These seven books reflect the great diversity and dynamism of contemporary scholarship on the Second World War. They encompass a broad range of genres, including analytical monographs, vivid and compelling memoirs, an edited conference collection and a work that makes hitherto classified archival material available to a wider audience. Together they demonstrate the vitality and breadth of recent Second World War scholarship, reflecting that the war remains a subject of significant scholarly and popular interest.
The memoirs of Uwe Timm and Willy Reese illustrate the ongoing interest in wartime autobiographical and biographical accounts that focus on the construction, reconstruction, suppression and recovery of memories of the Second World War. Recovering both individual and collective wartime experiences has become a major area of both scholarly and popular interest since the 1990s, as well as an area of vigorous, and controversial, historical debate. Both these works add their own distinctive contributions to the growing corpus of Second World War memoir accounts.
Novelist Uwe Timm's biography of his brother, In My Brother's Shadow: A Life and Death in the SS, adds to the flood of recent literature that examines the construction of German memory of the Second World War.Footnote 1 Timm's biography adds a new twist to this expanding genre as it depicts the author's self-discovery through his investigation and recreation of the life, actions, and beliefs of his elder brother, Karl-Heinz, who joined the Waffen-SS in 1942 and was killed on the eastern front in 1943. Uwe grew up in his brother's shadow as he experienced the adoration heaped by friends and family on his fallen brother, who died, in their eyes, a ‘war hero’. These childhood experiences alienated Uwe from his family, submerged his own self-identity and left him plagued with insecurities and self-doubt. Uwe's reconstruction of his sibling's life is based on his brother's brief, fragmentary and cryptic field journal. In seeking his ‘real’ brother, Uwe discovers and reclaims his own identity as he realises that his brother was not a war hero but a flawed individual who fell under the influence of the Nazis, shared their contempt for Slavs and almost certainly participated in war crimes. Uwe ultimately concludes that his brother's silence about war crimes in his diary reflects his acceptance of Nazi brutality. The distinctive quasi-autobiographical character of Uwe Timm's biography makes it an unusual and valuable contribution to the proliferating memoir literature on the eastern frontFootnote 2 that anyone interested in personal wartime experiences, issues of victimisation and victimhood, as well as the recollection and reconstruction of memory, ought to read.
Willy Reese's A Stranger to Myself is an account of fighting on the eastern front in the Second World War. Reese was a recent high school graduate and apprentice bank clerk when he was conscripted into the German army in early 1941 and dispatched to the eastern front, where he found himself engulfed by the brutality and the primitiveness of what became a daily struggle for survival. Increasingly disillusioned and alienated, Reese became fixated on the violence and death that surrounded him. This memoir is based on a combination of his field journal and letters home to his parents. When he was seriously injured in 1943 and returned home on extended convalescent leave, he used these to compile a manuscript that he left with his mother for safekeeping. He returned to the eastern front in 1944, to be killed soon afterwards. His mother kept the manuscript until her death, after which Reese's experiences were published in Germany by a cousin in 2002; they were translated into English in 2005 by Michael Hoffmann. As such, A Stranger to Myself represents one of relatively few eastern front memoirs actually written during the war.Footnote 3 As an ‘authentic’ memoir, Reese's autobiography thus adds valuable insight into the construction of German wartime experiences as well as the historical debate over the nature and mechanisms of postwar reconstruction of memory among German veterans.Footnote 4
The book's hyperbolic prose provides a disquieting contrast to its descriptions of the atrocities and the savagery of the war on the eastern front. Moreover, Reese speaks openly about this vicious war's destructive impact on himself, a theme that is relatively uncommon among the memoirs of German Second World War veterans. A Stranger to Myself describes how Reese gradually lost his soul and became an alcoholic indifferent to human suffering. It chronicles his growing obsession with death and killing as he descended into a primitive instinctive struggle for survival. In his reflections, Reese comes to question his own Christianity and ultimately the existence of God. It is in this discussion that Reese provides telling insight into how National Socialism came to be an ‘ersatz’ religion for so many young German soldiers during the Second World War.Footnote 5 Reese conveys how his embrace of Nazi racial views, as manifested by his superior and arrogant attitude towards Slavic Russians and his indifference to their suffering and torment, lead him to participate willingly, even enthusiastically, in acts of brutality. It shows how National Socialism stripped the thin veneer of civilisation from German soldiers and brought to the surface their darkest desires for martial prowess, power and violence. Thus A Stranger to Myself is another testimony regarding the participation of the German army in widespread atrocities.
