Introduction
As in most European countries, Spanish commercial archaeology emerged with the adoption of global regulations on safeguarding heritage and the palliative approach based on the ‘polluter-pays’ logic, prompted by public institutions since 1990. During this institutional process, Spain witnessed an exceptional building boom between 1997 and 2008. According to data from the Spanish Statistical Office, the economic impact of the construction sector took it up to 22 per cent of GDP in 2008, increasing by ten points during this period, and becoming the highest rate of growth in the sector among European Union countries. However, in 2014 the percentage dropped to 10.5 per cent. Spanish commercial archaeology evolved in parallel because the business model relied on the provision of specialized services to the construction sector by conducting archaeological impact-assessment studies, the main activity of 95 per cent of Spanish companies. Consequently, nearly 50 per cent of the archaeological companies that were operating in 2009 had closed by 2014. The surviving companies and professionals have been compelled either to explore new business initiatives to counteract the economic downturn, or to stop their activities.
The failure of Spanish commercial archaeology in a mere five-year period is a paradigmatic case study because the same phenomenon currently affects several other countries in Europe, the US and Latin America (Aitchison Reference Aitchison2009b; Gnecco and Dias Reference Gnecco and Dias2015; Schlanger Reference Schlanger2010), and also due to the relevance and complexity of cultural-heritage management as an economic activity in a post-industrial context (Alonso González Reference Alonso González2014). A large body of scholarship discusses the global economic crisis and heritage management, opening up a debate about the future possibilities of the archaeological profession (Cleary et al. Reference Cleary, Frolík, Krekovič, Parga-Dans and Prokopiou2014; Mizoguchi Reference Mizoguchi2015; Zimmerman Reference Zimmerman2018). These studies stress the need to reflect on and discuss how archaeology can generate initiatives and pave the way for the establishment of models of sustainable heritage management (Hamilakis Reference Hamilakis2018; Smith and Campbell Reference Smith and Campbell2018).
This paper contributes to the debate by analysing the underlying factors behind the collapse of commercial archaeology in Spain between 1990 and 2017, showing its similarities and differences with other contexts, and discussing potential alternative models. The study incorporates a longitudinal perspective based on empirical evidence and examines the contemporary connections between companies and institutions. The empirical research combines a qualitative and a quantitative approach, while data collection was organized along three main lines. First, it consisted of the permanent compilation of documental information, i.e. materials, memoranda and articles from companies, professional organizations, trade unions, scientific journals, magazines, blogs and administrative reports. Second, 100 in-depth interviews were conducted between 2009 and 2017 with sector representatives such as CEOs; ex-CEOs; academic, administrative and salaried staff; students; and professional associations. Third, and given the lack of data sources and statistics on commercial archaeology, quantitative data collection was conducted, consisting of 415 surveys of companies and involving three sub-phases. The first sub-phase was creating a directory of archaeological companies, which resulted in the identification of 273 functioning companies in 2009. This includes organizations with more than one worker, excluding self-employed archaeologists. The directory was updated in 2014, registering 158 companies, and in 2017, with only 120 in operation. The second sub-phase was designing the questionnaire. A structured guideline was implemented comprising a variety of aspects related to characterization and evolution of companies, their relations with other institutions and the description of critical events related to the development of commercial archaeology, the economic crisis and its consequences for the future of the activity. The third sub-phase was implementing the survey. Three waves of telephone surveys addressed to companies were conducted, combining CATI (computer-assisted telephone interviewing) and CAWI (computer-assisted Web interviewing), in order to simplify procedures, reach every company and facilitate ease of reply. The first wave was conducted in 2009, and obtained 212 valid responses out of 273 (78 per cent response rate). The second wave was conducted in 2014, and obtained 106 valid responses out 158 (67 per cent response rate). The third wave was conducted in 2017 and obtained 97 valid responses out of 120 (81 per cent response rate). Data were obtained in the framework of three European projects: New Scenarios for a Community-Involved Archaeology (NEARCH), 2013–18, Discovering the Archaeologists of Europe (DISCO), 2012–14, and Archaeology in Contemporary Europe – Professional Practices and Public Outreach (ACE), 2008–12. The article proceeds as follows. The first section illustrates the process of institutionalizing commercial archaeology in Europe and in Spain (1990–2009). The second section presents the collapse of Spanish commercial archaeology and its reorientation (2009–17) regarding the broader European and world context. Finally, the conclusions include a brief recapitulation and reflections, as well as potential avenues for future research.
