There are two distinctive groups that should immediately read Dov Waxman’s new book. First there are the actual members of the tribe—Jews in general and American Jews in particular. The members of the tribe have been having an increasingly polarized, and at times nasty debate over Israel. The encounters and exchanges are much less like a Habermasian dialogue or civil conversation and more like a trash-talking, World Wrestling Federation cage match. The reason for the combativeness is because the stakes are so high. What are Jews talking about when they are talking about Israel? Israel, in part, but also about who they are as a people. Once Israel became a core element of American Jewish identity, as Waxman and others note, it was inevitable that discussions about Israel would become personal, sensitive, and emotional (pp. 25, 90). Consequently, attempting to reach out to the participants is not for the fainthearted. Waxman says things that they are not going to want to hear. But they should listen.
The other group that would benefit from reading Trouble in the Tribe are those who are not members of the tribe but nevertheless have a keen interest in things Israel and in U.S. foreign policy. Waxman provides nonmembers with an opportunity to eavesdrop on the tribe’s tussles. For many outsiders, the fact that there are troubles, and that American Jews have divided opinions, will not be news. But for those whose understanding of the American Jews on Israel comes from Stephen Walt and John Mearshiemer’s The Israel Lobby (2007), the book under review will be an eye-opener—and an important corrective to narratives that suggest that Jews are a monolithic, clannish group. For insiders and outsiders, Waxman is an excellent docent for this tour of a fractious community.
Waxman’s central thesis is that American Jews are increasingly divided about Israel and demonstrating increasing reservations regarding Israel’s policies. Such divisions and reservations can translate into a weakening attachment of American Jews to Israel. Among scholars, this possibility is known as the “distancing” hypothesis—American Jews used to be close to Israel, but not so much anymore. There is a strong body of opinion, ranging from the political left to the political right in the United States and Israel, that such drifting is occurring. And Waxman importantly adds a third alternative to the standard “pro” or “anti” Israel position—indifference.
What is the evidence for such distancing? A lot of it relies on surveys and opinion polls, and Waxman does as well. There are real limitations with such data. Although the author acknowledges some of these limits, he nevertheless relies on these data (Chapter 4 in particular). American Jews are asked whether they are pro-Israel or not, but to believe these surveys is to conclude that there has been little change over the decades because they show a consistently high approval rating. However, it is difficult to know what respondents mean when they say that they are pro- or anti-Israel. If it is about particular Israeli policies, such as the settlements, then American Jews have become more distant from Israel, but then again, by this measure so too have Israeli Jews. Different surveys also generate different results depending on how questions are worded, the sequencing of questions, and even, and perhaps most importantly, who is surveyed; surveying Jews requires defining “who is a Jew,” which is itself a point of debate. Waxman uses a recent Pew survey to support his distancing thesis (multiple references throughout the book). But this same survey also discovered that one-fifth of millennial Jews believe that Jesus is the son of God (the “official” Jewish position is that he was not). This response rate either confirms the long-standing belief among survey experts that a good percentage of those surveyed will agree with whatever is asked them, or that perhaps there is a growing percentage of the American Jewish population that counts itself as a “Jew for Jesus.” Waxman puts a lot of faith in the results of these surveys, much more than I think is warranted.
The other source of evidence relies not on what American Jews think or say but rather what they do. And, according to Waxman’s anecdotal, circumstantial, and quite informative data, they are doing different things and organizing in different ways (Chap. 4). The author’s argument is supported by others who observe that fewer American Jews do things like celebrate Israeli Independence Day, participate in Israeli dance groups, place Israeli flag stickers on the bumpers of their cars, wear T-shirts associating themselves with the Israeli Defense Forces, voluntarily attend pro-Israel rallies, or donate to Israeli causes (the overall dollar amount has remained the same, if not gone up according to some sources, but more is coming from fewer Jews). In general, we are confronted with the interesting observation that American Jews say that they remain highly supportive of Israel, but they are no longer acting out such support in the same ways or with the same intensity.
