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Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the ‘New Europe’
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 October 2005
Abstract
This article examines the dynamics and implications of practices of socialization enacted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe. With particular emphasis on the Czech Republic and Romania, I argue that NATO relied extensively on mechanisms of teaching and persuasion to project a particular set of liberal-democratic norms of security into the former Eastern bloc. Several interrelated conditions affected NATO's ability to teach new norms to Central and East European actors: the parties' mutual recognition of their respective roles as “teachers” and “students”; the socializees' identification with the Western security community that NATO claimed to embody; and systematic interactions between teachers and students. In teaching new liberal-democratic norms, NATO exercised significant power: the power to shape its socializees' interpretations of the world and ideas about proper ways of acting in that world. The shared ideational framework established via teaching also empowered subsequent persuasive appeals launched in the name of liberal-democratic norms. NATO conducted a socialization process that targeted—and often affected—not simply the behavior of Central and East European socializees, but also their definitions of national identity and interests.For extremely helpful comments on previous incarnations of this article, I am grateful to the editors of International Organization, two anonymous reviewers, Jeffrey Checkel, Michael Zürn, Alastair Iain Johnston, Michael C. Williams, and all the participants in the IDNET workshops.
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- © 2005 The IO Foundation and Cambridge University Press
In recent years, the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the former communist countries of Europe has been the focus of numerous analyses in the field of international relations. This article seeks to contribute to those analyses by arguing that, following the end of the Cold War, NATO became systematically engaged in the projection of a particular set of Western-based norms into Central and Eastern Europe. Conventional wisdom about international security portrays NATO as a military alliance, irrelevant to processes of constructing or reproducing domestic norms and institutions. Contrary to that view, I show that NATO played an important role in the reconstitution of postcommunist polities. The alliance relied especially on mechanisms of teaching and persuasion in an effort to socialize Central and East European actors into a particular, liberal-democratic vision of correct norms of governance.
NATO was especially heavily involved in the eastern projection of liberal-democratic norms in the field of security. These include accountability and transparency in the formulation of defense policies and budgets, the division of powers within the state in the area of security, government oversight of the military through civilian defense ministries, and accountability for the armed forces. In addition, NATO has sought to project into Central and East European countries Western-defined liberal norms and rules of international behavior, in particular involving peaceful settlement of disputes, multilateralism, and democracy and human rights promotion in the international arena.
This article examines the dynamics and implications of socialization conducted by NATO between 1994 and 2000, in interactions with actors from the Czech Republic and Romania.1
1994 marked the beginning of more systematic interactions between NATO and former communist states, particularly through the establishment of the Partnership for Peace. The end point of 2000 was chosen to cover the 1999 enlargement and the Kosovo conflict.
The analysis proceeds as follows. In the next section, I briefly place my argument within a broader theoretical framework. In the second section, I provide an explanation of relevant mechanisms of socialization and anticipated scope conditions. I then turn, in the third section, to the empirical story—NATO's socialization of Czech and Romanian actors. Here I examine examples of teaching and persuasion that occurred in different contexts and targeted diverse sets of socializees. The fourth section analyzes the effects of socialization; and the fifth section revisits the question of scope conditions in light of the preceding empirical analysis.
Theoretical Framework
In recent years, several analysts have argued that NATO is more than just a military alliance. For instance, neoliberal institutionalists—most famously, Keohane and Wallander—have argued that there is a difference between alliances (defined as exclusive coalitions that respond to threats) and security management institutions (which are designed to address a variety of risks).2
See Wallander and Keohane 1999; and Wallander 2000.
Wallander 2000, 720–21.
In analyzing NATO as a self-defined institutional expression of the Western liberal-democratic community, it is useful to start from Risse's account of the collective identity on which the alliance is founded.4
See Risse-Kappen 1995 and 1996.
Risse-Kappen 1996, 396.
More recently, a series of analysts have tried to establish, empirically, whether NATO spreads liberal-democratic norms in Central and Eastern Europe. Particularly influential has been Reiter's critique: according to him, to the extent that democratization occurs in certain ex-communist countries, this is the result of domestic, rather than international, factors.6
In response, critics such as Waterman and Zagorcheva, among others, have argued that, through the Partnership for Peace, the Membership Action Plan, and various other programs, NATO has “co-opted” Central and East European actors into activities that are likely to affect the ways in which the latter think and behave. In other words, NATO has been involved in “socializing” Central and Eastern Europeans into the “Western ways.”7 The introduction of the concept of socialization is a significant step forward in explaining the relationship between NATO and Central and Eastern Europeans, but analyses such as those provided by Waterman and Zagorcheva need to be taken even further, to include an examination of the specific mechanisms used to socialize Central and Eastern Europeans into the Western ways of thinking and acting. That is precisely what this article seeks to achieve.Following Checkel's definition, socialization is understood here as a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community.8
See Checkel, this volume; and Lauer and Handel 1977. Also relevant are Berger and Luckmann 1967; and, within the field of international relations, especially Wendt 1999.
Checkel, this volume.
For analyses of different logics operating in international politics, see, for example, Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998; March and Olsen 1998; and Ruggie 1998. Also relevant are March and Olsen 1989; and Powell and DiMaggio 1991.
It is interesting to examine NATO's involvement in Central and Eastern Europe within the framework of rationalist/constructivist debates about socialization.11
For useful analyses, see Checkel and Moravcsik 2001; Checkel 2001 and 2003; and Schimmelfennig 2003.
I would like to thank the IO editors for bringing to my attention the importance of discussing the role of the United States within NATO in the context of interactions between the alliance and Central and Eastern Europeans.
Farrell 2002, 70–71.
I argue in this article that the logic of socialization of Central and Eastern Europeans into the norms prescribed by NATO departed in important ways from the rationalist logic of socialization.14
My argument here is similar to Adler's critique of neoliberal institutionalist analyses of the role of Western institutions in the former communist bloc. With particular reference to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Adler has demonstrated that international institutions have played an important role in former communist countries, not necessarily by increasing interstate coordination and reducing transaction costs, but by engaging in community-building socialization practices that have had the effect of changing intersubjective knowledge through which identities and interests are defined. See, in particular, Adler 1998.
The rationalist argument that NATO was able to use the issue of membership as an efficient carrot and stick fails to take into account the constraints within which the alliance was operating in pursuing enlargement. For example, vis-à-vis the Czech Republic, NATO's ability to use membership as an effective carrot was undermined by the fact that, by the time the accession talks began, the carrot had already been promised. Already in 1997 there was a widespread belief both among allied decision makers and in Prague's political circles that, if they wished, the Czechs would be included in the first wave of enlargement.16
Author's interviews with senior NATO officials from the Political Affairs division, 12 October 1999 and 28 April 2000, Brussels; and with Czech foreign affairs officials, 10 April 2000, Prague. See also the Czech News Agency (CTK) press release on “NATO Membership,” 10 October 1997. For a broader empirical analysis of NATO's post–Cold War enlargement, see, for example, Asmus 2002.
