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Corrupting EU Citizenship through the “Anti-Corruption” Smoke-Screen: Eurowhiteness Solidarity vs Investment Naturalisations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 September 2026

Elena Basheska Open the ORCID record for Elena Basheska [Opens in a new window]  and
Dimitry V Kochenov
Elena Basheska*
Affiliation:
Central European University Democracy Institute, Hungary
Dimitry V Kochenov
Affiliation:
Central European University Democracy Institute, Hungary
*
Corresponding author: Elena Basheska; Email: basheskae@ceu.edu
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Abstract

The EU chose “anti-corruption” to target a particular mode of citizenship acquisition: citizenship by investment. The fact that no other mode of acquiring citizenship has been actively stigmatised through “corruption” rhetoric, including discretionary naturalisations based on economic contributions, suggests that corruption was by no means the European Commission’s main concern. The high importance of citizenship could indeed carry corruption risks associated with it. This, however, cannot be the sole ground for closing particular avenues for naturalisation. Improving the enforcement of the rule of law and the effective implementation of anti-corruption mechanisms are more suitable approaches. Fighting “corruption” served as a rhetorical device deployed by the Commission to stop the supposedly corrupting effects of investment naturalisations on the ethno-nationalist Eurowhiteness model, which this institution, together with the Court of Justice, has chosen for Europeans in direct departure from the law in force. “Anti-corruption,” thus, helped achieve institutional ends unrelated to either fighting corruption or reinforcing the rule of law and other values in the EU.

Keywords

CBIcorruptionEU lawnaturalisationrule of law

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Articles
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European Journal of Risk Regulation , First View , pp. 1 - 14
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
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© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

I. Introduction

Although blood transmission remains by far the most prevalent method,Footnote 1 EU Member States recognise countless other ways of conferring their citizenship upon individuals.Footnote 2 While virtually all of them could be said to bear the risk of corruption, the Commission picked “anti-corruption” to wage a concerted attack against one in particular: citizenship by investment (CBI).Footnote 3 “Corruption” was thrown into the basket of other objections against investment migration in general and citizenship by investment in particular.Footnote 4

The Commission or the scholars who contributed to the cultivation of moral panic surrounding CBI, including through “corruption” arguments, have never offered a clear outline of how significant the problem was or whether there was any meaningful rise in corruption related to investment migration. There have been no comprehensive studies demonstrating that such programmes are a common pathway to corruption or that they are any more corrupting than other immigration or investment policies. For instance, in its Report from 2019, the Commission concluded that “[i]nvestor citizenship and residence schemes pose risks for the Member States and the Union as a whole, including in terms of (…) corruption”Footnote 5 without elaborating on the subject matter further. Instead, the Commission merely stated that the risk of corruption, among other risks, is “exacerbated by the cross-border rights associated with citizenship of the Union or residence in a Member State”Footnote 6 and referred to allegations of corruption related to citizenship and residence schemes in some Member States.Footnote 7 In fact, “corruption” has seemingly acquired quite an enhanced meaning, compared with what classical anti-corruption literature would imply.Footnote 8 It clearly boasted a “moral” nature, as Tanasoca, but also Džankić and Shachar seemingly intended: citizenship is too sacred and too valuable to sell.Footnote 9 The Commission put it most clearly: “European values are not for sale,”Footnote 10 when speaking of this blood-based status.Footnote 11 In other words, while the “goodness” of the status of citizenship as an inescapable dominant legal way of sorting populations is presumed,Footnote 12 such “corruption” arises as a synonym of liberation from citizenship’s blessings distributed by bloodFootnote 13 – no more – no less. A better blood you cannot buy,Footnote 14 you have to suffer a loss in a birthright lottery in full,Footnote 15 seems to be the message now engraved on EU citizenship since the shameful Commission v Malta case,Footnote 16 which, although largely inspired by anti-corruption sentiment championed by the Commission in its anti-CBI crusade, did not mention corruption at all.Footnote 17

It goes without saying that the high importance of citizenship, combined with its totalitarian and haphazard nature, poses considerable risks. In particular, in the vast majority of cases, citizenship is distributed against our will and thus offers a deeply unjust sorting of populations following the blood-aristocracy principle.Footnote 18 As a result, the potential for corruption increases, as people may be willing to pay bribes to obtain the desired status more quickly or with legal shortcuts, and officers may be willing to accept or even request such bribes. This, however, cannot be the sole ground for closing particular avenues for naturalisation – be it citizenship by investment or any other.Footnote 19 Improving the enforcement of the rule of law and strengthening the implementation of anti-corruption mechanisms are more suitable approaches to tackling corruption in citizenship matters.Footnote 20 This is particularly the case in the EU, where plentiful instruments deal with the risks of corruption, money-laundering and the like, making equating “corruption” with a particular mode of citizenship acquisition seemingly incomprehensible,Footnote 21 if not outright Orwellian, in the words of JHH Weiler.Footnote 22 Even more so, in the context where plenty of modes of naturalisation, which are much less transparent and involve no due diligence at all, are left outside the scope of the campaign in question.Footnote 23

This article analyses corruption allegations as part of the EU institutions’ sustained campaign against the investment migration industry. It argues that in the Commission’s war against the EU’s rule of law and, more specifically, the principle of conferral,Footnote 24 anti-corruption served as a wider context for the moral panic it generated. Such panic aimed to debase EU Primary law in force, especially Declaration No. 2 on the nationality of a Member State,Footnote 25 and achieve a breakthrough in EU competence at the expense of EU values and the national constitutional fundamentals of the Member States. “Anti-corruption” was cast as the first dirty trick to game the system, which was ultimately achieved in the Commission v Malta case. It is probably the first “anti-corruption campaign” to achieve political changes supranationally while side-lining legality considerations and, ultimately, forgetting to mention “corruption” altogether at the final act of the spectacle.Footnote 26 The paper, therefore, first asks, “the corruption of what?” (section II); then explains the states’ competencies in citizenship matters (section III); followed by a discussion of corruption allegations in the context of the investment migration industry (section IV); and finally, it concludes, suggesting that the Commission’s war against the rule of law rubber-stamped by the ECJ resulted in a successful deployment of a moral outrage to redraw the boundaries of competence and strip EU citizenship of its meaning: an effective moral smokescreen to cover up outright abuse and illegality, pointing in the direction of the rule of law weaknesses of the Union as a constitutional structure (section V).

