INTRODUCTION
Running a hospital is a tough business. Patients must be attracted, admitted, treated, and discharged; physicians and staff hired, trained, and retained; new technology mastered; and most importantly, reimbursement dollars from payors captured and retained. The hospital Board of Directors and top administrators must also keep an eagle eye on staff practices and patient outcomes or hospital revenue will suffer. The United States has over 6,000 hospitals, many in health care systems that provide almost ninety percent of U.S. hospital beds. These hospitals are the major providers of emergency care and highly complicated surgical and other procedures in the United States. They are also producers of patient harms.
Hospitals in the United States now face a perfect storm—the confluence of (1) a rising tide of hospital adverse events, (2) a tsunami of Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) technological developments changing hospital practice, and (3) the rapid onslaught of Medicare reimbursement tools. Running a hospital is a tough business. Patients must be attracted, admitted, treated, and discharged; physicians and staff hired, trained, and retained; new technology mastered; and most importantly, reimbursement dollars from payors captured and retained. The hospital Board of Directors and top administrators must also keep an eagle eye on staff practices and patient outcomes or hospital revenue will suffer. The United States has over 6,000 hospitals,Footnote 1 many in health care systems that provide almost ninety percent of U.S. hospital beds.Footnote 2 These hospitals are the major providers of emergency care and highly complicated surgical and other procedures in the United States.Footnote 3 They are also producers of patient harms.Footnote 4
Hospitals in the United States now face a perfect storm—the confluence of (1) a rising tide of hospital adverse events,Footnote 5 (2) a tsunami of Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) technological developments changing hospital practice,Footnote 6 and (3) the rapid onslaught of Medicare reimbursement toolsFootnote 7. These three pressure fronts together are battering the management of hospitals. Each corresponding technology—patient adverse event spotting, the use of powerful AI data analytic tools to improve health care delivery, and pay-for-performance reimbursement using incentives to improve institutional behavior—has promise, and one day they will work well together. At present, however, I will argue that all three—adverse event discovery, AI tools, and pay-for-performance (also known as “P4P”)—are halfway technologiesFootnote 8, aligning in such a way that they create a fog that obscures safety, distorts hospital spending, and pushes institutions toward imperfect patient safety systems.
The original meaning of the phrase “halfway technology,” as used by Lewis Thomas, was as follows:
Halfway technology … represents the kinds of things that must be done after the fact, in efforts to compensate for the incapacitating effects of certain diseases whose course one is unable to do very much about…. By its nature, it is at the same time highly sophisticated and profoundly primitive…. It is a characteristic of this kind of technology that it costs an enormous amount of money and requires a continuing expansion of hospital facilities.Footnote 9
Thomas uses as his examples the Iron Lung, a negative pressure ventilator that helps a person to breathe on his or her own in a normal manner when muscle control is lost which was used to treat patients with Polio in the 1950s, as well as dialysis, heart transplants, coronary artery bypass grafts, coronary stents, total hip and knee replacements, and drugs for hypertension.Footnote 10 These “primitive” tools are used “when physicians are bogged down by their incomplete technologies, by the innumerable things they are obliged to do in medicine when they lack a clear understanding of disease mechanisms, [when] the deficiencies of the health care system are most conspicuous.”Footnote 11
I use the phrase “halfway technology” here to describe a hospital environment in which tools are deployed too rapidly before they are mature, driven by both market and government pressures.Footnote 12 Hospitals adopt full use of these tools, in Lewis Thomas' words, before they have “a clear understanding” of their flaws, limits, and side-effects.Footnote 13 Because they are only “halfway tools” not completely tested, they risk poor results, or no results at all. These tools are however “halfway” only in the sense that they need further testing; they are innovative tools that improve over time—it is the early implementation that often creates problems for patient safety uses.