Under these circumstances, to understand the influence exercised by NATO in the ex-communist bloc, one needs to move beyond a narrow focus on material resources. Key here is a move away from an individualist perspective to an intersubjective understanding of power as competence. According to the competence model, status and the power to act are not inherently attributed to the resources possessed by a given entity, but depend on their recognition in a given set of international interactions.17
On the competence model of power, see Guzzini 2000; Williams 1997; and Williams and Neumann 2000. Also relevant are Adler 1997; Adler and Barnett 1998; and Barnett and Finnemore 1999. For a recent analysis of the role of power in social relations of constitution, see also Barnett and Duvall 2005.
Of course, the post–Cold War world has been marked by substantial asymmetries in resources between East and West. It is also true that at least the centrist, proliberal political elites from the Czech Republic and Romania were, from the early 1990s, keen to see their countries integrated into the Euro-Atlantic structures, including NATO. But what was key to this relationship was not simply the material power yielded by the allies—either collectively, or by the United States within the framework of the alliance. Rather, key here was the Czechs' and Romanians' identification with the Western community, and, hence, their trust in NATO—as the main security institution of that community. This identification made the Czechs and Romanians regard the allied material capabilities as friendly, rather than a source of threat. Or, the material strength of NATO allies (particularly the United States) is not always seen as benign; indeed, many actors in the world assign a different interpretation to the Western community and to the United States as a perceived leader of that community, and, on this basis, regard the strength of this community as a source of threat. To appreciate the multitude of possible meanings that states can attach to the material capabilities of NATO allies, one need only consider the meaning that, say, some Middle Eastern countries would attach to NATO offers of guidance in the reform process, the presence of allied troops on their territory, or requests to participate in the wars waged by the alliance. By contrast, Romanian reformers continued to pursue their country's integration into NATO, to act as a de facto allied state (particularly in the Kosovo crisis), and to carry out the liberal-democratic reforms prescribed by the allies, even when it became clear that it was more likely for Romanian troops to die fighting NATO's wars abroad than it was for NATO troops to die defending Bucharest against an invasion by an enemy state (for example, Russia). After all, in Kosovo and Bosnia, and later in Afghanistan and Iraq, Romanian troops participated alongside the allies in wars that had nothing to do with the territorial defense of their country.
Mechanisms of Socialization
In interactions with Czech and Romanian actors, NATO relied heavily on teaching and persuasion. Recent constructivist analyses have shown that persuasion is more successful when the parties involved act within the framework of a Habermasian “common lifeworld,” consisting of collective interpretations of the world and a common system of rules perceived as legitimate.18
Risse 2000, 10–11.
See Risse 2000, 15; and Adler and Barnett 1998.
See Bourdieu and Passeron 1977, 31–39; and Douglas 1975 and 1986. For analyses of international institutions as teachers of norms, see Adler and Barnett 1998, particularly 39–41; and Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 699–732. For an earlier account of international socialization via institutions, see Finnemore 1996.
Here, it is useful to draw on analyses provided by sociologists, anthropologists, and social psychologists who have argued that the establishment of shared intersubjective interpretations of the world, and definitions of proper modes of behavior vis-à-vis particular subjects/objects in the world, is the result of socialization processes involving the dissemination of a particular set of conceptual categories and behavioral dispositions (in Bourdieu's terminology, a habitus), which shape the ways in which people think about—and act in—the world.21
See Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; and Bourdieu 1990 and 1991.
Again, it is useful to place this discussion within the framework of rationalist/constructivist debates about socialization. Rationalists have argued that, in disseminating new norms into the former communist bloc, NATO sought to minimize its involvement in the socialization of Central and East European states.22
Schimmelfennig 2000, 125–27.
Ibid., 129.
By contrast, the type of sociological teaching outlined above—involving the dissemination of new conceptual categories and new dispositions—would involve a deeper engagement by NATO in Central and Eastern Europe. How can one establish whether NATO has actually conducted this kind of teaching? If one were to find that, rather than simply informing Czech and Romanian decision makers about the conditions attached to NATO membership, NATO actually engaged in systematic efforts to teach diverse sections of Czech and Romanian societies, even actors with no decision-making power, and to teach them a whole “lifeworld,” (a set of new meanings and dispositions for making sense of (and acting in) the world), then it would be reasonable to argue that this process of socialization conformed to the constructivist logic of teaching.
From a constructivist perspective, one would expect to find consistency in the activities carried out by various NATO representatives in diverse settings. Consistency refers to efforts to spread the same sets of norms in systematic interactions, to different sets of students, and even in situations that are not expected to generate specific changes in policies in targeted states. If, however, one were to find that different NATO representatives spread different norms, or that they changed their normative prescriptions depending on the context of interactions with Central and Eastern Europeans (for example, public versus private settings), then one could argue that NATO made rhetorical reference to norms to enhance its public image, but was not involved in the kind of deep sociological teaching outlined above. The constructivist position would be strengthened if one were to find that Czech and Romanian socializees relied on NATO for guidance in the process of identifying the goals of democratic reform in areas that involved significant ceding of sovereign power.
In addition to teaching, NATO also relied heavily on persuasion in the socialization of Central and Eastern Europeans. Persuasion typically occurs in social interactions between actors who have drawn different conclusions regarding the nature, merits, and/or implications of X action or policy, and in which one or more of those parties attempt, through arguments, to get their interlocutors to rethink their conclusions.25
I relied particularly on Cialdini 1993; Terry and Hogg 2000; and Zimbardo and Leippe 1991. See also, for political scientists' accounts, Checkel 2001; Gibson 1998; Johnston 2001; Mutz et al. 1996; Payne 2001; and Risse 2000.
As in the case of teaching, there are interesting differences between constructivist and rationalist accounts of persuasion. From a rationalist perspective, persuasion is closely related to the provision of instrumental incentives. For instance, rationalists suggest that the persuader is more likely to be successful when it can provide significant carrots or sticks to the persuadees.26
See Schimmelfennig, this volume; and Schimmelfennig 2003.
From a constructivist perspective, interactions governed by the logic of persuasion involve different dynamics. Actors that engage in persuasion do not mobilize coercion vis-à-vis their interlocutors. Similarly, they do not rely on the promise of direct instrumental benefits as a way of getting subjects to enact prescribed reforms. Rather, actors engaged in persuasion try to present a given course of action as “the right thing to do,” even in the absence of direct international rewards for taking that action.27
See Risse 2000; Checkel 2001; and Checkel and Moravcsik 2001. Also relevant is Jupille, Caporaso, and Checkel 2003.
Successful socialization would lead the socializees to internalize the new ideas about the nature and purpose of their polity. This internalization would, I suggest, be revealed by a series of indicators: the socializees would be consistent in their (re)definition of identity/interest in accordance with the new ideas, and they would uphold the new definitions vis-à-vis different audiences and in different circumstances (rather than invoke different definitions to different audiences, in an attempt to enhance their international gains and minimize domestic costs). In the case of political elites with decision-making power in the process of postcommunist reconstruction, it is also reasonable to expect that they would try to protect and promote the definitions they now take for granted, for instance by seeking to embed them in the institutions, legislation, and practices of their polity.