II. The corruption of what?

Corruption related to investment naturalisations is what the EU institutions, in general, and the European Commission, in particular, have emphasised for more than a decade.Footnote 27 The dislike of EU citizens naturalised through CBI programmes has always been transparent. The Commission seems to make assumptions about investors largely on the basis of their status – rich people who wish to invest and become EU citizens are probably criminals, and the chances of this are even higher because of the qualities of EU citizenship, which allow for free movement.Footnote 28 Corruption related to CBI programmes has been treated similarly and may therefore not be analysed outside the context of the ongoing attacks on these. What is behind the Commission’s alarmist story?

If it is correct to approach citizenship as the key tool underpinning the global passport apartheidFootnote 29 aimed to bring the global majority, whose blood is “naturally” of second-rate quality, down, one conclusion follows. In the context of the planetary distribution of rightsFootnote 30 and duties,Footnote 31 the difficulties of offering a view of citizenship as a “value”Footnote 32 are insurmountable. Indeed, especially in the post-colonial context of racial bordersFootnote 33 boasting absolute violence,Footnote 34 “citizenship as a value” is a difficult bet to make. At best, it is a deeply uneasy part of the legal-political set-up of the contemporary world, which poses significant questions of justice that remain unanswered in the context, where presenting the blood aristocracy of those in possession of the best citizenship as just and natural is unquestionably difficult. Particularly so in the light of dominant constitutional values around the world,Footnote 35 where democracy, equality and the rule of law are usually emphasised, least blood purity is taken as a sign of “merit,” of course, as Sarah Ganty rightly underlined.Footnote 36

This problem has been in evidence since the beginning of the Commission’s crusade against the “corruption” of citizenship,Footnote 37 which could legitimately be presented as a frontal attack against European values as the Treaties know them.Footnote 38 In the absence of any serious evidence offered by anyone involved in the moral panic anti-corruption campaign of the inseparability of investment naturalisations from corruption, which would equal total ineffectiveness of all the EU’s anti-corruption measures in this particular field, thus requiring action against a particular subset of naturalisation rules, the talk of corruption is unquestionably “moral.”

The debate then comes down to a simple question “the corruption of what?” And the answer is not difficult to come by: what EU citizenship, following Commission v Malta, defends us from is the corruption of inequitable blood aristocracy. Put differently, what we are dealing with, in essence, is the impermissibility, in the eyes of the Grand Chamber of the Court, of attacks on Eurowhiteness.Footnote 39 Blood quality often translates into skin pigmentation, and here we come to the foundational dilemmas underpinning EU law as such since the negotiations of the EEC Treaty. Specifically, its clear idea revolves around the colour-line and the presumption that EU law should not be applied equally to all the nationals of the Member States. This aims to establish a clear distinction between the colonials and all the Europeans.Footnote 40 The aftermath of this racist starting point is what Balibar branded apartheid européen.Footnote 41

Translated into the post-colonial reality, this morphed into the EU’s “disappearance act”:Footnote 42 all the rights, including the very existence of the EU as a single working-living space, apply only to citizens.Footnote 43 Just as before, they would only be applicable to white Europeans in the Eurafrican world.Footnote 44 The Court has elegantly endorsed this racist take as a matter of principle in Kaur,Footnote 45 translating the UK’s racist attack against some of its citizensFootnote 46 into the letter and spirit of EU law, by stripping them of EU citizenship in a hint at a de facto contra legem interpretation of the Treaties.Footnote 47 The resulting reality is best sketched in the lines of the presentation of the starting assumptions built into EU law as unveiled by Eklund “a way of thinking and a mode of societal organisation that does not start from the premise that all human beings deserve equal protection under the laws to which they are subjected.”Footnote 48 Another way to put it is that EU’s “solidarity”Footnote 49 is devoid of respect.Footnote 50

III. States’ competencies in citizenship matters

The foundation of global citizenship law is that states are free to confer citizenship on those whom they consider qualified in accordance with the Hague Convention of NationalityFootnote 51 and under EU law – as Shaw,Footnote 52 Kochenov,Footnote 53 Jessurun d’Oliveira,Footnote 54 Sarmiento and van den Brink,Footnote 55 and Tratnik and WeingerlFootnote 56 have demonstrated. By extension, this applies to EU citizenship, which is a derivative – ius tractum – citizenship.Footnote 57

In the context of the supranational ethno-nationalism pedalled by the EU institutions, diagnosed so well by Kundnani in Eurowhiteness, the question of what citizenship entails and how it is “normally” obtained is, of course, deeply political, usually turning on who has the authority to decide.Footnote 58 The absolute majority of citizens are created by ius sanguinis: they are the sons and daughters of citizens (de facto this is the case even in all the polities, where ius soli is the key vehicle, officially, of the status’s distribution). Most of the world’s population acquired citizenship at birth in this way, without any say in it or any chance to express a preference.Footnote 59 There is no place for any “values,” “genuine links,” or “solidarity” here:Footnote 60 only the purity of blood is talking. The totality of our rights depends on the status of citizenship we hold, and since these statuses of totalitarian blood distribution of privilege are deeply unequal,Footnote 61 the nature of citizenship as one of the core instruments of global inequality is profoundly consequential, splitting the population of the world into the global aristocracy – the super-citizens of Western democracies – and the national citizenship poor, who are the victims of citizenship.Footnote 62

The blood paradigm is broken only by naturalisations, which account for fewer than 2% of citizenship acquisitions worldwide.Footnote 63 The requirements to be satisfied in this latter category vary greatly and are not at all limited to holding a legal residence in a particular state for a certain number of years,Footnote 64 coupled with passing “culture” and language tests: a story, which is often mistakenly presented in the literature as the dominant mode of citizenship acquisition after birth. The empirical diversity of the predominant naturalisation modes – whether spousal, ancestral, emigrational or other – raises questions about the ideological stakes that underlie the presumption the European Commission entertains that the immigrant-to-citizen path is the baseline against which all other forms of naturalisation should be compared.Footnote 65 Is boasting of the right ancestral pedigree or tracing family origins to a particular area on the map, rather than money, a more just way of distributing the most important rights?Footnote 66 The focus of any naturalisation discussion turns thus, precisely, on this dilemma and the moral panic it provokes: if EU citizenship is sacred and rooted in the native possession of pure “Eurowhiteness” blood providing a “genuine link” to Europe, how come someone can “buy” it, thus foregoing the necessary humiliation of “ordinary” naturalisation? The deeply questionable, racist core of this starting point is evident and connects the issue of citizenship conferral to the broader story of the function that citizenship plays in the contemporary world of passport apartheid.Footnote 67