I will argue in this article that the entanglement of these metrics—adverse event tracking, AI tools, and pay-for-performance metrics—requires two counterforces to untangle them. First, hospital Boards of Directors must take a forceful ethical stance on the role of quality and patient safety as a central goal of hospital actions. The onslaught of expensive data analytics tools, coupled with premature P4P metrics, requires Boards to avoid distractions and focus on quality of care first. Boards can be distracted by the financial focus of hospitals, as they worry about reimbursement and reputation.Footnote 14 Second, Medicare needs to develop a better compensation model for the often harmed and often undercompensated Medicare patient. A new model needs to be developed and tested that uses Medicare tools to offer compensation to insured patientsa Medicare Patient Compensation Fund that produces a new stream of data as to patient harms from adverse events and creates the sting of a new set of financial penalties that start with current P4P metrics and improves them.
I. PATIENT SAFETY: SPOTTING ADVERSE EVENTS IN THE FOG OF HOSPITAL PRACTICE
A. Halfway Technology I: Adverse Event Detection
Adverse events are as old as medicine itself, and their frequency has increased as medicine has become technologically complex. An adverse event is defined by the federal Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (“AHRQ”) as “[a]ny injury caused by medical care.”Footnote 15 AHRQ notes that this definition means “an undesirable clinical outcome,” ranging from hospital-induced infections to a pneumothorax from central venous catheter placement, without regard to what caused the event.Footnote 16
Production of medical adverse events has traditionally focused on the individual physician as the primary causal agent of patient harm. Primary care practice certainly is marked by frequent misdiagnoses that cause harmful delays in treatment and by adverse drug reactions—and outpatient care can also do harm.Footnote 17 I will however focus my attention on hospitals, where most high-risk care is now delivered and most adverse events are produced.Footnote 18 Patient harms in hospitals continue to be seriously underreported. A report by the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) in 2011 found that hospital staff did not report eighty-six percent of events to incident reporting systems.Footnote 19 This failure to report is caused in large part by the lack of a federal comprehensive mandated national reporting system for adverse events, and half of states also lack any kind of reporting system.Footnote 20
The hospital environment lacks proper policing and is surprisingly full of risks to patients.Footnote 21 Even the best hospitals generate a high volume of patient harms.Footnote 22 A 2019 study based on data from Leapfrog, which grades hospitals semi-annually on patient outcomes, concludes that “[t]he number of avoidable deaths per 1,000 admissions ranged from 3.24 lives per 1,000 admissions in ‘A’ hospitals to 6.21 lives per 1,000 admissions in ‘D’ and ‘F’ hospitals.”Footnote 23 If all hospitals had scored an A performance, more than 50,000 patient lives could be saved, and there would still be considerable room for improvement.Footnote 24 A recent study concluded that medical error was the third most common cause of death in the United States.Footnote 25
The Institute of Medicine report, To Err Is Human (“IOM Report”), published in 1998, estimated a maximum of 100,000 patient deaths annually occurred due to medical errors.Footnote 26 The IOM Report—with its extrapolation of high levels of patient harms—created and energized the Patient Safety Movement. Three years later, the IOM published Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century, which stressed the importance of health care systems design.Footnote 27 It argued that most errors and adverse events in health care are caused by problems with system processes and not solely by provider error.Footnote 28
