In this fascinating study on the cognitive history of intuition in Classical antiquity, S. seeks to show how for many of the Classical philosophers, notably Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and the Neoplatonists, divination was not so much a practice to be associated with magic or other occultic practices, but rather one that helped people to make sense of unconscious knowledge. In the introduction, S. elaborates on the well-established view in the field of cognitive science that human beings are not entirely capable of developing an exhaustive account of the information that they know, what S. labels ‘surplus knowledge’; thus, a central proposition of this study is that the ancient practice of divination was simply one version in a long history of human attempts to grasp this ‘surplus knowledge’. In the chapters that follow, S. examines the enquiries submitted to divination in the philosophical literature of Classical antiquity, showing how divination was seen as a practice that challenged conventional epistemologies on human knowledge. The resulting picture that ultimately emerges is one of divination functioning not as some kind of obscure practice (akin, say, to palmistry or tarot card reading in the modern world), but rather as an institution that is ‘analogous to the position of the modern concept of intuition’ (p. 16).
In Chapter 1, ‘Plato on Divination and Nondiscursive Knowing’, S. investigates Plato's multiple and diffuse references to the practice of divination, particularly in a section of the Timaeus that concerns the placement of the soul (71c–e). S. illustrates how the verb manteuomai was frequently used by Plato in contexts where discursive reasoning had not been applied; in this way, Plato deployed the verb metaphorically to convey the concept of intuition. In the latter part of the chapter, S. analyses a complex passage in the Timaeus, in which Plato expands on the idea of the liver (in the lower part of the soul) receiving divinatory signs at times of calmness (e.g. during sleep). As the discussion shows well, Plato believed that the appetitive soul had the ability to receive non-discursive knowledge through the medium of divination.
Chapter 2, ‘Aristotle on Foresight Through Dreams’, the most substantial and dense section of the book, explores Aristotle's specific interest in prescient dreams, as evidenced in a triptych of treatises all concerned with divinatory behaviour during sleep (On Sleep and Waking; On Dreams; On Divination during Sleep). Here, S. argues powerfully against the scholarly consensus concerning Aristotle's approach to the divine's relationship with dreams by showing that Aristotle assigned predictive dreams to the daimonic (a term used by Aristotle to point to the ‘causal function of the divine within the natural world’, p. 168). As S.’s reading shows, both Plato and Aristotle conceived of discursive, reasoned knowledge and divined knowledge (or intuition) as separate poles of understanding. Given this conscious rejection of ostensibly empirical methods of divination (for instance, extispicy or inspecting animal entrails), it would be interesting to know whether or not others that believed in and practised such modes of ‘technical’ divination similarly conceived of divination as an articulation of intuitive knowledge.
In Chapter 3, ‘Posidonius and Other Stoics’, S. moves on to look at the Stoics and their attitudes to divination, chiefly considering a passage from Cicero's De divinatione (1.118–32). In this part of Cicero's own highly significant philosophical exposition on divination, its workings and its (in)efficacy, S. looks at ideas that are usually attributed to the philosopher Posidonius. Although the Stoics’ approach to ontology and metaphysics displays manifold differences with Plato and Aristotle, S. argues that their own views on a cosmos saturated with pneuma nonetheless harmonise with those of Plato and Aristotle, since they also viewed divination as a practice whose ‘workings lie beyond our regular inferential reason’ (p. 213).
In the final main chapter, ‘Iamblichus on Divine Divination and Human Intuition’, S. examines Neoplatonic theories on divination, which display a clear break from the views of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. Dismissing traditional approaches to divination, Iamblichus proposed that most ‘lower’ forms of mantic practice relied on guesswork (applying the term epibolê, which S. translates as ‘intuition’) and that it was only the highest human mind which was able to connect with the divine. Hence, rather than accepting the Platonic–Aristotelian–Stoic belief that humans experience divine phenomena when their rational senses are not operative, Iamblichus was of the contrary view that it is only during a state of higher rationality that humans are capable of connecting with divine knowledge concerning the future.
It is pleasing to see such a thoroughgoing treatment of divination in the Classical world that does not portray what was a widespread and long-held practice as thoroughly irrational or the product of superstitious thinking, but rather sets out to understand ancient Greek divination in its own terms (S. rightly notes that rationality has its own history, and that Classical notions of rationality are ‘not isomorphic to our own’ [p. 15]). It is important to note, however, that S.’s investigation is strictly focused on a limited range of philosophers from the Classical world, and there is little attention paid to how the practice of divination was understood outside this fairly narrow group of intellectuals (although the epilogue offers some interesting discussion on the confluences between divination and modern conceptions of intuition in the latter books of the Odyssey). The book leaves unexplored whether or not a wider cross section of Greek and Roman society shared similar conceptions of divination as a practice that is analogous to what we conceive of as unconscious, instinctive knowledge.
As is clear from this review, the volume covers a sizable geographical and chronological range, from the fourth century bce Athenian Plato to the Syrian Stoic philosopher Posidonius, who lived during the second and first centuries bce. Of course, one could hardly object to the profound influence of early thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle in the history of ideas, but it is difficult to accept that attitudes towards divination (an umbrella term that captures a whole range of behaviours and practices concerned with intuiting knowledge about the future) were not also constantly developed by, and re-articulated in, their own social, political and theological contexts. Indeed, the clear break with traditional ideas on divination that S. detects in the ideas of the Neoplatonists is a firm argument in favour of situating evolving epistemologies of divination in specific literary contexts within their wider social, political and religious landscapes. Moreover, as much as S. offers a rich analysis of approaches to non-discursive or intuitive knowledge amongst a number of philosophers from the Greek and Roman worlds, there is little space dedicated to attitudes towards divination in other literary (and non-literary) contexts. For example, ancient Greek and Roman historiography constitutes a rich body of evidence for the practice of divination in Classical antiquity: it would be helpful to know the extent to which a corpus such as this supports S.’s chief observation that divination was conceived in a fashion akin to that of intuition in modern parlance.
This volume is a sophisticated and cogently argued study that clearly develops our understanding of how divination was construed by an influential group of philosophical thinkers in Classical antiquity. The book successfully moves the debate concerning ancient Greek and Roman divination even further away from a discourse of irrationalism towards a more emic appreciation of divination as conceived by and practised within a specific culture. But it remains to be seen how philosophical approaches to divination compared with those of poets, historians and other individuals in the Classical world; by listening to a wider range of voices on divination and its epistemological value, we are sure to arrive at an even more developed understanding of how people in ancient Greece and Rome (and beyond) interpreted the practice of divination.
