In its four-year existence under the Khmer Rouge regime, Democratic Kampuchea (DK) was a setting of unspeakable horror. Because of forced migration, coerced labor, and outright extermination, all on a mass scale, the popular and fitting image of that country is one of unalloyed terror. Yet in this remarkable book, Andrew Mertha demonstrates that DK was not a thin veneer overlaying a Hobbesian nightmare. To the contrary, DK was “a state defined by a distinctive network of organizations and institutions, not the absence of them” (p. 2). Moreover, it was a state with a powerful patron, the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In terms of its relative size, deliverable resources, and massive military superiority, the PRC should have been able to dictate terms to, and significantly mold the behavior of, its junior partner. And DK’s military and economic dependence on the PRC should have made Beijing’s influence nearly impossible to thwart. Notwithstanding its material and ideological position in the international system, the PRC discovered that influence was extremely hard to come by: “China embraced a sucker’s payoff in a Faustian bargain: it justifiably received international condemnation for maintaining the viability of the CPK regime while receiving precious little tangible benefit from its Cambodian allies” (p. 3). As Mertha convincingly argues, DK–PRC relations are largely inexplicable from any perspective privileging broad material factors. Rather, the real source of influence (flowing in both directions) originated in the institutions and bureaucratic organizations through which state-to-state relations were conducted.
The issue of influence in asymmetric alliance relations has been extensively examined by scholars of all stripes. Common among these studies is a focus on the direct provision of security. Mertha’s major contribution is to broaden the empirical domain to that of foreign aid, a concept encompassing military assistance, civil infrastructure development, and trade and commerce. The author finds that in only one of these areas—trade and commerce—was China able to exert significant influence over DK policymaking and foreign policy behavior. The other two areas—military assistance and civil infrastructure development aid—were surprisingly immune to PRC influence.
To explain this variation, Mertha offers an argument designed to capture in intricate detail the interaction of the two states. Specifically, the degree of bureaucratic/institutional fragmentation (on both sides of the dyad) mattered significantly. In the case of military assistance, the relatively robust and coherent set of DK security institutions prevented Chinese preferences from prevailing over those of Phnom Penh. With respect to infrastructure development, DK’s institutional incoherence made it susceptible to extreme influence, a likely outcome were it not for the fragmentation that plagued the PRC’s bureaucracy charged with implementing these projects. In the case of trade and commerce, however, the institutional/bureaucratic deck was stacked heavily in China’s favor. Not only did the PRC possess bureaucratic competence in creating and maintaining international trade networks, but the organizations through which this expertise was brought to bear were closely knit as well. DK institutions, on the other hand, were remarkably wobbly, enabling China both to determine the substance of policy and to usurp the process of decision making and implementation. The receptivity to Chinese leadership in this area is all the more striking given that PRC influence often “ran counter to Pol Pot’s very literal interpretation of Marxist political economy,” thereby imperiling Cambodian officials suspected of deviating from Pol Pot’s directives (p. 124).
Detailed analyses of the organizational and institutional matrices through which DK–PRC relations emerged are taken up in Chapters 2 and 3. On the Cambodian side, the picture that emerges is one of extreme centralization at the apex of the state, while at lower levels, authority relationships were up for some degree of negotiation. In large part, this “parochial totalitarianism” resulted from khsae networks of patron–client ties that thoroughly permeated DK institutional structures. These “strings” of authority entailed the positioning of kith and kin to key posts, at times making the effective exercise of top-down management and the exertion of outside influence difficult to achieve. Degrees of bureaucratic fragmentation characterized the Chinese side of the relationship. Projects related to military assistance and trade and commerce were conducted through PRC organizations that were relatively coherent. Bureaucratic fragmentation, on the other hand, bedeviled Chinese infrastructure aid projects.
In-depth examinations of three case studies are taken up in Chapters 4–6. The construction of the Krang Leav airfield was the single most important example of Chinese military assistance to DK. Given the regional and geopolitical environment, in addition to the well-known “excesses” to which Khmer Rouge leaders were prone, the Chinese held strong preferences concerning the location of this airfield. Yet due to the coherence of DK security institutions, the materially weaker partner was able to prevail time and again. Still, the airfield project was the closest thing to a successful aid project during this period.
The Kampong Som oil refinery was an unmitigated disaster. Despite the fact that the refinery project was primarily one of retrofitting an existing facility, “DK institutions were simply incapable of managing the complex tasks assigned to them, particularly once the internal political purges began” (p. 98). At the same time, the PRC was incapable of exploiting DK institutional weaknesses due to the bevy of poorly coordinated organizations that the PRC assigned to the job.
Finally, the saga of the Ren Fung Company (an export–import company located in Hong Kong) is one of Chinese tutelage made successful due to the complex and fragmented nature of the DK’s Ministry of Commerce. This institutional fragmentation opened up “‘policy spaces’ necessary for China to exploit and shape outcomes” (p. 122). The end result was a growth in DK trade with the outside world that in all likelihood would have continued to flower had it not been for Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia at the end of 1978.
Mertha’s contributions in Brothers in Arms are many, most notably the adopted explanatory framework that places domestic institutions and bureaucratic organizations in the context of strategic interaction. Scholars of organizations will find much in this work that is novel, compelling, and pathbreaking. At the same time, the argument is largely untethered to extant theoretical work on organizations and institutions. Explicit theoretical guidance (particularly in the cases that Mertha examines with great care) is necessary in order to disentangle the potentially confounding effects of ideology, traditional culture, organizational culture, and forms of institutional design through which the independent variables affect foreign aid outcomes. Furthermore, Mertha’s discussion of the khsae patron–client relations is fascinating and promising (pp. 11–13), but apart from a brief reference to the ways in which the regime used these networks to liquidate large swaths of officials (p. 55), the concept does not emerge as a predominant factor affecting the coherence of DK institutions in any particular case. As such, scholars will need to do their own spade work to extend Mertha’s argument to other domains. That effort, no doubt, will pay off handsomely.
Holding aside these theoretical concerns, Mertha delivers a truly impressive work, one that advances our understandings of institutions in contexts of strategic interaction, foreign aid, and China’s likely influence in the coming years.