Anticipated Scope Conditions
Drawing on work developed by social psychologists and sociologists, I suggest that several interrelated conditions facilitated efforts by NATO to teach new sets of meanings to Central and Eastern Europeans. To begin with, a pedagogic agent is more likely to be successful when the parties involved recognize their respective roles as “teacher” and “students.” Two subconditions are relevant in my case. Regarding the socializer, this involves NATO's definition of Central and Eastern Europeans as changeable and responsible—and thus teachable subjects.28
I owe this point to Michael C. Williams.
On identity in social communications, see Checkel 2001; and Checkel and Moravcsik 2001.
Another condition affecting international teaching involves systematic interactions with targeted subjects. As anthropologists and sociologists of culture have argued, to succeed in constructing the “common sense” of targeted subjects, educational practices must be carried out consistently, over a relatively long period of time.30
Bourdieu and Passeron 1977, 31–39.
On the contact hypothesis, see also Beyers, this volume; and Lewis, this volume.
In my view, persuasion can be facilitated by successful educational practices. The logic behind this is that, if the socializees were to adopt the worldview taught by the pedagogic institution, further social communication would occur within a shared normative framework. In this article's case, the emergence of such a shared normative framework would enable NATO to formulate arguments within a set of—Western-defined—interpretations of the world that its Czech and Romanian interlocutors also accept as correct.32
Risse 2000, 10–11, 14–16.
A series of social psychologists have conducted extensive studies demonstrating that arguments put forward by actors recognized as members of the reference group (versus “other-group” messages) are far more likely to be persuasive. See, for example, Terry and Hogg 2000; see also Checkel's contribution to the debate with Moravcsik in Checkel and Moravcsik 2001.
However, one should not assume that prior teaching guarantees the success of particular attempts at persuasion. For instance, Czech and Romanian socializees might adopt the norms taught by NATO regarding transparency, accountability, and civil society empowerment in the area of defense and security. Yet they might also challenge NATO's specific prescriptions, arguing for a different interpretation regarding the correct application of the new norms in a particular case. I suggest that persuasion is especially likely to fail when persuadees perceive an inconsistency in the logic of their persuader's arguments (for example, in cases of apparent tension between the liberal-democratic norms to which NATO is explicitly committed, and particular courses of action prescribed by the alliance). More broadly, persuasion is likely to fail in cases of breakdown of trust: in our case, when either NATO per se, or particular representatives of the alliance, are not—or are no longer—regarded as trustworthy participants in debates about domestic reform. A breakdown of trust can occur, for instance, if a given NATO representative (or team of representatives) appears insufficiently knowledgeable about the issue at stake, appears to pursue a hidden agenda, and/or departs from the norms of arguing (for example, if they dictate a course of action, rather than seek to convince their interlocutors of the merits of the prescribed solution).34
On arguing as opposed to dictating, see Joergensen, Kock, and Roerbech 1998. On the importance of expertise, see Terry and Hogg 2000.
Data Sources and Methods
Given time and space constraints, this article relies on a limited set of cases of socialization carried out by NATO. To try and compensate for that limitation, I have selected my examples in such a way as to include variation on the parties involved, both within the socializer category (for example, different NATO representatives) and among the socializees, ranging from decision makers involved in individual accession dialogues, to “next-generation elites” involved in Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs. Regarding the category of socializees, because it was impossible to interview more than a handful of people out of the thousands being trained in the various NATO/PfP educational programs, I sought to compensate for this weakness in the data by also obtaining evidence from actors who had numerous opportunities to work with Czech and Romanian socializees, both before and after their socialization by NATO (for example, officials affiliated with the Czech and Romanian ministries of defense—both locals and Western advisers, as well as members of the armed forces who command PfP graduates). To minimize the problem of methodological biases, I adopted a strategy of triangulation, involving: in-depth, semi-structured interviews with NATO representatives and Czech and Romanian socializees; participant-observation in three different NATO/PfP educational activities (courses and workshops); and discourse analysis of relevant public and semi-confidential documents.35
See Checkel 2001; and Lewis, this volume.
NATO and International Socialization: An Empirical Analysis
Following the collapse of communism, the old norms that had governed Central and East European states lost their legitimacy, communist definitions of state identity and interests were rejected, and the people from the former Eastern bloc began the process of reconstituting their polities and rearticulating their relationships with the outside world. From the point of view of many Central and Eastern Europeans, including many Czechs and Romanians, the West ceased to be seen as the enemy and became the generalized other by reference to which the new identity of their countries was to be defined. Thus the changes that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s made possible a new kind of engagement with Western institutions, including NATO. Subsequently, through complex socialization practices, NATO came to play an important role in the reconstitution of former communist countries such as the Czech Republic and Romania.
Teaching
Given their political prominence in the Czech Republic and even Romania during the greater part of the period covered in this study, proliberal elites tended to represent both countries in interactions with NATO.37
Between 1993–98, the Czech Republic was governed by center-right political forces, grouped in coalitions that included the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Christian Democratic Union, and the Freedom Union. The 1998 elections led to the formation of the Opposition Agreement between the Social Democrats and the Civic Democrats. In Romania, between 1990–96, the most powerful political actors were of nationalist and socialist orientation. The ruling party between 1992–96 was the Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PDSR), which was seen by NATO as too communist to be socializable into Western ideas. Hence, vis-à-vis that party, NATO engaged in little teaching or persuasion. Gheciu 2005. But that situation changed following the 1996 elections, which brought to power a pro-West coalition centered around the Democratic Convention.
This was acknowledged by several Czech and Romanian foreign affairs and defense officials, as well as NGO representatives in interviews with the author, March–April 2000, Bucharest and Prague.
Prime Minister Ciorbea, in an interview given shortly after President Bill Clinton's visit to Bucharest. The interview was reproduced, in part, in the Washington Post, 12 July 1997, A1.
Author's interview, 6 April 2000, Bucharest. This view was echoed by two members of the Romanian Delegation to NATO, 28 April 2000, Brussels.
In a similar vein, in the Czech Republic shortly after the Velvet Revolution, Manfred Wörner, then Secretary General of NATO, reportedly asked President Vaclav Havel what was the most urgent problem of the postrevolutionary period. Havel allegedly replied: “I don't know how we are going to run this country. We have two options: we can rely on communists who do have some useful experience but are not politically reliable; or we can put former dissidents in key positions; these are reliable, but lack the knowledge necessary to run the country. If we opt for the second solution, we are going to need a lot of advice from Western experts.”41
Author's interview with a senior NATO official, international staff, 12 October 1999. Brussels.
Havel, quoted by Hybner 2001, 50–52. This was confirmed by a senior member of the Czech Delegation to NATO, 11 April 2000.
Payne, quoted by Simon 2004, 56.
It is true that in the early 1990s Prague initiated a series of reforms in the area of defense. However, in important ways those reforms were inconsistent with the norms of liberal democracy, as defined by NATO.44
Author's interviews with NATO officials, including senior officials from the Political Affairs division, October–November 1999, Brussels.
See also Sava 2002; Simon 2000; and Donnelly 1997a and 1997b.
