Murray Milgate and Shannon C. Stimson, After Adam Smith; A Century of Transformation in Politics and Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. x, 320, $35.00. ISBN 978-0-691-14037-7.
I. INTRODUCTION
The authors of this book—Murray Milgate, one of the editors of the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, who occupies an economics post at Queen’s College, Cambridge, and Shannon Stimson, a political scientist at the University of California at Berkeley—have been exploring, individually and in tandem, the main theme of this, their latest book, for over twenty years. In 1991 they published a study of Ricardian Politics, to which this book is a sequel. Since the sequel begins with Adam Smith, deals briefly with mercantilism and some eighteenth-century authors, and covers a longer period that ends with the early marginalists in the 1870s and supports frequent asides on late twentieth-century neoliberal versions of economics along the way, it may be more appropriate to describe it as the mother rather than the daughter of the earlier work. The two books share a common thesis and have been written from the same historiographic viewpoint.
A brief initial characterization of that viewpoint would be that it is a “Cambridge” variant on the standard Marxian critique of what was entailed in the transition from classical political economy to neoclassical economics. The main expositors of the position were Piero Sraffa, Maurice Dobb, and Ronald Meek, with the latter pair being more explicit about the implications of their reading of the historical record. Thus, Dobb claimed that his collaboration with Sraffa in producing the Royal Economic Society edition of Ricardo’s works and correspondence had enabled them to substitute for the “bourgeois tradition” a revisionist genealogy that made Marx, rather than Marshall, building on Mill, the legitimate successor to what was sound in the “classical” (i.e., Ricardian) tradition of labor value theorizing (Pollitt Reference Pollitt1988, p. 63). The new genealogy for value theorizing supported more substantive conclusions with regard to the nature of the marginal revolution. Meek, Dobb’s pupil, summed up the resulting interpretation as one in which “the popularization of the marginal utility theory set the seal upon that process of abstraction from the socio-economic relations between men in production which began after Ricardo’s death.” Instead of concentrating on these objective social relations in production, economics diverted its attention for ideological reasons to the subjective or “psychological relation between individuals and finished goods” (Meek Reference Meek1967, p. 208). In both their books, Milgate and Stimson have continued the policy of promoting a portrait of Ricardo that stresses his affinities with Marx and lack of affinity with his contemporaries. They also cite with approval Meek’s summary statement on the import of the marginal revolutions, without, significantly, the qualification embodied in his initial remark about “popularization.” One useful characterization of their larger message, then, is to say that they seek to draw out the implications for politics of Meek’s depiction of the marginal revolution.
The authors describe their book as an attempt to trace how “a systematic interrelationship between politics and political economy was developed, altered, and refined” (p. 1) in the century after Smith passed from the scene. Hence, the title of the book and the salutary observation on which it is based: in dealing with seminal works such as the Wealth of Nations “[w]e inherit … not the original but the summation of the reworkings to which it has been subjected over time” (p. vii). The reader should not expect, however, a study of the Wirkungsgeschichte or fortuna of Smith’s writings, a connected history of their reception and diffusion, of how they have made their way in the world by means of successive interpretations and misinterpretations. Milgate and Stimson take a less arduous route through their chosen territory, one that is best described in their own words as “an emphasis on moments of conceptual adjustment and change” (p. viii, italics supplied) rather than on continuous development. The moments are strung together loosely in a sequence of discrete essays that follow a rough chronological path, with plenty of backward and forward tracking along the way.
“After” Smith acquires another special meaning from the decision of the authors to treat Smith’s stance on questions involving the relationship of politics and political economy as a culminating moment. From the outset they inform their readers that “by the middle of the nineteenth century there was little objectively left of Smith’s original arguments in the literature of political economy” (p. 2). Robert Malthus, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill had taken things in new directions. What is often attributed to Smith can best be seen as the record of later accretions and attributions of meaning. More to the point of the book’s central thesis, Milgate and Stimson clearly still find the original import or upshot of Smith’s politics problematic. They review sympathetically the various ways in which Smith’s politics has been reconstructed by intellectual historians in recent decades, but they conclude that it represents the end rather than the beginning of something significant. For them, Smith remains a “distant eighteenth-century thinker” (p. 13) whose political message lacks “forward reach.”