The process of institutionalizing commercial archaeology (1990–2009)
Commercial archaeology is also known as cultural-resource management (CRM), or preventive, salvage, contract or rescue archaeology. It emerged as a business activity in most European countries through a series of initiatives associated with legal reforms driven by public institutions in the context of the welfare state. Key for this framework was the 1992 European Convention on the Protection of Archaeological Heritage (also known as the Valletta Treaty), which led to integration between archaeological monitoring of urban works and urban planning. The Valletta Treaty shifted the policy emphasis from a rescue-oriented archaeology towards a more developed form of ‘preventive archaeology’. The adscription to the Valletta Convention, passed by the Council of Europe in 1992, introduced a palliative approach to heritage management denominated ‘the polluter pays’, previously established in the United States, the United Kingdom and some German states, and widespread in other sectors such as the environment (Kristiansen Reference Kristiansen2009). Since the adoption of these legal measures, any individual or institution, public or private, wishing to carry out land development had to fund the mandatory archaeological impact-assessment studies, and these had to be conducted by professional archaeologists.
After that, archaeological research shifted from a solely academic endeavour to become a technocratic and bureaucratic system of heritage protection with large excavations being carried out either by state agencies or by private firms, following standard guidelines outside the monitoring of research centres and universities (Zorzin Reference Zorzin, Gnecco and Lippert2015). Today, nearly 90 per cent of global archaeology is commercial rather than research-oriented (Bonini Baraldi, Shoup and Zan Reference Bonini Baraldi, Shoup and Zan2017). The 1990s witnessed the neo-liberalization, decentralization and outsourcing of most commercial archaeology work, previously in the hands of state agencies, whose cumbersome paradigm is represented by France and INRAP (Demoule Reference Demoule2002), but also by Hungary, where only a few public institutions, including museums and universities, can carry out archaeological work (Aitchison Reference Aitchison2009c). The exceptions to this are various English-speaking countries deviating from the state-led model, such as the UK, where a market-oriented model always prevailed to some extent.
Now, competition between private organizations in a market supplying archaeological assistance and monitoring to building and development companies (the developer-led model) dominates the international scene (Aitchison Reference Aitchison2009a). Little research has addressed the practical consequences of these policy shifts, the adaptation of archaeological firms to changing market circumstances, and the effectiveness of international agreements in promoting heritage management and conservation goals. However, and due to the critical context of the archaeological profession globally, it seems rather necessary to rethink the foundational pillars of archaeology, its means and ends, within this new context. This is a theoretical gap that sorely needs resolution, especially in Southern European countries, where heritage has become a strategic resource in construction, tourism, export products and external national branding. Specifically, Spain is a paradigmatic case study for its higher investment in culture than other Southern European countries and for its higher level of decentralization (Rubio Arostegui and Rius-Ulldemolins Reference Rubio Arostegui and Rius-Ulldemolins2018).
The adoption of the preventive-archaeology paradigm in Spain was part of the process of state modernization, democratic re-establishment and economic expansion after the end of General Franco’s 1939–75 dictatorship. This process included (1) establishing an institutional framework of heritage protection through the 1985 Law of Spanish Historic Patrimony, (2) structuring an administrative system with seventeen regions and their respective competences of heritage management, and (3) huge public investment in large infrastructure, transport (high-speed trains, wind farms, highways and roads, etc.) and urban planning (transformation of rural land into urban land, projects of town planning, house building, etc.).
In parallel, between 1997 and 2008 Spain witnessed an exceptional building boom and boasted the highest GDP growth rate among European Union countries. Since 1990, and in only two decades of existence, commercial archaeology evolved significantly in the country. The results of the first wave of surveys conducted in 2009 showed the creation of 273 companies and more than 2,500 jobs related to these organizations (excluding figures of liberal professionals and unpaid personnel or volunteers). Previous to the period between 1990 and 2009, not one archaeological company had existed. Data reveal that 95 per cent of the archaeological companies relied on the provision of services to the construction sector by conducting archaeological impact-assessment studies. One of the CEOs explains it as follows:
Our company grew alongside the construction boom, and more than 150 professionals were employed with us. Furthermore, during the construction of large infrastructure, [archaeological] interventions lasted several months … Other companies arrived soon after, especially with the proliferation of works during the so-called building bubble.