From NATO's point of view, the prevailing Central and East European visions of a democratic polity were flawed, as they were based on a fundamental misconception of the proper relationship between the state and civil society, a misunderstanding of the proper roles of different branches of the state in the area of defense, and a lack of awareness of the domestic and international duties associated with the liberal-democratic identity.46
Author's interviews with NATO officials, including senior officials from the Political Affairs division and the Office of the Secretary General, October–November 1999, Brussels.
Author's interviews with a senior NATO official, international staff, 28 April 2000, Brussels.
In response to that situation, NATO took on the role of educator. On several occasions, senior NATO officials pointed to the education of Central and Eastern Europeans as a key process in the transformation of the former Eastern bloc, and the preparation of partner countries for greater integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. A key priority vis-à-vis relations with these countries was the transformation of the ideational framework within which the political elites and the armed forces, as well as the general publics, thought about the world, and—more specifically—about national and international security issues. The prevailing view within NATO was that only such an ideational change could ensure the evolution of former communist countries into stable, “like-minded” democracies. As Chris Donnelly, then Special Adviser to NATO's Secretary General, put it, what was particularly important to NATO was: “changing the way in which the armed forces [and their civilian leaders] think.”48
Chris Donnelly, quoted by Dragsdahl 1998, available at 〈http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP28.htm〉. Accessed 21 June 2005.
See “NATO Membership: Will There Be a Language Barrier?” Radio Praha, 11 March 1999. Available at 〈http://archiv.radio.cz/nato/english5.html〉. Accessed 21 June 2005.
Author's interview with a senior NATO official, Brussels, 24 April 2000.
Evidence obtained through interviews confirmed the information contained in public records regarding the view that ideational change in Central and Eastern Europe was key to the process of reform in those countries. According to three NATO officials, the shared understanding within the alliance was that they would have to lead the latter “by the hand” in the process of building liberal-democratic polities. The idea was that NATO would have to teach people from the former Eastern bloc the proper relationships between state and society, particularly in the area of defense, to help change their communist mentalities and get them to understand that “it was not acceptable for civilian leaders to make decisions in isolation from, and without the knowledge of, their society.”51
Author's interview with a member of the Defense Planning and Operations Division, confirmed by senior EAPC officials, 6 February 2000, Brussels.
NATO's acceptance of this position of teacher was also reflected in the organization's actions—particularly the effort to organize hundreds of workshops and seminars, as well as formal and informal consultations targeting Central and Eastern Europeans. NATO teams that conducted collective briefings and individual accession dialogues, NATO experts who led workshops in Brussels, Prague, and Bucharest, and—since March 1999—Western advisers based at the Romanian Ministry of Defense, have all stressed the importance of educating proreform political elites to think about democracy within Western-defined categories. In other words, the condition of mutual recognition of the actors' roles as teachers and students was largely met in interactions between NATO and pro-reform Czech and Romanian elites.
In the discourse articulated by NATO officials during collective briefings and accession dialogues, the alliance was depicted as an essentially Western institution, which had always worked to defend the values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and liberal individual rights. The West and its institutional expressions were portrayed in a relation of opposition to the authoritarian (“repressive,” “rigidly hierarchical,” and “fear-based”) communist system created by the Soviet Union. In other words, through the use of particular predicates (verbs and adjectives attached to nouns, such as “freedom-loving” versus “repressive”; and “based on consensus and the norms of consultation” versus “fear-based” and “rigidly hierarchical”), the NATO discourse defined a coherent subject, the West, defined by superior attributes of freedom, stability, and progress.52
On predicate analysis, see Milliken 1999, 231–33.
This idea of diversity within a fundamental Western unity was expressed by all the NATO officials that I interviewed in Brussels and Prague.
In the course of interactions with NATO representatives, Czech actors were told that, while they had enacted important reforms, they had failed to learn a key principle of liberal democracy: it was unacceptable to isolate society from debates and decision-making processes in the field of security.54
According to my interviewees, including NATO representatives and Czech officials involved in the accession dialogue, this issue was stressed by NATO both prior to, and after, the July 1997 NATO Summit.
Author interviews with senior Romanian officials from the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, 30 March–5 April 2000, Bucharest; and with senior NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) advisers, 24 April 2000, Brussels.
MAP also provides for the establishment of a clearinghouse for coordinating security assistance, and enhanced defense planning that establishes and reviews agreed-upon planned targets.
Even as they were told by NATO advisers that many reforms were still needed, Czech actors received assurances of their significant progress. By contrast, the Romanians were told that they were in a more precarious position. Given their particularly difficult communist legacy, the danger was that, unless Romanian reformers learned true democracy and moved quickly to reconstruct their country accordingly, the chance to transcend the past could be endangered. As a NATO official put it, “Romania is at an important crossroads. After seven years of stagnation, it finally has the chance to do what [others] did a long time ago: fully embrace change. But if Romanians waste this chance, they might not recover for a very long time.”57
Author's interview with a NATO official from the Political Affairs division, 28 April 2000. Brussels.
British Advisers' Report (formulated at the request of the Romanian Government): A Strategic Analysis of the Evolution of Romanian Politics of Security, Romanian Ministry of National Defense, Bucharest, 1998, 15–17.
In addition to teaching elites, NATO was systematically engaged in socializing younger Czechs and Romanians, in civilian as well as military circles. The assumption underlying these activities was that the education of a new generation of liberal elites was necessary if the norms of liberal democracy were to be (re)produced in the future.59
This was confirmed by NATO officials from SHAPE and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, as well as PfP teachers who led courses targeting young Central and East European civilians and military officers. Author's interviews, November 1999–April 2000, Brussels, Mons, and Vienna.
Sava 2002, 49–56.
Mission Statement quoted in ibid., 52. See also Kennedy 1998.
Developed as a branch of the Marshall Center, the College of International and Security Studies targets both senior military and civilian defense officials and younger people, and explicitly seeks to produce graduates expected to use their knowledge and expertise, as gained through the College's courses on democratic defense, to manage security issues in their countries in accordance with liberal-democratic norms and procedures.62
Ibid.
See the PfP Consortium Web site at 〈http://www.pfpconsortium.org〉. Accessed 21 June 2005.
For a more detailed analysis, see chaps. 4 and 5 in Gheciu 2005.
For its part, NATO's Parliamentary Assembly (PA) has conducted more than a hundred seminars and workshops, with the aim of diffusing knowledge about the normal functions of parliamentary defense and security committees, and, more generally, principles of democratic control of the military. For instance, the Rose-Roth program of cooperation with the parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe was initiated in 1990 with the explicit aim of strengthening the development of parliamentary democracy in the former communist countries. The Rose-Roth Initiative consists of a series of seminars designed to: “promote the development of appropriate civil-military relations, including the democratic control of the armed forces”; to “familiarize legislators with key security and defense issues”; to “share expertise and experience in parliamentary practice”; and “to help the development of a parliamentary staff structure in CEE parliaments” and thus provide Central and East European parliamentarians with administrative assistance comparable to their western counterparts.65
See the Rose-Roth Mission Statement. Available at 〈http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp〉. Accessed 21 June 2005.
