1. introduction
The last few decades have been marked by significant changes in environmental governance. Many nations have witnessed shifts from top-down, state-centred approaches towards more active non-governmental participation in forming and implementing public policy. This expansion in the scope, arenas and depth of regulation by non-governmental actors has seen scholarship move from a ‘regulatory state’ focus to a ‘regulatory society’ focus.Footnote 1 The rise of the ‘regulatory society’ and the growing role of non-governmental actors in governance has been explored in the United States (US), Australia, and the European Union (EU).Footnote 2 Far less attention has been paid to the role of civil society in environmental governance outside Anglo-American geographies.Footnote 3 Along with an emerging body of scholarship that seeks to broaden both the geographical and non-state perspectives of regulatory and governance studies,Footnote 4 this article turns its attention to Russia to explore the role of environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) as governors in this post-communist nation. In particular, this article provides one of the first examinations of recent, and often controversial, governmental reforms that have the potential to heavily influence the relationships between ENGOs and the Russian government.
While there have been a number of studies into Russia’s environmental bureaucracies,Footnote 5 eco-modernizationFootnote 6 and federal government structures,Footnote 7 the role of ENGOs in Russian environmental governance and their relationships with the state, and each other, have received less attention.Footnote 8
This is somewhat surprising given the number of challenges faced by ENGOs in Russia. One such challenge is that Russia has some of the world’s lowest levels of public trust in civil society organizations.Footnote 9 While Russian people are increasingly demanding change in the public sphere,Footnote 10 more than 21% of the population is estimated to be unaware of the existence of NGOs.Footnote 11 As of 2009, only 1.13% of economically active Russians were employed by NGOs on a full or part-time basis. This is a significantly smaller share than 4.6% in Australia, 5.8% in the US, 5.9% in France, and 3.7% in Germany. Among the reasons for this low level of engagement and trust in NGOs are doubts about the motivations of these organizations, insufficient awareness of their activities, and suspicions that such organizations may be engaged in corrupt practices such as colluding with public officers.Footnote 12 More generally, Russia’s communist history and state hegemony have cast a long shadow over the Russian public sphere.
Certainly, the Russian state has maintained its role as the predominant regulator in all spheres of Russian environmental policy. However, a number of developments are propelling a shift in the ‘steering’ and ‘rowing’ of Russian governance.
Following the economic collapse in the 1990s (and an associated reduction in environmental stress),Footnote 13 it has been Russian government policy to prioritize economic development.Footnote 14 This prioritization led to a weakening of state commitment to environmental protection functions. At around the same time, a decision to federalize and ‘recentralize’Footnote 15 Russia’s governance frameworks led to a reorganization of the nation’s environmental bureaucracy. Functions of a previously independent constellation of environmental bodies were transferred to what is now referred to as the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNR). This bureaucratic reorganization has weakened relationships between the state actors that implement environmental policies,Footnote 16 and has caused confusion over the division of tasks and responsibilities between new and old departments. There was a redistribution of power between the federal and regional environmental bodiesFootnote 17 and sizeable numbers of staff and areas of expertise were lost.Footnote 18 ENGOs and other civil society actors accordingly were compelled to play a greater role in environmental governance.Footnote 19
As part of Russia’s recentralization, the government established new participatory mechanisms to complement traditional forms of ENGO participation in the lawmaking process (for example, through the courts).Footnote 20 The new mechanisms of public input include the public chamber and other public councilsFootnote 21 that attempt to channel civic activity toward state goals and enable ENGOs to have a greater say in the development of laws and policies.Footnote 22 This development, combined with a growth in digital communication technologies,Footnote 23 has given rise to new mechanisms for enabling ENGOs to engage in public discussions of draft environmental laws,Footnote 24 as well as to monitor the work undertaken by state bodies.
ENGOs across Russia have begun to take advantage of these new opportunities for exercising power and authority over environmental decision making. However, at the same time, ENGOs have been confronted by burgeoning state controls that threaten to limit support for their actions. Indeed, the perceived threat of NGOs to traditional structures of state hegemonyFootnote 25 led to the introduction of complicated measures to make NGOs more accountable to the state (‘accountability measures’). Accountability is understood here as a relationship between actors in which one gives an account and another has the power or authority to impose consequences as a result.Footnote 26 This notion of accountability has been introduced through changes to lawsFootnote 27 regulating NGO operations (the NGO Law). These changes limit the rights of organizations representing foreign nationals or stateless persons, as they may be considered ‘undesirable in the Russian Federation’.Footnote 28 In particular, the NGO Law has expanded the government’s power to audit NGOs and to mandate reporting from foreign-funded NGOs.Footnote 29 Penalties for unauthorized rallies have increased and administrative procedures for organizing public action have become more complicated. The most recent changes to the NGO Law occurred in 2012;Footnote 30 these amendments require NGOs that are engaged in ‘political activities’ and receive foreign funding to register as ‘foreign agents’ (a term that historically has a negative connotation in Russia).Footnote 31
This steady increase in accountability measures for foreign-funded NGOs has been taking place since 2005. It was a major response to the ‘coloured revolution’Footnote 32 in the former Soviet Republics and the threat that this revolution posed for political stability in Russia. Indeed, the intention of the NGO Law was to limit foreign interference in internal Russian affairs.Footnote 33 However, the drafters of the 2012 amendments were quick to point out that the NGO Law was aimed at ‘ensuring transparency’ and would ‘by no means interfere with [NGO] activities’.Footnote 34 Further, despite some controversy over the recent changes to the NGO Law, government officials rightly acknowledge that very similar regulations concerning NGO registration procedures and financial controls exist in developed democracies.Footnote 35 Nevertheless, the risk of oppressive and strict implementation of the NGO Law has been recognized by Russian leaders.Footnote 36 The Deputy Prime Minister even discussed the possibility of adjusting the Law as recently as July 2013 at the Civil 20 Summit with NGO representatives in Moscow.Footnote 37 To date, legislative bodies have not reviewed the NGO Law.
The continuing operation of these laws largely reflects the ruling United Russia party’s principle of ‘sovereign democracy’.Footnote 38 This concept emphasizes the independence of Russia from Western democracies based on its own unique historical development and democratic values. Therefore, it is claimed, Russia’s approach to democracy should not necessarily correspond with Western standards.Footnote 39
Significant tensions have recently emerged between these accountability measures and the growth of participatory trends in Russian environmental governance. They raise a range of issues regarding the future role of ENGOs as legitimate and credible agents of environmental governance. The term ‘legitimate’ is used here to refer to the social approbation conferred on ENGOs. This can be formally given – for example, by governments who often treat NGOs as possessing some form of special environmental expertise; or informally – for example, by members of society through participation in NGOs and their activities.Footnote 40 However, given the low public support for NGOs in Russia,Footnote 41 and the enactment of strong accountability measures vis-à-vis the state, the legitimacy challenges confronting ENGOs remain paramount but under-examined concerns. For example, a pressing need exists to examine the extent to which recent accountability measures have marginalized or constrained ENGOs. To what extent do new participatory avenues enable ENGOs (domestic and international) to advocate and collaborate with (or against) other agents? Under what conditions can possible tensions between participation and accountability be resolved? What are the implications of these developments for our understanding of the role of ENGOs in environmental governance?