The expansion of commercial archaeology in Spain drastically changed the way of understanding archaeology and its socio-economic role, as it moved from being education- and research-oriented to become a valuable business activity based on a niche of disciplinary knowledge. From a conceptual point of view, it was necessary to define the typology and conditions of archaeological heritage at a national level (tangible, intangible, natural, etc.). Furthermore, it was necessary to categorize the activity from an applied perspective to address its management (protocols, deontological codes, stages, methodologies, tools, materials, etc.) regarding the different administrative competences between the seventeen regions. Moreover, it also required the standardization of the exercise of archaeology as a liberal profession with a set of diplomas, ethical codes, professional associations and salary agreements (Criado-Boado Reference Criado-Boado1996).
Consequently, a body of archaeological technical knowledge emerged in relation to the legal protection of heritage derived from building projects, development and land-use planning. Archaeological impact assessments had to be conducted by professional archaeologists trained with academic degrees and supervised by public institutions. Legal requirements implied an increase in university enrolment and degrees (graduate and postgraduate studies in archaeology, history, the humanities, fine arts, etc.), and also the consolidation of research groups, administrative services and archaeological museums (González Álvarez Reference González Álvarez2013a; Zapatero Reference Zapatero2005). There was a boom in archaeology degrees, which mostly trained students to become researchers rather than CEOs of archaeological companies or fieldworkers (Hernando Álvarez and Tejerizo García Reference Hernando Álvarez and Tejerizo García2011). In this context, archaeologists had to acquire practical training through summer excavations, where a ‘hands-dirty’ and ‘super-archaeologist’ mentality with traits of positivist and antiquarian archaeology developed (González Álvarez Reference González Álvarez2013b).
As a result, the concept of ‘archaeological heritage’ that eventually prevailed was highly positivist and conservative, the mission of commercial archaeology becoming the mere rescue of ‘objects’ for society. Today, those objects rest in a situation of half-abandonment in large warehouses, barely inventoried, studied or showcased in museum exhibitions or in public contexts. All of the above partly explains the lack of professionalization of commercial-archaeology companies: these developed from the ‘practical’ knowledge of archaeologists as works and a technical body of legislation developed, but lacking specific training in management, entrepreneurship or labour and legal procedures, a trait Spain shares with other countries from Turkey to Italy (Shoup, Bonini Baraldi and Zan Reference Shoup, Bonini Baraldi and Zan2014). The lack of professional bodies made things worse, due to the lack of labour legislation and of deontological and ethical codes. Indeed, the professional development of associations in the archaeological field in Spain was slow and rather atomized regionally. The Section of Archaeology of the College of Doctors and Bachelors in Philosophy and Letters, and of Sciences, within the Autonomous Community of Madrid, was founded in 1990, while the Madrid Association of Workers in Archaeology (AMTTA) emerged in 2007 (Marín Suárez and Parga Dans Reference Marín Suárez and Parga Dans2017). This reality contrasts with the creation of the College of Architects of Spain, founded in 1931 with a nationwide scope. Consequently, the initial fervour in the years of growth gave way to a self-acknowledgement of training pitfalls and of lacking knowledge when the crisis started to take root in Spain, as is shown in the following quotations:
It is a great time for archaeologists. We’re encouraged to start companies that employ surveyors, designers, computer scientists, labourers and even security guards. The activity is beginning to consolidate (CEO, 2005).
I’m not trained in management, I’m an archaeologist. But as a businessman above all my work is management. As we face economic challenges in the years ahead, it will become essential to have people around me who have that type of training (CEO, 2009).
This is a very closed and specialized collective, which traditionally hasn’t paid much attention to business matters – marketing, project management, profit analysis, quality control and so on. Many firms lost their chance to gain management knowledge when it was the right time to do so (scholar, 2010).
