Studying the policy process involves making assumptions about the influx and flow of information. For example, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), a prominent theory about policy change, includes assumptions about the way in which information influences policy learning and how scientific and technical information is incorporated into policy battles (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith Reference Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith1993; Weible and Sabatier Reference Weible and Sabatier2009). Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) suggests that information overload, combined with cognitive limitations (like bounded rationality), leads to disproportionate information processing, which accounts for systematic overreaction and underreaction to policy issues as expected by the punctuated equilibrium model (Baumgartner and Jones Reference Baumgartner and Jones1993). The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) posits that actors use information (i.e., “science”) to expand or maintain the scope of conflict surrounding an issue (Jones and McBeth Reference Jones and McBeth2010). Despite these assumptions, we know relatively little about how and why information is produced, and, more importantly, how it influences the policy process.

In The Politics of Information, Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones begin to answer these questions by developing a theoretical framework that specifies how, when, and why governments search for information and how this search for information influences public policy. Building on previous work (The Politics of Attention 2005; and the Policy Agendas Project), ^{Footnote 1} where the authors contend that information processing in government produces systematic patterns of stability and change in policy outcomes, this piece argues that a key to understanding information processing lies in the search for information. In an increasingly complex social and political environment, the government must simultaneously find problems and develop solutions to problems. Unfortunately, these tasks are best accomplished with divergent organizational forms. Problem discovery works best when a diverse group of people and organizations are involved in the search for problems (entropic search). Problem solving, on the other hand, works best when a centralized group of experts are involved in the search for solutions (expert search) (pp. 23–26). Though optimal in different situations, both types of search generate negative externalities. Unchecked entropic search, for instance, can lead to a “seek and ye shall find” dynamic, wherein the identification of new problems causes complexity and the growth of government (p. 112). Expert search, by comparison, leads to simplification and the omission of important facts, thereby generating misguided policies.

To demonstrate these points, Baumgartner and Jones trace the evolution of search mechanisms in the U.S. government from World War II to 2008. In so doing, they show that the entropic and expert search capacity of the government expanded between the 1950s and 1970s, leading to the well-documented growth of the government. This growth occurred through both the broadening of government activity (government enacted policies on new issues) and the thickening of policy action (government actions increased within existing issue arenas). As the 1970s waned, the pendulum shifted toward top-down models of problem discovery and censored models of expert search, both of which slowed the growth of government but limited the capacity of government to deal with complex problems.

The theoretical and empirical research presented in this work advances our understanding of how and why the U.S. government produces information, and how this information influences politics and policy. As such, scholars of American politics, public policy, and public administration will find it thought provoking and useful. One question that may arise: What caused the expansions and contractions of search that were empirically identified throughout the book? The authors suggest that these changes were caused by a complex mix of factors, such as executive preferences, organization within the legislature, the path-dependent nature of institutions, elections, and, more generally, environmental context. These suggestions imply that changes in search capacity are somewhat idiosyncratic and country specific. I wonder if this is the case: Is the U.S. experience specific to the United States? Or have other governments around the world experienced a similar trajectory? Have they, like the United States, gravitated toward simplification? Or have some governments opted for complexity? If so, what are the ramifications? I hope that Baumgartner, Jones, and their colleagues in the Comparative Agendas Project ^{Footnote 2} tackle these questions with the same enthusiasm they have about the comparative applicability of PET (and the Politics of Attention 2005).

Although The Politics of Information focuses on the macropolitical forces that influence public policy, it offers insights into dynamics at the issue (or subsystem) level that require additional research. For instance, the authors posit that the growth and complexity of modern-day government stem not just from the expansion of search about existing issues (termed “thickening” of government activity) but also from the search for information about new issues that were previously outside the purview of government activity (termed “broadening” of government activity) (p. 162). When studying the evolution of search dynamics across different issues, the authors find that information flows and search dynamics vary, sometimes substantially, across policy issues. To explain this variation, they show that issue subsystems that had been around for a long time witness different search dynamics and patterns of growth than newer issues that make their way onto the government agenda. Data on budgetary spending and government employment show that beginning in the 1950s through the 1970s, older, more mature subsystems (like Health and Transportation) tended to grow in thickness, whereas newer, more nascent subsystems (like Education and Justice) grew in breadth (pp. 142–49). Furthermore, the rate at which newer subsystems grew was faster than the rate of thickening for older subsystems. These distinctions may be a result of the urgency with which issues emerge on the agenda and the diverse flow of information associated with those issues. However, the authors do not include variables at the subsystem level that may cause these differences. This may provide yet another avenue of future research.

The most thought-provoking aspect of this research is the normative question it poses about the role of government in an increasingly complex world. When looking for information, should the government invest in entropic search, which results in complexity, redundancy, and inefficiencies, but is more representative of the complex problems we face? Or should the government continue to regulate the flow of information, leading to efficiency, speed, and “small government” but ignoring or neglecting the complex nature of the problems we face? At the end, Baumgartner and Jones come down on the side of organized anarchy—“vigorous information processing systems that are capable of detecting problems and prioritizing them for action” (p. 208).