The fact remains that the acquisition of residence and/or citizenship in exchange for investment or donation is a historically mainstream practiceFootnote 68 conducted worldwide entirely through the law and in full compliance with it.Footnote 69 This has been openly recognised by the European Commission, which, in the context of investment migration, noted that “[t]hird-country nationals may invest in a Member State for legitimate reasons.”Footnote 70 Moreover, the Member States, not the EU, are competent to decide who their nationals are. It has been confirmed unequivocally by the case law of the Court of Justice:Footnote 71 from Micheletti and Zhu & Chen Footnote 72 to Tjebbes Footnote 73 and JY.Footnote 74 This, however, has changed recently as the Court has reversed this basic legal premise in Commission v Malta.Footnote 75 While some countries offer citizenship by investment to individuals through specially designed naturalisation procedures, others allow for discretionary naturalisation on the grounds of “special achievements” (or similar notions) – often explicitly including the economic achievements of applicants – enshrined in national legislation.

The difference between the specially designed programmes and discretionary naturalisation on the grounds of “special achievements” is formal rather than substantial – the former are specifically designed to attract foreign investors, set clear criteria for applicants and are marketed by service providers (agents), while the latter is not necessarily exclusively intended for investors, is less transparent in terms of qualification criteria and is not marketed by nor does it involve agents acting in a transparent and clear fashion.

In a context where international law unquestionably allows states to determine who their citizens are, which is also evident from the Nottebohm case,Footnote 76 states’ competence in the field of citizenship matters is only limited by the binding rules of international law. It is clear that CBI programmes, as such, are a mainstream application of a state’s sovereign authority to determine who its nationals are, rather than a breach of any such rule. Consequently, given that citizenship by investment is entirely kosher in the eyes of international law, the one and only rule that could stand in the way of the states in the course of the implementation of their investment migration programmes, as far as international law is concerned, is the element of the voluntariness of the individual acquiring the citizenship, as non-consensual naturalisation is precluded. Non-consensual naturalisations have been consistently ruled out as breaches of international law, at least since attempts by Latin American nations to treat European expats born outside their territory – guys like Mr Nottebohm – as if they were local citizens, as Peter Spiro reports.Footnote 77 All CBI naturalisations in the EU and its immediate vicinity have been unquestionably consensual.Footnote 78

Also, treating persons in similar situations differently is prohibited under international law, except where reasonably justified and the measures taken are proportionate to a legitimate aim. In line with Article 5 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial DiscriminationFootnote 79 and Article 5 of the European Convention on Nationality,Footnote 80 conferral of citizenship cannot discriminate against citizens on grounds such as race, colour, national or ethnic origin. Lastly, discrimination on the grounds of sex in the conferral of nationality is equally prohibited.Footnote 81 Again, the acquisition of citizenship through investment has been generally aligned with these requirements.

No other requirement has developed into binding international law which may constrain states’ competence in citizenship matters. Despite that, the acquisition of citizenship by investment has been problematised in the EU.

IV. Corruption and CBI

There are various citizenship-by-investment programmes worldwide with different qualifying criteria, dating back to the early 1980s.Footnote 82 These have been criticised for potentially fostering corruption, in line with the EU institutions’ determination to abolish them. The risk of corruption has been linked to alleged less stringent conditions underpinning the acquisition of citizenship, among other factors. Indeed, with reference to citizenship by investment, the Commission consistently argued that, in essence, such “citizenship is granted under less stringent conditions than under ordinary naturalisation regimes.”Footnote 83 Yet, “ordinary conditions” – as opposed to the frowned-upon “less stringent” ones – imply a level of due diligence which is significantly lower than what investment citizenship promises: the entirety of one’s finances and business connections, as well as one’s entire life history, would not normally be dug up by independent due diligence providers, unless you are an investor naturalising on that ground.Footnote 84 This is only right: different applicants require different standards.

Thus, although recognising that third-country nationals may invest in a Member State for legitimate reasons, the Commission felt it necessary to note in its 2019 Report on investment programmes that such investments may also be for “pursuing illegitimate ends, such as evading law enforcement investigation and prosecution in their home country and protecting their assets from the related freezing and confiscation measures.”Footnote 85 On the basis of that possibility, the Commission concluded that:

investor citizenship and residence schemes create a range of risks for Member States and for the Union as a whole: in particular, risks to security, including the possibility of infiltration of non-EU organised crime groups, as well as risks of money laundering, corruption and tax evasion. Such risks are exacerbated by the cross-border rights associated with citizenship of the Union or residence in a Member State.Footnote 86

It further expressed its concerns about the lack of transparency and governance in the CBI and RBI programmes, some of which have been linked to corruption allegations.Footnote 87 Finally, the Commission suggested that “[e]nhancing transparency and putting in place adequate risk management, control systems and oversight mechanisms could help mitigate as far as possible some of these concerns.”Footnote 88

Similarly, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) noted that “it shows that CBI and RBI schemes, if not implemented appropriately may carry inherent corruption, money laundering, security and tax evasion risks, exposing both the individual Member States that operate such programmes and the entire EU to these threats.”Footnote 89 It further emphasised the lack of accountability and transparency in CBI and RBI programmes that can lead to increased corruption. Most interestingly, the EESC also implied that investment programmes can corrupt authorities. In particular: “structural weaknesses (of investment programmes) and opacity in a sector generating high cash flow and dealing with customers of high net worth risk may expose governments to undue influence, abuse of power, and bribery.”Footnote 90

The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) warned in its study on CBI and RBI programmes in the EU about the many risks associated with these programmes, including money laundering and corruption.Footnote 91 It noted that a lack of transparency in the administration of the CBI and RBI programmes may affect mutual trust between Member States.Footnote 92 The European Parliament’s TAX3 Committee stressed in its Position paper on financial crimes, tax evasion and tax avoidance that CBI and RBI programmes carry risks, “including a devaluation of EU and national citizenships and the potential for corruption, money laundering and tax evasion; not[ing] that one Member State’s decision to implement CBI and RBI schemes has spillover effects on other Member States.”Footnote 93

Outside the EU, the most thorough report on the subject has been produced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Financial Action Task Force. The Report, titled “The Misuse of Citizenship and Residency by Investment Programmes” points out the risk of cross-border corruption inherent to CBI and RBI programmes that lack “transparency, accountability and oversight.”Footnote 94 Such risk, according to OECD/FATF, is related to the possible misuse of the programmes, opaque governance structures and poor transparency.Footnote 95 A number of measures have been proposed in the Report to tackle corruption, financial crime and misuse of CBI and RBI programmes, including strengthened due diligence checks, ongoing investor monitoring and strengthened governance, integrity and oversight.

