Every now and again, a book appears that potentially changes the landscape of a field of study. David Vishanoff's new work on early Islamic legal theory is, in my opinion, one such book. The basic thesis, distilled from nearly 300 pages of rich and thoughtful analysis of early writings of uṣūl al-fiqh, is that two central theoretical issues dominated the early jurisprudential literature: 1) the acquisition/justification of legal rules from revealed texts; and 2) the methods of dealing with the inevitable ambiguity in language which flows from this acquisition/justification process. It is the latter that forms Vishanoff's primary emphasis. He recognizes it as an overarching concern of al-Shafiʿi in al-Risala, and argues that the various trends and emphases in later juristic writings represent the different possible responses to the framework proposed by al-Shafiʿi. Unlike some other commentators on early legal theory, Vishanoff stresses the continuity, rather than disjuncture, between al-Shafiʿi's argumentation and that of later, “mature” uṣūl al-fiqh. The continuity comes from a focus on the same fundamental questions in regard to textual interpretation and rule derivation, even if the answers to these questions differed. The continuity of a discipline is proven not simply by the maintenance of particular doctrines over time, but rather by recurring discussions on the same issues. In this sense, al-Risala is a clear and recognizable precursor to the uṣūl al-fiqh of al-Jassas Ibn Hazm, ʿAbd al-Jabbar, al-Baqillani, and others.
The continuity thesis is reflected in the structure of Vishanoff's book. After a very useful introduction to the field as it currently stands (pp. 1–14), Vishanoff presents a novel reading of al-Shafiʿi's al-Risala, based around al-Shafiʿi's various solutions to ambiguity (pp. 15–65). Al-Shafiʿi was not, it seems, fearful that linguistic ambiguity might undermine the authority of the law derived from legal texts. Instead, he embraced (or at least accepted as inevitable) the ambiguity inherent in communication. Linguistic forms do not, for al-Shafiʿi, dictate a single legal meaning for a statement. If he allowed them to do so, then contradictory texts would be irreconcilable. Instead, al-Shafiʿi is content with linguistic ambiguity because it gives him the room to allow the marriage of apparently contradictory texts, and thereby create a single textual corpus from which law might be derived. Revelation consists now of both the Book and the Sunna as equal contributors to legal interpretation. Within Vishanoff's approach, al-Shafiʿi is seen as the great synthesizer of the legal trends that preceded him, and his system is the base on which subsequent legal trends developed. So, al-Shafiʿi's demand that law be based on revelation formed the bedrock of a scripturalist trend (beginning with certain Muʿtazili thinkers and ending in the doomed Zahiriyya [pp. 66–108]). Al-Shafiʿi's “vision of a comprehensive law perfectly correlated with the corpus of Prophetic revelation” (p. 109) formed the basis for Basran Muʿtazili doctrine, and in particular al-Qadi ʿAbd al-Jabbar's view that if this “comprehensive law” is the expression of God's will for humankind, then God's communication must be absolutely clear. Al-Shafiʿi's notion that linguistic form does not (always) entail legal meaning creates, of course, a particular theory of language and communication; this theory is taken up and exploited by the great Ashʿari theologian al-Baqillani (pp. 152–98). In al-Baqillani we have a flexibility in interpretation which supports a practical employment of legal theory: a properly constructed theory must be able to provide a guide whereby law is derived ab initio, and without constant reference to previously declared rules by eminent jurists of the past. Finally, the real winner of the debate in Sunnism was what Vishanoff terms “the law orientated” hermeneutic, a prime example of which is the theory proposed by Abu Yaʾla al-Farraʾ (pp. 190–253) selected and analyzed by Vishanoff in the penultimate chapter.
The conclusions of this extensive study are instructive: al-Shafiʿi's system marks the beginning of Muslim legal hermeneutics, and the traditional claim that legal theory began with the companions, or even the Prophet himself, is clearly an element of salvation history, constructed as a result of the adoption of al-Shafiʿi's framework. Legal theory generally “retells the story” of how law came to be what it is, thereby justifying its present form. Islamic legal theory is no different in this regard. The other major conclusions of the book concern the function of legal theory, which has been the subject of some debate among commentators and academics. Vishanoff delineates four roles for uṣūl al-fiqh. First, legal theory made the theological claim that law was derived from revelation more plausible. Second, it functioned to legitimate the scholarly class. Third, it provided an epistemological context for Islamic revelation more generally, not only when dealing with legal issues. Finally, it “provided a grammar”—a set of rules by which the language of law operated—whereby doctrines could be developed, taught, and defended in polemic exchanges with internal (and, occasionally, external) defendants. The relative importance of these four functions might differ across time, and even synchronically between different authors, but Vishanoff's description is perhaps the most instructive and thoughtful of those presented to date in the field. The work closes with some musings on the relationship between Islamic legal theory and the possibility for reform of Islamic law in the modern period. The comments here are dense and require expansion, perhaps by Vishanoff himself in future writings. But I found myself nodding in general agreement when I read the skilfully fashioned statement:
Part of the genius of the law-orientated paradigm is that even as it maximizes opportunities for the reader's involvement in the construction of meaning, it disguises that involvement by presenting the meaning constructed by the reader as the plain and obvious meaning of the text itself . . . this puts the reformers at a disadvantage, because they must perforce acknowledge their novel interpretive choices and methods, whereas the interpretive moves necessary for correlating revelation with the status quo are already taken for granted (p. 278).
Nicely put and well observed. This assessment can be made of the whole work, and I am still processing the implications of Vishanoff's excellent study for my understanding of the early development of legal thinking in Islam.
