There is general agreement, which I share, that among the earliest of Western philosophers were three of the very greatest: Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Each of these is on record as saying something – and it is almost the same thing – about the nature of philosophy itself that goes to the heart of the matter. Aristotle said: ‘It is owing to their wonder that men now begin, and first began, to philosophise’ (Metaphysics, i.982). And Plato wrote, putting his words into the mouth of Socrates: ‘This sense of wonder is the mark of the philosopher. Philosophy indeed has no other origin’ (Theaetetus, section 155).
None of us chooses to be born; and when we come to consciousness we find ourselves existing in a world, a world of experience. Perhaps most of us accept it as we find it, and take up, and carry on as best we can, the unasked-for task of being in it. But some of us are struck with wonderment at it, and are moved to try to understand it. This wonderment – or its distant relation, curiosity – can be very powerful indeed for some individuals, enough to dominate their lives. It may turn them into philosophers, but it can also turn them into contemplatives of other kinds, including religious kinds; or it may encourage them to become creative artists, or scientists. Such people may all be trying to penetrate the mysteries of the world in which they find themselves, and to deepen their understanding of it; and their activities can for that reason have important characteristics in common. Philosophizing is far from being the only way of putting wonderment into practice. But philosophy is distinct from those others in significant respects, as indeed they are from one another, though it was not always the case.
Historically, philosophy began when some people started publicly trying to understand the world around them by the use of reason. This was a milestone in human development. Before then, claims to knowledge, or attempts at understanding, had appealed to authority, either human or supra-human. It could have been the authority of a person or a social class or a body of doctrine, or a priesthood, and could have expressed itself through laws or rituals or schools or traditions or social conventions or the use of armed men. Anyone who publicly flouted it was punished and cast out, usually killed. Rulers, teachers and priests, through institutions of what may sometimes have been quite primitive kinds, passed down from generation to generation an inviolate body of doctrine that called itself knowledge. Frequently it claimed divine origins, and was therefore difficult if not impossible to change. The appearance of the first teachers who tried to attain knowledge and understanding through reasoning had, among its many revolutionary consequences, a knock-on effect: they taught their pupils to reason too, and to think for themselves – and therefore to put forward ideas of their own: to discuss, debate, argue, criticize. No longer was there any handing down of something inviolate. Teachers did not expect even their own pupils to agree with them. Conflicting views between generations became the norm.
It was in the sixth century BC that these developments began, in the world of the ancient Greeks. They launched a runaway growth of knowledge and understanding that is without parallel in human history.
Those first philosophers, whom we now call the pre-Socratic philosophers, were concerned above all to understand the physical world around them, and their concerns would be characterized nowadays as scientific rather than philosophical. The first questions of the person conventionally taken to be the first philosopher, Thales, were ‘What is the world made of?’ and ‘What is sustaining it?’ Actually the chief interest of most of the pre-Socratics might be said to have been cosmology. The one among them who is usually said to have invented the term ‘philosophy’ was also the first to apply the word ‘cosmos’ to the universe – Pythagoras. The impersonality of their concerns was one of the chief criticisms made of them by Socrates, who was in conscious reaction against them. What difference – he asked, referring to some of their well-known questions – what difference could it possibly make to me or my life to know how far the sun is from the earth; or whether the sun is roughly the size of the Peloponnese or bigger than the whole world? What I need to know is how to live my life – and for that I need to know what is good, what is right, what is just: these are the questions we ought to be discussing … And as everyone knows, he went on to achieve immortal fame for the particular manner in which he discussed them.