Curiously enough, the growing concern among archaeologists regarding their entrepreneurial training developed hand in hand with a wider acknowledgement that market logics were inverted in commercial archaeology. Bids were won not by the best companies with a greater knowledge base, know-how or expertise, but by newborn companies that could throw prices down and offer a basic and quick ‘rescue’ of objects without proper scientific monitoring. At that time, the means of production of a new archaeology company could well be pick, shovel and trowel. Consequently, consumers opted for the lowest budgets, rather than for those providing higher scientific quality and value-added or scientific knowledge. As one of the interviewees suggests:
Our company was faithful in its modus operandi; we incorporated protocols to our systems of archaeological registry and documentation. This compromise, however, was a handicap from the standpoint of pure economic profitability. Other companies were not so respectful when carrying out their interventions or lowering their budgets. The enormous workload prevented administrations from better monitoring the minimum professional standards, and in some cases real atrocities were committed in archaeological interventions. The price wars [between companies] deeply affected our company.
CEOs then needed to learn how to deal with paperwork due to increasing bureaucratization of the field, which was both a consequence of and a key step in processes of land rezoning during the real-estate market bubble.
The collapse of Spanish commercial archaeology and its strategic reorientation (2009–17)
Despite the high volume of companies and workers linked to commercial archaeology in Spain, the bureaucratization of archaeological-heritage protection derived from a particular business model. Ninety-five per cent of the companies surveyed in 2009 aimed at meeting the demand generated by the construction industry through one single service: conducting archaeological impact-assessment studies. Thus most demand was private, although the state carried out large projects, including airports, high-speed railways and ports, that employed hundreds of archaeologists for years, requiring the collaboration of various companies and even their merger. Data reveal that this homogeneity prevailed in the organizational model adopted by these companies, most of them characterized by their small size (86 per cent of the companies had ten or fewer employees) and a strong part-time employment base (51 per cent of the jobs were temporary), to respond rapidly in accordance with project approval and flexibility. Spanish archaeological companies operated under a liberal or free-market model, yet they were narrowly connected with the regional administrative supervision protocol: 73 per cent of the companies surveyed in 2009 had only worked in the region where they were located. The significant legal and administrative differences between the Spanish regions became a barrier for the exercise of the archaeological profession at a national level, while at the same time promoting cronyism and a lack of real competence between companies. Eventually, each region had a number of ‘dominant’ companies, or even a single one that subcontracted others.
Moreover, from the demand point of view, the consumers of archaeological services (mainly building companies and public administrations) only ordered archaeological impact-assessment studies because of heritage legal requirements. This is related to the inverted market logic previously mentioned, characteristic of a governmentality pattern common to Spain and other Southern European and Latin American countries that has been defined as neo-liberal corporatism (Alonso González and Macías Vázquez Reference Alonso González and Macías Vázquez2014). In this context of inverted market logics pervaded by cronyism, it is not useful to ask whether Spanish society was producing enough jobs for archaeologists, or too many archaeologists for the jobs available: market logics did not apply in an offer–demand manner, and the regionalization of Spain prevents any overall interpretation for the country as a whole.
In 2008 the economic crisis arrived, with devastating effects on the construction sector and on archaeological activity. The Spanish Statistical Office recorded a shrinking of the construction sector of more than 10 per cent of GDP between 2010 and 2014, dropping from 22 per cent in 2008 to 10.5 per cent in 2014. To confront the beginning of the crisis, the Spanish government promoted infrastructure through investment in public works projects, which helped in minimizing the immediate effects of the crisis on archaeological activity (Parga-Dans, Barreiro and Varela-Pousa Reference Parga-Dans, Barreiro and Varela-Pousa2016). However, this investment did not result in a structural solution to the problem, but rather deepened it. With the end of the immense public-fund investment of 2011, the already critical situation of commercial archaeology only worsened. The second wave of surveys conducted in the year 2014 shows the collapse of this business activity, as almost 50 per cent of the companies existing in 2009 had closed by 2014. Besides, 66 per cent of the jobs related to these organizations were lost during the 2010–14 period and 52 per cent of the remaining jobs became part-time, with salaries below the average minimum annual wage of €22,500.
The ex-CEO of an important archaeology company that closed in 2016 explains it thus:
At the onset of the crisis period, and due to the absence of public and private works projects, the situation became untenable. Most companies in the sector have closed down in this country, and numerous jobs were lost. The future of the sector is difficult to predict. Public administrations will need to remain vigilant to prevent a price war in the offer of professional archaeological services that may result in a drop in the scientific quality of the interventions.