The high level of adverse events among Medicare patients in hospitals has been well documented by the OIG.Footnote 29 The OIG Report in 2012 found that “[a]n estimated 13.5 percent of hospitalized Medicare beneficiaries experienced adverse events during their hospital stays. Of the nearly 1 million Medicare beneficiaries discharged from hospitals in October 2008, about 1 in 7 experienced an adverse event that met at least 1 of our criteria (13.5 percent).” The OIG's conclusion: 27% of beneficiaries experienced care-related harm, and half of these harms were preventable.Footnote 30
B. Halfway Technology II. Data Analytics Tools
1. Electronic Health Record Utility
Adverse events are hard to detect.Footnote 31 Adverse event tracking, while it is improving, is still evolving … and expensive. Hospitals need to commit to well-tested AI tools to systematically find adverse events, because reliance on provider self-reporting has proved to be limited. Before Medicare can use reimbursement incentives to push hospitals to reduce adverse events, adverse events have to be discovered, tallied and stored in an accessible way for hospitals to track and then take action to reduce or eliminate. This has been a goal since the early 1900s, and progress has been slow.Footnote 32 In 2004 the Institute of Medicine report Patient Safety: Achieving a New Standard for Care (“IOM Patient Safety Report”) made a strong recommendation for computer systems to improve patient safety:
Traditional reporting systems can grossly under detect injuries, significantly impeding the ability to improve. A balanced detection system necessarily relies on case finding through surveillance, working together with voluntary incident reporting systems. Injury surveillance uses data-based clinical trigger systems that lead to prospective expert review, as well as retrospective review of patient records.Footnote 33
The IOM Patient Safety Report acknowledged the need for robust Electronic Health Record (“EHR”) systems to generate patient safety reports automatically during the patient care process.Footnote 34 The usefulness of these patient safety reporting systems, however, has been limited by the lack of EHR systems. The IOM Patient Safety Report notes: “[w]ithout EHRs, reporting systems typically rely on special data collection mechanisms (both human- and computer-based), making reporting a cumbersome, costly, and sporadic exercise. The data collected in these systems are neither complete nor standardized, making it difficult to aggregate the data or identify trends or patterns.”Footnote 35
The HITECH Act of 2009 was intended to speed up the slow adoption of electronic health records by hospitals.Footnote 36 The Act created $30 billion in incentives for adoption of EHRs: it subsidized adoption costs, provided technical support, and altered reimbursement rules, so long as an adopting physician was able to show “meaningful use” of the EHR system to improve patient care.Footnote 37 By 2012 the OIG had issued a clarion call to use EHRs and data analytics to improve patient safety, recommending that AHRQ and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) should work to identify all types of adverse events.Footnote 38 The OIG added that “CMS should provide further incentives for hospitals to reduce the incidence of adverse events.”Footnote 39 CMS had already begun its use of value-based-purchasing tools, and they increased their use after 2012.Footnote 40 It is as if the cart was loaded before the horse was even ready, given the continued problems with identifying adverse events.Footnote 41
EHRs are central tools for patient safety improvement.Footnote 42 Once an EHR system is in place, data analytic programs can be used to store, organize, and retrieve patient information; EHR applications can support healthcare providers and improve their ability to make both diagnostic and treatment decisions.Footnote 43 EHRs have tremendous potential, but have been slow to deliver. EHR software errors, coupled with user errors, have caused medical errors and several patient deaths.Footnote 44 EHR use also has produced surprisingly high levels of drug errors.Footnote 45
This rapid adoption of EHRs has created a range of problems—lack of standards, poor usability, and poor interoperability, among others.Footnote 46 The rapid push to adopt electronic health record technology by complex hospital systems has created a weak foundation for the application of pay-for-performance tools.
