“Predictions are risky, particularly if they look into the future.” That deep philosophical insight goes back to a Bavarian comedian of the last century. We can assume that neither Talcott Parsons nor Francis Fukuyama has ever come across the Bavarian comedian Carl Valentin; otherwise they would not have so easily dared to predict the long-term victory of capitalist-democratic modernization or the end of history.
Any look into the future is difficult for social and political scientists. But even looking back and finding ex post explanations for past developments is not uncontroversial in political science. This is true in particular for the “big questions” (Barbara Geddes), such as which determinants, causes, and drivers enable, promote, or prevent the democratization of political regimes. Since Seymour M. Lipset's seminal essay “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Legitimacy” (American Political Science Review 53 [1959]: 69–105) triggered the democratization debate, no commonly agreed-upon answer has been found. Structuralists compete with agency theorists, modernization theory has been challenged by dependency theory, and lean monistic explanations are confronted with complex eclectic and contextual approaches, large-n with small-n studies, and long-term with short-term analyses. The prolific production of disputed studies on regime changes has suggested that there might be several answers, quite to the dismay of those who claim to have found one single answer to the big regime question, which is universally valid across time and space.
Recently two books have been published that address those same old, but not yet uncontroversially answered, questions: Jan Teorell's monograph on explaining regime change in the world since 1972, and the volume on “the dynamics of democratization” edited by Nathan J. Brown. The Swedish political scientist Teorell poses his questions right at the beginning of his thorough empirical analyses: “Why do some countries become democracies and others not? … Are social, economic or international forces the key determinants of these processes? Are some types of authoritarian regimes more prone to democratize than others? Do actors influence democratization, or is that a structurally determined outcome?” (Determinants of Democratization, p. 1). And finally: “What lessons can be learned for international efforts at promoting democracy from comparative democratization studies?” (ibid.). The questions posed to the authors of the edited volume mirror those which underlie Teorell's study: “What causes a democracy to emerge and then maintains it? … Does democracy make things better? … Can democracy be promoted?” (The Dynamics of Democratization, pp. 1–2).
Although the questions are the same, the applied theories and methods differ. Teorell developed his own theoretical approach, which he then adopted to his empirical analysis. He first critically reviews the virtues, pitfalls, and shortcomings of four prominent approaches: the structuralist (e.g., Lipset), the strategic (e.g., Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, 1986), the economic (e.g., Carles Boix), and the social (e.g., Dietrich Rueschemeyer). The author convincingly argues that none of these approaches can explain regime changes as a whole, but they all have their analytical merits, which he intends to preserve in an “eclectic” combination of the structural, strategic, and social approaches. However, he excludes the new economic approaches of Boix (Democracy and Redistribution, 2003) and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 2006). Their somewhat orthodox rational choice–inspired economic approach “appears too occupied with conflicts over income distribution” (p. 12). Moreover, Teorell claims that their key explanation that democratization is triggered by decreasing income inequality “is not borne out in my data” (ibid.). By combining the strategic (agency) and structural (modernization theory) approach and not neglecting the force of social classes, he presents an eclectic but sound inclusive theoretical approach that promises to overcome the self-imposed limitations of the single theories.
Brown's volume, which grew out of a series of conferences, also does not follow one single theoretical approach. On the contrary, the editor deliberately allows for different theories and methods. Large-n analyses, such as the one by Jose Antonio Cheibub and James Raymond Vreeland on “Economic Development and Democratization,” and regional studies on the “Unexpected Resilience of Latin American Democracy” (Kathleen Bruhn) and “Present Authoritarianism and the Future of Democracy in Africa” (Staffan I. Lindberg and Sara Meerow) are assembled in the volume. So are case studies (“Sustaining Party Rule in China,” by Bruce J. Dickson); analyses of single institutions, such as Steven Fish's “Strong Legislatures as the Key to Bolstering Democracy”; and specific determinants of democratization, such as “Legacy Effects” (John Gerring), “Elections” (Susan D. Hyde), or “International Diffusion and Democratic Change” (Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik). Each of these studies can stand alone, but together they promise to give more conclusive answers to the three guiding questions of the book.