The closedown of nearly half of the archaeological companies, and the drama associated with the redundancy of its workforce in a mere five-year period, illustrate the collapse of the business model, and opened up a debate about the future possibilities of archaeology as a commercial activity in this context. Nevertheless, the current situation of prolonged crisis and construction-activity stagnation in Spain constantly threatens the established model of commercial archaeology. Only when the crisis arrived did archaeologists start to rethink the model that had prevailed hitherto:
In the last 10 years we excavated beyond our means. It has been so excessive that it created the bubble of archaeology, until prodded by construction. A return to past activity levels is unthinkable. We should have taken into account that what was happening was not real (ex-CEO, 2012).
The response from the construction sector to their own financial problems was solid: they internationalized their business, and lobbied the banks to assume their debt and their empty or unsold real-estate properties, while putting pressure on public administrations to suppress the legal requirement to carry out archaeological and environmental impact-assessment studies to lower costs, as has already happened in the Madrid region, and is under way in countries such the US, Brazil, Uruguay, Peru and Greece (González-Ruibal, Alonso González and Criado-Boado Reference González-Ruibal, Alonso González and Criado-Boado2018). The suppression of this administrative requirement in the system for assigning construction projects paves the way for the end of commercial archaeology, threatening the current model of heritage management that has prevailed to date worldwide. Thus, while other professions could rethink their model within a corporate neo-liberal system, archaeology companies simply disappeared, with no changes in university degrees regarding training to address new challenges, and a depletion of the newly formed professional associations.
The second wave of surveys shows that some surviving companies in Spain have attempted to overcome the end of commissions from the collapsed construction sector, and adapt to the new context by diversifying their offer and developing new economic uses for archaeological knowledge. Despite the continuance of construction-related services as their main activity, 20 per cent of the companies have decided to create a new market niche based on cultural, touristic, museum and outreach services as strategic initiatives. These market-diversification initiatives mark a turning point in the search for alternative business models by commercial-archaeology companies (Martin-Rios and Parga-Dans Reference Martin-Rios and Parga-Dans2016).
To do so, 10 per cent of the companies devoted part of their resources to acquiring technology applicable to heritage management (geographic information systems and satellite technology, remote 3D, teledetection, etc.), while 15 per cent have signed collaboration agreements with other organizations and individuals to diversify the offer of heritage services (e.g. topography, refurbishment, environment), to gain access to talent recruitment and strengthen their brand image in the new market. These adaptation efforts were clear for all, but not all companies could successfully address them, as is shown in the following quotations from a surviving and from a failed company:
We were trying to restructure our entire offer of services and our role in the marketplace. It was important to look for ways to apply new technologies and business offerings (CEO, 2012).
We’ve got to change and diversify. Some companies were able to keep up their offer of excavations, but many others disappeared or had to merge (ex-CEO, 2012).
In general, however, despite the huge adaptation efforts made by most companies, diversification strategies have been rather unsuccessful in the liberal market. The third and last wave of surveys carried out in 2017 reveals the closing of 24 per cent of the archaeological companies operating in 2014, an 11 per cent reduction in workforce, and an increase of temporary employment. Indeed, 86 per cent of companies present less than 10 workers and 65.5 per cent of those are temporary. At the onset of the crisis, the small size of archaeological companies was already perceived as a threat to their survival: ‘We’re at the point where everyone has to find their place; there’s work, but things are still uncertain. I think the market is too fragmented with way too many firms; but maybe not all of them will survive’ (director of professional association, 2008). In line with these arguments, the collapse of commercial archaeology in Spain reveals that this activity did not create value in terms of productivity in a knowledge economy (Macías Vazquez and Alonso González Reference Macías Vazquez and Alonso González2016). Rather, it captured part of the value created by the construction sector through archaeological impact-assessment studies, which can be conceived as a bureaucratic mechanism liberalized in a context of economic prosperity. The need to rethink the role of archaeology within a knowledge society was already perceived amidst the economic crisis:
The product of our work is knowledge; we are knowledge-based companies. Why don’t we do just like them? The next few years must show us the need to explore new organization and work systems based on managing knowledge, optimizing and automating work, fostering creativity and productivity, etc. (CEO, 2010).