2. Training Modern Data Analytics
Today's hospitals are working to digitize and connect their facilities and hospital systems, and their take-up of data analytic tools is accelerating.Footnote 47 The AI health market may reach almost $7 billion by 2021—a compound annual growth rate of forty percent.Footnote 48 Vendors claim that this growth in use of AI by hospitals could cut U.S. healthcare costs by $150 billion a year by 2026, in addition to improving care.Footnote 49 The lure of AI and data analytics systems in hospitals is powerful, providing new and swift ways to discover and track abuses of patient harms.Footnote 50 This AI capability, if and when it works as promised, will ultimately alter the standard of care in hospitals, allowing for a real reduction of adverse patient events.Footnote 51 Hospital systems will have available to them the technology to discover adverse events and their causes, and these new technologies will create an intensified duty to implement policies to reduce such patient harms.Footnote 52 Hospital litigation already has begun to reflect new patient safety programs and their legal consequences.Footnote 53 AI diagnostic tools will also force hospitals to confront new standards of care for diagnosing patient diseases.Footnote 54
Data analytics connects statistics—the study of data relationships using numbers; artificial intelligence—the use of software and/or machines that display human-like behaviors; and machine learning or deep learning—algorithms that learn from existing data to make reliable predictions.Footnote 55 Health care is a perfect candidate for the power of Big Data, considering data source, the need to manage complex diseases, and Medicare's linking reimbursement to patient outcomes.Footnote 56
The critics argue that the capabilities of AI are overestimated at present as to patient care benefits.Footnote 57 EHRs are full of “messy” dataFootnote 58 that is hard to read without natural language processing tools.Footnote 59 Data analytics provides the computing power and software to sort through large volumes of messy data; deep learning neural networks can learn from the data itself.Footnote 60 These tools can potentially work well in healthcare.Footnote 61 Fans of deep learning argue that it can incorporate the entire EHR to produce predictions for clinical problems and outperform state-of-the-art traditional predictive models.Footnote 62 Much of this, however, is stillthe promise of vendors of deep leaning tools and researchers who are exploring methods to improve deep learning.Footnote 63
A recent National Academy of Medicine report notes some of the limitations of implementing AI tools too early:
AI tools will also produce challenges that are entirely related to the novelty of the technology. Even at this early stage of AI implementation in health care, the use of AI tools has raised questions about the expectations of clinicians and health systems regarding transparency of the data models, the clinical plausibility of the underlying data assumptions, whether AI tools are suitable for discovery of new causal links, and the ethics of how, where, when, and under what circumstances AI should be deployed []. At this time in the development cycle, methods to estimate the requirements, care, and maintenance of these tools and their underlying data needs remain a rudimentary management science.Footnote 64
Optimistic assumptions about the use of EHR data sources assume that such EHRs are “interoperable,” i.e. easily exchanged across health systems. This is often not the case.Footnote 65 Many of the theoretical benefits of EHRs depend on their being interoperable.Footnote 66 A truly interoperable EHR system could reduce medical errors by, for example, equipping emergency room doctors admitting an unconscious patient to quickly look up the patient's medical history and current medications.Footnote 67 Such care coordination allows providers working in different health systems who care for a single patient to share notes and records.Footnote 68 It could make possible detection of patient problems before they even materialize and prevent them. Data analytic AI tools may plausibly evolve from halfway technologies to powerful, effective, and bug-free tools over time, but in the interim, regulators need to be attentive to the limits of their tools.Footnote 69
C. Halfway Technology III. Pay-for-Performance in Health Care
1. The Evolution of Medicare's Regulatory Model
Payment matters in health care and so does the design of payment. Medicare pays for almost half of hospital care in the United States.Footnote 70 Unlike other federal benefit programs that provide health care services and items, Medicare has gone from a payor without question in the years after its passage in 1965, to a purchaser of covered items and services from independent vendors, and finally, as health care costs came to consume more and more of the federal budget, to a payor who uses reimbursement penalties to squeeze hospital revenues.Footnote 71