But other philosophers went on asking those other kinds of question, as well as taking up Socrates' questions. His most gifted pupil, Plato, is as good an example of this as any. He made contributions of genius over the whole range of Socrates' field of enquiry, but then went on to produce an entire cosmology, in which mathematics plays an essential part, along with what we would now term physics. The ablest of Plato's pupils, Aristotle, then did the same again, and indeed coined the term ‘physics’. For generation after generation all attempts to understand the world by the use of reason continued to come under the general umbrella term ‘philosophy’. The attempt to understand nature became known as ‘natural philosophy’. Newton's great work was entitled ‘Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica’, ‘The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy’. It was not until the eighteenth century that science began to be distinguished from philosophy, and the word ‘scientist’ was not coined until the nineteenth century. I am told that to this day there is an ancient university in Scotland where the professor of physics has the official title ‘Professor of Natural Philosophy’.
Even after science had established intellectual independence of philosophy it retained an enormous amount in common with it, above all the imaginative propounding of explanatory theories that are then subjected to logical analysis and critical discussion. The principal characteristic that distinguished the two was that the propositions of science were testable not only intellectually in this way but also empirically, by measurement, experiment or direct physical observation. Empirical testability made so much difference to intellectual enquiry that, once science was independent, it started achieving results with almost unbelievable speed. By the nineteenth century more and more people had begun to believe that science had put in our hands the key to understanding everything, so that all meaningful questions about what actually exists would sooner or later be answerable by scientific methods. Philosophy itself ingested that view. It was central to logical positivism, which was the reigning orthodoxy when I first began to interest myself in academic philosophy. The view was that all statements that are not tautologies must, if they are to mean anything at all, make some noticeable difference to something, a difference that is observable at least in principle; otherwise they are empty. And therefore their truth or falsehood must be empirically decidable, again in principle. This means that when it comes to finding out truths about the world, the methods of science have the potential to fill all the available space, and there is nothing separate for philosophy to do. It has, as people used to say, no first-order tasks. Its function is a second-order function: not to tell us directly about the world but to elucidate and make more perspicuous our talk about the world. It is, as Gilbert Ryle famously put it, talk about talk. Scientists talk about the world, and philosophers talk about talk about the world. Philosophy's job is to deepen our understanding of the concepts we are using, and to make our use of them less ambiguous, to critically evaluate arguments; and to analyse, and possibly improve, our intellectual methods. Philosophy was still seen as important, because all these things were seen as important. And they were seen as being germane not only to the activities of professional scientists but to all significant utterance. But they were nevertheless seen as being unavoidably parasitic on the activities of first-order enquiry.
It would be difficult to exaggerate what a break this was with the whole of philosophy's previous history. I do not believe it had occurred to any of the great figures of philosophy before then, with only one or two arguable exceptions, to think of the subject-matter of philosophy as being in any way linguistic. They wrote as if they regarded themselves as confronting problems presented to them by an essentially non-linguistic reality. In fact they shared, I think, the attitude expressed towards his former self by one of the first major philosophers to move away from an exclusively first-order conception of philosophy, Bertrand Russell, who was older than the logical positivists and revered by them, but never wholly one of them. In his book My Philosophical Development (14) he tells us that until about 1917 – in which year, please note, he was forty-five years old, and had his most original and lastingly influential work already behind him – ‘I had thought of language as transparent – that is to say, as a medium which could be employed without paying attention to it.’ In other words, although philosophy could be expressed only in language, it was not about language: the objects of its concern were nearly always non-linguistic. As Schopenhauer had put it many years before, philosophy as it should be done is carried on in concepts but (except for logic) is not about concepts. To the day of his death Russell believed that the central task of philosophy was to understand the world. He says this baldly in his best known book of all, his History of Western Philosophy (411): ‘A philosopher's job is to find out things about the world by thinking rather than observing.’ Although it was in fact Russell's work that launched the logical analysis of statements in ordinary language on its triumphant career in professional philosophy, he believed to the end of his life that his successors had pursued this kind of analysis much too far, and had transmogrified what he had only ever intended as an ingenious and powerful tool into a subject matter, a whole conception of philosophy. But his view about that was to become a minority view, and has remained so.