The allegations by the EU institutions and bodies listed above, as well as those by the OECD/FATF, are not implausible. The former citizenship-by-investment programme of Cyprus is an example that CBI Programmes, like other arrangements involving financial transactions, are not immune to misuse and illicit activities, which may stem from both dishonest clients pursuing illegitimate ends and corrupt politicians misusing the programmes for personal gain. In particular, investigative reporters revealed that citizenship was granted to politically exposed persons and to individuals facing criminal charges.Footnote 96 The Cypriot CBI Programme was subsequently terminated.

When practised in non-transparent, corrupt ways, investment migration – like any other enterprise – will certainly generate problems that need to be tackled. These precisely involve corruption, money laundering and tax evasion rather than naturalisation as such. That being said, there is no definitive proof of a systemic relationship between these deviations and CBI Programmes. The illegal activities result rather from the law’s malfunctioning and are not related to citizenship-by-investment programmes as such. The focus, therefore, should be on enforcing the rule of law in EU Member States. Investment migration should undergo the same scrutiny as other industries involving large international financial transactions.

Indeed, money laundering, tax evasion, corruption and other illegal activities are one thing and the acquisition of citizenship through investment quite another. All the critical analyses of the subject fail to make this distinction. From this perspective, banking, mining or gambling – to name but a few corruptible enterprises – could be frowned upon; yet when banks, casinos or mines are regulated, it is not presumed that these activities should be outlawed. Moreover, numerous other risks related to citizenship and immigration exist, yet no radical measures have been proposed to address them.Footnote 97 Ultimately, the risk of corruption arises from corrupt officials. A notable example of this is the major scandal in which corrupt embassy staff worldwide fast-tracked hundreds of thousands of Polish visas.Footnote 98

In particular, the risk of corruption is not exclusively or particularly tied to the CBI programmes. Discretionary economic naturalisations, for instance, are an alternative to the CBI programmes. Austria, for one, practices discretionary naturalisation, granting citizenship in the country’s special interest, including for special economic achievements.Footnote 99 Other EU Member States include legal provisions allowing discretionary naturalisation for “special achievements,” without specifically mentioning economic contribution.Footnote 100 The discretionary naturalisation for special economic achievements carries the same corruption risks as formal CBI programmes, if not higher, given the lack of clear criteria and the discretion in determining the eligibility of potential applicants. Indeed, misuse has been well documented within the EU and beyond.Footnote 101 Yet, the EU institutions have not been interested in closing down the discretionary naturalisation programmes, indicating that corruption has never been their primary concern.

Further to the legal alternatives to CBI, other routes to citizenship may also be misused, even if no economic contribution is a direct criterion for their acquisition. This is the case, for instance, with naturalisation based on ancestry, where corruption may enter the picture during the preparation of required documents and the processing of applications, including the forgery of official documents.Footnote 102 Another example of corruption risk is associated with post-conflict registries, which may create vulnerabilities and fertile ground for misuse in the affected countries, including false domicile registrations and improper nationality confirmations.Footnote 103 Sham marriages, which may eventually lead to citizenship if they go unnoticed, carry a significant risk of corruption.Footnote 104 The examples of potential corruption risks are not exhaustive, as they may be as numerous as the instances in which human involvement plays a role – whether in decision-making regarding applications or on the applicants’ side. This is primarily a result of the quality of nationality discrepancies, which is the main factor underpinning naturalisations, including investment naturalisations, and is compounded by a weak rule of law and corrupt officials.Footnote 105

Finally, one could have expected the Commission to raise all possible arguments before the CJEU in support of its longstanding allegations of the corrupting nature of CBI programmes. What we have witnessed instead is probably the most controversial case and ruling in EU citizenship law, which not only proves that corruption has not been the primary concern of EU institutions but also that prioritising the closure of such programmes within the EU has taken precedence over upholding the rule of law. In particular, the Commission alleged that the Maltese CBI Programme undermines the essence of EU citizenship; it breaches the principle of sincere cooperation; it fails to meet the requirement of a genuine link. The CJEU ruled in favour of the Commission,Footnote 106 contrary to the Opinion of Advocate General Collins,Footnote 107 and all its previous case law.Footnote 108

Although the Commission’s political campaign resulted in a victory by a “miracle”Footnote 109 in front of the Court of Justice, which did not need any law to decide the case,Footnote 110 the “corruption” arguments never resurfaced following the initial agitation. The Court also chose not to address the issue of corruption, omitting it completely from its discussions. Worse yet, the strict due diligence checks conducted on candidates applying under the Maltese CBI Programme were not important to the Commission or the Court, as they did not affect “the commercialisation of the grant of Maltese nationality, following a transactional procedure.”Footnote 111

While the reasons for the Commission’s silence on this matter remain muted, one fact is evident: establishing a systemic causal link between CBI programmes in general and, more specifically, between the Maltese CBI and instances of corrupt practices would likely have failed. Moreover, other pathways to acquiring citizenship, such as those based on ancestry, talent, economic contributions or discretionary naturalisations, would probably also have been brought into question, further contributing to the inconsistencies in the Commission’s assertions.

V. Conclusion

At the EU level, the risk of corruption has often been associated with the acquisition of citizenship through investment. In addition, such risk has been linked to less stringent conditions for acquiring citizenship, among other issues.

