Consider the image of a benevolent, virtuous ruler at the head of a government grounded in universal moral principles and possessing cosmic sanction to rule. Variations on this Confucian ideal helped subvert the military character of rule during the Tokugawa period, argues Watanabe Hiroshi in this lucid, wide-ranging study of early-modern Japanese political thought. The military might that Tokugawa Ieyasu marshalled created lasting peace, but this lasting peace was not conducive to military values. Watanabe aptly characterizes Confucianism as “dangerous thought” (p. 77), a term that both highlights its subversive potential and runs counter to the old saw (still widely repeated) of neo-Confucianism allegedly serving as some kind of early ideological orthodoxy for bakufu rule.
As Confucian thought gradually worked its way into Tokugawa society, the pull of ideas such as imperial loyalty, the universal Way, and virtue as the basis of government legitimacy gradually transformed society from within. New ideas were not the only transformative influence. The rapid rise of a market economy impoverished rulers and the samurai class in general, and a “deferential but obdurate” (p. 227) peasantry resisted state attempts to tax rising agricultural productivity. A shogunate that made no sustained attempt to justify itself ideologically came to rely increasingly on the authority of the imperial court. This reliance ultimately caused the shogunate's downfall in the face of simmering samurai resentment and changes resulting from contact with foreign countries. In A History of Japanese Political Thought, 1600–1901, Watanabe examines the varied world of political thought in Tokugawa Japan. In the process, he connects ideas to their sociopolitical context and takes a fresh look at well-studied topics. It is a masterful book, and David Noble deserves praise for undertaking the painstaking work of translation and for completing the task with great skill. Despite the image of Tokugawa intellectual history as a relatively dry and specialized realm, Watanabe's highly contextualized approach and decades of research combined with Noble's fine translation result in a book that is well worth the time and attention of scholars in any realm of East Asian studies.
The chapters flow well. The first five set the stage, explaining Confucianism in its Chinese context and the government and social organization of early-modern Japan. Chapter 3 discusses the theatrical aspects whereby the Tokugawa house projected its authority, and nicely complements Luke Roberts's recent book, Performing the Great Peace: Political Space and Open Secrets in Tokugawa Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2012). Those who still adhere to the old notion that Tokugawa Ieyasu promoted neo-Confucian thought to bolster a rigid social order will want to pay especially close attention to chapter 5, “The Lure of Dangerous Thought.” “Once one became a Confucian scholar,” Watanabe points out, “one's former status did not seem to matter. Samurai studied under Confucian masters who were commoners by origin, and in the exchanges between Confucian scholars we see no evidence of concern for the social status of correspondents. This was true in the realm of the cultural pursuits in general” (p. 85), a point that resonates with Anna Beerens's prosopographical research on this topic.Footnote 1 In part because neither the Shogun nor the daimyo were concerned with policing particular interpretations of the classics, “Confucianism enjoyed an extraordinarily diverse and vibrant development” (p. 88), albeit removed from actual political power. As more samurai turned to scholarship and as Confucian ideas became increasingly influential in Japanese academic circles, the tension between a universal Confucian Way and the particularities of military rule in Japan increased.
Different thinkers negotiated this tension in different ways. Some, such as Itō Jinsai, Yamagata Daini, and, much later, Fukuzawa Yukichi, came to potentially subversive conclusions about those in power or the right of the people to oppose misrule. Arai Hakuseki endeavored to reconcile Confucian concepts with the peculiarities of Japanese sociopolitical reality. Ogyū Sorai, Yamagata Daini, and Andō Shōeki rejected the urbanizing, market-oriented society of their day in favor of imagined rural utopias. Kaihō Seiryō, by contrast, actively embraced the competitive atmosphere of the market economy and advocated state use of economic profit as a means of motivating society to increase production. Motoori Norinaga embraced a vision of Japanese particularity, rejecting the universal claims of Confucians. Notions of universal moral duty caused many Japanese intellectuals to reject nineteenth-century bakufu policies of violently turning away foreign ships, and Fukuzawa Yukichi and other intellectuals of the early Meiji era attempted to place Japan into a new universalistic framework. Watanabe nicely demonstrates that many of the tensions that developed in the Tokugawa period carried over into the modern era after being transposed into new frameworks.
Some chapters are devoted to major thinkers, but the book is much more than a chronological survey of the great minds. Chapters about individuals are interspersed with thematic chapters on topics such as peasant rebellions, changing definitions of “Japan,” sexuality and gender, perceptions of the Western world, bakumatsu era debates about Japan's place in the world, and “civilization” in the early Meiji era. The book features extensive quoted passages from primary sources, which are well integrated into the main text.
My brief summary here does not do justice to the rich content of A History of Japanese Political Thought, 1600–1901. All scholars of East Asia, especially those whose specialty lies outside Tokugawa Japan, would benefit from the book. Thanks to Watanabe's master narrative and Noble's smooth translation, the book is a relatively fast read. In addition to conveying Watanabe's insights, the book serves as an overview of Tokugawa political institutions, political culture, the major strains of thought before 1900, and intellectual antecedents of the Meiji Restoration. It would enhance advanced undergraduate or graduate courses in early modern or modern Japanese or East Asian history.