It is worth observing that developments of this kind did not occur only in philosophy. They happened at the same time in literature, and the study of literature. Academics in those fields too began for the first time to regard, let us say, novels not as primarily concerned to explore reality, the world, people, human relationships, life in all its aspects, but as being primarily concerned to explore language and the uses of language. And some creative writers who were to make big reputations – James Joyce is an obvious example, but there were others – produced novels in which that was indeed the primary concern. In literature too, as in philosophy, it was an almost complete break with the past, and was declared to be such by its practitioners. Some of the best known among philosophers felt that there was no longer much point in reading the philosophy of the past – Wittgenstein was famous for the meagreness of his acquaintance with it. My supervisor, Peter Strawson, said to me on two separate occasions that he regarded Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as the greatest work of philosophy to have been produced since the ancient Greeks – and I agree with that judgement – but one of his colleagues, a woman who had spent a long career teaching philosophy at Oxford, told me with unembarrassed complacency that she had never read it.
The equation of subject matter with language spread to one subject after another, for instance to psychology, and to sociology. In field after field, language was credited with a level of importance, indeed a centrality, that no one had ever thought of according it before.
I think this helps to explain an exceedingly strange aspect of philosophy's overall development, at least in the English-speaking world, in the twentieth century. Logical positivism had given rise to the view, and provided the intellectual foundations for it, that philosophy could not give us direct knowledge of reality, but was confined to a second-order function of examining what can be said in language. Eventually logical positivism was abandoned. But what was not abandoned was the view of philosophy's relationship to language for which it had provided the basis. The foundations had been removed, yet the superstructure was left standing. Through all the changes and developments that have happened here in philosophy since – and there have been many changes – most professional philosophers have pressed on as if their activity were a second-order one whose subject-matter consisted of linguistic formulations of first-order ideas. They are still devoting themselves primarily to the elucidation of concepts, and to the ancillary tasks that doing that involves.
Now it is my contention that this approach is misconceived – that as a conception of philosophy it is a mistake. Let me straight away make one thing clear. I am not against analytic activity in itself. I am against its being a conception of philosophy. I am against its being seen as philosophy's main concern. In fact I take the same view as did Bertrand Russell – who as the father or godfather of modern linguistic analysis can scarcely be thought to have been against it in principle. It is my view, as it was his, that a new weapon that should have been seen as a valuable addition to our armoury has been allowed, as in a horror story, to take on a life of its own, and to take over. And my chief complaint is not even this, which would be a wholly negative one. My chief complaint is that because a mistaken conception of philosophy has held sway, alternative conceptions of philosophy have not been pursued as they should have been, except by mavericks. On this point I am again with Russell. Near the end of My Philosophical Development he says (230): ‘The most serious of my objections is that the new philosophy seems to me to have abandoned, without necessity, that grave and important task which philosophy throughout the ages has hitherto pursued. Philosophers from Thales onwards have tried to understand the world… I cannot feel that the new philosophy is carrying on the tradition.’
Well, I'm afraid that is still true. And although I am out of step with most of my contemporaries on this, almost the whole of philosophy's history is on my side, not theirs. What has happened during the last half century and more has been a diversion, in both senses of that word; it has been fun, but it has been a detour, though admittedly a détour de force. In the remoter past of philosophy there were other detours, blind alleys, garden paths, which were sometimes followed for generations. I advocate a return to the main road. Philosophy should once more view its main task as that of trying to understand the world, not least the enigma of our existence in it, and also the nature of our experience.
