism and social markets are directly invoked as reasons to resist European integration.
Within British political history, the article has primarily limited itself to demonstrating the existence of a historical phenomenon. To better understand the significance of this phenomenon, either for each wave individually or as a collective whole, future scholarship can look further at the origins of these ideas and their impacts.
On the origins, this article demonstrates the reception and invocation of ordoliberal ideas and policy. All three cases reflect parties in opposition and looking for alternative economic models, responding to the perceived failure of the post-war welfare state. Further scholarship is needed to better identify the vectors bringing ordoliberal ideas to these actors. There are occasional engagements of think tanks and party networks with ordoliberal economists and texts, but for many of the references to social markets in this article it remains unclear how British actors initially became aware of social markets and which resources were used to inform their understanding. Understanding the vectors for ideas could also clarify links with active networks in Germany and the global neoliberal thought collective looking to actively spread ordoliberal ideas. However, the example of Wolfgang Streeck identifies that social markets and ordoliberalism may have occasionally been disseminated inadvertently.
The other area for future scholarship is in the impact of the engagement with ordoliberalism on parties and policy. This article does identify some influence on party policy discourses, but this is limited by a conservative selection strategy, looking for explicit mentions of social markets or ordoliberalism, and a bird’s eye view with long periodisation and multiple cases. More specific engagements with policy histories will likely identify more subtle impacts. Crucially, we should note that the three cases represent a key moment for each party family, directly before each adopts neoliberal thinking and policy more thoroughly.Footnote 111 These are key moments of neoliberalisation.
Establishing the existence of social markets in political discourse also establishes a justification to study their absence. In this light, it is notable that in two of the cases where the key party in a wave shifted from Opposition to Government, this shift coincides with the dropping of the direct language of social markets. Government archives could be examined to explore discussion of ordoliberalism and ordoliberal ideas within government and Whitehall. Closer examination of the decline of ordoliberal ideas, or rather the decline in their explicit articulation, could better identify whether this is due to political considerations, practical challenges to implementation, interaction with international institutions and/or the rise of more attractive alternatives.
Acknowledgements
This article was written as a contribution to the special issue ‘Varieties of Neoliberalism’ and initially developed as a paper at the associated workshop in Munich in summer 2025. I am very grateful to all the participants at the workshop, my paper’s discussant, Máté Rigó, and especially the organisers of the special issue, Grace Ballor and Mattia Ravano, for their support shaping the ideas into a serviceable argument.
