From one of our most distinguished political sociologists comes an encyclopedic survey of “usable theory” across the social sciences. Few scholars can rival Dietrich Reuschemeyer's record of broad theoretical contributions—as coeditor of the landmark Bringing the State Back In (1984), as coauthor of Capitalist Development and Democracy (1992), as coeditor of Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (2003), and many other works—and this book offers readers access to some of the seminars he has long taught on social theory.
The book's goal is to provide a tool kit of usable theory, but not theories. Reuschemeyer contrasts his aspirations to the classic kind of survey of grand theories of Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, George Herbert Mead, Talcott Parsons, Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, and so on. Instead, he chooses to “deliberately leave aside the dialogue and contention among grand theoretical conceptions” (p. 3), surveying a lower level of empirically relevant theory “that is to a large extent independent of—and shared across—the different major positions of ‘grand theory’” (p. ix). He inscribes his effort in the tradition of Robert Merton, who called for a focus on practical “middle-range theory” as an alternative to the grand theory-of-everything approach advocated at the time by Parsons.
The main advances in the social sciences, Reuschemeyer suggests, have come not in grand theories but at this lower level of “theory frames.” These are not full-fledged theories in the sense that they “do not themselves contain or logically entail a body of testable hypotheses” (p. 1). They offer concepts that identify causal conditions, processes, and patterns that seem relevant to certain questions or issues, allowing the scholar to generate hypotheses within a given context. As examples, he cites the rough theory frames that he sees in Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966) or Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions (1979). On his reading, the theoretical concepts that we can take from these books and apply elsewhere are not grand theories so much as plausible packages of suggestive concepts. They do not claim grandly to generate direct predictions, but anyone can use them to develop hypotheses in a variety of contexts. Such chunks of “usable theory” cannot be judged as empirically true or false—they are too modest, or underspecified, for such treatment—but rather in terms of “how fruitful they are in suggesting empirical propositions” (p. 1) in many places and times.
The first postintroductory chapter briefly argues that a general frame centered on social action is helpful in order to make space for and organize the groupings of theory frames covered in the other chapters. This “social action framework” takes rational choice as its point of departure, but combines it with a “second tradition” from Vilfredo Pareto, Durkheim, Weber, and Mead that “emphasizes more complex aspects of action” (p. 28). These two traditions are “not as mutually incompatible as they are often seen to be,” and together they open up a variety of possibilities in “the internal space of action” (pp. 28–29). Four chapters follow on theory frames within this internal space, respectively, on knowledge, norms, preferences, and emotions. Each touches on the variety of concepts that can come up under each heading. In the chapter on preferences, for example, Reuschemeyer gives some credence to innate dispositions, but notes that even those preferences that seem most innate may be malleable, and that preferences can be shaped by norms, past choices, frequent interaction, mutual dependence, “attachments,” collective organization, and resource constraints. Thereafter, the book proceeds upward and outward from internal space, with chapters, respectively, on “aggregations,” collective action, power and cooperation, institutions, social identities, macrocontexts, and cultural explanations.
This amounts to an extraordinary tour of a vast amount of scholarship. From a career that began with reading sociology in Cologne after World War II, Reuschemeyer has a long historical view of contemporary social science. As an eclectic “soft rationalist” political sociologist, he holds a central theoretical vantage point as well. I know of no other book that offers such a wide survey.
As such, this volume will be very useful for advanced graduate students and established scholars. It may be more challenging for beginning graduate students. Rueschemeyer avoids position taking on philosophy of science and theorizing, and touches only lightly on relationships among the dozens and dozens of bits of theory he mentions. Without such guidance, a complex survey risks overwhelming those who do not bring to it their own sense of how to organize social science approaches. There are mentions of Reuschemeyer's own preferences at a few points—most explicitly in a dismissal of antipositivist or interpretivist work (pp. 34–35)—but such discussions are limited by a resolve “to keep things simple,” avoiding any “metatheoretical discussion of these claims” and keeping an eye on concepts that are most likely to be “fruitful” (p. 34). Thus, the book seems better suited to help scholars flesh out their thinking than to give newcomers a structured entry point to social theory.
In light of the particular sense of philosophy of science and theorizing that this reviewer brings to the book, its basic thrust has much appeal. Reuschemeyer's message is pluralistic and relatively practical. He tells us that we live in a complex world that many different bits of theory can help us to unravel. There may even be dynamics in our world that seem contradictory, such that we can draw fruitfully on a variety of somewhat contradictory theory frames in our work. To begin by positing a world where many different bits of theory have something to contribute will surely strike many readers today as more promising than paradigmatic clashes between parsimonious claims that “this matters” or “that matters.”
From that promising point of departure, however, the thrust of Reuschemeyer's presentation may imply rather too much practicality, and not enough of a clash of competing views, in the search for explanations. We may indeed live in a world where many semirelated or even contradictory things happen overall, but that does not mean that all theoretical tools are equally useful in the explanation of any given pattern or instance. Indeed, in such a multifaceted world, we presumably need to pay all the more attention to separating out certain explanatory dynamics from others in order to make any claims at all. The more we want to use an eclectic kit of theory frames rather than parsimonious grand theories, then, the more attention we must give to sharp lines between distinct theoretical claims. Yet there is almost no mention of debate or competition among theoretical claims in the book, which consistently stresses that all of these theory frames are “not as mutually incompatible” as one might think.
This emphasis raises questions about how much Reuschemeyer's Mertonian, “usable” approach to theorizing is actually different from a Parsonian-style search for a synthetic theory. If we simply seek fruitful insights from a comprehensive menu of middle-range theory frames—themselves set in a general frame that mixes rationalism and critiques of rationalism—we may just end up with a more eclectic version of Parsons's product: an all-encompassing theoretical vocabulary, everything causing everything else, and little analytic leverage on anything in particular. If we step back and squint a bit, Rueschemeyer's stepwise progression through micro- and macro-level bundles of theory, all working in semiautonomous realms but interacting in a general frame of “social action,” has more than a passing resemblance to Parsons's architecture of systems and subsystems.
Rueschemeyer, however, ultimately wants us to use these theory frames, although his more proximate goal is to survey many different usable frames. That goal is realized admirably, and will surely help advance many fruitful research agendas.
