This is an ambitious book in which the authors, Paul Poast and Johannes Urpelainen, address the following questions that lie at the core of key debates in comparative politics and international relations: First (p. 2), does “democratization—the process by which government institutions transition from authoritarian or foreign rule to self-governing democracy—induce the creation of International Organizations [IOs]?” Second, does membership in IOs developed by democratizing states facilitate democratic consolidation in these countries? The book’s focus on answering these questions is motivated by a provocative but remarkably prescient claim made by Poast and Urpelainen—namely, that the “mechanisms underpinning the association (between democratization and IOs) remain unclear” (p. 3).
The authors thus first develop a parsimonious and cogent theoretical framework in Chapters 2 and 3 that unpacks the explanatory mechanisms that account for the relationship between democratization and international organizations. They use a variety of methodological tools—large-n statistical tests, case studies, and analysis of within-country data—to empirically evaluate the hypotheses derived from their theory. Chapters 4–5 report the results from their statistical analysis. Chapters 6–7 present case-study analyses, first from the Baltic states and then from Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa to test the battery of causal predictions extracted from their theory.
Poast and Urpelainen’s exceptional quality of research produces a theoretically insightful and empirically sophisticated work that will leave an indelible mark on enduring debates about democratization, institutional design, and the link between domestic politics and international systemic factors such as IOs. Few books can make novel contributions to central theoretical debates across different fields in political science and speak to distinct audiences with different methodological and theoretical perspectives. Yet Organizing Democracy succeeds in these endeavors. The theory presented in it makes an original contribution to the literature on democratization by demonstrating how and why democratizing states design IOs to strengthen their domestic democratic institutions. The book also develops new conceptual avenues in the study of IOs in international relations by putting forth a bold and counterintuitive argument that democratizing regimes will prefer opting to design new IOs. This departs from the conventional claim that new or fragile democratic states merely join established IOs to obtain side payments.
The authors begin their theory by proposing that states that are transitioning to democracy—that is, democratizing regimes—have three reasons to form new IOs over joining established IOs “managed” by advanced democracies like the United States (p. 29). The first reason is that forming IOs provides democratizing states an opportunity to develop international institutions that align with their interests to have third parties that help with “arranging elections, strengthening the judiciary, improving infrastructure, providing social security to mass constituencies, and dealing with internal conflicts” (p. 32) in their domestic polity. This interest alignment incentivizes democratizing states to develop IOs that—along with assistance from advanced democracies—act as neutral third parties to monitor elections and strengthen the rule of law in their respective domestic political arenas, which is crucial for maintaining domestic political stability.
The second reason is that incurring the transaction costs of forming new IOs serves as a costly signal that helps new democracies (that form IOs) earn a reputation for being committed to democratic rule. This reputation makes it easier for these democratizing countries to obtain “economic and military assistance from major Western powers” (p. 39), which benefits the newly democratized states.
The third reason is that the assistance (e.g., foreign aid, access to export markets) that democratizing states obtain from major Western powers after forming IOs is directed toward public-goods provision in these states. This substantially increases the capacity of governments in new democracies to ameliorate their citizens’ living standards.
According to Poast and Urpelainen, the three reasons that explain why democratizing states form new IOs also explain how new IOs foster democratic consolidation in these countries. For instance, since the new IOs developed by governments in democratizing regimes facilitate public-goods provision, this enhances their governance capacity, which increases their political legitimacy. This in turn stabilizes democratic rule in these states. Next, recall that democratizing states use the IOs they design to serve as neutral third parties to monitor elections, strengthen the judiciary, and resolve domestic political conflict. These factors promote robust democratic institutions in the transition states, which facilitates democratic consolidation. Finally, the new IOs designed by democratizing states provide “support for nongovernmental organizations, and civic education” (p. 59) in new democracies. This fosters the growth of civil society in the transitioning states, which supports democratic consolidation.
The theory in Organizing Democracy is rich and insightful. But it would have benefited from addressing the following key issues. To start, note that one of the central theoretical claims that Poast and Urpelainen propose is that democratizing countries will form new IOs because established democracies will support these new IOs and provide economic assistance to the nascent democracies that develop them. Indeed, they posit that “to the extent that established democracies have an interest in the spread of democratic political institutions, they can expect gains from strengthening IOs that support democratic consolidation” (p. 61). What are these “gains”? What are the strategic benefits that established democracies can derive from—and, hence, what are their incentives for—supporting the IOs designed by democratizing regimes? Can the established democracies obtain the proposed gains from new democracies even without supporting the IOs that these states create? While the authors are cognizant of these issues and address them, comprehensive answers to these questions could have been offered to further clarify their theory’s scope conditions.
Next, the book’s theoretical story could have paid more attention to the possibility that incumbents in democratizing regimes may account for the long-run sustainability of the IOs they design even before they incur the “sunk costs” of developing these institutions. After all, rational forward-looking leaders in democratizing states may account for their ex ante uncertainty that the IOs they develop may not deliver ex post the benefits they seek. Such uncertainty may discourage these leaders from incurring the sunk costs of developing IOs. Thus, the book’s theory could have been extended to explain when leaders in democratizing states will find it optimal ex ante to develop IOs that reliably provide benefits over time.
Lastly, the extant literature on democratic consolidation teaches us that newly enfranchised voters play a crucial role in determining the survivability of democratic institutions in nascent democracies. Poast and Urpelainen discuss the role of these actors in their theoretical story. Yet more analysis about whether incumbents in democratizing regimes believe that forming IOs may credibly signal their democratic credentials to domestic audiences at home would extend their theory’s explanatory leverage.
In addition to their original theoretical insights, Poast and Urpelainen use their formidable econometric skills to estimate statistical models such as split-population and Heckman-selection corrected models on several samples to statistically test the hypotheses extracted from their theory. This is complemented by a detailed case study of why the Baltic states developed and pursued membership in IOs following independence. They also evaluate their theory by analyzing cases from Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. The rigor and comprehensiveness of their tests is a textbook case of high-quality empirical analysis, one which is worthy of emulation by all scholars. But additional exercises could have been conducted to further push the boundaries of their empirical analysis.
For instance, IR scholars have suggested in different contexts that diffusion matters, in that each state in a region seeks to emulate the behavior of other neighboring states, either owing to peer pressure or to follow the (perceived) successful strategies of these states. Thus, if one state or two in a region form or join IOs, then other neighboring states will follow suit, not to facilitate democratic consolidation per se but because of the fear of being left out of international institutions developed by their peers. This alternative mechanism about how “spatial dynamics” may influence new democracies to form IOs could have been explicitly ruled out or controlled for in their statistical analysis.
Moreover, the empirical assessment would have been more thorough if the authors had evaluated whether democratizing states that develop IOs are more likely to receive International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans, foreign aid, or trade concessions from advanced democracies after these nascent democracies form (or join) IOs. Lastly, the incentives, strategic calculus, and behavior of incumbents in democratizing states regarding IOs is a crucial component of the book’s theory. To their credit, the authors do assess the decision that leaders in the newly democratized Baltic states made regarding IOs. However, more in-depth empirical analysis of the attitudes that these incumbents held about new and existing IOs would shed more light on how democratizing states perceive the functional efficacy of international institutions. Notwithstanding these minor quibbles, Organizing Democracy is a superbly crafted book that will be widely acclaimed by scholars of comparative politics and international relations.