In particular, investment migration in general and CBI programmes in particular have been singled out as problematic. The constant corruption allegations emerged as but one among a whole array of pieces in the puzzle of actions by EU institutions to combat CBI programmes in the EU. The fact that no other mode of acquiring citizenship has been actively stigmatised, including discretionary naturalisations based on economic contributions, which carry a much higher risk of corruption due to their opaque nature, suggests that corruption was by no means the European Commission’s main concern. Rather, the Commission has seemingly crusaded in defence of the blood aristocracy principle: CBI programmes corrupt reigning passport apartheid at the heart of the global population management.

This was further confirmed in the Commission v Malta case, which did not mention corruption at all. In oblivion of the rich history of the “corruption” rhetoric in the context of the moral panic surrounding investment naturalisations stoked by the Commission, the Court did not need “corruption” to rule against Malta. It has simply redrawn the boundaries of EU competence in direct violation of the Treaties and has not felt inclined to go into detail.Footnote 112 It needed no law at all to justify the move and cited none.Footnote 113 Much like the classical fable: “A mountain was in labour, uttering immense groans, and on earth there was very great expectation. But it gave birth to a mouse.”Footnote 114

Fighting “corruption” has consistently emerged as but a rhetorical device deployed by the Commission and the Court to achieve institutional ends unrelated to either fighting corruption or reinforcing the rule of law in the EU, further endangering democracy and the rule of law in the European context.Footnote 115

Competing interests

The authors state that there is no conflict of interest.

Footnotes

*

Professor Kochenov advised governments, international organisations and key law firms on the issues of his scholarly interest, including the Dutch government, Scottish and European Parliaments, the EU’s Overseas Countries and Territories Association, as well as the Maltese government, the latter on the issues of EU citizenship law in the run-up to the unveiling of the first emanation of the Maltese IIP in 2014. He served as the founding co-chairman of the Investment Migration Council (Geneva) and offered, together with Madeleine Sumption MBE, an expert seminar on Citizenship and Residence by Investment at Oxford University.

References

1 E.g., D Kochenov, “Citizenship as Aristocratic Justice” (2026, forthcoming) Brown Journal of World Affairs.

2 For a detailed overview of the numerous ways available to acquire EU citizenship, see the EUDO database of the European University Institute in Florence.

3 See, for a full story, e.g., E Basheska and DV Kochenov, “A Successful Attempt to Hijack the Union’s Liberal Promise: Commission v Malta” (2026) 9(2) Nordic Journal of European Law 36; HU Jessurun d’Oliveira, “Golden Passports: European Commission and European Parliament Reports Built on Quicksand” in DV Kochenov, M Sumption and M van den Brink (eds), Investment Migration in Europe and the World: Current Issues (Hart Publishing 2025); D Kochenov and E Basheska, “It’s All about Blood, Baby! The EU’s Attack against Investment Migration in the Context of EU Law, International Law and the War in Ukraine” in Kochenov, Sumption and van den Brink (eds), Investment Migration in Europe and the World.

4 JHH Weiler, “Postscriptum: Commission v Malta (Citizenship for Sale) Who of the Two is Selling European Values” in Kochenov, Sumption and van den Brink (eds), Investment Migration in Europe and the World; S Guido, “Divertissement: Investment Citizenship: A Berlaymont Fantasia” in Kochenov, Sumption and van den Brink (eds), Investment Migration in Europe and the World.

5 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Investor Citizenship and Residence Schemes in the European Union (Brussels, 23 January 2019) COM(2019) 12 final, 24 (Report from the Commission on Investor Citizenship and Residence Schemes in the European Union). See, also, the European Commission’s Reports in this regard: European Commission, 2021 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Cyprus SWD(2021) 704 final; European Commission, 2022 Rule of Law Report: The Rule of Law Situation in the European Union COM(2022) 500 final; European Commission, 2022 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Malta SWD(2022) 518 final; European Commission, 2022 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Cyprus SWD(2022) 513 final; European Commission, 2022 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Bulgaria SWD(2022) 502 final; European Commission, 2023 Rule of Law Report COM(2023) 800 final; European Commission, 2023 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Cyprus SWD(2023) 813 final; European Commission, 2023 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Malta SWD(2023) 818 final; European Commission, 2023 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Bulgaria (SWD(2023) 802 final; European Commission, 2024 Rule of Law Report (COM(2024) 800 final; European Commission, 2024 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Bulgaria (SWD(2024) 802 final; European Commission, 2024 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Cyprus (SWD(2024) 813 final; and European Commission, 2024 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Malta (SWD(2024) 818 final. See also Franco Peirone, “The Commission’s Annual Rule of Law Report: Three Transformative Shifts in the Oversight of EU Member States” (2025) 18 Review of European Administrative Law 9.

6 Report from the Commission on Investor Citizenship and Residence Schemes in the European Union, 10, para. 4.

7 Ibid.

8 R Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (University of California Press 1988); S Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Cambridge University Press 1999); M Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2005); F Schneider, The Shadow Economy (Cambridge University Press 2015); cf P Eigen, The Morality of Corruption: The Antidote to Cronyism and Inequality (Palgrave Macmillan 2021); cf R Dobson Phillips, E Dávid-Barrett and R Barrington, Defining Corruption in Context (Cambridge University Press 2025).

9 S Roy, “‘The Streetlight Effect’ in Commentary on Citizenship by Investment” in D Kochenov and K Surak (eds), Citizenship and Residence Sales: Rethinking the Boundaries of Belonging (Cambridge University Press 2023); L Erez, “A Blocked Exchange? Investment Citizenship and the Limits of the Commodification Objection” in Kochenov and Surak (eds), Citizenship and Residence Sales.

10 On 16 September 2020, the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, noted in her State of the Union address the following “[b]e it about the primacy of European law, the freedom of the press, the independence of the judiciary or the sale of golden passports, European values are not for sale” <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_20_1655> (last accessed 17 July 2026).

11 On the absurdity of treating citizenship as a “value”, see, e.g., Roy, “The Streetlight Effect”; D Kochenov, “Citizenship for Real: Its Hypocrisy, Its Randomness, Its Price” in R Bauböck (ed), Debating Transformations of National Citizenship (Springer, Berlin 2018); D Kochenov, “Citizenship Apartheid” in D Kostakopoulou et al. (eds), Elgar Concise Encyclopaedia of Citizenship (Edward Elgar 2026, forthcoming).

