The Palestinian refugee problem has been at the center of the Arab–Israeli conflict since 1948. This question, the greatest and most enduring refugee problem in the world, remains intractable despite endless diplomatic efforts and decades of “peace process.” Some 60 to 70 percent of Palestinians are refugees, and the resolution of the Israel–Palestine conflict is impossible without addressing their grievances, rights, and needs. Furthermore, any discussion of contemporary Israeli policies toward refugees must take into account their Zionist roots and, in particular, the way in which they are linked to those policies that were instituted in the early years of the Israeli state. After the 1948 expulsions, refugees were not repatriated because Israel had no interest in allowing them back; the Israelis correctly argued that Palestinian repatriation would entail the reversal of Zionism and Israel's transformation into a binational state. Since 1948, successive “ethnocratic” policies adopted by the Jewish state—land, ethnic and demographic, legal and political, military and diplomatic—have been aimed at reinforcing the power and domination of the Israeli–Jewish population.
A key element in these policies has always been the prevention of the return of Palestinian refugees to their ancestral villages and towns. Indeed denial has always been central to Israeli discourse: denial of the existence of the Palestinian people, denial of the (extensively documented) “ethnic cleansing” of Palestine in 1948, denial of the Palestinian “right of return,” denial of Palestinian rights in Jerusalem, and so on, ad infinitum and ad nauseam. Denial is a central component of a Zionist strategy of preemption: after the setting up of the “transfer committees” (first by the Jewish Agency in 1937–44 and later by the Israeli cabinet in 1948), and the cleansing of the land in 1948, Israelis denied any wrongdoing or any historical injustice. They continue to deny any moral responsibility or culpability for the creation of the plight of the Palestinian refugees and to deny any restitution of property. The refusal to entertain any recognition of culpability for the “ethnic cleansing” of Palestine in 1948 runs deep among Israelis of all political persuasions (left, right, and center). Instead, Israelis make counterclaims regarding Jewish property lost in the Arab world.
Fischbach's Records of Dispossession is an important piece of revisionist history. Chapters 1 and 3 provide an excellent discussion of Israeli policies toward abandoned refugee property, the variety of methods by which the Israeli state expropriated this property, and the way the property was used by the new state. Other chapters contain highly original material, with detailed and often critical examinations of the Palestinian refugee property question and the “compensation issue.” Fischbach's main contribution derives from his careful examination of the archival records, especially those of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP)—records that were never before available to the public; they were kept behind “locked doors” at the U.N. archives in New York for nearly four decades (p. xxi). In the 1950s and 1960s, the UNCCP had systematically compiled these massive records in the hope that they would become useful should Israel ever compensate the refugees for their losses. Israel's obligation to compensate the refugees for land and property had been codified in paragraph 11 of U.N. Resolution 194 of 1948. Fischbach's meticulous research documents U.N. estimates of the scope and value of the refugee property and conflicting Israeli and Arab estimates. The enormous number of previously unavailable documents on property losses by Palestinians in 1948 amassed by Fischbach, as well as the exceptional quality of his scholarship, makes his work by far the most important work on the subject.
Fischbach's work is also useful on early Arab and international policies toward the property question. Although the main focus of Records of Dispossession is on the 1948–67 period, the work is interesting on the wider political and diplomatic contexts of the property issue, particularly the way this question has been affected by the evolving Arab–Israeli conflict throughout the last fifty-five years. In his conclusion, Fischbach correctly argues that Palestinians and the wider Arab world have generally understood the compensation question as surrender of the “right of return,” and refugees, in particular, have generally refused to discuss compensation separately from restitution and repatriation. This deep ambivalence toward the concept of compensation also explains the recent insistence of many Palestinian groups that the refugees obtain justice through property restitution not compensation.
Records of Dispossession is excellent on details but conceptually flawed in one respect. From the early 1950s onward, all Israeli attempts to work out proposals on compensation for Palestinian refugee property were tied to a settlement of abandoned Jewish property in Iraq, and later in other Arab countries. This linkage was also tied to the myth of “population exchange,” which is still being publicly propagated by even “moderate” Israeli leaders such as Shimon Peres. One of the most important issues discussed by Fischbach is “whether Palestinian refugee claims are linked inextricably to counterclaims raised by Israel. Once again, the answer provided by the historical record seems to be ‘yes’ ” (p. 365). What “inextricable link” and which “historical record”? Of course “Arab Jews” currently residing in Israel and the West are entitled to seek compensation from Arab regimes. Some, like the pro-Western government of Nuri Said in Iraq, tacitly and opportunistically conspired with the Israeli government of David Ben-Gurion to get rid of the indigenous Jewish community residing in Iraq for over two millennia. On this supposed “inextricable linkage” the author surprisingly accepts the Israeli official line uncritically. This also perhaps explains why this work has been welcomed by some mainstream Zionist academics in Israel and the United States. Once again, however, we Palestinians are being asked to pay the price not only for the Holocaust and other European atrocities against Jews but also for the cynical and often brutal behavior of post-1948 Arab regimes toward Mizrahi “Arab Jews.”
Records of Dispossession produces mountains of evidence but leaves much to be desired on “the way forward”; its implicit procompensation concepts are carefully camouflaged. In the opinion of this reviewer, a comprehensive, just, and durable solution will depend on bringing an end to the Israeli politics of denial and addressing the refugee problem justly. Only by understanding the centrality of the nakba and expulsion that the Palestinian people suffered in 1948 (in the same way that the Holocaust has been central to Israeli and Jewish society of today) is it possible to comprehend the Palestinians' desire for return. Perhaps more crucially, the Palestinian refugee problem can only be resolved justly within the wider framework of a binational Israel–Palestine. Even now Israeli society is binational: one in every five Israeli citizens is a Palestinian. With acknowledgment and international support, the refugee issue can be resolved on the basis of a historic compromise between Israelis and Palestinians. Acknowledgment also means that the Reparations Agreement between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany of September 1952, which was designed to compensate victims of the Holocaust, might serve as a model to compensate victims of the nakba.