Responding to these questions, this article draws on a document analysis and 18 interviews conducted in 2012–13 with Russian and international ENGOs to explore the manner in which ENGOs and the Russian state have collaborated, interacted with and limited each other’s engagement in environmental governance. Given growing attempts by the state to control ENGOs, and the numerous gaps in our understanding of the experiences of ENGOs in Russia, the focus of this article on ENGO interviewees is purposefully exclusive. While interviewing a wider sample of government and other civil society actors is indeed important (and will be the subject of further research), the article’s in-depth examination of ENGOs aims to offer timely insights into the effectiveness and challenges of ENGOs as both advocates and collaborators in modern Russian environmental governance.Footnote 42
The article argues that ENGOs maintain a legitimate and effective role within Russian environmental governance (by virtue of their expertise and community participation). However, the extent of their legitimacy and success is both threatened and heavily limited by increasing accountability measures and state actions, particularly where ENGOs threaten economic activities prioritized by the state. Certainly, ENGOs have capitalized on new collaborative opportunities to implement environmental programmes, but much of this success has been countered by far greater state incursions into the autonomy of ENGOs via new accountability measures. In response, ENGOs increasingly look to each other as a means to resist state pressure and extend their influence as governors of environmental issues. More broadly, the article suggests that nothing is stationary. As the Russian state exerts itself by sometimes engaging and sometimes marginalizing ENGOs, these organizations have been responding, sometimes challenging and sometimes forming alliances with the state, while also actively linking themselves to other ENGOs as the opportunity affords.
The article starts in the next part with an overview of the literature on ENGOs and Russian environmental governance. Part 3 sets out the methods and Part 4 lays out our empirical findings on three key governance issues, namely:
(i) the collaborative relationship between the state and ENGOs;
(ii) the impact of state control and the NGO Law; and
(iii) the relationship between ENGOs internally.
Part 5 concludes by summing up our findings and offers a number of recommendations for increasing the likelihood of successful ENGO action in Russian environmental governance. These lessons are categorized into two main themes: improving interactions between ENGOs and the state, and resolving tensions between participation and accountability. The article concludes in Part 6 by reflecting on broader implications for theory and the literature regarding ENGO roles in environmental governance.
2. literature – engos and russian environmental governance
ENGOs have been defined in different ways. Although most ENGOs are formed via voluntary collective action, there has been a growing diversity and professionalization within ENGOs.Footnote 43 Organizations often differ across a number of dimensions, including ideology, funding sources, size, and the policy spheres in which they operate (for example, international, national or local).Footnote 44 While some researchers eschew defining ENGOs,Footnote 45 these organizations share a number of broad characteristics, which range from a perceived independence from profit making and governmental control,Footnote 46 to being commonly identified as campaigning organizations with a focus on the well-being of others.Footnote 47 This definition reflects the most traditional form of ENGO activity, namely self-organization and activism. In addition, we witness a growing trend of ENGO engagement in new public management (civil society as sub-contractors to policy makers) and ‘corporatization’ (civil society organizations partnering with companies).Footnote 48
The theory and literature on civil society offers a key perspective on this trend. ‘Civil society’ is a complex and contested topic,Footnote 49 but has become the comprehensive term for various ways in which people, ENGOs and other non-governmental actors express collective wills independently of (and often in opposition to) established power.Footnote 50 At the same time, researchers stress the possibility of a more positive relationship of partnership between civil society and political and economic actors.Footnote 51 On this view, civil society organizations have the potential to contribute to liberalization and democratization by engaging directly with political/state officials in an attempt to reshape their practices and norms.Footnote 52 The extent to which Russian ENGOs have engaged in this process is something the article will return to and explore below.
Debates on the possibilities for cooperation between the state and civil society actors are relevant for a second grouping of literature on regulatory and governance scholarship. ENGOs have conventionally been explored through a pluralist vision of governance that draws on and develops interest representation theory.Footnote 53 Traditionally, the actions and influence of national ENGOs have shaped major lawmaking developments brought about in centralized legislatures and a handful of agency headquarters.Footnote 54 This success was achieved because ENGOs have usually exploited broad-based social pressures and demands that materialized in the wake of salient, high-profile issues.Footnote 55
In recent decades, the environmental governance literature has expanded beyond investigating the influence of national ENGOs on the apparatus of the state to include the emergence of new collaborative forms of governance arrangements between state and non-state actors. For the purposes of this article, environmental governance is understood as the interrelated formal and informal rules, rule-making systems, and actor networks at all levels of human society that are set up to steer societies towards preventing, mitigating, and adapting to global and local environmental change.Footnote 56 Much of the scholarship discussing environmental governance (and governance trends more generally) explicitly or implicitly assumes that many environmental problems lie beyond the state’s regulatory capacity and look to partnerships with ENGOs and private actors.Footnote 57 These relationships have been termed ‘collaborations and partnerships’,Footnote 58 ‘webs’Footnote 59 and ‘networks’,Footnote 60 and are presumed to attempt to steer different aspects of social or economic life.Footnote 61 While regulatory scholarship has made some significant advances in understanding the role of ENGOs in these new forms of governance, the literature is based largely on research from the US,Footnote 62 Australia,Footnote 63 the EU and the United Kingdom (UK).Footnote 64 This is partly because post-regulatory state practicesFootnote 65 have been prominent in these Western nations, and civil society remains robust. In contrast, in post-communist countries such as Russia, the state has typically remained strong and civil society underdeveloped. The role of ENGOs in governance has received less attention under these different conditions. The discussion below accordingly explores the dimensions of ENGO engagement in environmental governance.