12 T Bloom, “Can Citizenship Studies Escape Citizenism?” (2022) 26 (4–5) Citizenship Studies 372.

13 Kochenov, “Citizenship for Real.”

14 A Tanasoca, “Citizenship for Sale: Neomedieval Not Just Neoliberal” (2016) 57 European Journal of Sociology 169.

15 A Shachar, The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality (Harvard University Press 2009).

16 Weiler, “Postscriptum: Citizenship for Sale (Commission v Malta).”

17 Basheska and Kochenov, “A Successful Attempt to Hijack the Union’s Liberal Promise.”

18 D Kochenov and E Basheska, “Confronting the Citizenship’s Sacred Blood Aristocracy Principle: Quality of Nationality Discrepancies as a Factor Underpinning (Investment) Naturalisations” (2026) Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

19 K Surak, “What are the Risks of Investment Migration? Going Beyond the Status Quo” in Kochenov, Sumption and van den Brink (eds), Investment Migration in Europe and the World.

20 See also Branislav Hock in this issue.

21 See also HU Jessurun d’Oliveira, “Gouden paspoorten: migratie voor miljonairs” (2026) De Nederlandse Boekengids 2026/2.

22 Weiler, “Postscriptum: Citizenship for Sale (Commission v Malta).”

23 J Veraldi and O Gstrein, “Nothing to Hide? Transparency Requirements, Accountability and Privacy in Investment Migration” in Kochenov, Sumption and van den Brink (eds), Investment Migration in Europe and the World; DV Kochenov, OJ Gstrein and JD Veraldi, “The Naturalisation–Privacy Interface: Publication of Personal Data of New Citizens vs European Privacy Standards” (2020) 42 Houston Journal of International Law 237.

24 Weiler, “Postscriptum: Citizenship for Sale (Commission v Malta).”

25 G Íñiguez, “On Genuine Links, Burdens of Proof, and Declaration No 2: Some Musings on The Court’s Reasoning in Commission v Malta (C-181/23)” (EU Law Live, 5 May 2025) <https://eulawlive.com/op-ed-on-genuine-links-burdens-of-proof-and-declaration-no-2-some-musings-on-the-courts-reasoning-in-commission-v-malta-c-181-23/> (last accessed 18 July 2026).

26 For a broader analysis of the deployment of “anti-corruption campaigns”, see N Hogic, Judicial Anti-Corruption Campaigns: Prosecutions in Italy, Brazil and Romania (Routledge 2025).

27 European Commission Report COM(2019)12 final; European Parliament, Resolution on the Sale of EU Citizenship 2017/2007(INI); European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Opinion for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on Lessons Learnt from the Pandora Papers and other relevant revelations 2022/2989(INI); see for broader approach: European Parliament, Resolution 2013/2995(RSP) of 16 January 2014 on EU Citizenship for Sale [2014] OJ C 482/117; European Parliament, Resolution on the Rule of Law in Malta 2017/2935(RSP) [2017] OJ C356/29; European Parliament, Resolution 2019/2954(RSP) of 18 December 2019 on the Rule of Law in Malta. Following the Recent Revelations Surrounding the Murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia [2019]OJ C 255/22 (29 June 2021); European Parliament resolution of on Financial Crimes, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance (2018/2121(INI)) [2019] OJ C108/8; European Parliament resolution of 9 March 2022 with proposals to the Commission on citizenship and residence by investment schemes (2021/2026(INL)).

28 Kochenov and Basheska, “It’s All about Blood, Baby!”

29 D Kochenov, “Ending the Passport Apartheid. The Alternative to Citizenship is No Citizenship” (2020) 18(4) I-CON 1525.

30 S Roy and D Kochenov, “Citizenship Is Anti-Rights” in M Tushnet and B Bugarič (eds), Research Handbook on Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar 2027, forthcoming).

31 Kochenov, Citizenship (MIT 2019); Shachar, The Birthright Lottery.

32 R Bellamy, Citizenship: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press 2008).

33 E T Achiume, “Racial Borders” (2022) 110(3) Georgetown Law Journal 446; A Soomro, “People, Paper and Power: The Birth of the Passport in International Law” (2024) 14(2) Asian Journal of International Law 358.

34 O Shatz, EU Crimes against Humanity (Doctoral dissertation, Yale Law School, 2023); S Ganty and D Kochenov, “EU Lawlessness Law” (2025) 30(1) Columbia Journal of European Law 78; Audrey Macklin, “Liminal rights: sovereignty, constitutions and borders” in M Tushnet and D Kochenov (eds), Research Handbook on the Politics of Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar 2023).

35 Kochenov, “Citizenship as Aristocratic Justice.”

36 S Ganty, “Race and Merit in the Context of Residency and Citizenship by Investment” in Kochenov, Sumption and van den Brink (eds), Investment Migration in Europe and the World; S Ganty, “Merit as a Racial Device. The Ambiguous Case of Citizenship and Residence by Investment” (2026) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1.

37 Kochenov and Basheska, “It’s All about Blood, Baby!”

38 Weiler, “Postscriptum: Commission v Malta”; Jessurun d’Oliveira, “Gouden paspoorten”; HU Jessurun d’Oliveira, “Union Citizenship and Beyond” in N Cambien, D Kochenov, and E Muir (eds), European Citizenship under Stress Social Justice, Brexit and Other Challenges (Brill/Martinus Nijhoff 2020); Kochenov, “Citizenship for Real.”

39 H Kundnani, Eurowhiteness: Culture, Empire and Race in the European Project (Hurst 2023).

40 H Eklund, “Peoples, Inhabitants and Workers” (2023) 34 European Journal of International Law 831.

41 É Balibar, We, the People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship (Princeton University Press 2004).

42 Ganty and Kochenov, “EU Lawlessness Law”, pp 88–98.

43 D Kochenov and M van den Brink, “Pretending There Is No Union: Non-Derivative Quasi-Citizenship Rights of Third-Country Nationals in the EU” in D Thym and M Zoetewij-Turhan (eds), Rights of Third-Country Nationals under EU Association Agreements: Degrees of Free Movement and Citizenship (Brill-Nijhoff 2015).