Surely something strange is going on here, something that makes one ask what counts as politics, let alone forward reach, in the authors’ lexicon. Is politics defined by the issues that concerned Smith’s contemporaries and successors, or merely by those that are currently of interest to some modern political theorists? Can the issues themselves be captured as party allegiances or struggle, by a stance taken on constitutional politics and forms of government, or in accordance with the ideological “isms” of modern life? But first it seems worth asking: is it true that nineteenth-century economists and their publics derived little of political significance from direct acquaintance with Smith’s writings; that everything was filtered and diluted through the reworkings of later classical and neoclassical authors?
II. ADAM SMITH’S POLITICAL LEGACY
Compared with some nineteenth-century thinkers, the sociological historians and grand evolutionary theorists, Auguste Comte, Karl Marx, and Herbert Spencer, or even compared with Malthus, Ricardo, and Mill, Smith was more skeptical about our capacity to predict future political and economic states. There are one or two minor exceptions to this in the Wealth of Nations, but on the whole he was not a contender for prizes in the prediction stakes. This has never discouraged later readers from imagining what Smith would say about the topics dominating their own political agenda. Opportunistic uses of Smith’s name in support of a variety of political causes became something of a late twentieth-century sport, especially during the Reagan–Thatcher years. Such things were taken more seriously in the previous century. Perhaps the most famous example can be found in the deliberations of those who attended the centenary dinner for the Wealth of Nations held in London in 1876 and chaired by Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone.Footnote 1 Smith’s chief fault, in the eyes of the dinner guests, lay in being a bit too faint-hearted about the prospects for political implementation of his ideas, notably on free trade, but there was still a list of hot political topics on which they felt that direct conversation across the intervening century was meaningful.
To those whose studious bent leads them to take Smith’s intentions seriously, there is now plenty of evidence of what would count as systematic contributions to political theory in his treatment of morals and the theory of justice in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, and in the notes on his lectures on jurisprudence that show how he would have gone about completing his planned “account of the general principles of law and government” (Smith [1759] Reference Smith, Raphael and Macfie1976a, Advertisement). Putting this to one side as a half-completed project still leaves us with the not-negligible resources of the Wealth of Nations for insight into the practical purchase of Smith’s “science of a statesman or legislator” (Smith [1776] Reference Smith, Campbell, Skinner and Todd1976b, p. 428). Consider only the sustained analysis in Book IV of the conflict between private and public interests that lay behind the institutions and legislative politics involved in managing a mercantile state; and the range of questions tackled in Book V on public revenues and expenditure on defence, justice, public works, and education, with its final peroration on the benefits of an incorporating union between England, Scotland, and Ireland, on the one hand, and the dangers posed by rising public debt to secure and expand the British empire, on the other. Were these not examples of forward reach, of attempts to leave readers with a political message, one that was capable of being taken seriously by later generations?
A casual exercise in examining some later episodes in Smith’s fortuna casts further doubt on the position adopted by Milgate and Stimson. Taking Book V of the Wealth of Nations as the base point, it is obvious that neither Ricardo nor Malthus was willing or able to replace Smith’s work with anything that covered the same ambitious territory. The first successful (yet still partial) attempt to emulate Smith was by Mill in the final book, On the Influence of Government, of his Principles of Political Economy. That proves not to be coincidental because Mill’s treatise was conceived in emulation of the Wealth of Nations on grounds of Smith’s success in having written a work that had “impressed itself strongly on the minds of men of the world and of legislators” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill1965, p. xxvii). Mill was too much of a Ricardian to be an admirer of Smith’s economics, but there were those who reached back to Smith in search of an antidote to the narrowing in the scope and method of political economy associated with Ricardo and his followers. In this way Smith, chiefly through the writings of Thomas Cliffe Leslie, became part of the Anglo-Irish Methodenstreit. If Milgate and Stimson had been less absorbed by the classical/neoclassical transition as the clue to everything of importance happening to political economy during the nineteenth century, a number of historical and institutional critics could easily have earned a place in this book on grounds of their claim to be upholding an older notion of political economy in which the adjective was stressed. It wasn’t just the putative neoclassicals who were thought in retrospect to have denuded the science of its historical and institutional integument: Ricardians and Benthamites were thought to have done so already.