Therefore the timid reorientation of the archaeological business model does not result in a strategy able to confront the current challenges faced by the sector, nor the recovery of its lost workforce, evidencing the failure of archaeology as a business model. When this model collapsed, archaeological companies attempted to develop new business strategies, providing specialized services in the area of tourism and cultural management in order to attract funding. However, the precedent logic still prevails, as cultural management is based on the provision of specialized services to cultural institutions; that is, it is again dependent on public funds in a context of economic downturn. The new entrepreneurial strategies were once again oriented towards the capture of value (from state institutions) rather than towards the generation of value in the market in open competition.
In other words, commercial archaeology was and remains dependent on lobbying public institutions to endorse the forceful implementation of archaeological impact assessments, in both private- and public-led projects. However, the tendency in the more advanced economies is shifting towards market liberalization and a reduction of state expenditure and interventionism, especially in the cultural realm, and to loosening impact requirements. Certainly, it could be argued that the problem with commercial archaeology is not related to its inner model, but to overall economic conditions transcending the discipline. In a knowledge-based society where value-added activities are prioritized, however, it would be naive to think that the old notion of archaeological rescue based on a fetishist cult of heritage objects will endure (Alonso González Reference Alonso González2019). For archaeological objects do not speak by themselves, and archaeological companies did a poor job of translating to society the results of their work, not including any sort of outreach tasks or research commitments in their budgets for bids, and the like. This would have made little sense, again, given that the market logic was inverted and the companies offering fewer value-added services (i.e. just pick-and-shovel rescue work) tended to win the bids. But there was more than a decade for the profession as a whole, from scholars to institutional archaeologists working for the state, and companies, to rethink the model and try to transform or at least analyse and critically reflect upon the trajectory of the whole system. This, however, only started to be perceived in the harshest years of the economic crisis:
By means of changing in terms of organization we hope to create a stable infrastructure that allows us to bid for public funds and industrial projects. It’s difficult for us to undergo this type of transformation. Still, we’re convinced that we need to seek out alternatives to the previous model (CEO, 2011).
The expansive economic cycle linked to the construction bubble in Spain was associated with a framework of generalized political and urban corruption, irrespective of political parties or regions (Jiménez Reference Jiménez2009). Spain recorded nearly 1,700 open legal proceedings and more than 500 prosecutions for corruption in 2015. Most precisely, the mediation of the public administration as a supervisory mechanism in adjudicating construction and urban bids in the liberal market concealed a framework of personal interests and power abuse by those managing and distributing public resources in a fraudulent manner (Jerez Darias, Martín Martín and Pérez González Reference Jerez Darias, Martín Martín and Pérez González2012). This process underlies a form of governmentality connected with practices halfway between traditional clientele structures and the free market (Cazorla Pérez Reference Cazorla Pérez1995). This is what Alonso González and Macías Vázquez (Reference Alonso González and Macías Vázquez2014) described as corporate neo-liberalism, which makes of Spain a somewhat radical case study in Europe (although not dissimilar from other Southern European countries), but also illustrates the manifold instantiations of free-market models. Excerpts from an interview illustrate the underlying functioning of corporate neo-liberalism, based on a complex interaction between private companies and public institutions.
As an ex-CEO explains,
Both the ministry and the city council initiated previous land speculations; roads were rebuilt even five times if necessary; rural land was converted into urban land at will. When it came to the archaeological contests, they [institutions] themselves would design contests to fit your profile, everything was done officially, but we all knew what was hiding underneath. The modus operandi was always the same; the archaeological report is only a piece of paper to support the decision that makes the building project viable, and it is written depending on the applicant … sometimes the archaeological company is created ad hoc for a specific assessment study, the application is filed with the city council and everyone benefits from it.
These words encapsulate the Spanish model of corporate neo-liberalism, which presents similarities with other Southern European countries or Latin America. In Latin America, for instance, policies of economic promotion and modernization have repeatedly failed, and have replicated the problems in the region, subjecting them to the oligarchic logic of the state (Farías, Ibarra-Colado and Guedes Reference Farías, Ibarra-Colado and Guedes2010). Thus, in the field of Latin American archaeology, the works of Gnecco et al. (Reference Gnecco, Langebaek, Nielsen, Haber, Laguens, Barreto and Londoño2006), Zarankin and Pellini (Reference Zarankin and Pellini2012) or Londoño (Reference Londoño2016) have shown how archaeology as a whole has been aligned with capitalist and nation-state interests, be it either community, multi-vocal, post-processual or multicultural.