While the operation and activities of ENGOs in post-communist countries is underexplored, an emerging branch of literature has started to focus on these issues. This cluster of literature began to emerge in the 1990s and focused on perceived positive developments in state policy with regard to environmental regulation as a wholeFootnote 66 and to civil society organizations, resulting in the establishment of a legal and institutional framework for ENGOs in Russia.Footnote 67 The works of Weiner, Yanitsky and others examine the historical development and institutionalization of Russia’s nature conservation and protection movements, as well as the role of ENGOs in environmental governance. Many of these studies focus on state environmental policies,Footnote 68 often approached from an interdisciplinary perspective.Footnote 69 Other scholars analyse the differences between Western and Russian NGOs.Footnote 70 One of the more comprehensive studies was conducted by Henry, who examined the ability of ENGOs to locate resources and engage with state policies on environmental protection to establish the foundations for future activism.Footnote 71 She concluded that the effectiveness of ENGOs depends on the different types of organization, the issues chosen, the tactics employed, the relationships developed with other actors, and the constraints in the domestic political environment.Footnote 72
Researchers have also recently pointed to the emergence of new forms of governance in Russia that extend traditional state governance to cooperation with businesses and ENGOs.Footnote 73 One example is the emergence of new civil society institutions set up by the Russian state, such as the Public Chamber and public councils, which reflects a shift towards recognizing the importance of public participation in governance.Footnote 74 However, questions remain as to whether these developments will actually empower non-governmental actors, or whether they are simply an attempt by the state to steer increasing ENGO and social activity towards state policy agendas.Footnote 75
At the same time, the literature identifies a growing number of barriers to effective ENGO engagement in Russian environmental governance. Such barriers can stem from organizational issues (for example, leadership and low public support),Footnote 76 lack of contacts and interactions with outside organizations, and an unwillingness on the part of ENGOs to extend their reach beyond their remit of supporting the state’s regulatory agenda.Footnote 77 The range and adequacy of funding also remain significant constraints. Financial support for Russian ENGOs often comes from other states, although the use of such funding in Russia remains controversial. Many scholars have noted that reliance on overseas funding has had the opposite effect to what was intended. While foreign funding can enhance the operational capacity of ENGOs, it has also strengthened their ties to the international arena, and distanced them from Russian society.Footnote 78
Low levels of participation, environmental awareness and trust in ENGOs constitute an additional barrier.Footnote 79 Generally, the minimal involvement of post-communist citizens in voluntary organizations is explained by their past experience in USSR communist organizations – including enforced volunteering and membership in state-run Soviet public organizationsFootnote 80– and post-communist disappointment in old ideals and new values alike.Footnote 81 However, the ongoing failure of contemporary ENGOs to engage citizens and ‘solve’ environmental problems further dents their legitimacy.Footnote 82
Other challenges for ENGOs in Russia include the continual reorganization and transformation of state environmental protection bodiesFootnote 83 and the limited rights of access to environmental information and decision making.Footnote 84 Russia’s persistent reluctance to ratify the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention)Footnote 85 and, accordingly, to strengthen these rights, remains a significant source of contention with ENGOs.Footnote 86
Perhaps the most significant challenge faced by ENGOs is the shift in state policy towards more restrictive regulation of ENGOs that are reliant on foreign funding.Footnote 87 Many commentators argue that the NGO Law is an attempt by the Russian government to gain more control over NGO activitiesFootnote 88 in an already vulnerable civil society context.Footnote 89 Others are more supportive of the new laws and have argued that, in practice, the number of audits and controls over Russian NGOs has always been very high and the new Law has merely legalized past practice. Foreign funding for NGOs has also never been welcomed, whether in RussiaFootnote 90 or internationally (for example, in the US).Footnote 91
Regardless of these mixed views on the new NGO Law, concern remains that ENGOs are encouraged to rely less on foreign funding and will accordingly turn towards Russian state donations. This risks compromising ENGO autonomy and legitimacy, creating perceptions of ENGOs as government affiliatesFootnote 92 which do not go beyond the state’s regulatory agenda.Footnote 93 Much work remains to be done to resolve these conflicting views on the impacts and effect of the NGO Law, particularly in light of the 2012 amendments, which have further strengthened ENGOs’ accountability to the state (discussed below).Footnote 94 This article aims to fill this, and the other gaps raised above, on the role of ENGOs in Russian environmental governance.
3. methods
Our examination of ENGOs in Russian environmental governanceFootnote 95 relies on a small-n sample and semi-structured qualitative interviewing; this approach best accommodates the complex nature of ENGOs as actors of environmental governance and is capable of capturing the context, opinions and experience of participants.Footnote 96
Six international and Russian environmental ENGOs were selected for this study to capture variance common to ENGOs active in the Russian context.Footnote 97 This variance covers differences in organizational status and level of action (internationally based, domestic or local), size (large, medium or small), strategies and tools (for example, collaborations with government agencies, campaigns with other ENGOs), activities (single and multiple issues) and geographic location.
The first group, comprising the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Russia and Greenpeace Russia, are branches of international ENGOs and can be categorized as large international ENGOs. With a significant number of members and offices in Russia, they are predominantly foreign-funded and operate at all levels of governance (federal, regional and local). However, because of their international reputation, status and resources, they focus mostly on large projects, lobbying and interacting with federal government bodies. The second group, comprising Dront, Ekovahta (a regional organization in North Caucasus), Druzhina Okhrani Prirodi (the Nature Protection Squad) and the regional youth movement Izmenim Mir (Change the World) are regional and local organizations. These organizations focus on regional and local environmental issues and generally interact with regional and local governmental bodies. While some are medium-sized with 20 to 50 permanent members, others are smaller with 5 to 20 members. They have access to limited resources, often relying on funding from international ENGOs or pooling resources among small/medium organizations. Although they are less successful players at the federal level, they can become involved at that level when local environmental issues escalate.Footnote 98 In such cases, local ENGOs represent their regions in addressing environmental issues at the federal level, armed with local knowledge and their local reputation. This may result in their becoming involved in international projects.Footnote 99 Generally, however, local and regional ENGOs operate on a smaller scale, mobilizing public rallies or organizing events such as local environmental clean-ups.
Eighteen interviews were conducted during the period 2012–13. Sixteen of the interviewees were representatives from each of the six ENGOs, with eight representing the international ENGOs based in Russia and eight from the regional and local organizations. The selected representatives were the key decision makers for their ENGO programmes. They included the chief executive officers (CEOs) of two ENGOs, the heads of different sectoral programmes (such as forests and rivers), and several ENGO members working as team members for various programmes. These 16 interviews were supplemented by interviews with two leading international ENGO professionals who have substantial knowledge and experience of the ENGO context in Russia. The interviews were conducted in Russian with ENGO respondents based in Russia and in English with the two international ENGO professionals. All interviews lasted up to one hour. The interview questions related to three main topics:
(i) the internal organizational structure of the ENGO, its general successes and failures in achieving its goals, and the strengths and weaknesses of specific strategies and tools;
(ii) the latest changes to the NGO Law; and
(iii) relationships between the ENGOs and stakeholders such as the state and other ENGOs.