Cliffe Leslie’s articles on Smith, collected and republished in 1879, certainly reveal that Smith was a good deal more to him than a distant eighteenth-century figure.Footnote 2 Similarly with the larger issues connected with imperial federation and tariff reform at the beginning of the twentieth century, another economist, a pupil of Alfred Marshall, Joseph Shield Nicholson, called on Smith as inspiration and ally in his book A Project of Empire; A Critical Study of the Economics of Imperialism, with Special Reference to the Ideas of Adam Smith, published in 1909. Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, there is the case of John Rae, Smith’s biographer, who was also the author of a comprehensive global survey, Contemporary Socialism, in the 1880s. Rae was perturbed by the caricature of Smithianismus that was emerging from German debates on Das Adam Smith Problem. He had little difficulty in showing that recent Anglo-German developments in the field of state involvement in social welfare provision were compatible with Smith’s system of natural liberty. He maintained that Smith should not be seen as “an exponent, if not the founder of what [German commentators] call the Rechtstaat theory—the theory that the State is mainly the protector of right.” Instead, Rae argued, “in reality Smith’s doctrine corresponded pretty closely with their own Kultur-und-Wohlfahrtstaat theory—the theory that the State is a promoter of culture and welfare” (Rae Reference Rae1908, p. 358).
My conclusion, when faced with Smith’s as yet unended postlude, is that those who have made a genuine effort to become familiar with his writings have often found fresh political and intellectual nourishment there. They have been able to see through the cruder attempts to reduce his politics to an extension of the economics of the market in which the state necessarily (or preferably) has a limited role. That describes quite a lot of work on Smith since the Glasgow edition began to appear in 1976, and if we can do that, so could his serious nineteenth-century admirers, albeit with less evidence at their disposal.
III. DUGALD STEWART AND ROBERT MALTHUS
Milgate and Stimson choose three main “moments” in the build-up to the reappearance of Ricardo, the hero of their earlier book; these moments turn on Dugald Stewart, Malthus, and James Mill. In the first of these they consider Stewart’s contribution to the diffusion of a particular view of the Smithian inheritance in his memoir of Smith’s life and in the pioneering set of lectures on political economy and politics he gave in Edinburgh at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Partly for reasons connected with the local reaction to the French revolution, Stewart advanced a bromide version of Smith’s ideas. As far as politics was concerned, Stewart prudently placed the more inflammatory questions connected with the “first principles” of obligation and alternative forms of government on a back burner. Milgate and Stimson are also justified in saying that Stewart favored an interpretation of Smith’s system of natural liberty that stressed its passive or non-interventionist features. Why this should be the case is more controversial. One answer, in condensed form, would be that Stewart, in contrast to Smith, upheld a Christian version of the doctrine of perfectibility that yielded a proto-Marxian conclusion: the progressive improvement in our intellectual and moral powers would make the withering away of the state and the reign of self-regulating natural processes attainable. Milgate and Stimson favor a more conspiratorial interpretation that also explains Stewart’s silence on the labor theory of value, his unwillingness to recognize the drawbacks Smith had noted in the division of labor, and his optimistic view of the effects of introducing machinery into manufacturing. Stewart, they tell us, was “quite self-consciously attempting to shape a discipline bearing the imprimatur of Smith, whose credentials make it essentially conservative of the existing political order of things” (p. 111). Stewart is also credited (debited?) with laying the groundwork for a scientific community centering on an autonomous and hegemonic version of positive economics—groundwork that can still be seen in operation today.
