Art Law is a complex and multi-faceted area of legal thought and practice. Often it is shorthand for how almost every aspect of the law touches creative expression, and how these nexuses are unique to the art world. Thus, from the outset achieving a comprehensive definition of the boundaries of art law, much less exploring the entire landscape, is likely a Sisyphean task.

Professor Herbert Lazerow’s Mastering Art Law pushes the boulder nevertheless. Lazerow comes to the field of art law with impressive credentials in the domestic and international tax field.^{Footnote 1} He currently teaches Art Law at the University of San Diego School of Law, and this, his first art law-related publication, is ambitious.

Lazerow’s book tracks many other art law texts with its inclusion of all of the expected topics. The book predictably covers everything from constitutional issues to intellectual property to commercial concerns in the art world. But notably, it also includes chapters on art during wartime, archeological issues, and international litigation. Writing a book that covers as many topics as Lazerow’s book does, unquestionably requires a herculean effort and on that basis alone deserves some commendation.^{Footnote 2}

With excellent texts already available,^{Footnote 3} what did Lazerow hope to accomplish with another book on art law? Disappointingly, the answer proves elusive. There is little in Mastering Art Law that is more interesting or more comprehensive than the existing literature. This alone is not enough to condemn the book, but what is included in the book presents its own set of critical concerns.

While there is nothing inherently wrong with another overview of standard art law topics, questionable organizational choices put this version in shaky territory from the outset. Beginning a book about art law with a discussion of “what is art” is virtually de rigueur. However, Lazerow presents “fixation in a tangible medium” (5) as a subsection of the discussion of “Art Defined by Artists and Art Critics.” Fixation in a tangible medium is in fact the legal standard required by Copyright Law before a work is copyrightable. Presenting the concept of “fixation in a tangible medium” without acknowledging that it is the established legal standard misstates the scope of the “what is art?” philosophical debate.

Another example of confusing organizational choices can be found in the chapter 11 title. Under the heading of “Adverse Possession,” Lazerow presents Statues of Limitation and Laches defenses as subcategories of Adverse Possession. In fact these are all separate defenses that may be raised in response to a stolen art claim and are not dependent on an Adverse Possession defense being raised so it is misleading to present all defenses under the Adverse Possession heading.^{Footnote 4} This sort of misleading organization is evident throughout the book resulting in inaccurate presentation of information.

Another lingering question is: Who is the intended audience? Given the relative brevity of this book (considering how many topics it covers) it is not surprising that many chapters touch only the surface of topics in a manner that might seem deferential to non-lawyers. But Lazerow frequently uses legalese without explanation, which may make much of the text opaque to the non-lawyer. And then there is the surprising dearth of references and citations, which greatly diminishes the usefulness of the book as a general reference for practitioners or law students.

Moreover, the book contains neither any footnotes nor a bibliography. Without more detailed explanations of the material cited, the book often reads more like a legal brief or an incomplete outline than a reference book. The result is the conflation or even misstatement of concepts and an often-rambling text.^{Footnote 5} One example of conflation resulting in confusion can be found under the heading “Transferring the Copyright” where Lazerow states that “[t]here is no transfer of the copyright unless it is expressly transferred with the work” (85).^{Footnote 6} With this statement he conflates three clear concepts: 1) that copyright ownership is separate and distinct from ownership of the material artwork;^{Footnote 7} 2) that a transfer of copyright ownership (or an exclusive right) requires a writing signed by the copyright owner; and 3) that a license (or a nonexclusive right) can be conveyed orally. These are all three very important, distinct points that are all but lost in Lazerow’s vague summation. Not only must the copyright be transferred specifically with a writing signed by the copyright owner, but that transfer may or may not have anything to do with the transfer of the physical artwork. Lazerow further muddies the issue when he unnecessarily references the primarily tax-related concept of fractional ownership of the physical artwork when concluding his discussion on the divisible nature of intangible copyright interests.^{Footnote 8}

One of the more curious ramblings can be found in the “Moral Rights” chapter, where Lazerow discusses artist’s right of attribution.^{Footnote 9} He states that if an artist fails to sign a work, the most traditional method of providing required attribution is “to affix a metal plaque to the frame of the painting, containing the artist’s name and the title of the painting” (132). He sees this as exceeding the Visual Artists Rights Act requirements only in that VARA doesn’t require the title to be included. In fact, this method of providing attribution is completely inappropriate in the contemporary realm and VARA does not articulate any such parameters for attribution. Further, he states that “a private owner of a work of visual art must identify the artist when the artwork is on display, even if the artwork is displayed in a private home. Presumably, no such identification is required when the work is in storage, though it is a good practice in order to avoid a situation where someone forgets to add the name of the artist when the work is put on display” (132). Where did he find these requirements? These assertions are somewhat mysterious and do not comport with any existing laws nor certainly with the way that artwork is actually handled in the real world. VARA, and the moral rights concept of attribution in general, speaks to a more intangible right that artists have to claim or disavow authorship of artwork.

Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of this book is the dry delivery. Art law cases are some of the juiciest stories around. What could be more interesting than obscenity, sex, intrigue, betrayal, hidden fortunes, and stolen treasures (to list only a few recurring art law themes)? More importantly, it is the specific subject matter of these cases that provides the essential armature around which the field of art law can be structured. The fact that the legal disputes involve art and artists is inextricably relevant to the eventual holdings—this is indeed the nexus that creates art law. Lazerow generally omits the stories, which results in a monotonous recitation of holdings that are disconnected from the facts. When facts are included, they are often so abridged as to be confusing. Nowhere is this more evident than in the book’s skimpy coverage of copyright and fair use material.^{Footnote 10} But it is also evident in other sections like that on NAGPRA with the slim treatment of the divisive Kennewick Man case.^{Footnote 11} Or the International Litigation chapter at the end of the book where Lazerow’s coverage of Maria Altmann’s dramatic case against the Austrian government is meager at best.^{Footnote 12}

Lazerow’s dry approach discounts the fact that it is the stories, and not just their endings, that make practicing and teaching art law exceptionally thrilling. Without examining the human struggles driven by greed, ego, jealousy, or just plain stupidity, we are left with a bland and unmemorable picture of art law. These great stories are the underpinning for decisions that form judicial precedent. The omission of these moving, exciting, and often outrageous stories, which comprise the fundamental allure of art law, bleeds the heart and soul from the concepts and cases that are so critical to understanding, loving, and indeed mastering art law.