Data from the interviews were coded according to common themes, which include ‘internal issues’, ‘comments on the new legislation’, and ‘relationships with the state’. In accordance with ethics and confidentiality requirements, the interviewees are represented by a code in the findings below. Interviews were supplemented with documentary analysis of laws, newspaper articles, ENGO reports and websites. Triangulation between these documents and interviews contributed to data quality and validity.Footnote 100
4. findings: engos and russian environmental governance
This section draws on the interviews and document analysis to explore three key dimensions of ENGO involvement in Russian environmental governance, namely: (i) the emerging collaborative relationship between the state and ENGOs; (ii) the impact of the NGO Law on ENGOs; and (iii) the relationship between ENGOs.
4.1. The State and ENGO Collaboration
For the first mass environmental movements of the 1980s and 1990s, protest against and confrontation with governmental policy were common strategies.Footnote 101 While less common, educational and scientific research programmes, as well as advocacy through the courts, were also practised.Footnote 102 ENGO respondents characterized legal challenges as ‘time consuming and not very successful, because courts and prosecutors are not independent and their decisions can be influenced by government authorities according to current economic interests’.Footnote 103 Even so, a number of successful legal challenges have been mounted. These include cases by Greenpeace Russia against an MNR decision in 2013 to open a section of a national conservation park in the Komi Republic to gold mining,Footnote 104 and an earlier challenge against the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation from 15/09/2003 N 571 ‘On Sochi republican State Nature Reserve’ regarding a change to the legal status of some sites in the Sochi National Park in 2004.Footnote 105
Many more legal challenges were unsuccessful. Examples include the legal action by WWF Russia to stop exploratory drilling on the shelf of the Sea of Okhotsk by the Kolskaya floating oil platform.Footnote 106 Our findings suggest that, while these traditional forms of participation in the legal process continue, they are now complemented by the emergence of more constructive collaboration with government.
This collaboration has taken two main forms: (i) the creation of public forums and special civic institutions to facilitate input and coordination of citizens, ENGOs, and authorities at all levels; and (ii) the delegation of policy responsibilities to ENGOs, including the implementation of government programmes. Given their novelty, the analysis focuses on these new forms of collaboration between ENGOs and the state, discussing their strengths and weaknesses.
Public forums and civic institutions
Examples of such institutions include the civic chambers (federal and regional),Footnote 107 public councils under the ministries and agencies, and their regional departments.Footnote 108 On all accounts, ENGO respondents favoured the participatory opportunities provided by these new forums and actively used these arenas to influence governmental authorities and the business sector to pursue stronger environmental protection. Participation took a variety of forms. Attendance at public consultation or decision-making forums to advocate key environmental issues (such as the rising water level in the Cheboksary Water Reservoir and the intended development of the copper-nickel minefields in the Voronezh Region) provided one pathway. Another avenue was through gaining membership of more selective government councils. Examples include Greenpeace Russia’s position in the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human RightsFootnote 109 and the public councils under the MNR.Footnote 110 Similarly, at the regional and local levels, respondents reported taking part in various committees, hearings and public discussions conducted by local civic chambers and public councils.Footnote 111
Although these various institutions are being reformed,Footnote 112 respondents reported that the forums had enabled them to draw attention to weaknesses in environmental regulation and to encourage better implementation by government officials. For example, one ENGO reported how it had successfully used a public council meeting to convince the MNR to change and strengthen the rules on hunting enforcement.Footnote 113
Although the availability of new channels for voicing concerns – resulting in occasional positive outcomes – is clearly a welcome development, instances of success were reportedly rare. Indeed, the majority of respondents suggested that ENGOs did not have a significant influence on decisions. In most cases, respondents described the forums as too ‘formal’, ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘slow’,Footnote 114 with state authorities dominating agendas because the public councils remained consultative in nature, and had no express power to bind government decision making.Footnote 115 Many of the larger ENGOs reportedly saw these forums as largely impotent, and had begun to disengage. For example, WWF Russia and Greenpeace left the public council of the Federal Service for Supervision of Natural Resources in 2008.Footnote 116
ENGOs also reported actively using a right to be engaged in the development of environmental legislation through participation in public discussions of draft bills and other normative and sub-normative acts of the state agencies.Footnote 117 For example, the discussion of a draft of the new Forest Code and water regulations was subject to public hearings in which ENGOs participated,Footnote 118 and a number of them, including Greenpeace Russia and WWF Russia, prepared comments and suggestions on the proposed drafts of the Russian Federation’s forest policy.Footnote 119 Although the MNR reviewed their comments and presented a new draft in response, the impact of the ENGOs’ inputs reportedly was difficult to determineFootnote 120 as feedback to participants from these discussions took place only at a general level. The ENGO Dront (through its subdivision, Help the River) also participated in public discussions on the related Water Code and prepared an expert report. They reportedly had little impact on the final decision taken at the federal level which, according to respondents, was because they were more successful at regional levels where they had an established reputation as water and river experts.
Overall, ENGOs lamented the lack of sufficient legal mechanisms to provide meaningful access to environmental decision making and information on governmental decisions. In the eyes of many ENGOs, significant improvements were needed, including ratification of the Aarhus Convention: ‘Russia’s joining the Convention will contribute to the normalization of the environmental situation in the country … high-profile conflicts … could have been avoided if the public had been involved in the discussion.’Footnote 121
Delegation of policy responsibility
Although there are formal avenues for the participation of ENGOs in state environmental protection,Footnote 122 the findings suggest that it is far more common for government to informally partner with ENGOs to provide expert knowledge and capacities (for example, on matters of biodiversity) in the delivery of government programmes.Footnote 123 The large majority of these partnerships emerged to fill the vacuum of environmental experts and regulators that resulted from the abolition of the Ministry of Environmental Protection in 2000. The restructuring of this ministry caused a decline in state environmental protection functions, produced a shortage of experienced staff, and led to a sharp deterioration in nature protection services in several regions.Footnote 124
Respondents suggested that the resulting partnerships have been largely successful.Footnote 125 At the regional level, for example, the ENGO Dront has been actively cooperating with the Ministry of Ecology for the Nizhny Novgorod region in the area of biodiversity and nature conservation. Despite the absence of a federal strategy for the conservation of biodiversity, the government has developed a regional biodiversity strategy for Nizhny Novgorod. Facing a gap in government expertise, the regional Ministry of Ecology entrusted Dront to examine the territory for future natural reserves, to find and describe subjects for conservation, including plants and animals. Dront subsequently took on a major role in coordinating activities under this strategy, including contributing to the successful conservation of wildlife, and updating and publishing the list of endangered animals and plants on government and public registers.Footnote 126
Another example of state and ENGO collaboration occurred in the context of new national parks, natural reserves and protected areas. Under Russian law, all national parks, territories and reserves are owned by state and local authorities and operated by state and local government institutions.Footnote 127 In practice, however, large ENGOs are often more capable than state bodies of creating and maintaining nature reserves and national parks, because they have greater willingness, experience and the resources – including foreign financial support – to hire specialists, to consult scientists, to work with local people, and to attract volunteers. According to respondents, state agencies increasingly expect ENGOs to take on many of their traditional roles for nature conservation.Footnote 128 As one ENGO respondent explained, ‘we do all the necessary preparatory arrangements for the organization of a new protected area. And when everything is ready then it's “here comes the state” to open the reserve or national park’.Footnote 129 In short, ENGOs remain a vital actor in Russian nature protection, and in many cases advance and do the work of government.Footnote 130
It is clear that there are various constructive relationships emerging between ENGOs and the state in Russia. Although state agencies appear increasingly willing to engage with ENGOs in decision making through new consultative forums, larger international ENGOs view such forums as tokenistic and lacking in legitimacy. Even so, many ENGOs remain willing to form partnerships with government agencies, particularly to plug gaps in state expertise and capacity in the area of nature protection. Despite these apparently constructive partnerships, ever-tightening state controls over ENGOs threaten to generate conflict and undermine these working relationships. It is clear that the state facilitates ENGO participation in the area of state policy where the capacities of authorities are weak (social services delivery). However, the state can also suppress their activities by using legal mechanisms, particularly when ENGOs threaten high-priority economic activities (as discussed below).