I said at the beginning that other people too were seriously engaged in this task and I referred to religious thinkers, scientists and creative artists. Philosophy differs from religious enquiry because it proceeds without appeal to faith or authority. Philosophers should be the last people inclined to treat any text as sacred. They should insist on subjecting everything to reason. I am not suggesting that the world is totally explicable by reason. In fact, I do not think it is totally explicable at all. But the task of philosophy is to take us as far as reason can take us. The role of reason is evaluative and analytic, and in that sense critical; so reason has to have something to work on that it does not itself produce. And for the philosopher, that something is first and foremost experience, and then the explanations of experience that we grasp at, or more consideredly offer ourselves, or receive from others. The creative writer too is exploring experience; but the philosopher differs from him in that he is trying to express himself in utterances that are literally true. Philosophy differs from science in that although its claims to truth are indeed testable by logical and methodological analysis, and critical discussion generally, they are not testable by empirical procedures. What are the foundations of commonsense knowledge, of science, of mathematics, of logic? These are not questions within those fields, they are questions about them. They are questions for philosophers, including of course philosophers of science, of mathematics and of logic. No science can tell us what is the provenance of ethics and values, or what a right is, or what makes something a work of art. Yet all these are questions that can be rationally addressed and critically discussed; and furthermore they are fundamental to our lives. They are philosophical questions, and that is what makes philosophy so important. We need to pursue them with a perpetually self-critical awareness that extends, yes, to our use of language, of concepts, of analysis and of argument, but such things are among the auxiliaries of method: they must never be seen as constitutive of what it is we are investigating – unless, of course, our investigations are themselves in the philosophy of, shall we say, language or logic. To take just one example, philosophical questions about time are not ‘really’ about temporal concepts, or our use of language. They are about time. They are not about ‘time’.
If I may summarize my view of what the central task of philosophy is as expressed up to this point, it is to formulate and criticize rational explanatory theories about the nature of reality, theories that address themselves to problems of substance, not usually of language, but theories that for some good reason are not empirically decidable, even though they are rationally criticizable. Problems of this character present themselves about questions of importance across the whole range of our human experience: I have given several examples, and shall give more. Our curiosity, our wonder, drives us to want answers to these questions; and science alone can never give us all the answers we look for.
It is salutary to remember that creative artists too may be involved, also in a professional and disciplined way, in trying to deepen their insight into, and understanding of, the world, and our experience of it, and to communicate their findings. I want to say a word about the arts in this context, because they help me to make an essential point about the role of language. Painting and sculpture can express insights into the nature of space, and of physical objects, and of the relationship of physical objects to space – and thus, more generally, the nature of the world around us – that are not expressible in language. They may also express inner states that are not expressible in language. The fact that something is not expressible in language does not necessarily mean that it is deep: works of art may be clichéd and superficial, and many are. But they need not be. The greatest art can be as profound as anything that can be experienced or expressed by human beings. And I do not see how anyone can seriously claim that language is in any way central either to the reality being experienced by the visual artist or to the artist's communication of it. Music is an even stronger example of the same truth. Many people claim that the profoundest experiences and insights they ever have, the deepest sense of being in contact with the inner significance of things, come from listening to great music. But again, it would be impossible to claim that language is in any way constitutive either of the experience being had or of the composer's expression of it. The philosopher, unlike the painter and the composer, cannot communicate his work without the use of language; but his work is not thereby about language, or about the concepts expressible in language. They are no more constitutive of what is being dealt with in the philosopher's case than in the artist's. If I may quote Russell one last time: ‘The essential thing about language is that it has meaning – i.e. that it is related to something other than itself, which is, in general, non-linguistic.’
I am as sure as anyone is entitled to be about anything that lies in the future that the importance accredited to language which so differentiates the last eighty or ninety years from everything that went before will come to be seen as wholly disproportionate. It is not the case that language is the most important single contributory element in the conception we form of the world. Seeing, to which much more of the brain is given over than to language, and only a few aspects of which are expressible in words, does more to provide us with our conception of the world. Or, to take a different sort of example: it has now long been treated as a truism that the single thing that most differentiates us human beings from the animals is language, but I should say that this is not so: I should say that morality is the most important single distinguishing factor.
If one thinks about it seriously, not all that much human experience is satisfactorily expressible in language. None of the things most important to us is, like being in love, or our grief at the loss of those we love, or our own fear of death, or our relationship to our children, even the taste of our food and drink, or our feelings about our work. And language is, anyway, a johnny-come-lately phenomenon, recently arrived on the surface of just our one particular planet. The planet itself is little more than a speck in the cosmos. It therefore cannot be the case that language is constitutive of the reality in which we find ourselves, which we are trying so hard to understand, and with which we have to deal, and of which indeed we are part.