Reese's disillusionment, however, ultimately led him to see war as irrational and German aggression, and the atrocities committed in its name as crimes. He realises that the wanton violence that he himself routinely practised was counterproductive, since it buttressed Soviet determination and desperation, and its fanatical will to survive Nazi aggression at any cost. It is here that Reese's account is atypical among German eastern front memoirs, few of which display a similar understanding of the negative consequences of Nazi barbarity.Footnote 6 Most importantly, Reese illuminates the complexity and inconsistency of human responses to the war, emphasising the limited historical utility of broad generalisations about collective wartime experiences.Footnote 7 For Reese is clearly a multi-faceted and conflicted soul: a man who comes to enjoy fighting, killing, looting and martial camaraderie, yet also becomes dead to human emotion and subject to wild mood swings that sometimes lead him to suicidal recklessness. Still, the memoir invites the reader to view Reese himself as a victim of Nazism and to invoke sympathy with his plight. This autobiography is a powerful memoir of war on the eastern front and represents a valuable addition to the genre.
Rothwell and Weinberg provide an analytical treatment of Second World War war aims in their respective studies. Viktor Rothwell's War Aims in the Second World War analyses seven of the major belligerents. It comprises five chapters examining Germany and Italy, Britain and France, the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan. In this carefully thought-out and well constructed analysis Rothwell offers a succinct study of the key belligerents’ war aims, something that few monographs have done hitherto. The book usefully distinguishes between war aims that were constants (that could not be abandoned short of utter defeat) and contingent war aims (that arose as a result of the fortunes of war). Rothwell sheds light on the wartime transition of the United States and the Soviet Union to superpower status. He also argues that British war aims were the most consistent and limited, in seeking to restore the status quo, while those of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan were, obviously, the most absolute. Rothwell's assessments dovetail nicely with those of Weinberg in most instances, although the absence of any analysis of nationalist China is disappointing. Rothwell emphasises that the Holocaust was a product of the Second World War, particularly the war on the eastern front, and that forced migration, not genocide, had been the pre-war Nazi intention. Rothwell stresses that imperial Japan had territorial ambitions in north America, that Soviet war aims were a blend of ideology, pragmatism and paranoia, and that French war aims suffered from delusions of grandeur. While generally paralleling Weinberg's conclusions (see the discussion below), Rothwell offers a few distinct nuances. He argues that Hitler remained ambivalent about a colonial empire in Africa and that he pursued an essentially defensive posture versus the Atlantic world and the United States; Rothwell also emphasises more strongly the anti-British nature of French war aims (to the extent that de Gaulle briefly advocated a postwar French alliance with the USSR!) as well as prewar British distrust of, and disillusionment with, the United States. But, overall, there is considerable consonance between Rothwell's and Weinberg's interpretations. War Aims is a well-written work, based on extensive and thorough grounding in the profuse secondary literature, that is highly recommended.
Gerhard Weinberg's Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leaders provides a fascinating parallel to Rothwell's study. This book examines a subject which, surprisingly, has not, previously been explored in great detail: the visions of an ideal postwar world in the eyes of eight of the principal war leaders. He covers the same seven countries as does Rothwell covers (de Gaulle being examined for France), with the addition of Chiang Kai-Shek for nationalist China. This compelling book looks at the personalities, agendas, visions and territorial designs of these eight statesmen. Weinberg also examines how the military strategies pursued by the leaders were shaped by their own worldviews and their own hopes and dreams for the future. Furthermore, he details the way in which their decisions affected subsequent events and events shaped their visions for the future. The result is a rather disturbing view of various possible outcomes. It includes a new Nazi ‘world order’ that was not only Jew-free and where Slavs were held in brutal bondage but also where a victorious Axis alliance would turn on the United States and share colonial empires in Africa, Asia and the Americas.
Among the Allies, Weinberg illuminates the enormous distrust of Stalin and communism and how de Gaulle desired not only to restore, but even expand, the French empire by reclaiming previously held lands in north-west Italy. In Churchill's vision traditional British and French empires would be reconstructed, a somewhat ironic endgame, given the great historical rivalries between the two powers. Weinberg explains how Stalin desired – and got – the extension of Stalinist control into eastern Europe to provide a buffer zone against the perceived menace that bourgeois-capitalism posed. The author contends that Roosevelt's vision of the postwar world probably came closest to realisation with the creation of the United Nations. Since the outcomes sought by the major protagonists powerfully influenced their decision-making and their conduct of the war, Weinberg's study adds insight to the existing literature on the Second World War. Visions of Victory is a broad synthesis of a voluminous and proliferating secondary literature. Throughout Weinberg is balanced and objective, and his vignettes are compelling. Some might quibble that Weinberg presents FDR in too favourable a light, but overall one is persuaded by the author's balanced and judicious evaluations. In summary, Weinberg's examination of alternate histories of the outcome of the Second World War is a must-read for anyone interested in the Second World War.