Assuming that American Jewish support for Israel is weakening and fracturing, then why? This is an area that I wish Waxman had developed further. Throughout the book he identifies various factors at home and in Israel that are likely causes. Although the Holocaust and anti-Semitism are generally associated with strong support for Israel, this is age-related and much less resonant with younger American Jews (p. 48). There is, as the saying goes, much less need for a “floating life raft.” Intermarriage is on the rise and evidence it that converts' love for Judaism does not necessarily translate into affection for Israel (p. 203). “Israelotry” (as Waxman nicely puts it) is on the decline, as American Jews are finding their Jewish identity in Judaism (p. 203). The Holocaust and the pre-1967 period, when Israel played David to the Arab states’ Goliath, does not resonate in the same way because of post-1967 events and with millennial Jews (pp. 40–44).
Israel’s behavior is also pushing American Jews away. Israel is much less sympathetic than it used to be for all the obvious reasons: its militant security policies and, most decisively, its occupation of another people (pp. 40–50). These activities do not go over very well with non-Jews and, it turns out, neither does it for Jews. But does this mean that everything would be fine if there emerged a two-state solution and Israel toned down its muscular foreign policy? Although Waxman does not fully and explicitly address this possibility, his analysis suggests as much. But I am much less certain. And my hope is that the future will allow for a real-time experiment in attempting to determine the answer to this question. In the meantime, my view is that the totality of Israel’s policies on issues of security, religion, and democracy is leading American Jews to raise questions about Israel’s very identity and whether its values are consistent with their own. Waxman himself notes that a century ago, the leading Jewish organizations were anti-Zionist and joined the campaign to create a Jewish state only with the destruction of the European Jews, but he does not explore the significance of this history. In other words, we need to explain this previous (and longer) period of “distancing” and see whether the reasons are the same as in the current period. My view is that the author is only skimming the surface for why American Jews have been historically ambivalent toward the idea of a Jewish state.
Waxman’s convincing analysis of the American Jewish debate about Israel leads to the inevitable question: What will the future bring? Assuming that there is no “game-changer,” then I think he thinks there will be more of the same. And not only more distancing from Israel, but perhaps more divisions and indifference among American Jews. He and others, like Peter Beinart, suggest that American Jews are heading toward a bimodal distribution—with a silent majority distancing themselves from Israel and a “Jewish Establishment” trying to run the foreign policy of American Jews. Of course, the reason they are silent is not only because they are indifferent but, rather, because the Jewish Establishment has silenced dissent, using the nastiest and most underhanded tactics imaginable, a point convincingly made in his conclusion. It treats any questioning as near blasphemy. Waxman strongly recommends that the establishment look to Israel’s vibrant public debate as a role model and let the marketplace of ideas become a genuine marketplace. But after reading his compelling analysis, I was left to wonder why the establishment would ever do such a thing. If they are as stiff-necked as they are presented, why encourage a more open debate that would possibly undermine their position?
Moreover, the Jewish Establishment is becoming more conservative and religious and are increasingly single-issue voters, while the clear majority of Jews rank a concern for Israel toward the bottom of the Top 10 list and demonstrate greater concerns for social justice, crime, the environment, education, and health care (pp. 21, 27). One of the interesting consequences of this development is that American Jews who take hard-line positions on Israel are more likely to align with the more conservative forces in American politics. But, as we have seen in this latest election cycle, these conservative forces also traffic in anti-Semitism. Does this mean that the Jewish Establishment (and the Israeli government) might be prepared to sacrifice American Jewish security for Israeli security?
If Waxman is right—and American Jews are becoming more outspoken about and troubled by Israel's behavior, and the Jewish Establishment is content to “hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil”—then the tribe might be experiencing something more than troubles. The conflict in Northern Ireland, also as Waxman defines, was often referred to as the “troubles.” But the discourse of “troubles” invariably minimized, nearly trivialized, what was occurring at and below the surface. Only time will tell if “troubles” in Waxman's book serves a similar euphemistic function.
