The notion of the cross-fertilization between domestic jurisdictions is not a new one. Slaughter has articulated the concept of judges ‘increasingly coming to recognise each other as participants in a common judicial enterprise’,Footnote 1 whether by meeting more frequently in a variety of settings or by citing each others’ decisions. In the context of the European Union, the literature to date has been focused on the dialogue, on the one hand, between European courts and national courts and, on the other, amongst the individual judges in European courts. While there have been studies published on a third category of dialogue, that which occurs between national courts, little research has been done to date with a specific focus on the substantive field of refugee law.
The publication of The Limits of Transnational Law: Refugee Law, Policy Harmonization and Judicial Dialogue in the European Union is therefore a welcome development, having as its aim the exploration of prospects for ‘a transnational legal order in the context of refugee law in Europe’. Edited by Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Hélène Lambert, the book is composed, for the most part, of a series of surveys of domestic case law in different EU member states as evidence of the use of foreign law by national judges in asylum decisions. In the introduction, Lambert explains that refugee law is a particularly interesting case study, as it has evolved mostly through judicial interpretation and it lacks an international mechanism capable of providing a common interpretation of the Refugee Convention. A transnational legal approach would be particularly useful within the European Union in the interpretation of key EU legislation of the Common European Asylum System; however, this volume reveals that European national judges rarely engage in transnational dialogue in the context of refugee law.
The book is divided into 11 parts: an introduction, a conclusion, and nine chapters, each of which surveys domestic refugee status cases in a different EU member state for evidence of transnational legal dialogue. The nine countries selected (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and Sweden) were chosen on the basis of two criteria – the divergence in legal culture within the European Union (notably, the civil/common-law divide), and the existence of a substantial body of refugee status cases and the accessibility of such case law. The chapters are logically structured and follow a similar pattern, beginning with an outline of the asylum decision-making process in the respective country. Each chapter then considers a common set of empirical questions: when, where, and to what extent do domestic courts use jurisprudence from other EU countries in the area of refugee law? Finally, the chapters deal with the question of why transnational dialogue does or does not occur – providing both rational (language, time constraints, training, and access) and cultural explanations (the style of judgments, the conceptual legal framework within which the judge operates, and the domestic dynamic surrounding refugee cases).
The book provides an interesting overview of the general ‘remarkable lack’ of transnational dialogue within the European Union. In Germany, for example, foreign case law was referred to only in very few cases and, of those foreign citations, most were decisions of the Swiss Asylrekurskommission (Swiss Asylum Appeal Commission). Similarly, the Italian judicial authorities made no references to foreign decisions when examining the merits of constitutional asylum law, the Refugee Convention, or EU subsidiary protection. Courts that did refer to decisions from other jurisdictions did not limit themselves to cases from other EU member states. Citations by national judges in the United Kingdom, for example, were overwhelmingly from commonwealth countries. Some national judges also relied on United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports, the writings of academics (notably, Goodwin-Gill and Hathaway), fact-finding reports, and governmental statements from EU member states.
Where transnational citation occurred, it was employed for three main purposes: first, in order to interpret the refugee definition in the Refugee Convention, particularly with a view to determining substantive questions such as the concept of ‘membership of a particular social group’, a ‘well-founded fear’, ‘political opinion’, and the exclusion clauses (Article 1F) as conditions for the recognition of refugee status. Second, foreign judgments were referred to where, under a similar factual circumstance, refugee status had been granted by a foreign court. Finally, foreign judgments were used to establish or verify facts of a case in which, as is common in civil-law systems, courts are required to investigate the facts of a case in their own capacity.
While an examination of each chapter is beyond the scope of this review, two chapters in particular, those on Ireland and Denmark, serve to demonstrate the disparate use of transnational dialogue by different domestic jurisdictions. As expounded by Mullally, Ireland, unlike most jurisdictions examined in the volume, has a well-established practice of citing case law of foreign jurisdictions. As such, transnational legal dialogue ‘has had a significant impact on the evolution of refugee law in Ireland’ (p. 150). Decisions in Denmark, on the other hand, have generally been made without any reference to foreign judgments. According to Vedsted-Hansen, this was partly because of Denmark's particular position vis-à-vis the Common European Asylum System whereby, under Title IV of the Treaty of the European Community (TEC), no provision, measure, or decision shall form part of community law as applicable to Denmark (p. 179). Nonetheless, he submits that there may be legal or policy reasons why Denmark can be expected to align its domestic law in certain circumstances, such as for the purposes of conforming to the development of the Schengen acquis under Title IV TEC (p. 180).