The dynamics of the educational activities carried out by NATO came closer to the constructivist—rather than the rationalist—logic. Those activities were explicitly aimed at teaching students to regard Western-defined norms as the correct foundation of a progressive society; they did not simply provide information about the conditions attached to NATO membership. Equally importantly, the NATO/PfP educational activities targeted diverse groups, rather than being directed only at Central and East European actors with decision-making power. Within the framework of the NATO/PfP educational programs, Central and East European participants occupied the role of students being exposed to a new culture—to new ways of understanding the world and thinking about building postcommunist polities. As indicated in the mission statements of these programs, as well as in the statements issued by some of their organizers, the interactions between NATO representatives and Czech and Romanian socializees were aimed at disseminating new ideas and presenting them as the correct way of making sense of the world, identifying problems, and finding solutions to those problems. The seminars and workshops organized within the PfP Consortium, at the Marshall Center, at the NATO Defense College, or by the NATO Assembly, were not about promising instrumental rewards to Central and East European socializees in exchange for their compliance with NATO-prescribed rules and norms. In fact, it is difficult to see how a system of incentives might have operated within the framework of those programs. For instance, it is unclear why—or how—the allies might have offered to reward those Central and East European socializees for learning new norms, when many of them did not have decision-making power (hence, were in no position, at that time, to introduce changes in the actions and policies of their countries).
Persuasion
In addition to, and often against the background of, systematic teachings, NATO representatives engaged in specific instances of persuasion. Among the techniques of persuasion (or types of persuasive appeals) used by NATO actors, especially important were consistency, authority, and social proof. Consistency involves linking prescribed reforms to norms that are accepted by socializees as unproblematic.67
See, for example, Cialdini 1993; and Searing 1995.
While teaching and persuasion were sometimes used in tandem, in other cases these two mechanisms of socialization were mobilized separately. For instance, vis-à-vis younger students involved in PfP-related courses or in educational programs at Western institutions, the focus appears to have been especially on teaching them new ways of conceptualizing the world and new dispositions for acting in that world.68
Author's interviews with teachers/graduates of the Marshall Center, the Geneva Center for Security Policy, and NATO's Defense College; as well as with three SHAPE officers involved in PfP courses, November 1999–February 2000, Geneva, Brussels and Vienna.
In the period leading up to, but also following, the Madrid Summit, NATO advisers who participated in accession dialogues and informal consultations in Prague sought to persuade Czech decision makers to pursue key legislative reforms in the areas of national emergency and conscription—which were still governed by communist laws.69
Author's interviews with two senior NATO officials, international staff (Political Affairs division), 29 November 1999, Brussels.
Author's interviews with a senior NATO official, international staff, 28 April 2000, Brussels; and with a member of the Czech Senate Committee for Defense, 19 April 2000, Prague.
As in the Czech case, NATO also sought to persuade Romanian policymakers to pursue specific reforms to change state-society relations in the area of defense. There, too, persuasion occurred against the background of teaching: having taught Romanians the “correct” norms of liberal democracy, NATO representatives tried to convince them to accept a particular interpretation of the application of those norms. In the case of Romania—regarded as a “laggard” compared to the Central Europeans—attempts at persuasion were even more frequent, and sought to affect more issues than in the Czech Republic. NATO's evolution into a more comprehensive agent of socialization was facilitated by two institutional innovations: the Membership Action Plan, and the appointment of permanent Western advisers to Romanian, and other East European, defense ministries. These innovations enhanced NATO's ability to closely monitor—and guide—the reform process in candidate states.
In 1997–98 consultations with Romanian members of parliament and defense and foreign affairs officials, NATO recommended the formulation of new legislation on the state of emergency, as well as legislation governing defense planning.71
Author's interviews with Romanian defense officials and security-related NGO member, March 30–April 5, 2000, Bucharest; and with an adviser from NATO's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 24 April 2000, Brussels.
Author's interview with an adviser from NATO's Political Affairs division, 24 April 2000, Brussels.
Western advisers working within the framework of the MAP also sought to promote several institutional reforms, particularly targeting the restructuring of the Defense Ministry, the institutionalization of channels of communication with society, and the reform of the Interior Ministry. For instance, NATO officials argued that a militarized Ministry of Interior was a serious obstacle to the Romanian reform process, especially because that ministry had been a key instrument of repression under communism.73
Author's interviews with Romanian delegates to NATO, 17 February 2000, Brussels.
Beyond Elite-Level Socialization: Educating the Public
In some instances, NATO sought to educate Central and East European publics into accepting a particular definition of national identity and of reasonable political goals. A case in point was the public relations campaign designed to enhance Czech support for membership in NATO. In the Czech Republic, as late as 1997, the level of public support for membership was low (under 50 percent).74
Sarvas 1999, 18.
Ibid.
These divisions were founded on different conceptions of Czech national identity. For the liberal coalition, NATO membership was tied to the idea of “return” to the Euro-Atlantic world. From that perspective, common historical roots and shared values made integration into Western institutions seem normal.76
Ibid., 7–8.
Ibid.
For a useful analysis, see Sarvas 1999, 32.
Given that Czech leaders attributed that public opinion climate to long-term communist propaganda, NATO advised an informational campaign to educate the public in understanding the appropriate relationship between their country and the Atlantic organization.79
Author's interviews with Czech foreign affairs and Ministry of Defense officials, 11 April 2000, Prague.
Author's interview with an official from NATO's Press Office, 29 November 1999, Brussels; and with a media officer from the Czech Ministry of Defense, 20 April 2000, Prague.
Some Czechs did not regard NATO as a legitimate teacher of norms, and some of them—particularly nationalist and socialist groups—associated the organization with Western imperialism, and with an American conspiracy to master the world.81
See Culik 1999; and Sarvas 1999, 30–33.
Dasa Obereigner, “Czech Republic: Focus on EU, NATO,” Central Europe Online, March 1998. Available at 〈http://archive.tol.cz/transitions/archmar1.html〉. Accessed 21 June 2005.
Ibid. See also Pecina 1999; and Zajicova 2000.
The discourse put forward by the pro-NATO campaign invoked a natural affinity with the Western world, depicted as a “messianic” figure which “will help us achieve political stability.”84
The Czech Republic's return to that messianic entity was justified by reference to history and basic shared values. President Havel's statements remain particularly powerful expressions of this view of Czech identity as inextricably linked to the West, and an integral part of Europe. In his words, “NATO entry meant the acceptance of principles of human rights, parliamentary democracy, and free market economy.”85 In response to the widespread public reluctance to take on the obligations entailed by the Washington Treaty, President Havel sought to present those obligations as duties associated with the identity of the Czech Republic as a member of the Western civilization. In his words, in a situation in which NATO is “an alliance which protects a certain civilization circle with its cultural tradition and responsibility,”86Havel, quoted by Hybner 2001, 52.
Havel, quoted by Jolyon Naegele, “NATO: Havel Backs Continued RFE/RL Broadcasts from Prague,” 26 February 1999. Available at 〈http://www.rferl.org/features/1999/02/F.RU.990226134718.html〉. Accessed 21 June 2005.