No new evidence is deployed in support of this novel portrait of Stewart as a bold, highly influential, and self-conscious manipulator of Smith’s image, who was attempting to lay down “the party line for later classical economists” (p. 116). The line was a defensive or apologetic one designed to drown out “the threatening voice of workers who found themselves increasingly dissatisfied with the effects of machinery on their own wellbeing” (p. 117). Quite apart from the uncertain nature of the idea of a “party line” covering such a heterogeneous entity (the limits of which are never properly explored), it is to be doubted if Stewart had the inclination or strength needed to carry the burden this interpretation places on him. His philosophy of mind was treated with respect in some American, English, and French universities well into the nineteenth century, but the same cannot be said of his loosely formulated opinions on political economy, especially during the period (not specified by Milgate and Stimson) in which the threatening voice of workers might have been at its loudest. The least durable and authoritative part of Stewart’s memoir of Smith’s life relates to the Wealth of Nations. The lectures on political economy were not published until the 1850s, by which time, as Stewart had begun to recognize half a century earlier, the entire complexion of the post-Smithian enterprise had been altered by the intervention of English and London-based authors.
Malthus’s population principle was one of the earliest and most obvious manifestations of the new outlook; it represented a more substantial shift of perspective than anything associated with Stewart’s philosophical commentary on the safety and usefulness of the infant discipline. The population principle implied a major limitation on the prospects for improving the living standards of the mass of society that has no Smithian equivalent. The associated law of diminishing returns in agriculture, a proposition vital to Ricardo’s economics and that of his followers, became, as John Stuart Mill said, “the most important proposition in political economy” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill1965, p. 174). Yet Milgate and Stimson have difficulty in giving Malthus his due. Unlike Smith or Ricardo on either side of him, he is saddled with a subsistence wage theory that is biological rather than sociological in origin. Malthus should not have wasted energy collecting all that comparative-historical evidence in the second and later editions of his Essay on the Principle of Population concerning the effect of institutions and other social practices on the way in which population pressures operated in different settings: a simple calorie count would have sufficed. The authors hedge their bets on whether Malthus was also responsible for the “demoralising” influence attributed to him by Karl Polanyi and E.P. Thompson. It is hard not to conclude that something inhibits Milgate and Stimson’s inquiry into Malthus. They do not confront his appeal to a higher science of morals and politics capable of dealing with “happiness” as opposed to “wealth.” Nor do they deal with Malthus’s thoroughly Whig notion of balance within Britain’s mixed constitution. Yet, even if we adopt a Ricardo-centered view, as they do, one major justification for paying attention to Malthus is that it was precisely when Ricardo was arguing with his better-educated friend that he was forced to spell out the larger background assumptions of his own position on political as well as economic questions.
IV. JAMES MILL AND DAVID RICARDO
Doing justice to James Mill’s dogmatism and polemical exaggerations has tested the tolerance of many over the years. It has always been tempting to make him the utilitarian fall guy, a temptation to which Milgate and Stimson have surrendered fully. To sustain their basic thesis, taken over from the earlier book, that Ricardo—contrary to a widespread belief in his own day that has been upheld by most modern students—was neither a utilitarian nor a philosophic radical in his politics, Milgate and Stimson maximize the distance between him and James Mill, the person usually thought to have acted as his mentor in such matters. Yet, when one reads the correspondence between Ricardo and Mill, Ricardo and Hutches Trower, and the political disquisitions Ricardo wrote at Mill’s behest as preparation for his role as speaker on questions of parliamentary reform, the evidence for the conventional view appears overwhelming when compared with the meager textual support that can be mustered in favor of the interpretation of Ricardo given here of him as a “modern” exponent of democratic citizenship. In a footnote Milgate and Stimson admit that the evidence for their position presses hard on “a very shallow textual vein,” but give the following justification for sticking with it: “the interest of Ricardo’s writings on these subjects rests less on the total amount written than on understanding the larger question of what he might have been doing when he wrote” (p. 161n, italics added). The conditional form of the verb signals an exercise in rational reconstruction, with all the usual problems of determining whether it is also an accurate historical reconstruction.