As noted above, the lack of reference to foreign jurisprudence was explained by a ‘rational account’ and a ‘cultural account’. The rational account revealed that considerable obstacles were created by a lack of resources, time constraints, and difficulties in accessing foreign case law, as well as the absence of knowledge of foreign legal systems. To encourage transnational dialogue, Carlier and Vanheule put forward the controversial possibility that domestic decisions would be delivered in one of the country's national languages and in a common ‘European language’. This suggestion, however, was immediately followed by the acknowledgement of the significant political difficulties that this would entail. Despite the fact that the European Union has, at present, 23 official working languages, the general theme of the volume as a whole was that language issues are not insurmountable. It is therefore submitted that such a common ‘European language’ would by no means substantially ameliorate the lack of transnational dialogue between national judges.
As for the cultural account, the common/civil-law divide featured strongly throughout the volume as a bar to transnational dialogue. The short style of civil-law judgments combined with concise reasoning and a lack of references to doctrine or to other case law meant that there was little scope for citation of foreign judgments. Other issues identified as obstacles to transnational referencing were the domestic dynamics surrounding refugee cases, the limited role of the UNHCR and other actors in the decision-making process, and the lack of courses in refugee law at university level.
An interesting methodological approach used in this book merits attention. A number of authors utilized interview and survey techniques in order to ascertain the attitude of stakeholders generally to the use of foreign refugee judgments in domestic law. The lack of response to these surveys was striking and revealed the general lack of interest with which this area of law is viewed. In the survey undertaken in Denmark, for example, only one lawyer out of more than 100 responded. That is not to say that the use of surveys/interviews was not without merit, however, as their real value lay in the honesty and openness of the respondents and the varied results received according to jurisdiction. It is significant that the German survey found that the use of transnational law was initiated by the parties to the case just as often as by the judges, while, in the Italian survey, none of the practitioners questioned had ever come across a case that cited foreign law. One practitioner explained that she constantly had difficulties convincing deciding authorities that case law of the European Court of Human Rights was not a ‘Shakespeare poem’, but applicable law in the Italian courts. Consequently, she would never even consider using examples from a foreign domestic jurisdiction, which is not surprising given what she perceived to be the attitude of the Italian judiciary.
Reference was made in some chapters to the concept of ‘invisible traffic’ between judges – that is, that judges are influenced by foreign decisions via contacts and networking, while not openly referencing them in their decisions. In the chapters on the French, Italian, British, Danish, and Swedish jurisdictions, reference was made to the existence of anecdotal evidence suggesting that such dialogue was influential. Tidemann, on the other hand, drawing on his experience as an administrative judge in Germany, found it highly unlikely that invisible traffic does occur, as it appeared ‘utterly inconceivable’ that judges would adopt foreign jurisprudence without citing it in their decisions, given the usefulness of foreign law in supporting the court's own argumentation. Whether or not ‘invisible traffic’ exists therefore appears to be a question of subjective opinion, rather than a conclusion that can be drawn from objective evidence. Consequently, the presence of differing opinions within the volume leads to the logical conclusion that the book makes no coherent statement on whether or not ‘invisible traffic’ exists as an influencing factor on transnational legal dialogue.
In the concluding chapter, Goodwin-Gill examines the principles of treaty interpretation to determine a rational basis for using foreign decisions in the refugee-law context. He also looks at the unclear role of the UNHCR in the interpretation of the law, considering that the latter has a supervisory role concerning the convention's application, although it is neither a party to the convention nor a treaty-monitoring body. He puts forward a number of interesting possibilities by which the UNHCR may secure its standing before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and member states, such as by acting as amicus curiae in proceedings. However, he warns that the UNHCR must distinguish between positions that deal with interpretation (which a court is competent to decide on) and those that go further than the convention and are better dealt with by states in their executive and legislative capacities.
This book fulfils its aim of comprehensively demonstrating the use of transnational legal dialogue in the context of refugee law within domestic European jurisdictions and the reasons why such referencing does or does not occur. The volume seems to accept as its starting point that a transnational approach is a welcome development, however, and it would have been interesting had the volume engaged, in the context of asylum law within the European Union, with arguments that have been made against the use of such dialogue. This might include, for example, the idea of selective or haphazard use of foreign legal materials or the argument that foreign decisions could turn into a standard of deference for domestic judiciaries.Footnote 2 In addressing these concerns, the book could have made a stronger impact in advocating for the use of transnational legal dialogue in domestic asylum decisions within the European Union.
The conclusion of this volume is that a ‘search for the one, true meaning . . . is not necessarily one with an end in sight’ (p. 241). This is not surprising, as the overall result of this research is that transnational legal dialogue is rarely utilized in asylum decisions within domestic EU jurisdictions. For those who advocate a transnational legal approach, some hope can nonetheless be gleaned from the fact that the need for transnational dialogue may rise to assist in the interpretation of key concepts of the EU Qualification Directive in the move towards a truly ‘common’ European asylum system. In the meantime, this book will contribute significantly towards raising awareness of the concept of transnational legal dialogue, which, to quote Slaughter once again, ‘creates an incentive for both lender and borrower be’.Footnote 3