Weinberg's study also intersects with Richard Eubank's revised third edition of his well-received The Origins of World War II, originally published in 1969. Eubank's revised edition incorporates the increasing complexity that recent historiography has brought to the understanding of the origins of the war. The book still addresses – and still seems unable to answer fully – the simple question the author first addressed nearly four decades ago: why did the Second World War occur? Since the first edition, many studies have reinforced Eubank's original assessment that Hitler was primarily responsible for the war. His central questions remain: why did the Western powers fail to read accurately the threat posed by Hitler and Nazism? Why were the Western powers so reluctant to confront a once defeated foe? And, finally, why was Germany permitted to rearm? Eubank's answer is that there was an illusion that sufficient security measures were in place to maintain peace which, when combined with the terrible memories of the Great War, paralysed the Western powers.
Another major section of the book examines the genesis and goals of the policy of appeasement. Eubank demonstrates that appeasement had public endorsement and that it was a policy rooted in rational nineteenth-century diplomatic decision-making. He also emphatically rejects the notion that appeasement by Chamberlain should be equated with cowardice. In examining the unwillingness of Britain and France to confront an expansionist Germany in the 1930s, Eubank ably contextualises the policy of appeasement, arguing that it was sensible given that it sought to reduce international tension by defusing points of friction. Perhaps the author ought to place more emphasis on Chamberlain's intellectual failure to understand Hitler – who was no nineteenth-century statesman but a product of the radicalising Great War itself.Footnote 8 With Britain and France clearly unprepared, both militarily and psychologically, for war, appeasement was a prudent policy to buy time and prepare peoples and militaries for war. The idea that appeasement, however, emboldened Hitler and reinforced his contemptuous attitudes toward the West, as Churchill warned it would, ought to receive more treatment.Footnote 9 But Eubank is generally correct in his emphasis that few realistic alternatives to appeasement existed.
The author also rejects the notion that Britain and France could have stopped German reoccupation of the Rhineland. Here the author appears to under-appreciate Hitler's domestic weakness during his consolidation of power. A significant foreign policy failure would have been a humiliating, and potentially disastrous, setback for the Führer. Moreover, Eubank does not grapple with recent literature that demonstrates the enormous difficulties the German military encountered during its painful early years of expansion and how in fact it remained much weaker than the powerful image of strength and effectiveness that the Nazi propaganda machine so convincingly portrayed throughout the 1930s.Footnote 10
Eubank also illuminates the opportunistic and pragmatic nature of Soviet foreign policy in the 1930s. While British and French fear of communism precluded the recreation of the Triple Entente, the author contends that Soviet opportunism also contributed to the outbreak of war in September 1939. The fact that what was original in 1969 has become conventional today is a testament to the staying power of Eubank's original interpretations. While the major interpretive changes of the third edition – a re-evaluation of Soviet foreign policy as more opportunistic and added emphasis on Hitler's central role in craving war – enhance the work's quality, they do so without substantively transforming its original conclusions. At its heart the book remains a conventional interpretation that emphasizes Nazi Germany's desire to overturn the crushing humiliation of defeat in the Great War and the failure of the Western Allies to prevent the kind of war recurring that they desperately sought to avoid. In his explanation of the path to war, Eubank stresses both that the Treaty of Versailles lacked teeth and that the Allies’ failure to impose a military occupation on Germany in 1919 (as they would do in 1945) ensured that the German people failed to appreciate fully that they had been comprehensively defeated in the Great War. If the Allies had occupied Germany, Eubank convincingly argues, there would have been no ‘stab in the back legend’ nor the revival of militant nationalism in the guise of National Socialism. The author also correctly emphasises that the triumph of nationalism and the creation of multiple new nations in east-central Europe out of the ashes of multiple empires, in fact left Germany stronger in the long term, strategically, than that country had been in 1914.Overall, this revised edition is a useful concise overview for undergraduates of the events that led to the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939. Since it is a short text, it can not explore in depth the historiography of the origins of the Second World War. Thus it is best utilised in conjunction with other interpretive accounts on the origins of the conflict.Footnote 11
Breitman, Goda, Naftali and Wolfe's US Intelligence and the Nazis is the product of the 1998 US Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, which led to the four authors serving as the consulting historians on the Nazi War Criminal and Imperial Japanese Records Interagency Working Group (NWCIJRIWG). These historians assisted in the declassification of 8 million pages of US government records, and this book is a synthesis of their insights into the most significant topics and revelations that have emerged as a result of this declassification process. The work should not, however, be mistaken for an official history; it is an expanded and revised version of the original NWCIJRIWG-sponsored study. It sheds light on a number of important historical questions, including Allied knowledge of the Holocaust, the prevalence of antisemitism in the United States, US business collaboration with the Nazis, how Nazis managed to evade postwar prosecution and the protection of indicted Nazis by US intelligence agencies.