What are the results of these studies? Do the different types of books and the varying theoretical and methodological work produce different results? Do they enrich our knowledge of the causes and dynamics of democratization? On the basis of an excellent database and large-n regression analyses, Teorell provides reasonable insights that are not entirely new but are empirically well founded. After having tested social (Chapter 2), economic (Chapter 3), international (Chapter 4), and agency-related (Chapter 5) determinants of democratization, the author presents his research results in a list of 12 relevant findings. The most important ones are summarized here:
Structural factors matter as postulated in modernization theory. They drive regime change toward democracy. However, they unfold their predictive power only in the long run. In the short run, their prognostic capacity is rather limited. Teorell confirms O'Donnell and Schmitter's argument of “uncertainty” and” unpredictability” stressed so strongly in their seminal 1986 work. Referring to his data and calculation, the author finds no evidence that one of the classical modernization factors (economic, social, educational) or international factors is more conducive to democracy than another. Here, he remains cautious. Nevertheless, “economic crises, peaceful demonstrations, neighbour diffusion and democratic regional organizations were robustly related to positive increases in the level of democracy” (p. 142). The relatively high levels of the conventional modernization indicators do not drive democratization on their own. Also, the presence of these indicators limits the potential impediments posed to the quality of democracy. Teorell provides evidence that supports both the endogenous and exogenous versions of modernization theory, suggesting that the choice of data sets and research periods plays a larger role in determining research results than do objective causal mechanisms.
Teorell found no robust correlation with (non)democratization for some of the usual suspects among the causal preventers of democratization, such as colonial origin, non-Muslim religious denomination, ethnic and religious fractionalization, natural resource abundance, or income inequality. What matters more by contrast is media proliferation. It is clearly positively correlated with transition to and the consolidation of democracy. Protest, manifestation, and unrest do not trigger democratization per se; rather it is, above all, peaceful demonstrations that often lead to a split within the authoritarian elites and prompt business-sector defection from the co-optation bargain in authoritarian regimes.
Not surprisingly, Teorell both confirms and denies some of Geddes's findings regarding the link between the authoritarian regime type and its vulnerability vis-à-vis democratization. Teorell agrees with Geddes that the most fragile dictatorships are military regimes. However, he does not confirm Geddes's observation that one-party regimes are more resilient than monarchies. Against the rational-choice interpretation by Boix and Milan Svolik that semipluralist elections help to stabilize authoritarian regimes by alleviating the moral hazard and defection problems among the ruling elites, he argues in line with Andreas Schedler (“The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections,” International Political Science Review 23 [2002]: 103–22) that elections in multiparty autocracies exacerbate intraelite regimes' splits and foster the coalescence of the opposition.
The great merit of Teorell's impressive study does not lie in providing the research community with fundamentally new insights into the dynamics of democratization. Almost all single results can be found (and contested) somewhere else in the extensive bulk of the literature. But what singles out Teorell's book is that all these single causalities were revealed by employing the same database, which seems to be more complex and richer than most of the data sets used so far in democratization research. Determinants of Democratization indeed explains the main drivers and preventers in the world since 1972. The book has to be considered a landmark of empirical research in this field until someone falsifies its findings by developing a superior theoretical approach and a more complex database.
The edited volume represents not an alternative reading but, rather, a complementary one. Not all of the 11 chapters written by 17 authors can be summarized here. They rely on different theories and employ different methods. Most authors focus on the third wave of democratization. They stress the crucial role that historical-institutional legacies play in shaping democratization and democracy. In particular, Henry Hale argues that the dichotomy of dictatorships and democracies fails to recognize one important outcome of the “third wave,” namely, that it resulted less in bringing about liberal democracies than in “hybrid regimes,” which share elements of both prototypical regime types. Therefore, the protagonists of a dichotomous world of regimes cannot understand that hybrid regimes do not simply represent a mix of democratic and authoritarian elements; hybrid regimes differ from both major regime types in that they are often more violent and unstable, display warlike behavior, emerge from fragile states, and often produce failing states.
Kathrin Bruhn's very readable regional study on Latin America convincingly argues that the new democracies have survived and that they are even stable, but that most of these new regimes display a rather low quality of democracy. The high inequality and the fact that most of the democracies neither delivered more (physical) security for their citizens nor were able to reduce the blatant economic inequality have led not to the “sudden death” of Latin American democracy but to “its slow erosion from within” (p. 87). The weakness of the parliaments is endemic in the presidential political systems of Latin America. For Africa and even more so for the postcommunist countries, a robust legislature has turned out to be the institutional key to avoiding regression to authoritarian regimes, as Steven Fish demonstrates in his chapter (p. 118).
Brown's volume powerfully demonstrates how necessary it is to complement the large-n studies with small-n regional or even single-case studies. Deeper insights into the dynamics of democratization can be reached only by taking both approaches seriously. This should be taught to students in undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate seminars. Both books are valuable devices to do this successfully.