Effects of NATO's Socialization Practices
NATO's teaching and persuasion had a significant impact on Czech and Romanian actors. In several instances, following interactions with NATO representatives, Czech and Romanian socializees redefined their views regarding the correct norms for governing their polities and the basic purpose of key domestic institutions, repositioned the national self in the international arena, and reconceptualized the kinds of domestic and international goals and practices seen as consistent with the liberal-democratic identity. How does one know that this was not simply the result of actions by domestic forces, or by other international actors? As I have shown, in the early 1990s there was a tension between definitions of liberal democracy held by Czech and Romanian reformers, and definitions that prevailed within NATO. In the area of security, it was in the aftermath of the socialization carried out by NATO—broadly recognized by both parties as a process of learning—that Czech and Romanian actors adopted the Western-defined vision of liberal democracy. As far as international actors are concerned, in the period covered by this study, NATO was by far the institution most deeply involved in defense-related Czech and Romanian reforms.88
See also Sava 2002.
Following interactions with NATO representatives, there was a significant shift in the Czech reformers' views of liberal democracy, in particular involving a redefinition of correct norms and institutions in the field of security. The new view was reflected both in the public discourse articulated by proliberal reformers in Prague, and in more private comments, with the new norms now being presented as natural, common-sense aspects of a liberal-democratic polity. The new discourse on defense was articulated vis-à-vis different audiences and in diverse forums. These ranged from official declarations on the reform of the armed forces (in which the NATO-prescribed model of democratic control of the military and the integration of the armed forces into society was portrayed as the only reasonable way of governing this area of society), to statements issued in the course of workshops and seminars aimed at teaching schoolchildren, university students, and the public at large the new norms of defense.89
For details on the principles of reform of the armed forces, see the Czech Defense Ministry's Web site at 〈http://www/army.cz/reforma/english/docs/reforma.htm〉. Accessed 21 June 2005. The workshops, seminars, and briefing tours on defense issues in the context of Czech integration into NATO are often organized by the Public Relations Dept. of the Czech Ministry of Defense in cooperation with the Public Information Office of SHAPE, or by Czech NGOs working in cooperation with various branches of NATO or the Atlantic Treaty Association. For more information on these activities, see Hybner 2001, 35–40, and the Czech Ministry of Defense Web site at 〈http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=823〉. Accessed 21 June 2005.
Author's interviews with foreign affairs officials, 12 and 19 April 2000; with officials from the Ministry of Defense, 20 April 2000; and with a former assistant to top foreign affairs officials, 18 April 2000, Prague.
The new view regarding desirable state-society relations also informed a series of legislative changes, most of which were enacted in 1998 (especially a new Constitutional Act on National Security), and throughout 1999 (a package of defense-related laws to complement the Constitutional Act). In other words, rather than engaging in purely rhetorical action, Czech reformers took a series of steps aimed at embedding the new norms of security into the institutional and legislative fabric of their society—and continued that process even after the carrot of NATO membership had been promised and subsequently granted. The actions taken by the Czech policymakers are important because they indicate an effort to promote the society-wide internalization of new norms. Thus, new laws and institutions have the effect of (re)drawing the boundaries of normal arrangements and practices in a society.91
On this, see Cortell and Davis 2000.
Hoskova 1999, 8.
Another important area of change concerns the role of societal actors in the formulation of defense policies. At the end of 1997, the Defense Ministry approved the Conception of Relations and Communication of the Defense Department with the Public, which led to the creation of a public relations department in the ministry, and institutionalized consultations with Czech NGOs. Finally, in 1999 the ministries of defense and foreign affairs embraced the Western-suggested goal of institutionalizing a defense community, consisting of societal actors who would cooperate with governmental agencies in formulating and monitoring defense-related reforms.93
According to Jaroslav Janda, the Deputy Director of the Czech Institute of International Relations, the goal of the security community was: “to contribute to the development of the civic and social consciousness of the responsibility for safety, defense and protection of both the citizen and the state, and to spread the knowledge on how to improve the defense system of the Czech Republic.” Quoted by Hybner 2001, 42.
The legislative and institutional reforms aimed at implementing liberal-democratic norms in the field of security—some of them seeking to redress the specific problems identified by NATO—continued after the Czech Republic had acceded to the alliance. For example, at its session on 29 August 2001, the Czech government approved documents on the preparation of the reform of the armed forces, and stated that the key governing principle of the armed forces will continue to be civilian management and democratic control. Thus, “the integration of the Armed Forces into the democratic society will go on and become more profound.”94
See “Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic: Objectives and Principles.” Available at 〈http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/reforma.htm〉. Accessed 15 January 2004.
In some instances, pro-reform Czech decision makers requested NATO's aid in overcoming domestic obstacles encountered in the process of reform. The relationships involved in such situations can be usefully conceptualized as transnational networks, in which Central and East European political actors and Western officials acted on the basis of shared understandings regarding “correct” norms.95
On transnational coalitions, see Evangelista 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998; and Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999.
In the Czech case, an interesting instance of transnational networking occurred, as I have shown, during the 1997–98 educational campaign organized by NATO representatives and Czech reformers. Following that, the level of public support for membership in NATO rose to between 55 and 65 percent in March 1998.96
Author's interview with an official from the Office of the Media, Ministry of Defense, 20 April 2000, Prague. While some polls indicated 65 percent support for NATO membership, others reported a lower level of support—around 55 percent. On this, see also Sarvas 1999b, 18.
NATO's socialization practices had similarly important effects in Romania. Following consultations, collective briefings, workshops, and individual accession dialogues, Romanian reformers redefined their vision of a liberal-democratic society, and reconceptualized their goals regarding the kinds of domestic institutions that should be established. The change was not confined to their discourse, but came to be inscribed in key documents adopted by the Romanian government, including the 1999 National Security Strategy and the White Book of the Government on Romania and NATO. Contrary to their initial position, in 1999 Romanian policymakers argued that it was essential to enact reforms that would give a stronger voice to civil society, because this was a normal dimension of building liberal democracy. According to them, “in a modern democracy, defense should be the business of the entire society.”97
Romanian Government 1999, 129.
Romanian reformers also took a series of steps aimed at embedding the new vision in the legal and institutional fabric of their society. Through governmental decrees issued in 1999, new laws on the organization and functioning of the Ministry of Defense, as well as on the state of emergency, came into effect. They both served to bring about changes advised by NATO. For instance, in January 1999 a special executive ordinance defined limited mandates for different government branches in a national state of emergency, established Western-style procedures for the declaration, continuation, and end of the state of emergency, and limited the right of the authorities to suspend individual freedoms even in that special context.98
Romanian Government, “Ordonanta de Urgenta 1/21.01.1999 privind regimul starii de asediu si regimul de urgenta (Emergency Ordinance Regarding the Regimes Governing the State of Siege and the State of Emergency),” printed in Monitorul Official al Romaniei, 22, 1999, 1–10.