In its most basic features, this world that the philosopher finds himself wondering at, and finds himself wondering at his own existence in, seems to consist of a container whose most clearly perceptible contents are material objects. The container itself has four dimensions, three of space and one of time, and the material objects in it have their being in those dimensions. The objects are continuously in interaction with one another, and these interactions are for the most part causal in character, so that it is usually possible to give causal explanations of the motion of matter in space. The search for causal explanations has always been among the central preoccupations of science. Characteristically, scientific explanation reduces the phenomena to be explained to connections between fundamentals. In physics these may include mass, energy, change, distance, time; and the connections between them are likely to be expressed in mathematical equations. The most famous equation to be formulated in the twentieth century was E = mc2 – the amount of energy embodied in a material object is equal to its mass times the square of the velocity of light – a simply incredible discovery, fraught with consequence. But if you were to say to the physicist: ‘You are using mathematics here. How is mathematics to be justified? What are its foundations? How can they be validated?’; or ‘What actually is a causal connection, in itself? What is it for one thing to cause another?’; the scientist excuses himself and bows out. These are not scientific or mathematical questions. They are questions about science, and about mathematics. They are, in fact, among the classical, and still unsolved, problems of philosophy. The amount of knowledge that science has provided us with is prodigious, and has transformed our understanding of the world, but science cannot explain everything. What is characteristic of science is the reduction of explanation to a basic level that is then left unexplained. Schopenhauer, who revered science, and was very knowledgeable about it, and appreciative of its power and significance, said that in relation to ultimate explanation it was like meeting a group of people and being introduced to each of them in terms of his or her relationship to the others – this one was that one's brother, that one was this one's cousin, the other one was another's niece, and so on – so that by the end you were left saying to yourself: ‘Yes, I've got all that straight – but who on earth are they all?’ This fact that science explains things without itself being explained is one of the factors (there are others) that precludes it from ever providing us with ultimate understanding of the world. This point was taken up and repeated by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus (6.52): ‘We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched.’
Science gives rise to many, many questions that it cannot itself answer. Problems about the nature of time are notorious. Einstein believed that there was no such thing as an objective now, a now not relative to an observer, and therefore no such thing as an objective flow of time. But Karl Popper disagreed with him about that, and they had a face-to-face argument about it. The status of science itself is contentious, and there is disagreement among eminent scientists about what constitutes acceptable scientific method. It is more usually the philosopher of science than the scientist who tries to sort out their differing views. (In that matter, incidentally, Einstein endorsed Popper's basic formulation.) Anyone attached to a university will have on all sides of him people (by no means all of them scientists in a narrow sense) who believe that all significant questions about the nature of reality are ultimately soluble by scientific methods. Such people seem not to recognize that this belief is not in itself a scientific belief, but is a belief about science. It is not itself susceptible of scientific investigation. It is a metaphysics, and one that, it so happens, stands up very badly to critical discussion; in fact it does not stand up at all. Its uncritical acceptance is an act of faith, not rationally sustainable.
The status of mathematics is problematic in a quite different way. In philosophy of mathematics the ur-question is, is mathematics a product of the human mind, as natural languages are, or does it exist independently of the human mind? To give a specific instance from within the subject, are the natural numbers human constructions? I personally have heard world-famous mathematicians argue on each side of that question; and the question itself is not to be solved by mathematics.
