In tracing the history of the war of 1739–48, this book focuses on how its ever-changing circumstances, hazards, and opportunities were addressed by those who formulated British policy and strategy. Regarding the opening phase, the war against Spain, the author effectively conveys the early confidence with which British statesmen endorsed a strategy of Caribbean conquests despite warnings that nearly all attacking and occupying troops would probably die of disease. The War of the Austrian Succession shifted British attention to Europe, and Richard Harding has delved deeply into the permutating continental situation. Alliances were seen as the keys to success, and British statesmen seemed remarkably confident that subsidized allies would actually put the agreed number of troops in the field as required. This seldom happened. There were also confident expectations—among all participants—that army field commanders would achieve success, although often their preparations were inadequate and failure resulted. Following the twists and turns of Harding’s well-researched narrative is not always easy (and the index is amazingly unhelpful, clueless really); one is driven to the conclusion that nothing ever worked on a sustainable basis, diplomatically or militarily. The important exception, before the war’s closing years, was Frederick II’s campaigning in Silesia—in which he acted without an ally.

In truth, reliable alliances were almost impossible to construct in this war. When urging support for their European goals, British statesmen, notably the duke of Newcastle, invoked the idea of the “common cause,” as if the circumstances of forty years earlier still prevailed. They did not, fundamentally because Louis XV’s policy was far less aggressive and threatening than Louis XIV’s. Consequently, France was no longer so universally or intensively feared by other continental powers. British policy was particularly concerned to defend the Austrian Netherlands against French attack, but the Dutch Republic chose neutrality, and Austria did not give high priority to defending its Netherlands provinces. Although British statesmen considered it essential to help keep Austria fighting, there was a growing sense in London, as Harding observes, that Britain was being “forced to fight on Austrian terms for Austrian objectives” (340). In fact, Vienna, not without reason, feared Prussia more than France, and George II, thinking Frederick II to be the greatest threat to Hanover’s safety, behaved as if he, too, feared Prussia more than France. As a result, there was ample reason for members of Parliament to believe that the heavily subsidized allies were not providing much that served British interests. The problem was more fundamental than the claim, promoted by William Pitt with fiery rhetoric, that the money was being spent merely for the sake of Hanover. Yet, so long as the House of Commons was willing to approve the subsidies, Newcastle was determined to try to defeat France militarily on the continent. His optimism was remarkable. For a time it was supposed that allied forces would successfully invade France. Then, when campaigning became focused on the Austrian Netherlands, Newcastle hoped for success there. But Marshal de Saxe, commander of the French army, easily turned the tables. By late 1747, the conquest of Flanders and Brabant was complete—a dreadful outcome for Britain.

While its diplomatic and military measures in Europe were failing, Britain’s maritime operations were achieving successes. With Royal Navy assistance, New England colonists captured Louisbourg in 1745. British privateers choked off the commerce of French ports, and the navy’s Western Squadron annihilated (on two separate occasions in 1747) French battle squadrons that had been assigned to escort large departing convoys. At the peace in 1748, the British reluctantly exchanged Louisbourg in return for ending French occupation of the Austrian Netherlands. It would seem that a lesson had been learned that a European alliance system must be built on forces that were likely to cooperate effectively and that Britain should therefore be very careful when making European commitments. In view of the book’s title, one might think that the author’s purpose in probing the often tedious details of Britain’s diplomatic and military involvement on the continent was to show how, in the end, the British learned that they must rely more fully on naval power.

But Harding does not say this. He concludes that when the war ended, “the dominant logic [remained] that France had to be defeated in Europe” (342). Undoubtedly this was Newcastle’s opinion, and although his cabinet colleagues forced him to admit, in early 1748, that campaigning on the continent must be given up, his ongoing influence over foreign policy was paramount. Besides, his colleagues could not imagine how British interests on the continent could be secured without alliances. Despite the book’s title, Harding holds that the British navy’s victories in 1747 “failed to have any practical impact on French or Spanish policy” (6), but he has not closely examined French or Spanish policy, and there is evidence to the contrary in both cases.

It is curious—again noting the book’s title—to find him insisting that even in the closing years that featured naval successes, popular perception of the navy remained rather unfavorable. This may or may not be true; he does not supply a convincing argument with evidence or citations. One possible reason for unpopularity, however, may have been the impact of the dramatic courts-martial that came in the wake of the botched battle of Toulon. The verdicts exonerated Admiral Richard Lestock on a technicality (there were strong indications that he deliberately avoided combat) and found Admiral Thomas Mathews, who fought hard but without forming a proper line, guilty. (See my articles on these admirals in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.) These trials undoubtedly had an enormous impact on public perception of the navy; moreover, it was suspected, with good reason, that the Admiralty Board was influenced by politics and not on the side of naval wisdom and justice. Yet, curiously, these courts-martial are essentially unreported in this book.