4.2. State Control and the NGO Law
While there is evidence that the Russian state is willing to engage with ENGOs, it increasingly marginalizes them and controls their activities. This is particularly so where the state prioritizes the benefits of economic development over its nature protection functions.
Respondents pointed to a number of instances where environmental agencies downplayed or ignored ENGO warnings about environmental damage from industrial activity. For example, the Federal Agency on the Supervision of Nature did not stop the illegal activity of exploratory drilling on the shelf of the Sea of Okhotsk, despite an initial negative environmental reviewFootnote 131 and WWF warnings regarding violations of environmental laws. Rather, following business lobbying for permission to drill, the Agency accused WWF of publishing incorrect information and reportedly tried to protect the company. As a result of the state’s inaction, the Kolskaya floating oil platform sank in the Sea of Okhotsk on 18 December 2011, causing the death of 53 people.Footnote 132
A more extreme example of confrontation reported by one respondent involved Ekovahta, a campaigning environmental organization in the North Caucasus. Ekovahta openly criticized local public authorities and accused a local governor of corruption and violation of environmental laws in the course of preparation for the 2014 Winter Olympics.Footnote 133 This resulted in a state-backed criminal prosecution of the activists. According to respondents, the trial was both unfair and politically motivated.Footnote 134
In addition to prosecutions, two regional ENGOs have reported being ‘harassed’ by authorities with additional tax inspections and searches for extremist literature and classified information stored on computers.Footnote 135 Whether such actions were justified or constituted an abuse of power is difficult to determine, but at the very least the findings suggest that the state is regularly willing to flex its muscle and use its available powers to intervene in ENGO activities.
These interventions are significant, but the amendments to the NGO Law referred to above represent a far more pervasive attempt to control ENGO activity.Footnote 136 Not surprisingly, the amendments were anything but welcomed by ENGOs, partly because they remain dependent on foreign funding. It is true that ENGOs can apply for other sources of domestic funding – for example, ‘presidential grants’,Footnote 137 educational programme funding through the Ministry of Education, local government funding or governmental support in kind.Footnote 138 However, such state support (both in-kind and financial) was seen to threaten the autonomy of ENGOs ‘because we are not relying on government money, that’s what has given us our independence up until now’.Footnote 139 On a more practical level, foreign sources are preferred to domestic funding because the latter is often too little and too difficult to obtain.Footnote 140 Although state funding for NGOs has increased in recent years, it is still at least two to three times less than that provided in most developed countries.Footnote 141 Most ENGOs rely on diverse financial sources, including generating their own income (such as through publishing ecological newspapersFootnote 142), private donations (which are extremely limited in Russia) and, by a large margin, accessing foreign funding.
The fact that foreign grants remain vital to NGOs led some 40 non-governmental bodies (including seven ENGOs) to issue a statement in July 2012 protesting against the first bill on the amendments to the NGO Law.Footnote 143 Although this protest was unsuccessful, it spurred subsequent amendments which clarified a number of issues, including that ‘the protection of plants and animals’ is not a ‘political activity’ for the purposes of being defined as a foreign agent. One ENGO respondent viewed this clarification as positive, suggesting that ‘the law does not regulate our activities anymore’.Footnote 144 Another commented that ENGOs would be able to find a way to work within the system: ‘[D]on’t criticise the state and talk about issues and solutions.’Footnote 145 However, the majority maintained that ‘of course, we still fall under the scope of this regulation; we are politically active after all’.Footnote 146 Indeed, nearly all interviewees viewed the NGO Law as an overreach, describing it as ‘weird and restrictive’, and suggesting that the vagueness of the terms ‘protection of plants and animals’ and ‘political activities’ left significant scope for ENGOs to come within the Law. This was particularly the case for most of the large and medium ENGOs, such as WWF, Greenpeace and Dront, who consider many of their activities and campaigns to be overtly political. Moreover, none of the ENGOs interviewed were solely engaged in the protection of plants and animals, with most participating across a spectrum of environmental issues, including nuclear power projects and the protection of all species of nature (for example, fungi and bacteria, which do not belong to the kingdom of plants and animals).Footnote 147 In short, most ENGOs were sceptical that the ‘plants and animals’ exception would help them to avoid the operation of the new Law.Footnote 148
Based on our findings, such initial scepticism appears to have been warranted. Indeed, the Russian government recently demonstrated its commitment to enforcement of the NGO Law, with the Ministry of Justice developing guidelines and forms for reporting NGOs that appear to be acting as ‘foreign agents’.Footnote 149 Authorities have also conducted searches of the offices of NGOs, mostly human rights organizations but also ENGOs, such as the Bellona Foundation. Bellona is an international ENGO with its main office in Oslo (Norway), and with international offices in Murmansk and St Petersburg (Russia), and Brussels (Belgium).Footnote 150 The searches of the Bellona offices in Russia, conducted in March 2013, suggest that although ‘protection of animals and plants’ is not regarded as a political activity by the NGO Law, the activity of ENGOs with foreign funding continues to be a focus of state enforcement authorities. As a result of the inspections, the Prosecutor General stated that 22 NGOs out of 2,226 that were investigated come within the above-mentioned legislation as ‘organizations performing functions of foreign agents’.Footnote 151 The Prosecutor General did not provide the names of these 22 organizations but, in April 2013, Greenpeace published a list of 11 ENGOs which had received notices of violation of the NGO Law or admonitions from prosecutors for not registering as foreign agents.Footnote 152 These ENGOs were mainly local or regional domestic ecological groups. According to Greenpeace Russia and Bellona, this is because state bodies are targeting smaller and more vulnerable NGOs.Footnote 153 The impact of these inspections and raids on ENGOs is still unclear, but at the very least they suggest that many ENGOs will be considered to be ‘organizations performing functions of foreign agents’ despite the fact that ‘the protection of plants and animals’ is formally excluded from the notion of ‘political activity’.Footnote 154 As one ENGO respondent from a smaller regional ENGO summed up, the unfortunate consequence is that ‘these laws can be used to prohibit any NGO. Under this law it will be possible to close any objectionable NGO’.Footnote 155
In summary, although ENGOs are not intended to come within the new provisions on ‘foreign agents’, the absence of clarity in the definition of ‘political activities’ has meant that foreign-funded ENGOs routinely fall within the scope of additional accountability inspections and scrutiny from state enforcement bodies. Given the low public awareness of the activities of ENGOs and the negative connotation of the term ‘foreign agents’, the new NGO Law is likely to further marginalize ENGOs from society and undermine their legitimacy.