Milgate and Stimson clearly believe this to be the case because, once more, they bring no new evidence to bear on their thesis, and do nothing to respond to the sharp yet well-documented criticisms of their earlier book by Terence Hutchison (Reference Hutchison1994) and Terry Peach (Reference Peach1997). Indeed, in some respects, they take a less qualified stance. One of the most important practical implications of Ricardo’s rent theory, licensing the right of the community to tax the “unearned increment” in land values, was fully in line with the class-conflictual view that Milgate and Stimson attribute to Ricardo’s politics. The issue was at least mentioned in the earlier book but has now disappeared. Holding the position they do, it would seem natural to consider why Ricardo refused to endorse James Mill’s proposals on this subject. The obvious answer is that on this, as on most questions, Ricardo was more moderate in his opinions than Mill: some would say more realistic; others, more deferential towards established property rights. In this respect, as on the related question of whether the landowning interest should be granted a breathing space before full withdrawal of protection from imported corn, Ricardo took a softer line than his political mentor and his precocious son. Within what they described pejoratively as Britain’s “aristocratic” polity, the Mills manifested plenty of the “deep-seated class antagonisms” (p. 158) that Milgate and Stimson seem unable to find.
When faced with Mill’s History of British India as a source of enlightenment on the principles of government, Ricardo posed an acute question concerning a possible clash of interests between rulers and ruled. We do not have Mill’s answer in the published correspondence, but this does not mean he was “silent” on “imperial despotism,” as he is alleged to have been here. He took it for granted and defended in public the idea that European, preferably British and utilitarian-minded, rulers were to be preferred to native ones. It was inconceivable for him to have held that “the government of India could be safely entrusted to the members of the Imperial Parliament at Westminster” (p. 152) for the simple reason that until 1859, India was governed by the East India Company, the company that employed Mill and his son as expert civil servants to do so bureaucratically from a London base. The father died in 1836, before Westminster took direct responsibility, but there can be no doubt that he would have taken his son’s position in opposing abolition of the company’s bureaucratic form of government precisely because it would bring the clash between the interests of rulers and ruled to the surface. We may not regard the company as an example of enlightened despotism, but that is the form of government that Mill père et fils believed to be the best that India could hope for in their day.
Having concentrated on suffrage politics when dealing with James Mill and Ricardo, Milgate and Stimson, for some undisclosed reason, bypass John Stuart Mill’s Considerations on Representative Government in order to devote most of their attention to On Liberty and his Principles of Political Economy. The younger Mill appears first in a rather miscellaneous chapter on utopias and stationary states largely on account of his revamping of the classical conception of the latter and his sympathetic critique of socialism. They doubt if the sympathy was more than skin deep, and maintain that Mill was more concerned to display “the acceptable face of capitalism” (p. 206). In this respect they assign to him an ideological role, though they do not disclose whether he played his part self-consciously, as in Stewart’s case, or if he was allocated it by the impersonal forces of history. Nor is it clear whether apologetics explains the other part Mill plays in their story: his occupation of a “half-way house” on the road to neoclassical theories of value and distribution. It was this, they claim, that made it easy for William Stanley Jevons and Léon Walras to take the necessary mathematical steps in the 1870s, thereby enabling the application of a utilitarian model of rational choice to economic theory to take place “almost immediately after Mill’s death” in 1873.