The use of economic incentives in the Medicare program is not new. First came the Diagnosis-Related Groups (“DRG”) program in 1983, a program designed to slow what had become rapid hospital price inflation.Footnote 72 It set maximum charges for hundreds of medical treatments by establishing 467 diagnostic payment rates for the 4,800 hospitals of that time, using historical Medicare data.Footnote 73 The Social Security Amendments of 1983 established the DRG prospective payment system for inpatient hospital services, in which Medicare pays hospitals a fixed fee for each type of case, determined in advance and based on the relative average cost of treating that type of case in hospitals nationwide instead of the hospital's own costs.Footnote 74 It forced hospitals to look at these procedures and see which ones were losing revenue and which were producing an excess of revenue over cost.Footnote 75
Medicare's DRG payment system shifted the balance of economic power between the providers of medical care (hospitals and physicians) and those who paid for it, power that providers had acquired for more than half a century.Footnote 76 The DRG program was in fact successful in rationalizing hospital budgeting and taming inflation.Footnote 77
With the publication of the Institute of Medicine report, Crossing the Quality Chasm,Footnote 78 Medicare turned its attention to more powerful reimbursement tools to both control Medicare expenditures and improve hospital quality of care.Footnote 79 CMS developed specific reimbursement measures as a regulatory tool to incentivize good hospital care and to punish hospitals for substandard performance: pay-for-performanceFootnote 80 and value-based-purchasingFootnote 81 models were developed to create incentive systems where quality shortcomings trigger hospital reimbursement penalties.Footnote 82 The use of pay-for-performance metrics are designed to score hospitals on measurable specific conditions like Hospital-Acquired Conditions (“HACs”), through the HAC Reduction ProgramFootnote 83, and through the use of patient outcome measures, such as patient safety indicators (“PSIs”).Footnote 84 As regulator, CMS has come to demand of hospitals that they fix excessive readmissions, reduce PSIs, and meet quality metrics or they will experience a Medicare reimbursement hit.Footnote 85
Data mining is used, for example, by hospitals to find HACs and to prevent them, in order to avoid CMS financial penalties.Footnote 86 Such tracking efforts will increase as (1) hospitals adopt data analytics and (2) ever-expanding federal pay-for-performance programs condition larger fractions of a hospital's reimbursement on performance standards for hospital-acquired events. Data analytics can aid clinicians in eliminating adverse events and resulting excessive costs.Footnote 87 It can also assist clinicians in determining care plans, for example, based on estimating disease trajectories of cancer patients from unstructured, free text in EHRs.Footnote 88 These tools have power to improve the care of Medicare patients in hospitals, without a doubt. The Medicare program has pushed these P4P tools to promote quality in hospitals but also to reduce costs to the program.Footnote 89 Medicare has enthusiastically noted that its non-payment policy for HACs has saved Medicare almost $350 million each year.Footnote 90 Medicare indeed has saved money, but these dollars represent revenue lost to hospitals that could have been spent by hospitals on other areas of quality improvement.Footnote 91 If the reimbursement measures used are well justified and fairly applied, then the Medicare system gains in both quality and cost; if however these metrics are poorly tested and are unproven, hospitals are wasting scarce staff time and resources.Footnote 92
Hospitals today face what has been called “confusing complexity—safety initiatives focused on a broad array of specific safety targets with interventions for each one: process standardization, checklists for surgery, bundles for central lines, electronic prescribing and order entry, and medication barcoding.”Footnote 93 For the hospital statisticians, epidemiologists, and data analytic officers, there are too many metrics and systems to easily keep track of, as they are of differing validity, and often hard to apply to the clinical setting.
2. Limits of Halfway Technologies Such as P4P
Value-based-purchasing and pay-for-performance are growing in importance for hospitals, as described above. The rationality of using financial incentives to improve the Medicare program appeals to authors of the IOM reports and to policymakers—it is a potent mix of the ideology of market-like incentives to affect institutional behavior and the attraction of CMS to continued accumulation of political/financial muscle over often-resistant hospitals.Footnote 94 In the process, CMS is forcing hospitals to face increasing amounts of money at risk with every patient admission.Footnote 95 The Medicare program hopes that Big Data and data analytics will achieve remarkable efficiencies in the messy U.S. health care system, improving diagnoses and reducing costs and adverse events.Footnote 96
Here we see the fusion of economic tools and computer power shifting the fundamental role of hospitals from fiduciaries of their patients' care—putting patient safety and welfare first—to economic entities driven by the lure of increased value-based payments and the skittish avoidance of the sting of penalties. Neither pay-for-performance or data analytics tools perform miracles.