4.3. Relationships between ENGOs
While nascent relationships between large international ENGOsFootnote 156 and local Russian groups were identified during the early 1990s, the literature commonly pointed to unproductive competition between ENGOs.Footnote 157 Our findings also identified competition. As one respondent put it: ‘ENGO dynamics are similar to any other country, it depends on the individuals – some collaborate, some compete.’Footnote 158 However, there was also evidence of expanding networking and collaboration among ENGOs, which has resulted mainly from variations in capacity between international and domestic ENGOs, in the legal regulations of their activities, and the scale of their influence.
The findings below offer a brief discussion of the two main groups of ENGOs (international and domestic) and then outline three types of ENGO relationship: (i) ‘supportive’, (ii) ‘issue coalitions’, and (iii) ‘mergers’.
Russian state authorities formally recognize international ENGOs as legitimate actors in environmental governance. The current NGO legislation does not limit their political activities or advocacy. On the one hand, the international reputation of these ENGOs and foreign financial sources give them status as ‘independent’ organizations, which are not overly influenced by Russian authorities. The EGNOs operate mostly at the federal level, are better funded and, as a result, able to hire professional services to maintain their accounts and fulfil additional reporting requirements. Furthermore, international ENGOs are more likely to receive support from foreign governments, as demonstrated by the Greenpeace activists who have received support internationally against Russian charges of piracy.Footnote 159 On the other hand, these activities have distanced international ENGOs from Russian society, as citizens are unsure of their motives and suspect them of promoting the interests of their donors rather than Russia’s environmental interests.Footnote 160
Domestic Russian ENGOs vary in size, purpose and capacity. These ENGOs focus mainly on local issues and are often members of regional and local public councils. Dront, for example, is a member of the public council under the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of the Nizhny Novgorod region. It collaborates with regional and local authorities; at the same time, it remains active in public advocacy and organizes campaigns against local issues such as the construction of shopping centres and management of river banks.Footnote 161
Domestic ENGOs are commonly assisted by large international ENGOs through financial or in-kind support and capacity building (for example, training in fund raising).Footnote 162 The former relationship was prevalent in the 1990s and resulted in the institutionalization and professionalization of Russian ENGOs.Footnote 163 This support often formed part of Western efforts towards democratizing Russia.Footnote 164
Our respondents confirmed that the assistance and support from large professional ENGOs remains an important factor for smaller Russian groups, particularly as funding remains scarce. Indeed, smaller environmental groups were reportedly encouraged to take part in various projects of larger ENGOs. For example, WWF Russia often supports protests at the local level by both ENGOs and individuals, as demonstrated by the local action against the building of the Boguchany Dam.Footnote 165 Other types of collaboration have seen smaller ENGOs working with larger bodies in nature reserves and parks, assisting in the organization of mass actions,Footnote 166 working with local communities and becoming a part of new virtual environmental networks by using Vkontakte, Facebook, and Twitter.Footnote 167
A second type of relationship between ENGOs is in the form of cooperation whereby ENGO associations are involved in the mobilization of multiple ENGO resources to address common issues and goals. This type of association is commonly formed around geographic parameters and specific environmental problems. Thus, a group of ENGOs came together to protest against the construction of a local highway through the Khimkinsky forest, with the aim of protecting the forests in the Moscow region. Initially headed by a local environmental movement, Khimkinsky Forest,Footnote 168 the group was later supported by Greenpeace Russia, WWF Russia, the Biodiversity Conservation Centre (BCC) and others, all of whom acted jointly in the coalition For Moscow’s Forests. In this instance, the joint ENGO efforts successfully drew attention to the problem through mass media and raised what started as a local conflict up to the federal level.Footnote 169 This helped to position the coalition to negotiate and bargain with regard to the new highway, although its actions have had limited success. Following the mass protest activity between December 2010 and February 2011, activity declined in 2012 and 2013 (partly because of police violence). Ultimately, the campaign has fallen short of its goal to stop the highway construction. Respondents suggested that this was less a failure in the campaign strategy and more a consequence of the economic and social importance of the project, which made the government determined to proceed with the development in any event. It was reported that activists and supporters of the movement experienced significant violence perpetrated by the police and local authorities;Footnote 170 arguably, intimidation was a factor in the decline of the campaign.
These events led to a distinct change in the organization’s strategies. With the support of French NGOs, the Khimkinsky Forest Movement initiated legal action in Nanterre (France) against a French company involved in the road construction project.Footnote 171 This type of issue coalition fosters collaboration between Russian ENGOs (both internationally based and domestic) and ENGOs from other countries to explore common problems and undertake joint projectsFootnote 172 on domestic and international issues.
The third way in which relationships between ENGOs develop is through increased networking and the merging of smaller ENGOs with larger domestic bodies. Not surprisingly perhaps, growing state control over ENGOs reportedly has driven this trend. Indeed, the complicated financial and activity reporting under the NGO LawFootnote 173 was a challenge for many small ENGOs and they looked to network with better resourced ENGOs to support their operations and capacity. The ENGO Dront is an example of such an umbrella organization, which reduces the costs of operation and increases efficiency for smaller ENGOs.Footnote 174
To sum up, international ENGOs continue to play an important role in building the capacity of local ENGOs. This support has strengthened domestic ENGOs in their ability to collaborate with international ENGOs and bring actions at the federal, and even the international, level. The formation of issue coalitions remains an important strategy to gain traction on environmental problems. Restrictive state policies, along with insufficient funding, have also resulted in the consolidation of smaller regional ENGOs under umbrella organizations. Environmental NGOs are increasingly seeking to work together to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.