This is an informative collection, comprising fifteen articles covering three main topics: what US intelligence agencies knew about the Holocaust, US and European collaboration with the Nazis and post-1945 Allied use of indicted German war criminals. The volume thus has a well-defined focus. The authors’ conclusions are disturbing. US intelligence agencies made many mistakes in the gathering and utilisation of information regarding the Holocaust. The released documents reveal that the Allies were more aware of the Holocaust at the time than had hitherto been thought and that US intelligence agencies failed to study actively evidence of the Final Solution because, in wartime, military intelligence took precedence. Moreover, by imposing their own frame of reference, US intelligence agencies failed to appreciate the racial and ideological beliefs of wartime German intelligence operatives that invariably rendered the latter inept. US blinkers therefore helped some Nazi war criminals to evade prosecution as US intelligence agencies mistook their willingness to co-operate with the Allies late in the war (out of self-preservation) as an indication of distaste for Nazism and/or repulsion at the Holocaust. Consequently, for pragmatic reasons (to ensure that other Nazis continued to provide valuable intelligence) the US shielded various war criminals – such as SS General Karl Wolff – from prosecution. The authors also contend that avoidable ignorance of the Holocaust contributed to the inappropriate hiring and protection of various ‘entrepreneurial’ Nazi war criminals who had little intelligence of value to offer the United States but who were able to ‘buy’ themselves immunity from prosecution on the basis of their own inflated claims of what their intelligence was worth. Cynical Nazi war criminals clearly manipulated evident US anti-communist obsessions to evade prosecution. However, the study concludes that very few of the declassified documents suggest that the Nazi war criminals protected by the United States provided intelligence of sufficient value to justify their ‘protection’. Instead, the US intelligence agencies had to bury these embarrassing truths for as long as possible. It took the waning of the cold war in the 1980s for the United States belatedly to recognise the mistakes made during the exigencies of that period.
The prescience and relevance of this study's conclusions regarding the appropriate use of intelligence assets in the contemporary international ‘war on terror’ could not be starker. The authors’ assessments that the reliability of information garnered from Nazis was often low are a lesson that has clear contemporary relevance. Some might argue that the authors perhaps fail to weigh sufficiently the impact of cold war imperatives that created a powerful perception of an imminent and overriding communist threat. For, it was this climate that compelled the US government and its intelligence officers to conclude that using Nazi war criminals for intelligence purposes represented the lesser of two evils. Nonetheless, the authors convey a salutatory, implicit lesson for the US government (and others) in the contemporary global ‘war on terrorism’, where similar powerful perceptions of threat exist. Overall, this collection presents insights for scholars interested in wartime intelligence gathering and postwar efforts to prosecute war criminals, as well as contemporary concerns over the appropriate use of intelligence.
Chickering, Förster and Greiner's A World at Total War is the culmination of a series of conferences on the history of total war, another increasingly popular focus of scholarly endeavour in modern military and political history.
The basic question examined in this edited collection of nineteen thematic articles by some twenty-three contributors is whether the Second World War ought to be regarded as a paradigm of total war. The study starts in 1937, in recognition of the significant role of the Sino-Japanese conflict in the genesis of the war. Nevertheless, it was Nazi aggression in Europe that began the process of transforming the conflict into a global struggle. This is the fifth publication emanating from conferences dedicated to the theme of total war (the others cover conflicts from the American Civil War to the Great War).
In concert, these publications have added valuable insights to historical understanding on the phenomenon of total war. The concept of ‘total war’ is one based on modern Western military thought, particularly the ideas of the nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist Karl Marie von Clausewitz. In his On War, Clausewitz identified ‘absolute war’ as an idealisation of total conflict that could never be realised because of the ‘frictions’ (i.e. the ‘fog’) of war. Some academics believe that studying total war as a phenomenon can help scholars better understand the true nature, characteristics, and impacts, of warfare. In the end most of the contributors appear to conclude that the Second World War did not reach the abstract ideal of absolute war that Clausewitz envisaged; nevertheless, overwhelmingly, they concur that the Second World War represents the closest approximation of ‘total war’ yet seen within human conflict.