All these are areas of questioning that are fundamental for philosophers, and cannot be answered by science. Ordinary, everyday life too is such an area, I am tempted to say the most fertile of all. We cannot stir an inch in any direction without running into enigmas. For instance, all of us here believe 100% that tomorrow will come, and after that another day, and another day after that – and so on indefinitely. The time-unit ‘day’ is local to our world, and if in the future the earth is drawn into the sun there will be no more days; but whatever units of time are appropriate, we assume that one will be positioned after another. Does this mean that we, here, now, are living in time without end, eternal time – that we are already living in eternity? Or is time bounded? Or will it stop? How could that happen? What could it even mean? Are there any other possibilities? If so, what are they? That is only one example. Our ordinary here-ness and now-ness bristles with such fundamental philosophical enigmas. The space we find ourselves in: is that infinitely extended? Could it be? Or is it bounded? If so, how could that be? What sorts of things do we know about the physical objects that seem to be sharing our space, and how do we know them? What difference does it make that we ourselves are physical objects, each one of us always and inescapably located in a particular place at a particular time, with the result that all our perceptions and all our experiences are perspectival?
Here we come to a point which, in my opinion, is more than any other fundamental to philosophy. Everything of any kind that we can do – including all our knowing, experiencing, apprehending, thinking and imagining – can be done only with the physical apparatus we have. So only what that apparatus can mediate is apprehensible by us, and it is apprehensible only in the forms that the apparatus makes available to us. But that is not to say that only such things can exist or be the case. Anything else, provided it is not self-contradictory, can exist or be the case, but is just not apprehensible by us. Now the fact that we have the physical apparatus that we do have is a contingent truth, not a necessary one, as is the fact that the forms it makes available to us are whatever it is they are. Likewise the fact that the reality external to ourselves is whatever it is is also a contingent and not a necessary truth. So our situation is that of an only partially and contingently equipped observer trying to understand a contingently existing and contingently characterized reality that may extend immeasurably beyond him. An inescapable conclusion is that what we take reality to be can exist for us only in whatever terms our little bit of contingently possessed apparatus makes available to us. But those terms are perforce already limited to what is apprehensible by us. This is a permanently unsatisfactory situation. The only conceptions of reality we are capable of forming are such as are apprehensible to us, yet we have the strongest possible rational grounds for believing that reality extends beyond that, and is not confined to the terms in which we are able to conceive it. So it may well be that by far the greater part of it is not explicable to us in terms that we are able to understand at all, and must therefore remain permanently unintelligible to us. J. S. Haldane – who was, I believe, always a materialist – once asserted that the universe is not only queerer than we imagine, it's queerer than we can imagine.
This luminous and entirely rational insight was pioneered most influentially by Kant, richly developed by Schopenhauer, and taken up from Schopenhauer by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. I do not think Wittgenstein added to it very importantly, but he understood it profoundly, and gave it wonderfully incandescent expression. This line of development within Western philosophy contains, I do believe, the most insightful of the thinking available to us so far on these utterly fundamental matters.
I could go on and on giving examples of philosophical questions about matters that are fundamental to our existence; and they would all be among the questions with which philosophy could and should concern itself. None of them is a question primarily for science, because the investigations and conjectures of science are confined to the realm of empirical testability – though this does mean that science can often give our enquiries helpful support. Also, scientific theories can rule out metaphysical theories. None of these enquiries is primarily about our use of concepts or of language, though we need always to be critically self-aware in such use. They are enquiries into the nature of reality, the way things actually are. As with the novelist and the playwright – who may be superior masters of the use of language – it is important that we never confuse the medium we are communicating in with the reality we are communicating about. Only one small corner of the field should ever be given over to concern with the medium itself.
Many of the philosophical questions I have mentioned so far come from areas in which philosophy finds itself in a neighbouring territory to science or mathematics. This reflects the mainstream development of the subject for most of the last four hundred years, if not during the last few. There was a period of hundreds of years before that, during the Middle Ages, when philosophy was closer to religion. The balance and the emphasis have differed in different historical periods. I am sure the balance will continue to change. An outsider might be forgiven for supposing that in the study of philosophy, intellectual fashion would have no place; but everyone in this room knows that intellectual fashion is an exceedingly powerful force. There is one aspect of philosophy's potential that has never had such a period of dominance although it has always existed, and has always intrigued me, namely philosophy that shares concerns with, and takes account of, the creative arts. I would approach it in the following way.