Romanian Government, “Ordonanta 41/11.08.1999 privind organizarea si functionarea Ministerului Apararii Nationale (Ordinance Regarding the Organization and Functioning of the Ministry of National Defense),” printed in Monitorul Oficial al Romaniei, 388, Art. 2.
In addition to these legislative measures, Romanian policymakers carried out a series of institutional reforms, including further restructuring of the Defense Ministry (for example, via the creation of the function of Ombudsman and the establishment of a Western-based system of personnel management, aimed at limiting the practice of political appointments and nepotism and establishing selection, training, and promotion criteria for career management in accordance with NATO practices and standards). At the same time, a series of steps were finally taken in the direction of reforming the Ministry of Interior, and turning it into a more transparent institution. The 1999 Romanian Annual National Plan in the area of defense provided for the restructuring of the police and the gendarmerie, and the retraining of its members, in an attempt to make these institutions compatible with their Western counterparts.100
Planul National Anual (Annual National Plan), 48–49.
Like their Czech counterparts, Romanian reformers sometimes acted within transnational networks, seeking NATO's aid in overcoming domestic opposition to Western-prescribed courses of action. An interesting case of this involves the Romanian participation in the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999. The Romanian government accepted NATO's definition of the Kosovo crisis as a conflict between the progressive, modern values of liberal democracy and the barbarity embodied in the Milošević regime. According to NATO's representation of the situation, only a country that was not truly committed to the norms of liberal democracy could fail to support the Western military intervention. In a similar vein, against overwhelming domestic opposition and in spite of significant economic costs that Romania could ill afford at that time, the Romanian government defined its country's participation in the allied operation as the only course of action that was consistent with its emerging liberal-democratic identity.101
On the costs associated with that participation, see Gousseff 2000.
Author's interviews with senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 April 2000, Bucharest.
In justifying their unqualified support for NATO intervention in parliament, Romanian decision makers framed their response precisely in the terms of value-based confrontation depicted in the Western discourse.103
Gousseff 2000, 12.
Speech by liberal deputy minister for foreign affairs, 22 April 1999, Bucharest; printed in Adevarul, 23 April 1999.
Author's interviews with senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 April 2000, Bucharest.
As it was becoming increasingly clear that the Romanian government and pro-West societal actors were encountering significant domestic opposition, allied officials stepped in to help them. NATO allies resorted to a strategy of shaming the critics of war, by presenting opposition to the Kosovo campaign as an indication of support of “barbarity.” For instance, Prime Minister Tony Blair pointed out in his address to the Romanian Parliament on 4 May 1999 that the only appropriate course of action for an emerging democracy was to take a firm stand against the actions of the Milošević regime. In his words, “This is a test for countries like Romania, on the front-line…. this is a time for democracies, old and new, to stand up and be counted.”106
Romania Libera, 5 May 1999, 7.
Ibid.
A critic might argue that NATO's pedagogic practices reflect no more than a case of instrumental learning on the basis of pregiven identity: Czech and Romanian pro-reform elites had decided they wanted to build liberalism, so it was a sensible thing for them to learn how to be “good liberals” from the institutions of the Western world.108
See Zürn and Checkel, this volume.
Second, the rationalist vision of instrumental learning overlooks the extent of NATO's involvement in reshaping the orientation of Czech and Romanian societies. Thus, in the course of pedagogic activities targeting publics and future elites, NATO promoted a particular vision of national identity and portrayed the accession to NATO as a normal—indeed, necessary—course of action given that identity. In essence, in cooperation with Czech and Romanian reformers, NATO was involved in efforts to cultivate a particular type of rationality in those countries, so that certain conceptions of national identity and certain definitions of interest would come to be widely recognized as correct. In PfP courses and educational campaigns targeting the public, NATO sought to delegitimize nationalist and communist worldviews—which involved different definitions of the distinctiveness of the Czech Republic and Romania, and presented the integration into NATO as a threat to sovereignty—as an irrational course of action.
Scope Conditions and Socialization
The education of Czechs and Romanians by NATO was facilitated by a particular set of social relations, in which the parties' mutual recognition of their respective roles as teachers and students was essential. There was a prevailing collective understanding within NATO that Central and East European actors could learn “correct” liberal democracy, and that, given its identity and expertise, the alliance could act as teacher in such a process of learning.109
See also Williams 2001.
By contrast, in the Czech case, it was much more difficult for NATO to teach new ideas and norms to communist or nationalist groups. From the perspective of those actors, what was needed was not the complete (re)construction of Czech society on a Western model. Rather, the process was one of reasserting unique elements of Czech national character. Nationalists and communists repeatedly argued that integration into Euro-Atlantic structures threatened to bring the Czech Republic under the exploitative influence of the West. From that perspective, the West appeared as a potential threat to the Czech identity, rather than an authoritative guide in the process of postcommunist reconstruction of the Czech polity. Similarly, in the Romanian case, several political parties and movements—particularly the socialists and the nationalists—did not see Westernization as the right way of (re)constructing the identity of their country.111
See the political platforms of the PUNR and the Greater Romania Party, available at 〈http://www.romare.ro/partid/doctrina〉. Accessed 21 June 2005.
A related scope condition involved NATO's ability to secure recognition in the eyes of its socializees as an institutional expression of the West. As President Havel insisted, NATO represented “a key democratic structure” of the West.112
Cited in Ulrich 2000, 79. This view was confirmed by senior Czech liberal politicians.
In the Romanian case, as I have shown, a similar acceptance by liberal decision makers that NATO was an institutional expression of the Western world led them to recognize the organization as a legitimate educator. This led these Romanian decision makers to invite NATO to play complex roles in the identification of national defense goals and reform priorities (for example, NATO advisers became directly involved in writing the 1999 Annual National Plan, and the White Book of the Government on Romania and NATO).113
Author's interviews with members of the Romanian Mission to NATO, and with an official from the Romanian Ministry of Defense, February–April 2000, Brussels and Bucharest.
An additional condition that facilitated the education of Czech and Romanian actors was the ongoing, systematic interaction between socializers and socializees. Recent institutional innovations created numerous forums within which NATO had ample opportunity to interact with, and shape the understandings of, Central and East European actors. Western advisers who worked with Czech and Romanian officials argue that, even within the category of pro-reformers, there is a significant difference between those who were systematically educated into Western ideas, and those who only participated in a few short sessions of socialization. The former tend to subscribe to norms taught by NATO, and to define problems and identify solutions within the framework of those norms, to a greater degree than the latter.114
Confirmed by NATO advisers who participated in accession dialogues and consultations at the ministries of defense in Prague and Bucharest, and military officers who work with PfP graduates. Author's interviews, 5 April 2000, Bucharest. For the Czech Republic, relevant also were author's interviews with NATO/PfP teachers attending a PfP workshop in Vienna, 18 November 1999.
One problem with the evidence on systematic interactions is that it does not enable one to assess the importance of intensive—relative to extensive—exposure to socialization, because instances of intensive socialization also tended to be extensive in duration.
Vis-à-vis Czech and Romanian actors who had come to subscribe to the normative framework taught by NATO, it was easier for the organization to conduct successful persuasion. In those situations, NATO had the advantage of a shared normative framework within which duties could be invoked, and reasonable actions—by reference to collective understandings—could be defined. Indeed, NATO succeeded, in several cases, in convincing Czech and Romanian reformers to change their attitudes vis-à-vis a series of reforms.