V. THE MARGINAL REVOLUTION AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE
It will be obvious from this that Milgate and Stimson regard the marginal revolution and the neoclassical era it announced as an event rather than as a process, a long-awaited event, the seeds of which could be found in Bentham’s felicific calculus. Mill was paving the way towards it, and even the Chartists and Ricardian socialists were inadvertently setting the stage “for the eventual replacement of classical political economy by an altogether more reassuring, legitimating version of economic science—one engineered by the neoclassical economists of the final quarter of the nineteenth century” (p. 219). Not for the first time the reader may be led to ask: reassuring to whom, legitimating what, and engineered for what purpose? Instead of direct answers to these Marx-inspired questions, we get a nudge and a knowing wink, though, given the importance Milgate and Stimson attach to the event, it is surprising how little they have to say about it. They appear to regard it as so obvious that no further explanation is required:
[T]he outstanding contribution of the recasting of the mainstream of political economy undertaken in the closing decades of the nineteenth century was that it provided, for the first time, an account of the workings of market exchange under conditions of perfect competition that was capable of sustaining a general presumption in favour of laissez–faire. The question of just how this reconciliation between the conclusions of utilitarian political theory and those of economic theory was effected is a simple one to answer: the calculus of pleasure and pain was systematically applied to an analysis of market exchange and a full-fledged utilitarian economic theory was the result. The differences between the political and economic case for laissez-faire that had existed previously were eliminated at a stroke (p. 259).
Well, that’s that, then: as soon at the relevant components were available, they were assembled for immediate use.
A fuller treatment of the actual historical unfolding of these ideas would have been beneficial here. For example, if Milgate and Stimson had paid more attention to Frédéric Bastiat, one of the harmony theorists writing in the 1840s whom they consider earlier, they could not have written the first sentence of the above quotation: late nineteenth-century developments were not responsible for the first attempt to sustain a general case for laissez-faire. This is not just a simple matter of dating. The extreme form of laissez-faire thinking to be found in Bastiat came under fire from leading pre- and post-marginal authors, from Mill and John Elliot Cairnes on one side of the magic border as well as from Henry Sidgwick and Marshall on the other. In Cairnes’ case, opposition to Bastiat included an argument that is highly relevant to the central theme of Milgate and Stimson’s book. Cairnes attempted to show why, even if human interests could be harmonized, this would not put an end to the clashes of class interests that were endemic to economic life (Cairnes Reference Cairnes1873, p. 246). In congratulating Cairnes on his performance, Mill affirmed his belief in the importance of demonstrating “how far from the truth it is that the economic phenomena of society as at present constituted always arrange themselves spontaneously in the way which is most for the common good or that the interest of all classes are fundamentally the same.”Footnote 3
Sidgwick and Marshall concurred in this dismissal of “invisible hand” arguments, and Marshall took things further by using the tools supplied by marginalism and mathematics to demonstrate the fallacies of what he called the “maximum satisfaction” school of thought, thereby opening up one of the paths towards what became known as “welfare economics.” Marshall’s aim was to find a way of articulating collective interests rather than individual ones, and, contrary to what is said here on the subject (p. 59), he had no time for such restrictive criteria as those embodied in Pareto optimality.
Cairnes and Sidgwick do not figure in Milgate and Stimson’s book, and Marshall, for all his importance as a post-marginal thinker, makes only a fleeting appearance. This is regrettable because Marshall was the person actually responsible for transforming Mill’s verbal treatments of value into mathematics, thereby creating the genealogy in value theorizing that Sraffa, Dobb, and Meek sought to change in favor of a connection between Ricardo and Marx through the labor theory of value. The potential rewards for taking on Marshall would, therefore, seem to be considerable from the point of view being espoused by Milgate and Stimson. What may have deterred them from making the attempt is the impossibility of fitting Marshall into the institution-less and consumer-demand-led world of neoclassicism that they have depicted here. For whatever reason, then, Walras and more especially Jevons are the representative post-marginalists here; and they both appear as the author of one book apiece, respectively the Elements of Pure Economics and the Theory of Political Economy, as though that is all one needs to know about their views on the connection between perfect competition and the politics of laissez-faire. Walras’ other work on l’économie social, with its enthusiasm for social justice, land nationalization, and the other “questionable philosophies” that so disappointed his chief admirer, Joseph Schumpeter (Reference Schumpeter1954, pp. 827–828), have not yet become part of the historical record as far as Milgate and Stimson are concerned. If they had asked themselves why Walras was so opposed to the hard-line economic liberalism of orthodox economics in France, they might have had to rethink their categories.