As González-Ruibal, Alonso González and Criado-Boado (Reference González-Ruibal, Alonso González and Criado-Boado2018) argue, the commercial sector in Spain is wondering what will happen if undercutting the requirements for conducting cultural impact assessments is applied, or how the current condition of CRM at the verge of collapse can be transformed. In the words of a representative of a professional association in 2017,
The new model does not arrive and precaritization continues to overwhelm the sector and its professionals. More and more, I see the need for the archaeological collective to unite and push towards a change in the model. A special plan for the sector is needed to save much of the heritage at risk and help revive archaeology. It is urgent to take steps for heritage management in other directions.
The reasons behind the collapse of commercial archaeology in Spain can, then, be summarized by five main explanatory factors, all of them equally important. First, the lack of management capabilities and an entrepreneurial mentality among CEOs. Second, the absence of professional organizations demanding rights and more favourable legislation, as well as a lack of self-awareness as a labour collective. Third, the disconnection between university training and research, public institutions and museums, and rescue archaeology. Fourth, the coincidence between the emergence of commercial archaeology and an unprecedented building bubble that enabled the expansion of the profession without much self-reflection and solid grounds. Last but not least, the regionalization of Spain, which facilitated the development of cronyism, eventually leading to the subsistence of small-sized companies operating within the comfortable boundaries of their own territory and familiar sociopolitical networks.
In light of these factors, it seems fundamental to redefine the role of archaeology and its relationships with society through a new public, social and community archaeology, as pointed out by the contemporary academic debate on archaeological theory and practice. In doing so, the underlying philosophy and politics of commercially driven CRM, the existing mass of workers, and the various tenets and nuances that exist between wider and specific contexts must be taken into account, as well as the gaps between different legal systems and practices. Ultimately, this involves posing the question of the sense and meaning of archaeology in current societies, what archaeology has to offer, and why rescuing past material culture is valuable at all. Asking this question goes beyond the scope of this paper, and it would be presumptuous to argue in any specific direction. Rather, the aim has been limited to showing and analysing past and current problems and structures, and paving the way for further discussion which takes into account the complexity of the issue. This has involved showing that the future of commercial archaeology in Spain does not depend on a ‘stabilization’ between offer and demand. But also highlighting that, for most archaeological companies in the field, the major problem faced by Spanish archaeology is the lack of management capabilities, as these quotations highlight:
There’s been a before and after in terms of innovation. We’ve finally understood that we can’t always do the same thing. We’ve got to provide a dynamic work environment fostering new ways of working, new leadership and managerial competencies (CEO, 2012).
We need to build a strong organization upon which we can grow. To do so, we must be willing to cooperate, transfer knowledge collaboratively, invest in R & D, and seek out new management models in collaboration with all those involved in, interested in or concerned about heritage (director of foundation, 2011).
What these views convey is a sense of transformation and self-reflection, something unprecedented in Spanish commercial archaeology. However, they also reflect a lack of a deeper consideration of the social, political and economic role archaeology plays beyond its ‘proper management’ within society, especially considering that various Spanish regions are withdrawing or loosening impact-assessment requirements. The Spanish situation sits within a larger context, as shown by different academic works that raise concerns about the critical situation of archaeological activity worldwide. Aitchison (Reference Aitchison2009b) and Schlanger (Reference Schlanger2010) opened the debate in the European context, while later on Gnecco and Dias (Reference Gnecco and Dias2015) widened the discussion about the effects of capitalist expansion and heritage loss in different global settings. More recently, in the Spanish context, González-Ruibal, Alonso González and Criado-Boado (Reference González-Ruibal, Alonso González and Criado-Boado2018) have argued that global capitalism does not need archaeologists any more to promote heritage as commodity, and thus CRM appears to be irrelevant in the quest to produce economic value through heritage. In turn, Zimmerman (Reference Zimmerman2018) suggests that CRM in the USA has promoted an ‘archaeology brand’ in a way that trivialized archaeology in order to attract public attention. This is echoed by Holtorf (Reference Holtorf2005), in his claim to turn archaeology into a form of popular culture. Similar concerns on the debate between commoditization and professional ethics emerged in the debate between Holtorf (Reference Holtorf2008) and Kristiansen (Reference Kristiansen2008) some years ago. What brings all these authors together, however, is an emphasis on the need to reconsider and even redefine the relationship between archaeology and society through a new sort of ‘public archaeology’ or ‘social archaeology’, understood broadly as ‘all archaeology that is concerned with the interface between the discipline and society, including community and indigenous archaeologies and heritage studies’ (González-Ruibal, Alonso González and Criado-Boado Reference González-Ruibal, Alonso González and Criado-Boado2018, 507).