CMS, private insurance, and many states have taken an enthusiastic approach to the use of data analytic tools and measures to compare or benchmark hospitals' performances for patient safety.Footnote 97 Such tools are certainly necessary to track reimbursement driven incentive and penalty systems under Medicare. The problem is that the shortcomings of AI and its applications suggest a halfway technology that still has limitations along with its promise.Footnote 98 AI has not yet been proven to be clinically effective in many clinical applications. AI requires high quality data sources,Footnote 99 but most clinical data, whether from EHRs or medical billing claims, remain ill-defined and not easily exploited by AI technologies. EHRs for example lack specificity measures such as duration, severity, and pathophysiologic mechanism.Footnote 100 Such records also create their own risks to patient safety: adverse events including deaths are traceable to software glitches, user errors or other system flaws, and are not yet well understood.Footnote 101 Like adoption of many new technologies, safety depends on slow adoption with careful attention to the risks created and constant recalibration of the metrics and assumptions of such systems.Footnote 102
Hospitals are generally scored according to patient outcome measures.Footnote 103 These measures include specific PSIs.Footnote 104 Total Medicare payments to the worst-scoring facilities with HAC Reduction Program scores greater than the 75th percentile are reduced by 1%, and this percentage is likely to increase.Footnote 105 The hospital industry now faces financial pressures to reduce these harms or suffer both reimbursement penalties and loss of patients due to published hospital rankings and posting of quality scores.Footnote 106
The authors of one study found that only one measure out of twenty-one scientific criteria considered as true indicators of hospital safety—accidental punctures or lacerations obtained during surgery—met the researchers' validity criteria.Footnote 107 This clearly shows the rush by CMS to impose metrics lacking in evidence in order to validate the concept of P4P penalties and generate savings in the Medicare budget. If CMS measures are invalid, then reimbursement penalties are not empirically justified. And public rating systems magnify the effect of these CMS measures, as U.S. News and World Report's Best Hospitals, Leapfrog's Hospital Safety Score, and CMS's Star Ratings end up broadcasting and amplifying measures that lack validity.Footnote 108
The allocation of significant resources to PSI and HAC reimbursement penalties has a signification budgetary effect on hospitals, both positive and negative.Footnote 109 The benefit is more attention paid to patient safety—hospital leadership hires more staff, upgrades software, and demands better teamwork.Footnote 110 These are generally positive, increasing staff adherence to evidence-based guidelines (“EBGs”) and new protocols for prevention and prophylactic care treatment, new safety procedures for HAC prevention, and so on.Footnote 111
The negatives however are substantial. First, the HAC penalties in particular distort investments in patient safety and damage hospital reputations unfairly, while having little or no effect on the reduction of HACs.Footnote 112 Hospital staff spend time and resources; more specialists are hired; new oversight structures are created; productivity of clinical staff and coders decrease.Footnote 113 Some of these changes may be valuable, but others are a waste of time and money if few specific changes in HAC incidence patterns occur. As one commentator has noted, “[t]hese measures have the ability to misinform patients, misclassify hospitals, misapply financial data and cause unwarranted reputational harm to hospitals.”Footnote 114 These unvalidated metrics distract from patient safety efforts.Footnote 115 Second, the HAC penalties, while failing to drive effective clinical improvements, appear to penalize hospitals who care for more disadvantaged patients; one study concluded that this “could exacerbate inequities in care.”Footnote 116
The problem is not just that the metrics used to justify P4P penalties lack validity, but also that AI tools have yet to be proven clinically effective in many clinical applications.Footnote 117 AI will succeed if used with high quality data sources that allows it to “learn” and classify data in relation to outcomes.Footnote 118 Most clinical data, on the other hand, whether from EHRs or medical billing claims, is poorly defined and therefore insufficient for effective exploitation by AI technologies.Footnote 119 EHR data on demographics, clinical conditions, and treatment plans, for example, are generally of low dimensionality and are recorded in limited, broad categorizations (i.e., diabetes) that omit specificity (e.g., duration, severity, and pathophysiologic mechanism).Footnote 120 Without specificity and high dimensionality, the EHR data is of little value.Footnote 121