While it is true that Jevons’ Theory contains, as Milgate and Stimson state, a “withering attack” on Mill, it is concentrated on the Ricardo–Mill position on value and distribution. As far as Mill’s Principles, taken as a whole, was concerned, Jevons thought that Book V was the best part, with the treatment given to the functions of government having only one defect: brevity. He was even more of an admirer of On Liberty. The last two comments are based on manuscript sources that are publicly available but perhaps not widely known.Footnote 4 The same cannot be said of two published works that are surely germane to the Milgate and Stimson thesis: Methods of Social Reform and The State in Relation to Labour. The quotation they take from Mill concerning the impossibility of limiting “the interference of government by any universal rule” (p. 248) could just as well have come from Jevons’ first chapter on the “principles of industrial legislation” in the latter work. This would be surprising only to those for whom marginalism possesses Manichaean significance. Many other commentators, not least R.D. Collison Black, Jevons’ editor, showed long ago that classical and neoclassical components exist side by side within his Theory of Political Economy (Black Reference Black1971 and Reference Black1995, pp. 163–201). Only by the most drastic butchery can the Jevons legacy be reduced to the bare bones outlined by Milgate and Stimson.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although the underlying thesis of this book is obvious by the end, it has to be said that the method of presentation does not make for easy or unambiguous reading. The book jogs back and forth between authors and topics, and an excessive proportion of the argument is contained in footnotes that require the reader to divide attention almost equally between text and running commentary at the foot of the page. One result of this rather confusing method of exposition is that it is difficult to establish where the authors stand on some of the questions they have privileged. It is clear they have a low regard for what they consider to be the chief political legacy of neoclassical economics, models based on the market as an allocational device that treat voters as utility maximizers and political agents as rent seekers (some rather elderly work by Anthony Downs and by Gordon Tullock is cited as exemplary here). If that was the sum total of the neoclassical bequest, it would be hard not to agree that it was not one that encouraged high political expectations.
But the alternative Milgate and Stimson appear to be recommending in parts of the book seems just as limited and limiting. For example, one of the problems with their reconstruction of Ricardo’s politics is that he becomes a lonely pioneer of an economic interpretation of democratic citizenship, someone who had “come close to, without quite reaching, an understanding of politics as being exclusively contingent on the relations of economic life” (p. 69). Thomas Hodgskin is mentioned as a possible successor, someone who reached similar conclusions, if only by “good fortune” (p. 226). This leaves Marx probably where he should be as the sole representative of a fully materialist and reductionist position. While that conclusion conforms to other features of the “Cambridge” position outlined above, it is not clear that Milgate and Stimson wish to revive a materialistic perspective on politics that has been in sharp retreat, along with other forms of Marxism, in the face of the revival of interest in culture, law, religion, locality, and republicanism. They recognize that Marxism no longer commands confidence, and they speak, with no obvious signs of regret, of “the ever-dwindling ranks of Marxist historians” (p. 5). Their concluding chapter shows they are aware that the Marxian position on politics allows as little scope for effective action as the one they impute to neoclassicism. Why, then, have they earlier deemed it to be preferable to the approach adopted by other economists who found it best, or simply more convenient, to separate economics from politics?
Without the underlying “Cambridge” thesis, Milgate and Stimson’s book would not have much of a spine. Yet, as an approach to the history of economics, it is not clear where a book like this leaves that historical thesis. Outside the narrow reaches of Ricardo scholarship, of the three key figures mentioned above, only Meek made any lasting contribution to the scholarly history of economics at large, both before and after he ceased to be a Marxist. He was admirably clear about what interested him and why, whether it concerned Turgot or Adam Smith, Marx or Keynes, physiocracy or the four stages theory of history.Footnote 5 While there will always be scope for exercises in modern Cambridge hagiography, the larger agenda now seems to be exhausted as an historical program. This book testifies to some of the enthusiasms, suspicions, and dislikes of its authors, but it also leaves an impression that their approach lacks “forward reach,” that it represents the end of something rather than the beginning.