5. discussion and recommendations
This article has examined the role of ENGOs in Russian environmental governance and the impact of recent governmental reforms regarding NGO accountability. Given the priority of economic development and the administrative legacy from the Soviet Union, it is perhaps not surprising that the role of ENGOs in environmental governance has not escaped the controlling hand of the state. The analysis showed that the Russian government is refining ways to exert control over the operation of ENGO actors and, in the opinion of the respondents, restrict their activities when they constitute a threat to the economic and political interests of the ruling elite. Even so, the article has revealed that, despite these constraints, domestic and international ENGOs maintain an important role and influence in Russian environmental governance.
ENGOs in Russia continue to protest, rally, lobby and appeal to the national and international community. They voice legal complaints against state authorities over violations of environmental law. However, ENGOs are also finding new ways to engage with the community and each other, including through fostering greater environmental awareness and forming new coalitions under umbrella ENGO organizations like Dront. Perhaps most significantly, ENGOs are increasingly collaborating with the state. The partnerships are coming about through the creation and coordination of state environmental programmes and the management of national parks.Footnote 175
Clearly, this expanding role in environmental governance is not experienced equally across every type of environmental issue.Footnote 176 For example, our findings suggest that direct collaboration with the state occurs primarily in the areas of biodiversity and nature conservation because this is an area where the state has retreated most significantly from its role (but it remains important to Russian and international communities). By the same token, not all ENGOs have engaged fully in these new partnerships. For instance, WWF has aimed to cooperate with the state across a range of areas,Footnote 177 whereas Greenpeace is more adversarial and maintains its distance, even to the point of withdrawing from the public council of the Federal Service for Supervision of Natural Resources. Yet even Greenpeace, which defines itself as a campaigning organization, manages to maintain some constructive relationships with the state, for example, through its membership of various public councils under the MNR and the Presidential Council on Human Rights.
Despite these differences, our interviews across six diverse ENGOs suggest that there are significant signs of growth in constructive collaboration between ENGOs and other actors in Russian environmental governance. This expanding role is likely to generate a number of positive effects. For example, greater ENGO input into government decision making through public forums has resulted in amendments to the hunting regulation.Footnote 178 Furthermore, ENGOs ‘plugging gaps’ in state capacities has strengthened environmental protection in areas of conservation and biodiversity.
Notwithstanding these positive outcomes, the analysis cautions that the success of new collaborations and networks is anything but assured. New state-backed participation initiatives, such as civic forums and public and presidential councils, remain tokenistic at best. Funding shortages and new accountability measures also appear to obstruct ENGOs. In particular, state policy is turning the screws on ENGOs and may be used to intimidate or close down organizations at the government’s will. Even if not used to such extremes, the new NGO Law is likely to weaken ENGO autonomy and capacity, as foreign funding sources are stigmatized and ENGOs are forced to turn to limited state funding. Few inroads appear to have been made with engaging the wider community, which still provides little funding to ENGOs, despite awareness-raising campaigns by ENGOs and strategies aimed at promoting ecological values.
What then are the lessons from this study? As with any empirical research, there are inherent dangers in over-generalizing. Nonetheless, a number of insights may be drawn from our 18 interviews with national and international ENGOs. They offer some key lessons on how to increase the likelihood of successful ENGO involvement in Russian environmental governance, which can be categorized into two main themes: (i) improving ENGO collaboration with the state; and (ii) resolving tensions between participation and accountability.
In terms of ENGO collaboration with the state, two issues arose. Firstly, the use of formal state mechanisms, such as civic chambers, is currently problematic. Despite some promise, our findings suggest there are significant weaknesses in new decision-making fora, not least their evident tokenism. To the extent that the Russian government is serious about engaging with ENGOs and other stakeholders in decision making, there is a need for more explicit legal and procedural frameworks to provide these institutions with greater power.Footnote 179 This could include establishing consensus decision rules that afford non-state actors greater power over the final decision. Many ENGOs appear increasingly disillusioned with participatory processes. A change in decision-making rules might induce them to (re)commit to these processes, knowing that they will have a greater opportunity to influence the outcome.Footnote 180
On a broader level, the Russian government could take steps to ratify the Aarhus Convention to reaffirm to the domestic and international community its intention to engage meaningfully with ENGOs and civil society. An important corollary would be the creation of new opportunities for participation in environmental decision making in Russia. Indeed, Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Convention encourage parties to develop mechanisms for greater ENGO engagement in decision making around plans, programmes, policies and legally binding rules. Although this has been mooted, there has been little progress to date on the ratification of the Convention. It has been announced several times that the MNR is working on documentation for the ratification and harmonization of domestic laws to comply with the Convention, but the process is very slow and it is still unclear when the Convention will be ratified.Footnote 181
The second aspect of collaboration involves ENGOs taking responsibility for state service functions. Our analysis confirmed that ENGOs play a crucial role in the protection of nature.Footnote 182 To the extent that the state continues to rely on ENGOs to deliver these services (and effectively bolster its impoverished environmental protection administration), more funding for ENGOs will be needed. Increased funding has the potential to generate a win-win-win outcome: a win for ENGOs, which will be better resourced; a win for the environment, which benefits from improved service provision; and a win for the state, which, for a modest sum, will be able to better incentivize and leverage the expertise, skills and networks of a greater range of ENGO actors. Funding arrangements would, of course, need to be properly designed (to ensure sufficient accountability while not threatening ENGO autonomy)Footnote 183 and could complement other state support channels.Footnote 184
More generally, a rise in state funding for ENGOs across the board would substantially help to strengthen ENGO activity in Russia. While ENGOs may be unwilling to increase their reliance on state funding, to the extent that the government continues to stigmatize foreign funding under the NGO Law, greater levels of support will be needed from the state. The provision of such funding would require reforms in the procedures of grant applications and approval, both to streamline the process and ensure that the procedures remain transparent in order to avoid the possibility of corruption and capture of ENGOs.Footnote 185
Alternatively, ENGOs may seek to enhance their funding through working with other non-governmental sources. One option available is to collaborate with international and Russian businesses. Such collaborations remain at a nascent stage in Russia,Footnote 186 but emerging initiatives such as Forest Stewardship have been identified in the literature.Footnote 187 Although seeking funding from businesses is not without its challenges (such as capture by economic interest), productive ENGO–business partnerships offer an important way for ENGOs to enhance their autonomy from the state.