44 P Hansen and S Jonsson, Eurafrica: The Untold Story of European Integration and Colonialism (Bloomsbury Academic 2014)

45 Case C-192/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte: Manjit Kaur, intervener: Justice [2001] ECLI:EU:C:2001:106.

46 European Commission of Human Rights, East African Asians v United Kingdom (1973) Apps. No 4403/70-4419/70, 4422/70, 4423/70, 4434/70, 4443/70, 4476/70-4478/70, 4486/70, 4501/70 and 4526/70-4530/70 (joined); Anthony Lester, “Thirty Years on: The East African Case Revisited” (2002) 47 Public Law 52.

47 D Kochenov and R Plender, “EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance? The Discovery of the Treaty Text” (2012) 37(4) EL Rev 369.

48 H Eklund, “Peoples, Inhabitants and Workers” (2023) 34 European Journal of International Law 831, 833.

49 On the intellectual origins of the idea of dignity in the EU on which the current “solidarity” is building, see JQ Whitman, “On Nazi “Honour” and the New European “Dignity” in C Joerges and NS Ghaleigh (eds), Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and Its Legal Traditions (Hart Publishing 2003).

50 D Kochenov, “Citizenship without Respect: The EU’s Troubled Equality Ideal” Jean Monnet Working Paper 08/10.

51 See, Art. 1 of the Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (1930) 179 UNTS 89 (the Hague Convention).

52 J Shaw, “Citizenship for Sale” in R Bauböck (ed), Debating Transformations of National Citizenship (Springer 2018).

53 D Kochenov, “Rounding up the Circle: The Mutation of Member States’ Nationalities under Pressure from EU Citizenship” (2010) EUI RSCAS Working Paper No. 2010/21.

54 Jessurun d’Oliveira, “Union Citizenship and Beyond”.

55 Sarmiento and van den Brink, “EU Competence and Investor Migration.”

56 M Tratnik and P Weingerl, “State Autonomy vs “Genuine Links”: Nottebohm and beyond” in Kochenov, Sumption and van den Brink (eds), Investment Migration in Europe and the World: Current Issues. See, also, P Weingerl and M Tratnik, “Relevant Links: Investment Migration as an Expression of National Autonomy in Matters of Nationality” in Kochenov and Surak (eds), Citizenship and Residence Sales.

57 D Kochenov, “Ius Tractum of Many Faces” (2009) 15 Columbia Journal of European Law 169.

58 Jessurun d’Oliveira, “Golden Passports”; Jessurun d’Oliveira, “Citizenship and Beyond.”

59 D Kochenov, Citizenship (MIT Press, Cambridge MA 2019).

60 For a poignant criticism of Commission v Malta on this point, see, e.g., Jessurun d’Oliveira, “Gouden paspoorten.”

61 cf Kochenov and Lindeboom, “Empirical Assessment of the Quality of Nationalities” (2017) 4 European Journal of Law and Governance 314; Kochenov and Lindeboom (eds), Quality of Nationality Index (Hart 2020).

62 D Kochenov, “The Victims of Citizenship” in Kochenov and Surak (eds), Citizenship and Residence Sales.

63 cf Kochenov, Citizenship.

64 On the far-reaching differences between holding legal residence, which is usually required for naturalisations and physical presence in the jurisdiction, see, D Kochenov and M van den Brink, “Legal Residence and Physical Presence” in Kochenov, Sumption and van den Brink (eds), Investment Migration in Europe and the World.

65 E.g., European Commission Report COM(2019)12 final.

66 The two obviously overlap, so the question is necessarily tongue-in-cheek: if an investment visa is annulled, a Russian billionaire may be able to visit London again visa-free on an Israeli or on a Portuguese passport, acquired via an established Sephardic connection – only “blood” and no money involved: D Lesperance, “Even for The Super-Rich, Citizenship by Descent Is Extremely Useful: Lessons from Abramovich” (IMI, 5 January 2022); HU Jessurun d’Oliveira, “Iberian Nationality Legislation and Sephardic Jews” (2015) 11 European Constitutional Law Review 13.

67 See for a more detailed analysis, Kochenov, “The Victims of Citizenship”; Kochenov, “Ending the Passport Apartheid”.

68 M Prak, “Citizenship for Sale in Pre-modern Europe” in Kochenov and Surak (eds), Citizenship and Residence Sales. M Prak, Citizens without Nations: Urban Citizenship in Europe and the World, c. 1000–1789 (Cambridge University Press 2018).

69 Weingerl and Tratnik, “Relevant Links.”

70 European Commission Report COM(2019)12 final, 9.

71 See, for the general analyses, D Kochenov and J Lindeboom, “Pluralism Through its Denial” in M Avbelj and G Davies (eds), Research Handbook on Legal Pluralism and EU Law (Edward Elgar 2018); Jessurun d’Oliveira, “Union Citizenship and Beyond.”

72 Case C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:639. D Kochenov and J Lindeboom, “Breaking Chinese Law – Making European One: The Story of Chen, or Two Winners, Two Losers, Two Truths” in F Nicola and B Davies (eds), EU Law Stories: Contextual and Critical Histories of European Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press 2017).

73 Case C-221/17, M.G. Tjebbes and Others v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:189; D Kochenov, “The Tjebbes Fail” (2019) 4 European Papers 319; HU Jessurun d’Oliveira, “Tjebbes en aanhangend nationaliteit” (2019) 37 NJb; K Swider, “Legitimising Precarity of EU Citizenship: Tjebbes” (2020) 57 CML Rev 1163.

74 Case C-118/20, JY v Wiener Landesregierung [2022] ECLI:EU:C:2022:34; D Kochenov and D de Groot, “Helpful, Convoluted, and Ignorant in Principle: EU Citizenship in the Hand of the Grand Chamber in JY” (2022) 47 EL Rev 699.

75 Case C-181/23, Commission v Malta. D Kochenov and G Íñiguez, “EU Citizenship’s New Essentialism” (2025) 50(4) EL Rev 455; Basheska and Kochenov, “A Successful Attempt to Hijack the Union’s Liberal Promise.”

76 International Court of Justice, Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) [1955] ICJ Rep 4.

77 PJ Spiro in Kochenov and Surak (eds), “Investment Citizenship and the Long Leash of International Law” in Kochenov and Surak (eds), Citizenship and Residence Sales, and the literature cited therein.