Conclusions
Cultural-heritage management as a commercial endeavour has emerged as a strategic resource for economic and social development in the 21st century in Europe and elsewhere. Indeed, the European Commission declared 2018 the ‘European Year of Cultural Heritage’ (European Parliament 2017). Under the slogan ‘Our heritage: where the past meets the future’, the relationship between cultural-heritage conservation, social cohesion and economic development took on special relevance for the research debate and the European policy agenda. However, the current context of global crisis emphasizes the need for a new paradigm of heritage management in the years to come.
This paper opens up new areas of inquiry and sparks a fruitful dialogue about archaeological and heritage management with practical policy implications in various ways. It does not offer a solution to the problems of Spanish CRM, but provides a detailed assessment of the underlying factors behind its collapse and failure to transform and redefine its role. It also offers insights into the views of those who, like archaeological companies’ CEOs, lived the process in the field, away from the calm reflection of scholarly work. While the Spanish commercial-archaeology experience cannot be generalized, the breakdown of this promising business activity in a mere five-year period and the threat to heritage protection stress the need to rethink heritage management in alternative terms. The collapse of Spanish commercial archaeology represents a paradigmatic case study since this activity is deeply affected by contextual transformations throughout the world. The empirical evidence illustrates a situated adaptation of archaeological business organizations through a specific type of corporate governance in the Spanish cultural field and to the functioning of corporate neo-liberalism for survival.
The lesson to be learnt from the failure of Spanish commercial archaeology would be the need to include other spaces in the debate for the future of archaeology, setting up an open and practical multi-vocal discussion about other scenarios, from Latin America to Asia and Oceania. Again, this involves taking into account many more actors beyond scholars, including representatives from professional associations, archaeological companies’ CEOs, archaeology workers, and representatives from public institutions in charge of heritage legislation. Moreover, this highlights the need to emphasize territorial complexity through the incorporation of other realities and spaces of archaeological management. Taking into account the need for detailed case studies to redefine the relationship between cultural heritage, management and society, this article has advanced an enhanced empirical understanding of the relevance and complexity of cultural-heritage management as an economic activity in a knowledge economy. The Spanish case opens new avenues for rethinking heritage management on regional and national scales and offering practical opportunities in the institutional context.
It is thus necessary to understand for whom, when and how (commercially or not commercially driven) archaeology could legitimize heritage protection socially, as demanded by the recent works of González-Ruibal, Alonso González and Criado-Boado (Reference González-Ruibal, Alonso González and Criado-Boado2018), Jones (Reference Jones2017) or Díaz-Andreu (Reference Díaz-Andreu2017). We need to further explore and define the social dimension of heritage in order to put into place suitable or optimized heritage-protection and management strategies, incorporating market-dynamic reinterpretations or aspects of political economy. Future research should address such questions as, what do we need for archaeology to go beyond impact-assessment reports, training and practice? Can we conceive of an archaeology that understands its practice as part of social life? How can archaeology connect with contemporary communities and social demands? This paper is by no means the final word on these complex topics; rather it hopes to spark further debate on them within and beyond commercial archaeology.
Eva Parga-Dans is a Ramón y Cajal Researcher at the Institute of Natural Products and Agrobiology (IPNA-CSIC) and at the CICS.NOVA, University Nova of Lisbon (Portugal). She holds a BA in sociology and a Ph.D. in applied economy. She specializes in the sociology of innovation and in the organizational field of heritage and culture. This work was supported by the Institute of Heritage Sciences (Incipit-CSIC).