Moreover, the work identifies and examines the various elements that the contributors deem central to ‘true’ ‘total war’: the growing lethality of modern weaponry, total psychological and economic commitment, absolute ideological goals calling for the annihilation of enemies, the blurring of traditional distinctions between civilians and combatants, and total war practised on a global scale.
Messer's examination of the morality of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima presents probably the most valuable study of the wartime dynamics that blurred the differences between civilians and combatants. He concludes that the dropping of atomic bombs was a logical culmination of two elements. The first element was the Allied strategic bombing campaign, which, in targeting Japan's decentralised workshop war industry located in urban centres, easily evolved into a larger campaign to ‘de-house’ Japanese civilians, to damage and disrupt Japanese infrastructure, to compel redirection of Japanese resources towards air defence as well as civilian protection and relief efforts, as well as to assail civilian morale and willingness to continue the war. Messer rightly emphasises that the cumulative damage of the ‘fire-bombing’ strategic bombing campaign against Japanese industry and cities was much greater than that inflicted by the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs. The second dynamic was the transformed context of a vicious total war of great savagery and brutality, particularly in the ‘island hopping’ campaign of the central Pacific, which saw the price of Allied victory increase dramatically the closer the Allies edged to the Japanese home islands. That the Asia–Pacific war had by 1944 become a ‘total war’ for the protagonists inevitably made it very much easier for the US government and military to employ a weapon that, more than any other, has come to symbolise total war in the post- Second World War era. Together the contributions of Messer, Overy and Nolte help to reinforce awareness that it was the dynamic of mutual escalation, combined with the enhanced lethality of modern military technology, which dramatically diminished distinctions between combatants and civilians during the war.
Particularly valuable among the four contributions on societal mobilisation is Barber's study of women in the Soviet war effort. He emphasises that Soviet mobilisation of its society came closest to realising total war. Moreover, although Barber stresses the enormous contribution made by Soviet women to the victory of the USSR, he concludes – contrary to conventional wisdom that war is a major accelerant of social change – that the Second World War was less of a catalyst for improvement in the status of women in postwar Soviet society than is often portrayed. Barber argues quite the opposite: the war had a highly destructive impact on Soviet women, leading the author to question whether the postwar advances gained by Soviet women were worth the price paid by them. This is a thought-producing piece and a refreshing foil to conventional interpretations.
The last section, ‘criminal war’, comprises three articles but lacks the coherence of the other parts. The most illuminating contribution here is Beck's examination of the prevalence of the wartime sexual violence of German soldiers and the failure of the German military justice system to respond to this problem. Beck argues that it was military necessities as well as racial and ideological prejudices that dictated the action of wartime German military justice. Such imperatives ensured that French women could, on occasion, obtain justice for sexual assaults inflicted by German soldiers, but that Polish and Russian women were much less likely to obtain any redress, and the punishments meted for assaults on ‘Slavic’ women were consistently much lighter. Nonetheless, despite the brutal ideological war fought in the east, German soldiers in Russia could be and were, on occasion, tried and convicted of rape, largely as a result of the efforts of officers to maintain discipline and of local commanders to undercut popular support for the partisan war. Pragmatic military and politico-strategic considerations – not the inherent right of victims of sexual violence to obtain justice – therefore dictated the invariably inconsistent responses of the German military justice system.
Among the many nuggets of insight in this book, a few collective conclusions stand out: the increasing radicalisation of modern war and the classic wartime dynamic of mutual escalation which contributed directly to such radicalisation. Probably the most disturbing conclusion (offered by both Gessler and Förster) is that genocide might be intrinsic to total war. Overall, the volume presents a clearer appreciation of many of the varied manifestations of total war. Together the contributors add to our understanding of the phenomenon of total war and the characteristics that defined it during the Second World War. This collection of essays is undoubtedly worthy of study by scholars of modern war and society as well as by anyone interested in the Second World War or in the phenomena of genocide and total war.
In conclusion, these seven works represent some of the major trends in scholarship on the Second World War in recent years, from analytical studies that seek to comprehend the conflict in more global terms, to memoirs that seek the authentic individual and collective experiences of the war, to an attempt to comprehend the conflict as a manifestation of total war. All these books are valuable additions to the historiography of the Second World War and are important additions to the bookshelves of Second World War scholars.