78 The only possible examples of a non-consensual CBI programme could be found in the Comoros: the island state used to offer wholesale naturalisation options to the Gulf monarchies seeking to reuce the level of statelessness among the Bidoon population. This CBI programme was subjected to clear criticism in the literature as potentially breaching international law: e.g., Spiro, “Investment Citizenship and the Long Leash of International Law.”

79 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UNGA Res 2106 (XX) (21 December 1965).

80 European Convention on Nationality, CETS (6 November 1997).

81 Ibid.

82 European Business Review, “Evolution of Citizenship by Investment Programmes” (3 November 2025) https://www.europeanbusinessreview.com/evolution-of-citizenship-by-investment-programmes/ accessed 17 July 2026.

83 European Commission Report COM(2019)12 final, 1.

84 M Corrado and K Marsh, “Investment Migration and the Importance of Due Diligence” in Kochenov and Surak (eds), Citizenship and Residence Sales.

85 European Commission Report COM(2019)12 final, p 9, para. 4.

86 Ibid, pp 9–10, para. 4.

87 In particular, the Commission relied on a study that was conducted by a consultancy firm, Milieu Ltd., under its own instruction: J Džankić et al. (for Milieu Ltd.), “Factual analysis of Member States Investors’ Schemes granting citizenship or residence to third country nationals investing in the said Member State: Study Overview,” JUST/2016/RCIT/FW/RIGH/0152 (2017/06), 23, 75. See, also, X Xu, A El-Ashram and J Gold, “Too Much of a Good Thing? Prudent Management of Inflows under Economic Citizenship Programs” (2015) International Monetary Fund Working Paper No 15/93, 7–8.

88 European Commission Report COM(2019)12 final, p 10, para. 4.

89 European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on “Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Investor Citizenship and Residence Schemes in the European Union”, SOC/618-EESC-2019 (OJ C 47, 11 February 2020, 81–86), para. 3.1.1.

90 ibid, para. 3.4.2.

91 European Parliament, Citizenship by investment (CBI) and residency by investment (RBI) schemes in the EU: State of play, issues and impacts (European Parliamentary Research Service Study PE 627.128, October 2018) <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/627128/EPRS_STU(2018)627128_EN.pdf> (last accessed 17 July 2026, 28).

92 Ibid, 46, para. 4.3.2.

93 Ibid, para. 186.

94 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and Financial Action Task Force, Misuse of Citizenship and Residency by Investment Programmes (OECD Publishing and FATF, 22 November 2023), 35, para. 103 <https://doi.org/10.1787/ae7ce5fb-en> (last accessed 17 July 2026).

95 Ibid, 104 and 105.

96 Al Jazeera Investigative Unit, “The Cyprus Papers” (2020).

97 K Surak, “The Misuse of Citizenship and Residence by Investment: Going beyond the FATF/OECD Report to Assess Key Risks” Social Policy Working Paper. See, also BBC News, “The ＄2bn dirty-money case that rocked Singapore” (12 April 2024) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-66840450> (last accessed 17 July 2026).

98 E.g., W Kość, “Poland’s Government under Fire After Reports of Cash-For-Visas Scheme” (Politico, 11 September 2023) <https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-government-under-fire-cash-for-visa-scheme-scandal-election/> (last accessed 17 July 2026).

99 Section 10(6) of the Citizenship Act 1985 (StbG).

100 EUI Globalcit database – information under “Mode A24, Special Achievements” <https://globalcit.eu/modes-acquisition-citizenship/> (last accessed 17 July 2026).

101 Surak, “The Misuse of Citizenship and Residence by Investment”, 13–14.

102 Ibid, 16.

103 cf F Ragazzi and I Štiks, “Croatian Citizenship: From Ethnic Engineering to Inclusiveness” in R Bauböck, B Perchinig and W Sievers (eds), Citizenship Policies in the New Europe: Expanded and Updated Edition (Amsterdam University Press 2009).

104 Eurojust, “Report on National Legislation and Eurojust Casework Analysis on Sham Marriages” (Updated version, January 2024) <https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/sites/default/files/assets/sham-marriages-report-2024.pdf> (last accessed 17 July 2026).

105 Kochenov and Basheska, “Confronting the Citizenship’s Sacred Blood Aristocracy Principle.”

106 Case C-181/23 Commission v Malta EU:C:2025:283.

107 Opinion of AG Collins in Case C-181/23 Commission v Malta.

108 Basheska and Kochenov, “A Successful Attempt to Hijack the Union’s Liberal Promise.”

109 LD Spieker and F Weber, “Commission v Malta (C-181/23): A “Miracle” of Union Citizenship?” (2025) 50(4) EL Rev 487.

110 M van den Brink, “Why Bother with Legal Reasoning?: The CJEU Judgment in Commission v Malta (Citizenship by Investment)” (VerfBlog, 5 May 2025). cf Kochenov and Íñiguez, “EU Citizenship’s New Essentialism”; X Groussot and M Valera, “The Metamorphosis of EU Law through Article 19(1) TEU: From Loyalty to Value-Laden Interpretation” (2025) Europarättslig Tidskrift nr 4, 567; Íñiguez, “On Genuine Links, Burdens of Proof, and Declaration No 2”; DV Kochenov, “EU Citizenship’s New Essentialism: The Solidification of the Illiberal Union” (Verfblog, 5 May 2025).

111 Case C-181/23 Commission v Malta, para. 113.

112 van den Brink, “Why Bother with Legal Reasoning?”.

113 Íñiguez, “On Genuine Links, Burdens of Proof, and Declaration No 2”; van den Brink, “Why Bother with Legal Reasoning?”

114 This is the earliest version of the text that has been associated with Gaius Julius Phaedrus or Phaeder, while the most well-known version of it with Quintus Horatius Flaccus epistle on Ars Poetica (c 19 BCE). It is one of Aesop’s Fables and appears in L Gibbs, The Mountain in Labour (Perry Index 520), Perry’s Index to the Aesopica <https://web.archive.org/web/20230605041932/http://mythfolklore.net/aesopica/perry/520.htm> (last accessed 17 July 2026).

115 DV Kochenov and JD Veraldi, “Supremacy Rule of Law in the Service of a Depoliticised Democracy – Pondering the Nature of the EU’s “Social Contract”“ (2026) 32(1) ELJ Communications Center 144.