The thesis of Ian Rutledge's Addicted to Oil: America's Relentless Drive for Energy Security promises to be highly interesting. The author tells us in a foreword that the war in Iraq is a culmination of a decades-long struggle by the United States to “control” Middle East oil. Careful to give the appearance of not simply falling into the blood for oil rhetoric, Rutledge notes that. although “there was never any intention to ‘steal Iraq's oil,’” he will show in his book that this policy of “control and domination” was intended to “be achieved without the direct appropriation of Iraqi oil reserves by U.S. citizens” (p. 12). The task is a large one but certainly worth a good, modern political history.
The subject of the interaction between U.S. foreign policy and oil since World War I has been covered in various periods in many excellent histories. The author cites Irvine Anderson's Aramco, the United States and Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Dynamics of Foreign Policy, 1933-1950 as one example. Allen Matusow's Nixon's Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars & Votes is another outstanding example of a book that covers the challenges for the Nixon presidency of energy shortages. International relations specialists might also appreciate John Ikenberry's Reasons of State: Oil, Politics and the Capacities of American Government, which covers the same crisis periods. More recently, Georgetown University has made a contribution to the field by setting up its special collection for the Aramco history project, which is rich in documentation about how Saudi King Faisal interacted with American oil companies to try to influence American foreign policy in the Middle East.
When I picked up the Rutledge book, I was hoping for a nice treatise that would take me all the way from Franklin Roosevelt's early interactions with King Abdul Aziz, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, and the subsequent entry into the kingdom of American oil companies, through Ronald Reagan's alleged effort to get allied Middle East oil producers to hasten the collapse of the Soviet Union (which was then occupying Afghanistan) through an oil price war. In this historical context, it would be useful and important to think about how we went from the 1940s Getty oil deal in Saudi Arabia to invading Iraq to change its government.
Unfortunately, Rutledge's book does not accomplish this. Instead, he slips into left-wing jingoism about how Vice President Dick Cheney and former President Bush and the current president worked for companies involved in the oil business and never builds his case. A good treatment of the subject would show us documentation on how the industry ties of our senior leaders, combined with our need for oil, changed U.S. foreign policy. The Georgetown collection, for example, shows through correspondences and interviews exactly how King Faisal tried to use oil blackmail and threats of nationalization to motivate American oil companies to lobby Nixon to change U.S. foreign policy toward Israel. Concerning the blood for oil myth, the Georgetown materials do show that King Faisal used oil companies as emissaries, but studies make the opposite point. King Faisal was unsuccessful in changing U.S. foreign policy, despite his documented anti-Semitism and geopolitical efforts to the contrary. The documents collected by Georgetown add tremendous insight into the process of King Faisal's interactions with the United States.
Rutledge refers only infrequently to this kind of rich primary-source material. Instead, he cites less reliable works, such as Ali Tareq's Bush in Babylon: The Recolonisation of Iraq (the title speaks for its objectivity) and lesser known anti-Cheney websites. Whereas his better-documented accounts show that former President Bush started up an independent oil company in Texas, that point seems to contradict his basic premise, because Rutledge himself correctly points out that the Independent Petroleum Association of America, the lobbying group of the U.S. independent oil companies (especially those based in Texas), has long lobbied against U.S. dependence on Middle East oil to the point that it successfully attained a tariff on imported oil in 1932 and further protection from the Eisenhower administration. The same organization tried to sue the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries during the 1998 oil-price collapse and by no means is an organization trying to get the majority of its members oil in places like Iraq.
Overall, Rutledge relies heavily on quotations from what one could refer to as the “Bush-bashing” literature. His history sections are thin and seem based in footnoting to only a handful of secondary sources, such as Daniel Yergin's The Prize and Bob Woodward's Bush at War. His simplistic recounting of the 1956 Suez Crisis and Central Intelligence Agency involvement in the coup against Qassem in Iraq makes sweeping claims that are neither backed up nor well explained. In sum, I was left with the desire to go to some other reference material for much of the book to look up whether Rutledge was on point or not.
To give you a flavor of why one cannot recommend this book, I end with a quotation that is representative. “In 2000, Cheney accepted George W. Bush's offer to be his vice presidential running mate. Cheney had previously stated categorically that he would never return to politics. We do not know what changed his mind, but possibly it was the realization that with Bush as president, he would be the real power behind the throne.” This and similar points about the vice president are asserted but never documented. Many of us suspect Cheney is a critical driver to many foreign policy decisions, but if Rutledge would like to prove that the vice president drove us to Iraq to get the oil, it would take far more than the anecdotal, loosely linked references he has provided in this book.