One conclusion is that reimbursement metrics should be reformed to use clinical rather than billing data.Footnote 122 HAC and PSI penalties are flawed and need to be fixed before reimbursement penalties are imposed.Footnote 123 Hospitals are slow learners, and the pressure of poorly validated reimbursement penalties in the U.S. hospital system further impedes their ability to learn.Footnote 124 Pay-for-performance has so far largely failed to produce improvements in patient health, especially as it cuts or otherwise reallocates hospital income away from productive patient safety initiatives.Footnote 125
II. COUNTERACTING THE PRESSURES
A. Creating A Compensation Program for Medicare
Why develop a compensation program for Medicare patients when the existing tort system is available to such patients? It is clear that elderly patients suffer from more preventable adverse events. Adverse drug events, procedures, and falls are common in the Medicare population, and in the words of one study, these events “should be targets for efforts to prevent errors.”Footnote 126 The incidence of adverse drug events was found to be 14.8% among hospitalized elderly patients with a mean age of 78.Footnote 127 “This figure is much higher than the reported rate of adverse drug events in patients of all ages from other studies.”Footnote 128
Medicare patients, in other words, fare poorly as a patient population compared with other age groups.Footnote 129 They also fare poorly with the medical malpractice claiming process.Footnote 130 The elderly suffer from lower claiming rates in part because of the impact of tort reform, which has reduced potential recoveries and the incentives of plaintiff lawyers to take the cases.Footnote 131 One study concluded that “the share of med mal payouts to the elderly remains well below their share of health care use. And total payouts to elderly claimants, after rising steadily during the pre-reform period, have dropped back to the low levels that prevailed at the start of our sample period.”Footnote 132 The elderly lack lost wages, have low life expectancy, and present an unsympathetic case for pain and suffering in their old age. The reality of a low claim for damages means that trial lawyers, litigating based on a contingency fee, find the Medicare elderly unrewarding plaintiffs.
My proposal is to take advantage of two features of modern Medicare patient care. The first step is to take advantage of the tools of Big Data as they improve as a way to discover adverse events that may not otherwise be visible.Footnote 133 Automated search programs are already spotting such adverse events.Footnote 134
The second step is to develop a Medicare-based administrative claim system for harms suffered by patients due to preventable adverse events, such as the Nordic countries have developed.Footnote 135 One proposal is a compensation system using Medicare's Quality Improvement Organizations (“QIOs”), drawing on a proposal by Eleanor Kinney and William Sage.Footnote 136 Kinney and Sage propose that these QIOs would be tasked with “hearing and resolving cases of patient injury, with mediated discussions, reasonable awards of compensation, and feedback to participating institutional providers regarding the safety and quality of their care.”Footnote 137 QIOs at present have nothing to do with patient compensation, focusing on the metrics of quality improvement and cost reductions, but they do offer administrative frameworks within which a fair compensation system could be imbedded.Footnote 138
Such a compensation system might consist of several features. First, hospitals would be required to disclose Preventable Adverse Events (“PAEs”).Footnote 139 Second, the system would be funded through Medicare by an assessment on hospitals. Third, hospitals' assessments would be linked over time to their level of adverse event compensation, with reductions of their assessments as adverse events decreased.Footnote 140 Fourth, a fixed schedule of payments would be designed as part of a benefit structure, as opposed to a damage schedule modeled on tort reform.Footnote 141 Fifth, Medicare patients would be foreclosed from suing in civil court for medical malpractice. Sixth, the QIO program, by existing within the federal Medicare program,Footnote 142 would avoid the problem of trying to get fifty states to buy into a national compensation system of some kind.Footnote 143 This is a pure adverse event-driven benefit system that broadens the use of data analytic tools to develop effective adverse event search tools.Footnote 144
Various models of enterprise liability have been considered before as ways to improve the patient compensation system.Footnote 145 It is time again to develop a model of Medicare patient compensation, as a new approach to preventable adverse events. Ironically, it is the promise of the tools of AI and P4P that can underpin such a new benefit system, informed by more robust data and by an incentive structure that finally motivates hospitals to make patient safety central to their decision-making.