Finally, we turn to resolving tensions between ENGO participation and state accountability. The central challenge lies with the NGO Law. Based on our interviews with ENGOs, the current NGO Law is a significant threat to their free operation. Consistent with growing calls internationally,Footnote 188 there is a need to promptly review the suite of laws in an open and transparent manner. In particular, there is a need for greater clarity regarding terminology such as ‘political activity’ and ‘foreign agent’. The broad remit of these terms presents opportunities for controlling state bodies to impinge on ENGOs and try to close down the operation of those organizations they find objectionable. Reducing the opportunities for such abuse of discretion is central not only to the credibility of the law, but also to ensuring the free activity of civil society organizations in a democracy.
To the extent the Russian government persists with the NGO Law, much will depend on the ability of ENGOs to work together to challenge its implementation. As our findings revealed, umbrella organizations, along with international ENGO support, already play a crucial role in supporting smaller ENGOs in dealing with the new controls. However, it will be important for ENGOs to capitalize on these networks, to protest against the NGO Law, to encourage reform and seek greater international pressure. The recent statement by EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on the condition of NGOs in the Russian Federation exemplifies the scope and potential importance of international pressure.Footnote 189
6. conclusion
The role of non-governmental actors,Footnote 190 and ENGOs in particular,Footnote 191 remains an under-examined area within the governance literature. In investigating ENGOs in Russia, we join others concerned with better understanding the role of the ‘regulatory society’Footnote 192 in non-Anglo-American geographies. This article has examined both the opportunities and challenges that confront ENGOs in Russia, illuminating their experience and providing insights into recent reforms that have the potential to heavily influence trends in the Russian government’s relationships with ENGOs. It has argued that ENGOs have found opportunities to enhance environmental outcomes through collaboration with each other and with the state (at least where its capacities are weak). However, ENGOs continue to face substantial barriers, not least in the guise of the new NGO Law and a continued lack of public awareness and support.
Drawing on the empirical analysis of the recent NGO Law, as well as ENGO relationships with the state and other ENGOs, the article identified a range of mechanisms and conditions that, jointly or individually, appear likely to enhance successful ENGO action in Russian environmental governance. These include:
• reforming state-backed decision-making forums;
• ratifying the Aarhus Convention;
• increasing funding for ENGOs both for specific delivery of nature protection services and across-the-board; and
• conducting an open and transparent review of the NGO Law to clarify the extent of its application to ENGOs.
The empirical research in this article also sheds some important light on the role of ENGOs in environmental governance in non-Anglo-American geographies. Key issues in this scholarship include better understanding the changing nature of authority in environmental governance; whether ENGOs can be considered ‘environmental governors’ replete with legitimacy and the capacity to ‘steer’ decisions and implement actions; and the ways in which different agents constrain or enhance each other’s agency as authoritative governors of environmental issues. Our findings provide a number of initial insights into these issues to reveal a complex and dynamic relationship between ENGOs and other environmental governors that is at times complementary and at times conflicting.
On a descriptive level, the analyses confirmed that ENGOs may be considered as environmental governors in the Russian polity. Not only do they posses legitimacy (by virtue of expertise and community participationFootnote 193) but they also seek to steer and influence the actions of others. This was clearly evident in the ‘traditional’ actions of protest and lobbying against the Khimkinsky Forest highway, which sought to block the policy decisions and actions of the Russian state.Footnote 194 Although ENGO actions were frequently marginalized (as in the Okhotsk Sea example), our findings suggest that ENGOs remain a crucial agent in environmental regulatory processes and can exert pressure on environmental decision makers to try (albeit often unsuccessfully) to make up for state omissions and weakness.Footnote 195
The authority, capacity and legitimacy of ENGOs as environmental governors are also implicitly and explicitly recognized by the state. The engagement of ENGOs in state-backed forums, and their (albeit limited) success in influencing the shape of laws, underline their capacity as key agents of environmental governance. Similarly, ENGOs have stepped in as decision makers and implementers of national parks policy as a result of their expertise and capacity to respond to state omissions.Footnote 196 Here, rather than actively seeking to block or undermine the state, ENGOs work in tandem with government missions, and appear to strengthen the role of the state by filling its lacunae.Footnote 197
Indeed, even though the Russian state is suspicious and at times hostile to ENGOs (as illustrated by the NGO Law and subsequent raids), it welcomes the participation of ENGO expertise-based input.Footnote 198 From a normative perspective, expertise may well be a point of leverage for ENGOs, and may provide a key to unlock access and exert further influence over state agendas on environmental issues. Relevant environmental expertise is held by a small part of the population, but is potentially prized by the Russian state.Footnote 199 Further work is needed to better understand whether and how ENGOs can capitalize on these ‘expertise gaps’ in the regulatory administration, and to what extent there are trade-offs in authority between ENGOs and the state.
Although ENGOs clearly continue to shape decisions and actions over environmental issues in Russia, the extent of their role is both threatened and limited by state policy and accountability measures. The NGO Law, and prosecutions and raids conducted under its purview, evidence an underlying tension and belief that ENGOs can undermine formal political structures.Footnote 200 State attempts to gain stronger control over ENGOs have a significant potential to block ENGO actions, either indirectly (through the threat of raids) or directly (through closing down organizations). The legal regime constitutes the biggest threat to the role of ENGOs as capable and independent environmental governors. While we have identified some strategies for responding to this challenge, more analytical work is needed to better understand the long-term environmental and democratic consequences of such strong state accountability measures over ENGOs. Furthermore, from a normative perspective, research is needed to identify the means and ways in which to resist or reform such top-down controls in order to promote democratic freedom and a stronger role for civil society in nations similar to the Russian context.
In summary, our findings have provided timely insights with regard to the role of ENGOs in environmental governance and their interaction with the state and each other. It has advanced our understanding of the operation, strengths and challenges of ENGOs as environmental governors in Russia. However, it must be recognized that the conclusions and implications in this article are limited to the interviews and ENGOs from which they were drawn. Further, the role of ENGOs and the state is far from static, and continues to be shaped through ongoing interaction of numerous non-governmental and government actors.Footnote 201 While the comparative and empirical analysis of multiple ENGOs has allowed the article to explore a range of issues, further interviews with government, business and other ENGOs are vital to test and confirm what its findings and implications hold for both Russian and broader contexts. It is hoped that this article has generated interest in a more widespread and sustained examination of ENGOs in environmental governance around the globe, in order to foster greater knowledge of both the growth and limitations of non-state environmental governors.