As I have already stressed, we do not just inhabit a world of material objects existing in a container of space and time: we ourselves are material objects. Opinions differ as to whether we are wholly and solely our bodies. Many people believe that we are, others that we are our bodies plus something else, and yet others that the real, essential ‘I’ is a something else whose existence is independent of space and time. But whichever of these alternatives is correct, if any is, while we are in this world we are unquestionably embodied. Whether or not we have spirits or souls or disembodied minds, and whether or not our experience will ever include any world other than this one, while we are in this world we are unquestionably living in, or with, or through, if not as, material objects, the material objects that are our bodies. Whatever the explanation may be, each one of us in this world is a material object that knows itself from inside. And for each one of us, his own body is the only material object that he knows from inside.
Inside ourselves we have an unending welter of experiences that range from the superficial and trivial, or the workaday and mundane, to the compelling and the profound. Some of our inner experiences are almost overwhelmingly powerful, and are of the very highest interest and importance to us. But they are not subject to rational enquiry in the normal sense, because they are accessible to only one person. Our bodies – including our brains, our nervous systems and our sense organs – are fully available to the investigations of science, but our experiences are not. It is very properly a principle of science that for any claim to have scientific status, what it claims must be inter-subjectively observable, checkable, testable – and our inner experiences are not. Yet they are the most immediate experiences we have, and this gives them an inescapable importance for philosophy. As Descartes famously claimed, the only things of which I can be indubitably certain are that I am having whatever immediate experiences I am currently having, and that in the having of them I know myself to exist as, at the very least, a something that has these experiences. If I try to enlarge on this in any way at all – for instance, by describing any of the experiences in language, or by drawing logical inferences from them, or by trying to establish what sort of a something I am – I make myself liable to error. But in knowing that whatever I am is having whatever pre-linguistic experiences I am currently having I cannot err. This has what might appear to be the paradoxical consequence that our only absolutely certain knowledge is permanently ring-fenced from science and scientific investigation.
This does not, however, mean that it is ring-fenced from all investigation. Much of it belongs to the province of the creative artist, although it is not the whole of his province. Creative artists can have what are perhaps the profoundest of all insights into inner states, and can give public expression to those insights in works of art. But some of the same territory also belongs to the philosopher. Substantial contributions to its investigation have been made not only by Kant and Schopenhauer, whose work ranged across the whole of philosophy, but, after them, more narrowly, by Nietzsche and Husserl. It has always been central to the concerns of existentialist philosophy – first, in the nineteenth century, with Kierkegaard, and then in the twentieth with philosophers as different as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Some other philosophers who confine themselves within analytic traditions coterminous with science and mathematics have been suspicious of these thinkers, if not downright hostile to them, because of the unamenability of these aspects of their subject matter to enquiries that embody scientific principles. But this is surely an error on their part. It is manifestly a mistake for a philosopher trying to understand the nature of material objects, and the nature of our knowledge of them, to rule out of consideration his direct knowledge and experience of the one and only material object that he experiences and knows from inside. How can it not be obvious that if he wants to deepen his understanding of the inner nature of things, at least one legitimate place to start is with the only thing of whose inner nature he has immediate, direct, unmediated perceptions? Of course, what he then goes on to say must be subjected to rigorous logical analysis and critical discussion, like all other philosophical utterances. His statements may not be empirically testable, but nor are most of the statements of most other philosophers – it certainly does not mean that they are not testable; and, as with others, their tenability will depend on their success in withstanding detailed and prolonged criticism. If a philosopher produces utterances that cannot be rationally criticized at all then they will not be philosophy. They may have other interest: they may be metaphysical rhapsody of a kind that some religious people value, or they may be poetry, perhaps even great poetry. On the other hand such a philosopher may produce utterances that claim to be literally true, and are rationally criticizable, and are interesting. All the philosophers I have just mentioned did that. And in all such cases they were writing – there should be no serious question about this – philosophy.