B. Articulating A Robust Hospital Fiduciary Duty
Hospitals are increasingly under pressure from multiple sources to track and prevent adverse event creation.Footnote 146 At the same time they face ethical mandates to manage AI problems that create ethical violations.Footnote 147 Hospital Boards of Directors, under the Medicare Conditions of Participation, are required to have hospital bylaws that reflect the accountability of the medical staff to hospital governing board or “governing body for the quality of care provided to patients.”Footnote 148 It isn't clear, however, that Medicare enforces these Conditions in any serious way.
Cultural changes in hospital patient safety require changes in the culture of the Boards of Directors as well.Footnote 149 Changes in cultures do produce changes in patient care and patient safety.Footnote 150 Studies have found that a range of board practices can improve hospital care and mortality. Such practices include (1) having a board quality committee; (2) establishing strategic goals for quality improvement; (3) being involved in setting the quality agenda for the hospital; (4) including a specific item on quality in board meetings; (5) using a dashboard with national benchmarks that includes indicators for clinical quality, patient safety, and patient satisfaction; and (6) linking senior executives' performance evaluation to quality and patient safety indicators. Footnote 151
A hospital Board of Trustees is a co-fiduciary with its physicians and staff. This creates an ethical obligation to protect patient safety and health.Footnote 152 Hospitals have a developing fiduciary duty to patients, with clear obligations to coordinate care to minimize patient safety risks, including informing patients that they have experienced adverse events and offering compensation for such events.Footnote 153 The expansion of corporate negligence doctrine in many states contains the kernel of an expanding fiduciary duty on hospitals.Footnote 154 The hospital is viewed as a corporate management structure with responsibilities to its patients, measured by its own internal practices as well as those of other similar hospitals.Footnote 155
These duties give new content to the existing duties of loyalty traditionally applied in corporate law to hospitals boards of directors.Footnote 156 This means that when hospitals take on expanded norms of fiduciary obligations to patients, this includes the obligation of “creating and sustaining an organizational culture that unites administration and physicians in the task of protecting and promoting the health-related interests of patients.”Footnote 157 This ethical role of the hospital Board of Directors should be expanded, as discussed above, as part of Board duties. It provides a strong counterpressure to the temptations of Boards to focus only on reimbursement penalties, arming the Board to demand more of hospital managers in developing a patient safety culture.
CONCLUSION
The technologies that hospitals are now deploying for regular use are often at odds with the goal of high quality and patient safety. Patient adverse event detection is improving with the development of new software programs to hunt for variation in hospital infections and other patient safety indicators. The adoption of EHRs and data analytics by U.S. hospitals continues, as hospitals struggle with the often problematic nature of such tools. And Medicare continues to ramp up its use of pay-for-performance tools to incentivize hospitals to reduce their readmissions, infections, and adverse events. The problem, as we have seen above, is not that these goals are not worthy, but that the tools are only halfway ready; hospitals are pressured to adopt these tools of data analytics and P4P metrics by sheer competition in the health law marketplace and by CMS as it pushes for visible progress in hospital quality and cost control of rising health care costs.
I have argued that the above three pressure fronts are battering the management of hospitals. Each technology has great potential, once they are coordinated and mature, but I have argued that all three are still halfway technologies,Footnote 158 applied while immature to distract hospitals from safety considerations in a more coherent and global way, distorting hospital spending, and misdirecting some of that spending; this pushes hospitals toward imperfect patient safety systems.
I have proposed two major counterforces that need to be developed. First, a new model of ethical obligations of hospital Boards of Directors is needed, in which the Board takes an aggressive role in mandating patient safety reforms while challenging the blind application of CMS P4P metrics that may not achieve their quality goals. Second, I advocate a new model of Medicare patient compensation that uses QIOs for more than appeals, turning QIOs into a benefit payment role for preventable adverse events.
The hope is that the two counterforces will slow down the adoption of the halfway technologies and drive them to a more developed set of tools that will make Big Data powerful and effective, and P4P meaningful in turning the incentives into real quality improvements. This is a large task, but the status quo at the moment suggests that federal dollars are being spent to a large extent in vain—and that is a waste of our resources.