Yet there were also cases in which, although socializees had adopted norms taught by NATO, they were not persuaded that the correct interpretation of norms applicable to a given situation was that prescribed by NATO. One relevant case was the difficulty encountered by a British NATO adviser in convincing Czech officials to set up an integrated emergency security system, thus ending a situation of excessive decentralization of various security services. The Czechs argued that, while a centralized system might be a good solution in established liberal democracies, it was inappropriate in the specific case of their country. Given the particular history and persisting communist mentalities in those institutions, they argued, recentralization would recreate some of the authoritarian bureaucratic tendencies of the past.116
Mentioned by several Czech foreign affairs and defense officials; author's interviews, 19–20 April 2000, Prague.
See Simon 2004, 59.
In a broader perspective, it is also important to keep in mind that even when NATO succeeded in (re)shaping the views held by Czech and Romanian actors regarding desirable institutions and correct norms of liberal-democratic governance, this did not always translate into direct change in the prevailing national discourse on security, or in the institutions and policies of their countries. In several instances, and in various ways, domestic politics complicated the international process of norm projection. Thus, NATO-socialized Czech and Romanian reformers encountered several domestic obstacles in their attempt to embed the new norms in the fabrics of their polities. At least two aspects of this problem were especially significant. Perhaps the most visible problem involved the marginalization of proreform actors socialized by NATO. This problem occurred at the level of political elites, particularly in the Romanian case, where many of the reformers associated with the proliberal coalition that governed the country in 1996–2000 were marginalized following the return to power of the socialists, led by President Iliescu. The same problem affected many young Romanian—but also Czech—civilian experts and military officers who graduated from Western defense academies and PfP courses, but who, upon their return home, were marginalized by older, more conservative superiors who perceived the younger, Westernized experts as a threat.
In addition, attempts at (re)shaping Czech and Romanian polities in accordance with NATO-prescribed norms were also complicated by problems of implementation of the new norms. In several instances, significant tensions persisted between, on the one hand, new laws and institutional arrangements, and, on the other hand, actual practices in the area of defense-related decision making. In the case of the Czech Republic, one relevant example concerns the relationship between the Ministry of Defense, Parliament, and the defense establishment. Following NATO's guidance, Czech decision makers initiated reforms aimed at enhancing consultation and cooperation among these different bodies. In so doing, they created the institutional basis for ending the past practice of isolation and secrecy shrouding defense policies. However, as late as spring 2000, the practice of interinstitutional cooperation in this area continued to be difficult, particularly below top-level contacts, where officials have been less exposed to Western-style socialization regarding the democratic control of the military. There, cooperation was hindered by persisting communist mentalities and practices, and a culture of mistrust on the part of civilians vis-à-vis military officers and vice versa.118
See also Ulrich 2000, 87. This is similar to the problem of “cultural mismatch” identified by Checkel 1997. Keck and Sikkink 1998 reach a similar conclusion with respect to the ability of transnational networks to promote norm compliance. For a broader analysis of problems of norm implementation in the area of defense in the Czech Republic, see Simon 2004, especially Part II.
Similar problems occurred in Romania, where a culture of mutual civil-military mistrust, not unlike the Czech one, created obstacles in the reform process. In the eyes of many observers, the Romanian reform process was bound to be adversely affected by the socialists' return to power following the 2000 national elections. Yet it is interesting to note that the reforms carried out between 1996–2000, to a significant extent as a result of NATO's involvement, continued to have a positive impact on Romania even under the socialist government. The pro-West, pro-NATO discourse formulated by the 1996–2000 government, a discourse widely disseminated through the media and embedded in new strategic documents and defense-related legislation, portrayed Romania's liberalization, “return to Europe,” and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures as the only course of action consistent with the true identity of the country.
That discourse shaped subsequent domestic political debates, making it difficult even for socialist political elites to advocate a different kind of future for Romania without appearing to favor a relapse into an anti-democratic past. The pro-West, pro-NATO discourse formulated by the 1996–2000 government, now embedded in key pieces of legislation, has redefined the boundaries of acceptable practices and institutional arrangements in a modern democracy. The Iliescu administration publicly subscribed to the Western-based liberal-democratic norms and principles of reform, including in the area of defense, and adopted and actively pursued the goal of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. There was, then, an interesting shift away from the attitude characteristic of his first mandate, in which President Iliescu was adamant that Romania should strengthen ties with Russia and build a sui generis democracy, involving Euro-Atlantic integration only to the extent that it did not undermine that particular model of democratic polity.
In practice, the socialist government that came to power in 2000 was widely criticized for its corruption and for failing to take decisive action to carry out a series of reforms, and it is certainly true that corruption was a problem and the implementation of liberal-democratic norms was often quite slow.119
For a more detailed analysis, see Gheciu 2005, chap. 5.
For an interesting analysis, see Barany 2003, chap. 4.
In the presidential elections of 2004, the leader of the Democratic Party, Traian Basescu, defeated Adrian Nastase (the president of the ruling Social-Democratic Party) and subsequently managed to form a government around his Truth and Justice Alliance by appointing Prime Minister Calin Popescu-Tariceanu. The Alliance formed a government with the Humanist Party (now the Conservative Party), and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania.
The Romanians were rewarded for their reform efforts and their contribution to the wars in the Balkans and—more recently—the “war on terror” in November 2002, at the Prague Summit, at which the allies announced their intention to launch a second wave of enlargement, and included Romania on the list of countries expected to join as part of that second wave. In 2004, Romania finally achieved its goal of becoming a full member of NATO.
Conclusion
Some analysts have argued that NATO was successful in promoting liberal-democratic norms in those two countries because it prescribed things that Czech and Romanian reformist elites wanted to do anyway.122
I am grateful to Judith Kelley, Frank Schimmelfennig, and Michael Zürn for this point.
Finally, let me briefly point to an important normative issue. In my analysis, I suspended the question of whether this process—which is carried out in the name of democracy promotion—is justified. Without trying to answer this here, it is worthwhile to point to a paradox of democracy promotion involved in NATO's activities. The implementation of NATO-prescribed norms did, I believe, lead to more transparent and inclusive arrangements in the former communist countries. At the same time, however, the process whereby these reforms were carried out was, in many ways, quite elitist. NATO conducted systematic socialization of political actors and military officers from target states and simultaneously sought to educate a new generation of elites into norms of Western-style liberal democracy. In some instances, NATO also tried to shape public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe. What seemed to be involved in these activities was a version of developmental democracy. According to that model, citizens—that is, in this case people perceived as carrying the heavy burden of socialist mentalities—require extensive guidance by enlightened elites to prepare them for self-governance. However, in the cases illustrated in this article, civic education was to be conducted not just by domestic actors, but also, to a large extent, by international institutions. Interestingly, one of the agents involved in this international socialization process was NATO—conventionally regarded as just a military alliance, which, by definition, would not become involved in domestic politics.
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